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# GREAT INVASION

OF 1863;

OR,

General Lee in Pennsylvania.

EMBRACING AN ACCOUNT OF

The Strength and Organization of the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia; Their Daily Marches with the Routes of Travel, and General Orders Issued; The Three Days of Battle; The Retreat of the Confederates and Pursuit by the Federals; Analytical Index, Maps, Portraits, and a large number of Illustrations of the Battle-field.

With an Appendix

Containing an Account of the Burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, A Statement of the General Sickles Controversy, and other Valuable Historic Papers.



BY

JACOB HOKE.

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TO THE  
SURVIVING MEMBERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
AND TO THE  
MEMORY OF THOSE WHO HAVE DEPARTED,  
AS WELL AS  
TO ALL THE HEROIC MEN, BOTH LIVING AND DEAD, WHO  
HASTENED TO THE RESCUE OF THEIR IMPERILED  
COUNTRY IN THE HOUR OF HER NEED,  
THIS VOLUME,  
WHICH RECORDS THE EVENTS OF ONE OF THE GREATEST AND MOST  
DECISIVE CAMPAIGNS OF THE WAR OF THE REBELLION,  
IS MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED  
BY THE AUTHOR.

## PUBLISHER'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

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THE Publisher wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Brigadier-General M. R. Patrick, Provost-Marshal-General of the Army of the Potomac, and at present Governor of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers at Dayton, Ohio, who kindly loaned the originals from which the "gravures" of Generals Meade, Hancock, and Lee were made. The kindness is all the more appreciated from the fact that the originals are souvenirs, presented to General Patrick by the distinguished personages themselves, and have never before been given to the public. The pen and ink sketch of General Meade, on page 241, was made by Colonel C. H. T. Collis, just before the Wilderness campaign, and was pronounced by General Meade the best likeness of himself yet made.

W. J. SHUEY.



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## INTRODUCTION.

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No battle field on earth is so well preserved and marked as is that of Gettysburg. Little and Big Round Top, East Cemetery Hill and Ridge Culp's and Wolff Hill, Seminary and Oak Ridge, have become immortal, and will endure while time itself lasts. The lines of the two great armies, the positions occupied by the various corps, divisions, brigades, and regiments, and the places where heroic deeds were performed and where distinguished men fell, are being marked by tablets and monuments of enduring marble and granite. In this commendable work, it affords us pleasure to state, Confederates as well as Federals are engaged. The stone fences and huge boulders, used as defenses, and many of the breast-works thrown up at the time, also remain, and will be preserved as long as time and the elements of nature will permit. The various states whose troops participated in the memorable battle which occurred there, as well as brigades, regiments, and companies, are vying with each other, not only to mark for future ages where gallant men fought and where patriots died, but to make as beautiful as possible the entire field where the life of our great Government was assured. It is eminently proper, then, that every fact of historic value connected with the great episode which culminated upon that field should not only be preserved but placed upon record in its proper connection. This the survivors of the period of those stirring events owe to the generations who are yet to come.

The author of this work has attempted to discharge, in a measure, the duty indicated in the foregoing. His qualifications for the task he has

undertaken may be stated thus: he resided in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, during the entire period of the War of the Rebellion, and for a score of years previous and ever since; he not only witnessed all the armed hosts, Federal and Confederate, which passed through that place, but had access to their camps and hospitals; he preserved important papers, and kept an account of events with the dates of their occurrence; he visited the field of battle and noted facts and incidents; he has corresponded with others, both Federals and Confederates, competent to impart important information; and he has made it a point to read and preserve everything relating to the subject, which has come under his notice. The material thus carefully gathered he has compared, classified, and placed upon record in the following pages. He has been especially careful to be exact in the facts stated, and in the dates given. Errors may have crept into this record, but every precaution has been taken to secure entire accuracy. If he has not succeeded in giving the public such a history of the subject as its importance demands, he has at least rescued from oblivion much valuable historical matter, which, without this humble effort, would have been forever lost.

It will be seen in the perusal of this work that the published statements of both Federal and Confederate writers, relating to the invasion of Pennsylvania and the battle of Gettysburg, have been used. This has been done that the fullest and fairest history of the whole may be secured, for both sides are equally entitled to a hearing. Besides this, events which transpired within the Confederate lines, and which Confederates only could detail, are of equal importance in an impartial and reliable history with those which occurred within the Federal lines, and which Federals only could narrate. For the reasons thus stated, as well as to preserve in a permanent form some of the many excellent and interesting articles, written for the newspapers and magazines, by eye-witnesses and participants, I have drawn largely upon this class of writers.

In matters of dispute, or where differences of opinion have prevailed, I have endeavored to be impartial; and in every case, where it was at all possible, both sides have been accorded a hearing.

The writer has not only sought to be impartial, but also unpartisan,


He could not, however, conceal the fact that he wrote from the standpoint of a Unionist, and that his sympathies were, and ever must be, with those who stood for the maintenance of the Government. For those who arrayed themselves upon the opposite side, he has but feelings of kindness. The time has come for all ill feeling to be entirely laid aside and forgotten. In this spirit this history has been written; and its author disclaims any other reason for the task he has undertaken, than to place upon record a fair and truthful account of events in which both the late contestants have an equal interest. If, then, in the following pages, any injustice has been done, or if a feeling or expression inconsistent with an impartial history, intended for the whole country, and for all time to come, has found place, the reader will kindly attribute it to inadvertence rather than to any disposition to perpetuate the bitterness and estrangement of the past.

J. HOKE.

*Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.*







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# THE GREAT INVASION; OR, General Lee in Pennsylvania.

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## CHAPTER I.

### THE ARMIES OF THE POTOMAC AND OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

**I**T is conceded by the highest military authorities that the skill displayed in the Pennsylvania campaign in the year 1863, by both the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia and the general in command of the Army of the Potomac, has never been surpassed in any other campaign in the annals of military history; and it may as truthfully be said that no other great military movement involved consequences so momentous and far-reaching as did that one. With the view, then, to give the reader a clear understanding of this great crisis in the terrible struggle in which not only the destiny of the government was at stake, but the higher and greater problem whether a "*Government of the people, by the people, and for the people,*" was at all practicable, I will place upon record in these pages facts and incidents that occurred during this in-

vasion, that will greatly aid him, as I believe, in his comprehension of that event. Before proceeding, however, to the narration of these events, it will be necessary to have a correct understanding of the organization and strength of the two armies, the designs and purposes of the invasion, and the relative positions which they occupied when the great movement began. These may be stated thus:

**I. THE NUMBER OF THE FORCES ON EACH SIDE IN THE PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN.**

**(1.) *The Army of the Potomac.***

There has been a disposition by nearly all historians upon both sides in the great struggle, to magnify the strength of the opposing army, as well as to understate their own. Historical accuracy as well as fairness to both sides requires that the truth only should be told.

General Meade, in his testimony before the committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War (page 337), states the strength of his army as "a little under one hundred thousand men—probably ninety-five thousand men." This being reliable is of course decisive, and establishes the number of men in the Army of the Potomac in the Pennsylvania campaign. This army was organized as follows:

**MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commander-in-Chief.\***

**STAFF.**

**MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, Chief of Staff.**

**BRIGADIER-GENERAL M. R. PATRICK, Provost-Marshal-General.**

**BRIGADIER-GENERAL SETH WILLIAMS, Adjutant-General.**

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\* Major-General Joseph Hooker was in command of the Army of the Potomac up to Sunday, June 28th, 1863, and on this day, for causes which will hereafter be stated, resigned that position while on the march to Gettysburg, and was succeeded by Major-General Meade.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDMUND SCHRIVER, Inspector-General.  
BRIGADIER-GENERAL RUFUS INGALLS, Quartermaster-General.  
COLONEL HENRY F. CLARKE, Chief of Commissary of Subsistence.  
MAJOR JONATHAN LETTERMAN, Surgeon, Chief of Medical Department.  
BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. K. WARREN, Chief Engineer.  
MAJOR D. W. FLAGLER, Chief Ordnance Officer.  
MAJOR-GENERAL ALFRED PLEASANTON, Chief of Cavalry.  
BRIGADIER-GENERAL HENRY J. HUNT, Chief of Artillery.  
CAPTAIN L. B. NORTON, Chief Signal Officer.

The infantry force of the army was divided into seven corps, as follows:

*First Corps.*—Major-General JOHN FULTON REYNOLDS, Commander. His division commanders were—Brigadier-General James S. Wadsworth, 1st division; Brigadier-General John C. Robinson, 2d division; Major-General Abner Doubleday, 3d division. The brigades were commanded respectively by Brigadier-General Solomon Meredith, Brigadier-General Lysander Cutler, Brigadier-General Gabriel R. Paul, Brigadier-General Henry Baxter, Brigadier-General Thomas A. Rowley, Colonel Roy Stone, and Brigadier-General George J. Stannard. The first two belonged to the 1st division, the next two to the 2d, and the last three to the 3d. The artillery brigade attached to this corps was under the command of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright.

*Second Corps.*—Major-General WINFIELD SCOTT HANCOCK, Commander.\* The division commanders were—Brigadier-General John C. Caldwell, 1st division; Brigadier-General John Gibbon, 2d division; Brigadier-General Alexander Hays, 3d division. The brigades were commanded by Colonel Edward E. Cross, Colonel Patrick Kelly, Brigadier-General S. K. Zook, Colonel John R. Brooke, Brigadier-General William Harrow, Brigadier-General Alexander S. Webb, Colonel Norman J. Hall, Colonel Samuel S. Carroll, Colonel Thomas A. Smyth, and Colonel George L. Willard. The first four named belonged to the 1st division, the succeeding three to the 2d, and the last three to the 3d. The artillery brigade was commanded by Captain J. G. Hazard.

*Third Corps.*—Major-General DANIEL E. SICKLES, Commander.† The

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\*The Second Corps was commanded by Major-General D. N. Couch until June 9th, 1863, when, in order to prepare for the reception of the threatened invasion of Pennsylvania, he was placed in command of the Department of the Susquehanna, with head-quarters at Harrisburg, and Major-General W. S. Hancock succeeded to the command of this corps.

†At the commencement of the Pennsylvania campaign, Major-General Birney was temporarily in command of the Third Corps, but General Sickles resumed command on Sunday, June 28th.

division commanders were—Major-General David B. Birney and Brigadier-General Andrew A. Humphreys. The brigades were commanded respectively by Brigadier-General C. K. Graham, Brigadier-General J. H. Ward, Colonel Philip R. De Trobriand, Brigadier-General Joseph B. Carr, Colonel William R. Brewster, and Colonel George C. Burtling. The first three belonged to the 1st division, and the last three to the 2d. The artillery brigade of this corps was under the command of Captain George E. Randolph.

*Fifth Corps.*—Major-General GEORGE SYKES, Commander.\* The division commanders were—Brigadier-General James Barnes, 1st division; Brigadier-General Romain B. Ayres, 2d division, and Brigadier-General S. Wiley Crawford, 3d division. The brigades were commanded respectively by Colonel W. S. Tilton, Colonel S. B. Sweitzer, Colonel Strong Vincent, Colonel Hannibal Day, Colonel Sidney Burbank, Brigadier-General S. H. Weed, Colonel William McCandless, and Colonel Joseph W. Fisher. The three first named belonged to the 1st division, the next three to the 2d, and the remaining two to the 3d. Captain A. P. Martin commanded the artillery brigade of this corps. The first and second brigades of the second division of this corps were composed of United States Regulars, and the two brigades of the third division were composed of Pennsylvania Reserves.

*Sixth Corps.*—Major-General JOHN SEDGWICK, Commander. The division commanders were Brigadier-General H. G. Wright, 1st division; Brigadier-General A. P. Howe, 2d division; and Brigadier-General Frank Wheaton, 3d division. The brigades were commanded by Brigadier-General A. T. A. Torbert, Brigadier-General J. J. Bartlett, Brigadier-General D. A. Russell, Colonel L. A. Grant, Brigadier-General T. A. Neill, Brigadier-General Alexander Shaler, Colonel H. L. Eustis, and Colonel David I. Nevin. The first three named belonged to the 1st division, the next two to the 2d, and the remaining three to the 3d. The artillery brigade was commanded by Colonel C. H. Tompkins.

*Eleventh Corps.*—Major-General OLIVER O. HOWARD, Commander. The division commanders were—Brigadier-General Francis C. Barlow, 1st division; Brigadier-General A. Von Steinwehr, 2d division; and Major-General Carl Schurz, 3d division. The brigades were commanded respectively by Colonel Leopold Von Gilsa, Brigadier-General Adelbert Ames, Colonel Charles R. Coster, Colonel Orlando Smith, Brigadier-General A. Von Schimmelpfenning, and Colonel William Kryzanowski. The first two belonged to the 1st division, the following two to the 2d, and the remaining two to the 3d. The artillery brigade was commanded by Major Thomas W. Osborn.

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\* General Meade was in command of the Fifth Corps until Sunday, June 28th, when he was made Commander in Chief, and the command of his corps was given to General Sykes.

*Twelfth Corps.*—Major-General HENRY W. SLOCUM, Commander.\* The division commanders were—Brigadier-General Thomas H. Ruger, 1st division, and Brigadier-General John W. Geary, 2d division. The brigades were respectively commanded by Colonel Archibald L. McDougall, Brigadier-General Henry H. Lockwood, Colonel Silas Colgrove, Colonel Charles Candy, Colonel George A. Cobham, and Brigadier-General George S. Greene. The first three named belonged to the 1st division, and the others to the 2d. The artillery brigade was commanded by Lieutenant Edward D. Muhlenberg.

The cavalry corps was commanded by Major-General Pleasanton.

It was composed of three divisions, commanded respectively by Brigadier-General John Buford, 1st division; Brigadier-General D. McM. Gregg, 2d division; and Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick, 3d division. The first, second, and reserve brigades of the first division were commanded respectively by Colonel William Gamble, Colonel Thomas C. Devin, and Brigadier-General Wesley Merritt. The three brigades of the second division were commanded by Colonel J. B. McIntosh, Colonel Pennock Huey, and Colonel J. L. Gregg; and the two brigades of the third division were commanded respectively by Brigadier-General E. J. Farnsworth and Brigadier-General George A. Custer. The reserve artillery, of which there were five brigades, was under the command of Brigadier-General R. O. Tyler.

(2.) *The Army of Northern Virginia.*

Hon. Edward Everett, in his address at the dedication of the Soldiers' National Cemetery at Gettysburg, November 19th, 1863, estimated the Confederate force at ninety thousand infantry, upwards of ten thousand cavalry, and four or five thousand artillery—a total of one hundred and five thousand men of all arms. This estimate, made so soon after the great battle, and professedly drawn from official sources, has been generally accepted by northern writers. That the number is entirely too high will appear in the following statements:

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\*General Slocum commanded the right wing of the army on July 2d and July 3d. His corps, during that time, was under the command of Brigadier-General Alpheus S. Williams. In like manner and at the same time General Hancock commanded the left center, and General Reynolds, up to July 1st, commanded the First, Third, and Eleventh corps, which composed the left wing of the Union army.

General Longstreet, in an article contributed by him to the *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, and since published in a book entitled "*Annals of the War*," says that General Lee informed him at Chambersburg that on the 30th of June his infantry consisted of about fifty-two thousand bayonets, and his whole force, including the detachments which would join him on the march, amounted to a trifle over seventy thousand. (*Annals of the War*, page 621.)

Colonel W. H. Taylor, Lee's Adjutant General, in an article contributed to the same paper, says on page 318 of the same book, that the whole strength of their army during the invasion consisted of sixty-seven thousand men of all arms—fifty-three thousand and five hundred infantry, nine thousand cavalry, and four thousand five hundred artillery. The discrepancy between the number stated by General Lee and Colonel Taylor would be accounted for in the supposition that General Imboden's cavalry, which consisted of over three thousand men, and which did not really belong to the army of Northern Virginia, but acted in an independent capacity—subject, however, at all times to Lee's orders—was not included in the latter's estimate. This force, with probably others, was referred to by General Lee as some of the commands that were to join him on his march.

The foregoing numbers from Confederate sources are verified by the following authorities: The Count of Paris, whose impartiality and accuracy are generally admitted, in his recently published history of the American conflict, states the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia at seventy-three thousand five hundred. That part of this army which passed through Chambersburg was carefully

estimated by competent persons both there and in Greencastle, with the following concurrent results: Mr. W. A. Reid, of Greencastle, in an article contributed to the *Pilot* of that place, in its issue of July 28th, 1863, says that the Confederate force which passed through that place amounted to about fifty thousand men. *The Franklin Repository* of Chambersburg, in its issue of July 8th, 1863, while the matter was fresh in the minds of the people, and taking its figures from the several estimates made by citizens as the army marched through there, states the number at forty-seven thousand. Mr. John F. Glosser, at the time of the war a clerk in the office of the prothonotary of the county, quoting from his diary kept at that time, says: "The Confederate army which passed through Chambersburg was as follows: Ewell's corps, fifteen thousand men, infantry, artillery, and cavalry, with sixty pieces of artillery, and over one thousand wagons; A. P. Hill's corps, the same; Longstreet's corps, twenty thousand men, eighty pieces of artillery, and over one thousand wagons. The entire army did not number over forty-eight thousand or fifty thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery." This is an estimate made by an entirely competent person, from his own actual observation, the result being noted at the time. Now, taking fifty thousand—the numbers generally fixed upon by all who estimated them—that passed through Chambersburg, and add to them Early's division, which passed by way of Waynesborough, Quincy, Funkstown, and Greenwood, and Stuart's cavalry, which passed around east of the Federal army, and we have about seventy thousand to seventy-five thousand men. It may safely be assumed that the entire strength of the invading army did not exceed that number.

The Army of Northern Virginia was organized as follows:

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, Commander.

STAFF.

COLONEL W. H. TAYLOR, Adjutant-General.

COLONEL C. S. VENABLE, Aid-de-Camp.

COLONEL CHARLES MARSHALL, Aid-de-Camp.

COLONEL JAMES L. CORLEY, Chief Quartermaster.

COLONEL R. G. COLE, Chief Commissary.

COLONEL B. G. BALDWIN, Chief of Ordnance.

COLONEL H. L. PEYTON, Assistant Inspector-General.

GENERAL W. N. PENDLETON, Chief of Artillery.

DOCTOR L. GUILD, Medical Director.

COLONEL W. PROCTOR SMITH, Chief Engineer.

MAJOR H. E. YOUNG, Assistant Adjutant-General.

MAJOR G. B. COOK, Assistant Inspector-General.

The army was composed of three corps, as follows: \*

*First Corps.*—Lieutenant-General JAMES LONGSTREET, Commander. The division commanders were—Major-General L. McLaws, Major-General George E. Pickett, and Major-General J. B. Hood. The brigade commanders were—Kershaw, Benning, Barksdale, Wofford, Garnett, Armistead, Kemper, Toombs, Corse, Robertson, Laws, Anderson, and Jenkins. The four first named belonged to McLaws' division; the succeeding five to Pickett's; and the four last named to Hood's. The artillery belonging to this corps was under the command of Colonel J. B. Walton, and consisted of eighty-three pieces.

*Second Corps.*—Lieutenant-General R. S. EWELL, Commander. The division commanders were—Major-General J. A. Early, Major-General R. E. Rodes, and Major-General Edward Johnson. The brigade commanders were—Hays, Gordon, Smith, Hoke, Daniels, Dole, Iverson, Ramseur, Rodes, Stewart, Walker, Jones, and Nichols. Four of these belonged to Early's division, five to Rodes', and the remaining four to Johnson's. The artillery of this corps consisted of eighty-two pieces, and was under the command of Colonel S. Crutchfield.

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\*The Army of Northern Virginia was divided into three corps, while the Army of the Potomac was divided into seven. Each of the three Confederate corps, however, represented a *third* of its whole force, while each of the seven Federal corps represented a *seventh* of its whole. The same ratio extended to divisions and brigades.



*Third Corps.* — Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill, Commander. The division commanders were — Major-Generals R. H. Anderson, Heth, and Pender. The brigade commanders were — Wilcox, Mahone, Posey, Wright, Perry, Pettigrew, Field, Archer, Cook, McGowan, Lane, Thomas, and Scales. The first five belonged to Anderson's division; the succeeding four to Heth's, and the remaining four to Pender's. The artillery of this corps consisted of eighty-three pieces, and was under command of Colonel R. Lindsey Walker.

The cavalry corps was under the command of Lieutenant-General J. E. B. Stuart. His brigade commanders were Generals Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee, B. H. Robertson, W. E. Jones, J. D. Imboden, A. G. Jenkins, and Baker.

It will have been perceived from the estimates which have been given of the numerical strength of the two great armies, which were about to enter upon the great and decisive campaign, that the Federal army exceeded the Confederate some twenty thousand or twenty-five thousand men. This disparity in numbers, however, was in part offset by the prestige which the victories gained at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville had given the Confederates. That these victories had a great effect in elating the spirits of the invading army was evident in the confidence which they seemed to have in the success of their aggressive movement, — a confidence which seemed to be universal, with the exception of a few of the officers, who quietly expressed to some of the people, as they passed through Chambersburg, their apprehension that they had gotten into a trap from which they feared it would be difficult to escape.

Colonel Freemantle, of the British army, who, with another British officer, accompanied the invading army, and whose sympathy for the Confederates was open and undisguised, as appears in his writings, in an article contributed by him to *Blackwood's Magazine* on the great

invasion, says: "The staff officers spoke of the coming battle as a certainty, and the universal feeling was one of contempt for an enemy whom they had beaten so constantly, and under so many disadvantages." That this contempt for the Federals, and undue confidence in themselves, was shared by General Lee himself, is made clear from a statement made by General Fitzhugh Lee, who said that General Lee "was controlled too far by the great confidence he had in the fighting qualities of his troops, who begged only to be turned loose upon the Federals." "This confidence," said the general, "was equally shared by the officers high in command." ("Annals of the War," pages 421, 422.) Mr. Edward A. Pollard, in his "Lost Cause," page 407, says: "The Army of Northern Virginia was in an extraordinary state of efficiency; it was flushed with victory; it had accomplished so many wonders in the past that it was supposed to be equal to anything short of a miracle; and when, on the morning of the 2d, General Lee reconnoitered the field, and scanned the heights which looked upon him through brows of brass and iron, he was noticed to rise in his stirrups and mutter an expression of confidence, and he decided to attack."

## II. THE PURPOSE AND OBJECT OF GENERAL LEE IN THE INVASION OF MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA.

That the deliverance of the Confederate Capital from a probable transfer of the Federal army from the Rappahannock to the James and York rivers and the Peninsula, as well as a diversion for the relief of the Confederate forces then sorely pressed in Vicksburg, was among the reasons which induced General Lee to abandon the defensive policy

which he had so long pursued, and to adopt an aggressive one, will appear in the following authorities: General A. L. Long, whose intimacy with General Lee as his chief military secretary enabled him to speak understandingly upon this subject, in an article contributed by him to the *Philadelphia Weekly Times* of November, 1884, says: "Since the battle of Chancellorsville, although the Federal army had been reinforced to its former dimensions, it still retained a spiritless attitude. As yet no future plan of operations had been developed. It was just to conclude that General Hooker would not again advance on his present line, and that a change of base was in contemplation; and as the James and York presented the most propitious lines, it is probable that the Army of the Potomac, if left uninterrupted, would move in that direction. \* \* \*

The object of the campaign (upon the part of General Lee) being the defense of Richmond, General Lee could either continue on the defensive and oppose the Federal advance as he had recently done, or he might assume the offensive, and by bold maneuvering oblige the Federal army to recede from its present line of operations to protect its capital, or oppose the invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania. The advance upon Richmond would thus be frustrated, and the attack upon that city delayed at least for a time. The dispirited condition of the Federal army since its late defeat, and the high tone of that of the Confederates, induced the adoption of the latter plan. \* \* \*

If successful (in the invasion), the defeat of the Federal army would be followed by the possession of Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania, and the fall of Washington City. Moreover, an important diversion would be made in favor

of the western department, where the affairs of the Confederacy were on the decline. With this alluring conception the hazard of an invasion would be fully warranted."

General Longstreet, who was opposed to the invasion of the North, and only consented to it upon a condition which will appear further on, gives the following facts in an article contributed to the *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, and which will be found upon pages 416 and 417 of the *Annals of the War*. General Longstreet says that while in Richmond early in May, 1863, Mr. Seddon, Confederate Secretary of War, called his attention to the critical condition of General Pemberton's army at Vicksburg, around which General Grant was then decisively drawing his lines, and informed him that he had under consideration a plan for relieving him by concentrating a succoring army at Jackson, Mississippi, under the command of General Johnston, with a view to drive Grant from before Vicksburg by a direct issue at arms. Mr. Seddon also intimated to General Longstreet that in the execution of this purpose, it might be necessary to send his (Longstreet's) corps there. General Longstreet suggested to Mr. Seddon that, in his judgment, a better plan for relieving General Pemberton was to have the army then concentrating at Jackson move swiftly to Tullahoma, where General Bragg was then located with a fine army, confronting an army of about equal strength under General Rosecrans, and that at the same time two divisions of his corps (Longstreet's) be hurried forward to the same point. With this force it was expected that Rosecrans could be crushed, after which the whole force should move northward through Tennessee and Kentucky, and threaten the invasion of Ohio.

General Longstreet's opinion was that, in the proposed march through these states, no organized obstruction would be encountered, and that the invading army could obtain liberal supplies of provisions, and even reinforcements by those friendly to their cause, and that General Grant's army would be surely drawn away from around Vicksburg to look after and protect its own territory. Mr. Seddon did not look with much favor upon General Longstreet's proposition, because of the difficulty and danger of withdrawing so large a force, at that time, from General Lee. This plan General Longstreet subsequently laid before Lee himself, and after a free interchange of opinions touching it, was overruled by the commander-in-chief, his principal reason against it being his unwillingness to divide his army. General Longstreet says that in this conference with Lee, no room was left to doubt that he entertained the idea of an offensive campaign, and he at length asked him if he did not think an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania by his own army would not accomplish the same result as the proposed threatening of Ohio? To this Longstreet replied that he could not see how it could, that the movement would be too hazardous, and a campaign in thoroughly Union states would require more time and greater preparation than the one proposed through Tennessee and Kentucky.

"I soon discovered," says General Longstreet, "that he had determined that he would make some forward movement, and I finally assented that the Pennsylvania campaign might be brought to a successful issue if he could make it *offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics*. This point was urged with great persistency. I suggested that,

after piercing Pennsylvania and menacing Washington, we should choose a strong position, and force the Federals to attack us, observing that the popular clamor throughout the North would speedily force the Federal general to attempt to drive us out. I recalled to him the battle of Fredericksburg as an instance of a defensive battle, when, with a few thousand men, we hurled the whole Federal army back, crippling and demoralizing it, with trifling loss to our own troops; and Chancellorsville as an instance of offensive battle, where we dislodged the Federals, it is true, but at such a terrible sacrifice that half a dozen such victories would have ruined us. It will be remembered that Stonewall Jackson once said that 'we sometimes fail to drive the enemy from a position; they always fail to drive us.' I reminded him, too, of Napoleon's advice to Marmont, to whom he said, when putting him at the head of an invading army, 'Select your ground, and make your enemy attack you.' I recall these points simply because I desire to have it understood that, while I first suggested to General Lee the idea of an offensive campaign, I was never persuaded to yield my argument against the Gettysburg campaign, except with the understanding that we were not to deliver an offensive battle, but to so maneuver that the enemy should be forced to attack us—or, to repeat, that our campaign should be one of offensive strategy, but defensive tactics. Upon this understanding my assent was given, and General Lee, who had been kind enough to discuss the matter with me patiently, gave the order of march."

It will be perceived further on in this record of the invasion, that General Lee failed to adhere to what General

Longstreet claims was an agreement between them as to the policy stated, and to this departure General Longstreet at the time it was made objected, and to it attributes in part their defeat at Gettysburg.

As intimated by General Long in the article already quoted, the discouragement and demoralization which always follow defeat, prevailed extensively throughout the North, and to a considerable extent in the Army of the Potomac. Then, during the month of May, quite a depletion of the rank and file of this army took place by the mustering out of large numbers of three months' and three years' men.\* And such had been the depressing influence of the defeat of Chancellorsville upon the country, that the places of these men were not easily filled. These facts were not only known to the military authorities upon the Federal side, causing much alarm and anxiety, but they were equally known to the Confederate leaders, and afforded them opportunities for bold and aggressive schemes. Then, too, a draft was ordered to replenish the Federal ranks, and it was exceedingly unpopular in some places, and resistance was expected, especially if the Confederate army should obtain a foothold upon northern soil. The probable defeat of Hooker, the capture of Washington, the securing of supplies and perhaps recruits for his army, and foreign recognition and armed intervention, were factors in inducing Lee to give his reluctant consent to the forward movement. That General Lee expected to reap these results,—at

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\*The Army of the Potomac was reduced during the month of May by the expiration of the term of enlistment, to the extent of about twenty-five to thirty thousand men.

least that he would find a divided North and a revolution in his favor, with foreign recognition in case he succeeded in capturing the National Capital, is obscurely hinted at in the opening of his report on the Pennsylvania campaign. After stating the military reasons for his movement, he adds, "In addition to these results, it was hoped that *other valuable results* might be attained by military success." General Doubleday, on pages 76-78 of his book entitled "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," thus summarizes the reasons for the invasion: "The rebels had obtained a triumph, rather than a substantial victory, at Chancellorsville. It was gained, too, at a ruinous expense of life, and when the battle was over they found themselves too weak to follow up our retreating forces. While the whole South was exulting, their great commander, General Lee, was profoundly depressed. The resources of the Davis Government in men and means were limited, and it was evident that without a foreign alliance, prolonged defensive warfare by an army so far from its base, would ultimately exhaust the seceding states without accomplishing their independence. It became necessary, therefore, for General Lee to choose one of two plans of campaign: either to fall back on the center of his supplies at Richmond, and stand a siege there, or to invade the North. By retiring on Richmond he would save the great labor of transporting food and war material to the frontier, and would remove the northern army still further from its sources of supply and its principal depots. One circumstance, however, would probably in any event have impelled him to take the bolder course. The situation in Vicksburg was becoming alarming. It was evident that



the town must fall, and with its surrender the Federal fleet would soon regain possession of the Mississippi. The fall of Vicksburg, supplemented by the retreat of Lee's army on Richmond, would dishearten the Southern people, and stimulate the North to renewed efforts. It was essential, therefore, to counterbalance the impending disaster in the West by some brilliant exploit in the East.

“There was, perhaps, another reason for this great forward movement, founded on the relation of the Confederacy to the principal European powers. England still made a pretense of neutrality, but the aristocracy and ruling classes sided with the South, and a large association of their most influential men was established at Manchester to aid the southern cause. The Confederates were fighting us with English guns and war material, furnished by blockade runners; while English *Shenandoahs* and *Alabamas*, manned by British seamen, under the Confederate flag, burned our merchant vessels and swept our commercial marine from the ocean. The French Government was equally hostile to us, and there was hardly a kingdom in Europe which did not sympathize with the South, allied as they were by their feudal customs to the deplorable system of southern slavery. Russia alone favored our cause, and stood ready, if need be, to assist us with her fleet; probably more from antagonism to England and France than from any other motive. The agents of the Confederate Government stated in their official dispatches that if General Lee could establish his army firmly on northern soil, England would at once acknowledge the independence of the South; in which case ample loans could not only be obtained on Southern securities, but a

foreign alliance might be formed, and perhaps a fleet furnished to re-open the Southern ports.

“While thus elated by hopes of foreign intervention, the Confederate spies and sympathizers who thronged the North greatly encouraged the Davis government by their glowing accounts of the disaffection there, in consequence of the heavy taxation, rendered necessary by the war, and by the unpopularity of the draft, which would soon have to be enforced as a defensive measure. They overrated the influence of the anti-war party, and prophesied that an invasion would be followed by outbreaks in the principal cities, which would paralyze every effort to reinforce the Federal forces in the field.

“These reasons would have been quite sufficient of themselves to induce Lee to make the movement, but he himself gives an additional one. He hoped by this advance to draw Hooker out where he could strike him a decisive blow, and thus insure the permanent triumph of the Confederacy. He was weary of all this marching, campaigning, and bloodshed, and was strongly desirous of settling the whole matter at once. Having been reinforced after the battle of Chancellorsville by Longstreet’s two divisions, and a large body of conscripts, he determined to advance.

“On May 31st his force, according to Southern statements, amounted to eighty-eight thousand seven hundred and fifty-four, of which sixty-eight thousand three hundred and fifty-two were ready for duty. Recruits, too, were constantly coming in from the draft, which was rigidly enforced in the Southern states.”

The various reasons thus stated no doubt entered into the consideration which induced the invasion. The princi-

pal reason, however, was the confidence which Jefferson Davis felt in the success of the movement. Indeed, while yet in the United States Senate he declared that in the event of war the battles would be fought on the soil of Pennsylvania, and on its wheat-fields the contest would be decided. Mr. Pollard says that in confident anticipation and assurance of a decisive victory in Pennsylvania, Jefferson Davis, about the time the Confederate army crossed the Potomac into Maryland, ordered Alexander H. Stephens, vice-president of the Confederacy, to proceed to Washington with the view to take advantage of the victory and propose a peace upon the condition of the recognition of the Confederate Government. And with a view to mask his real intentions, which were unwritten and were to be presented verbally, the following letter was given him:

RICHMOND, 2d July, 1863.

HON. ALEX. H. STEPHENS, *Richmond, Virginia*:

*Sir*—Having accepted your patriotic offer to proceed as a military commissioner, under flag of truce, to Washington, you will herewith receive your letter of authority to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

This letter is signed by me as Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate Land and Naval Forces.

You will perceive, from the terms of the letter, that it is so worded as to avoid any political difficulties in its reception. Intended exclusively as one of those communications between belligerents which public law recognizes as necessary and proper between hostile forces, care has been taken to give no pretext for refusing to receive it on the ground that it would involve a tacit recognition of the independence of the Confederacy.

Your mission is simply one of humanity, and has no political aspect.

If objection is made to receiving your letter on the ground that it is not addressed to Abraham Lincoln as *President* instead of Commander-in-Chief, etc., then you will present the duplicate letter, which is addressed to him as President, and signed by me as President. To this letter objection may be made on the ground that I am not recognized to be President of the Con-

federacy. In this event, you will decline any further attempt to confer on the subject of your mission, as such conference is admissible only on a footing of perfect equality.

My recent interviews with you have put you so fully in possession of my views that it is scarcely necessary to give you any detailed instructions, even were I at this moment well enough to attempt it.

My whole purpose is, in one word, to place this war on the footing of such as are waged by civilized people in modern times, and to divest it of the savage character which has been impressed on it by our enemies, in spite of all our efforts and protests. War is full enough of unavoidable horrors, under all aspects, to justify, and even to demand of, any Christian ruler who may be unhappily engaged in carrying it on, to seek to restrict its calamities, and to divest it of all unnecessary severities. You will endeavor to establish the cartel for the exchange of prisoners on such a basis as to avoid the constant difficulties and complaints which arise, and to prevent for the future what we deem the unfair conduct of our enemies, in evading the delivery of prisoners who fall into their hands, in retarding it by sending them in circuitous routes, and by detaining them sometimes for months in camps and prisons, and in persisting in taking captive non-combatants.

Your attention is also called to the unheard-of conduct of Federal officers in driving from their homes entire communities of women and children, as well as of men, whom they find in districts occupied by their troops, for no other reason than because these unfortunates are faithful to the allegiance due to their States, and refuse to take an oath of fidelity to their enemies.

The putting to death of unarmed prisoners has been a ground of just complaint in more than one instance, and the recent execution of officers of our army in Kentucky, for the sole cause that they were engaged in recruiting-service in a state which is claimed as still one of the United States, but is also claimed by us as one of the Confederate States, must be repressed by retaliation if not unconditionally abandoned, because it would justify the like execution in every other state of the Confederacy, and the practice is barbarous, uselessly cruel, and can only lead to the slaughter of prisoners on both sides, a result too horrible to contemplate without making every effort to avoid it.

On these and all kindred subjects you will consider your authority full and ample to make such arrangements as will temper the present cruel character of the contest, and full confidence is placed in your judgment, patriotism, and discretion that, while carrying out the objects of your mission, you will take care that the equal rights of the Confederacy be always preserved.

Very respectfully,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Mr. Pollard says, "Mr. Stephens proceeded only as far as Fortress Monroe, where he was intercepted by a dispatch peremptorily forbidding his access to the Federal Capital. Whether the authorities there were aware or not of the real nature of his mission it is since ascertained that, apart from the written text which he bore, he was to sound the Washington Government on the question of peace. There could be no other proper conclusion, judging from the importance of the emissary, and the absurd futility of his going to Washington merely to protest against the enemy's cruelties in conducting the war.

"The whole explanation of the affair is that Mr. Stephens was fully empowered, in certain contingencies, to propose peace; that President Davis had sent him on this extraordinary visit to Washington, anticipating a great victory of Lee's army in Pennsylvania; that the real design of the mission was disconcerted by the fatal day of Gettysburg, which occurred when Mr. Stephens was near Fortress Monroe; and that it was in the insolent moments of this Federal success that he was sharply rebuffed by the Washington authorities. Considering the conjuncture of the occasion and the circumstances in which the President of the Southern Confederacy sought to signalize what he supposed would be a great victory of his armies, by a distinct and formal proposition of peace at Washington, it may be said that, notwithstanding the disappointment of the event, and the jeer of the enemy, Mr. Davis occupied a proud position in this matter, and one that merited the applause of the Christian world."

The particular merit attaching to Mr. Davis for this

mission to Washington, which, as Mr. Pollard says, placed him in a "proud position," and "merited the applause of the Christian world," is indeed hard to see. The time certainly was inopportune, and the overwhelming Federal victories of Vicksburg and Gettysburg sadly interfered with his calculations.

### III. GENERAL LEE'S STRATEGICAL PURPOSES.

In his address at Gettysburg, November 19th, 1863, Hon. Edward Everett, whose information was drawn from the archives of the War Department, stated Lee's strategical purposes as follows:

1. By rapid movements northward, and by maneuvering with a portion of his army on the east side of the Blue Ridge, he sought to tempt General Hooker from his base of operations and thus uncover the approaches to Washington, and to throw it open to a raid by Stuart's cavalry, and at the same time to enable Lee himself to cross the Potomac at Poolsville and fall upon the Capital from the north. This design of the confederate general was promptly discovered by General Hooker, who moved with great rapidity from his encampments on the north bank of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, and preserved unbroken his inner line, and stationed the various corps of his army at all the points protecting the approaches to the Capital, from Centreville up to Leesburg. In the mean time, by the vigorous operations of Pleasanton's cavalry, the cavalry of General Stuart was so crippled as to be unable to perform the part assigned to it in the campaign. In this manner Lee's first object, the defeat of Hooker on the south of the Potomac and a direct march upon Washington, was baffled.

2. A second part of the Confederate plan was to turn the demonstration northward into a real invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania, in the hope that, in this way, General Hooker would be drawn to a distance from the Capital, and that some opportunity would occur to take him at a disadvantage, and after eluding or defeating his army, to make a descent upon Baltimore and Washington. This was substantially the repetition of the plan of the invasion of Maryland in 1862; and as the latter was defeated at Antietam, so was the former at Gettysburg.

Another plan which, though not stated by Mr. Everett, was forced upon the Confederate commander by the excellent strategy of General Hooker, was this: to advance by way of the Shenandoah and Cumberland valleys upon Harrisburg. That Lee's original purpose was to advance east of the Blue Ridge and its continuation north of the Potomac, the South Mountain, seems to be verified by General Long in the published statement previously referred to. General Long says: "Before entering upon the execution of his plans, General Lee had marked out his line of operations, which was to advance into Pennsylvania, with Gettysburg or York for his objective point, as circumstances might dictate. It was his determination to give battle at one or the other of these places." It will be perceived that Harrisburg was not mentioned by General Long as one of the places where a battle might be fought, and yet an attack upon that place was planned by Lee, not before he set out upon his expedition northward, nor before he crossed the Potomac, but at Chambersburg, after he was forced to cross the river west of the Blue Ridge instead of east of it, as originally intended.

That an attack upon Harrisburg was arranged by Lee at this place, and that he held to that purpose up to the night of Monday, June 29th, will clearly appear in the following, as found in General Longstreet's own published account in the "Annals of the War," pages 418, 419. It was on that night that General Longstreet's scout brought him the information at his head-quarters near Chambersburg, that the Federal army was no longer south of the Potomac, guarding the approaches to Washington, as Lee supposed, but had crossed the river and was marching northward, parallel with him, to the east of the mountain; and this information caused him to change his plan and march eastward across the South Mountain. The statement is as follows:

"While at Culpeper, I sent a trusty scout (who had been sent to me by Secretary Seddons, while I was in Suffolk,) with instructions to go into the Federal lines, discover his policy, and bring me all the information he could possibly pick up. When this scout asked me, very significantly, where he should report, I replied, 'Find me, wherever I am, when you have the desired information.' I did this because I feared to trust him with a knowledge of our future movements. I supplied him with all the gold he needed, and instructed him to spare neither pains nor money to obtain full and accurate information. The information gathered by this scout led to the most tremendous results, as will be seen. \* \* \* I reached Chambersburg on the evening of the 27th (Saturday). At this point, on the night of the 29th (Monday), information was received by which the whole plan of the campaign was changed. We had not heard from the enemy for several days, and General Lee was in doubt as to where he was; indeed, we did not know that he had yet left Virginia. At about ten o'clock that night, Colonel Sorrell, my chief of staff, was waked by an orderly, who reported that a suspicious person had just been arrested by the provost-marshal. Upon investigation, Sorrell discovered that the suspicious person was the scout, Harrison, that I had sent out at Culpeper. He was dirt-stained, travel-worn, and very much broken down. After questioning him sufficiently to find that he brought very important information, Colonel Sorrell brought him to my headquarters and awoke me. He gave the information that the enemy had crossed the Po-



tomic, marched northwest, and that the head of his column was at Frederick City on our right. I felt that this information was exceedingly important, and might involve a change in the direction of our march. General Lee had already issued orders that we were to advance toward Harrisburg. I at once sent the scout to General Lee's headquarters, and followed him myself early in the morning. I found General Lee up, and asked him if the information brought by the scout might not involve a change of direction of the head of our column to the right. He immediately acquiesced in the suggestion, possibly saying that he had already given orders to that effect. The movement toward the enemy was begun at once." \*

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\* General Longstreet, in a second article contributed to the *Annals of the War*, page 632, says that he erred in his first statement that this scout reported to him on the night of Monday, June 29th, and that it occurred on the night of Sunday, June 28th. That he was right in his first statement will appear in the following considerations:

1. According to General Longstreet's own statement, as well as the official declaration of General Lee, the order countermanding the attack upon Harrisburg, and a rapid concentration of the scattered Confederate forces in the vicinity of Gettysburg, was issued immediately upon the receipt of the information brought by that scout, *and the concentration was at once begun*. If the scout reported on the evening of Sunday, 28th, then the concentration must have taken place on Monday, whereas the fact is placed beyond all question that it occurred on Tuesday. This will unmistakably appear in the statements yet to follow.

2. General Longstreet says that early the next morning after the arrival of the scout, he went to Lee's headquarters, and, finding him up, inquired of him if the information brought would not necessitate a change in the direction of the head of the column, to which Lee replied that it would, and that orders to that effect had already been issued. He further says that Lee and himself then rode together to Greenwood, where they remained over night; and the next day, after riding together some three or four miles toward Gettysburg, the sound of guns was heard, at which Lee rode rapidly forward to ascertain the cause, leaving him to see after hurrying forward the troops. (*Annals of the War*, pages 419, 420.) The cannonading heard was that of the first day's battle, Wednesday, July 1st, as Longstreet himself admits. This fact alone fixes Tuesday morning as the time Lee and Longstreet left Chambersburg for Greenwood, and, as a consequence, Monday night, the 29th, as the time of the scout's arrival.

3. General Lee officially declares that it was upon the night of June 29th that the scout reported to him (*Annals of the War*, page 420). This official declaration is more likely to be correct than General Longstreet's memory, upon which, it is evident, he relies.

4. There is another way of harmonizing the discrepancy in the dates given by General Longstreet, which is that the scout reported on the evening of Sunday, 28th, and the orders for the concentration of the troops were imme-

General Lee himself in his official report says: "Preparation had been made to advance upon Harrisburg, but, on the night of the 29th, information was received from a scout that the enemy had crossed the Potomac, and was advancing northward, and that the head of his column had already reached South Mountain. As our communications with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was

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diately issued and sent to their respective destinations, but the concentration itself did not commence until Tuesday, 30th. This seems to be sustained by an account of this affair given by Dr. Cullen, Medical Director of Longstreet's corps, in *Annals of the War*, page 439. Dr. Cullen says: "I distinctly remember the appearance in our headquarters of the scout who brought from Frederick the first account that General Lee had of the definite whereabouts of the enemy; of the excitement at General Lee's headquarters among couriers, quartermasters, commissaries, etc., all betokening some early movement of the commands dependent upon the news brought by the scout. That afternoon General Lee was walking with some of us in the road in front of his headquarters, and said, 'Gentlemen, we will not move to Harrisburg as we expected, but will go over to Gettysburg and see what General Meade is after.' Orders had been issued to the corps to move at sunrise on the morning of the next day, and promptly at the time the corps was put on the road." If Dr. Cullen is not mistaken in the statement he makes, then the scout reported on the evening of Sunday, and the conversation between Lee and his staff occurred on Monday, and the concentration began on Tuesday morning. This view is further sustained by General Doubleday's assertion, on page 119 of his "*Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*," that General Early received at York, where his division was encamped, *in the afternoon of Monday, 29th*, Lee's order to return to Gettysburg, and that recalling Gordon's brigade from Wrightsville, whither it had gone, he made preparations to start the next morning. The chief difficulty to this last explanation is this, how could that scout report to General Lee at Chambersburg *on Sunday evening* that the head of the Army of the Potomac had reached Frederick, and that General Meade had been put in command, when the army only reached that city that same day, and the change of commanders only took place that morning? Could he have made his way from Frederick to this place—a distance of about fifty miles—in six or eight hours? Then the fact of General Lee's official declaration fixing Monday evening, the 29th, and Lee's and Longstreet's movements on Tuesday and Wednesday, as previously referred to, seem to be insuperable difficulties in accepting General Longstreet's last statement as to Sunday, the 28th. I have presented both the dates, with the reasons for accepting the first given, leaving the reader to accept whichever he pleases. The fact, however, of the commencement of the concentration is fixed beyond dispute as Tuesday morning, June 30th, and this date is not affected by the adoption of either Sunday evening or Monday evening for the scout's arrival.

resolved to prevent its further progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountain." (Annals of the War, page 420.)

#### IV. WHAT WAS THE PLAN OF THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC?

During a period of three weeks—from June 2nd, when General Lee broke up his encampment about Fredericksburg,—to the 24th, when the main part of his army crossed the Potomac into Maryland, the Confederate commander so maneuvered his army as, if possible, to outwit and entrap General Hooker; but in every case he utterly failed. So readily did the latter detect his antagonist's strategy, and so successfully did he handle his forces, that he not only defeated Lee's purposes to lure him into some error, but compelled him to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown and Williamsport west of the mountain, instead of at Poolsville or Edward's Ferry to the east, as intended, thus damaging his entire plan of campaign north of the river as he had defeated it to the south of it. Owing to the severe handling which General Pleasanton administered to the Confederate cavalry at Beverly Ford, Aldie, and Upperville, it was unable to perform the part assigned it, and was forced to cross the river to the east of the Federals, thus being detached from its proper connection with Lee's army, and compelled to make an entire circuit of the Federal forces, only reaching the Confederate lines on the evening of Thursday, July 2nd. General Stuart's proper course, and the one he should have taken—at least the one Lee expected him to take—had he not been forced to do otherwise, after Lee's forced route up the Cumberland Valley, would have been somewhere near

the Confederate right, either to the west or east of the mountain, guarding its passes, masking Lee's movements, protecting his communications, reporting information of the Union forces, and harassing whatever of those forces he might come in contact with. All these advantages which Lee expected of Stuart were lost to him by the circuitous route which the great cavalry commander was compelled to take. Of this loss not only General Lee, but General Longstreet and other subordinate officers have greatly complained. Lee, in his report of the Pennsylvania campaign, says: "No report had been received (Saturday, 27th June,) that the enemy had crossed the Potomac, and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information." General Longstreet says: "The army moved forward as a man might walk over strange ground with his eyes shut." Colonel W. H. Taylor, of Lee's staff, says: "On the 27th of June (Saturday) General Lee was near Chambersburg, (his headquarters were in a grove near the eastern suburbs of the town,) with the first and third corps, the second being still in advance, but within supporting distance. With the exception of the cavalry the army was well in hand. The absence of that indispensable arm of the service was most seriously felt by General Lee. He had directed General Stuart to use his discretion as to where and when to cross the river—that is, he was to cross east of the mountains, or retire through the mountain passes into the valley and cross in the immediate rear of the infantry, as the movements of the enemy and his own judgment should determine; but he was expected to maintain communication with the main column, and especially directed to keep the commanding

general informed of the movements of the Federal army.” (Annals of the War, pages 306, 307.)

It is altogether probable that if Stuart's cavalry had maintained communication with the Confederate commander, the great battle would not have been fought at Gettysburg. The advance of the Federal army would have been reported, and another field less favorable to the Federals would have been forced upon them. And it is further probable that the departure from the policy agreed upon before entering upon the campaign, namely, to take a strong position of its own choosing, and compel the Federals to become the attacking party, and in no case to attack them in any position they might choose, was owing to the absence of the knowledge of the whereabouts of the foe, and the strength of the position he had taken, which knowledge would have been promptly communicated had Stuart been within communicating distance of his chief.

Although General Lee had been apprised on Monday evening, the 29th, that the Federal army was marching northward, and that its advance had reached Frederick, he was nevertheless surprised to meet it in force at Gettysburg. This will appear in statements yet to follow. That he met this army there in a position of its own choosing, and was compelled to depart from the purpose he had agreed to pursue before leaving Virginia — “a strategical offensive but tactical defensive” — was owing to the excellent generalship of both Hooker and Meade. Having then advanced into the plain beyond the fastnesses of the South Mountain, and having found unexpectedly the foe confronting him, he was no longer able to order the situa-

tion to his own choosing, but must make the most out of that which was thrust upon him.

In the emergency threatening Lee when confronted by the Federal army at Gettysburg, the following four alternatives were presented to him, one of which he was compelled to choose: to retire into the gaps of the South Mountain, and compel General Meade to leave the position he had taken and attack him; or wait steadily in the position he had taken to be attacked there; or to maneuver so as to dislodge his foe from the position he occupied by menacing his communications by the right or left; or to attack the strong position the Federals had taken, in the hope of carrying it by main force. The Count of Paris, in his recently published work on the War of the Rebellion, in considering these alternatives, says that "the best plan would undoubtedly have been the first, because by pursuing the *strategic offensive*, Lee would thus secure all the advantages of the *tactical defensive*." Referring to these four alternatives, as stated by the Count, with his strong endorsement of the first named, General Long, in the article previously referred to, says:

"This view of the Count suggests the remark that, though he may possess a profound theoretical knowledge of war, he lacks the practical experience that teaches the correct application of rules and principles. Could the Frenchman have seen the actual field of operation and have known the circumstances that governed General Lee, he would have probably taken a different view of his actions. \* \* \* \*

"I will here add that Gettysburg affords a good example of the difficulties to be encountered and the uncertainty of being able to harmonize the various elements of armies when the field of operations is extensive. This battle was precipitated by the absence of information which could only be obtained by the active cavalry force. General Lee had previously selected the neighborhood of Gettysburg for his field of battle, but the time and position were

to have been of his own selection. This could have been easily effected had not the cavalry been severed from its proper place with the army. \* \* \*

"During the evening General Lee decided on his plan of operations. Knowing the prostrate condition of two Federal corps, and being convinced that General Meade could not complete the concentration of his forces before the following afternoon, he determined to risk the fate of the campaign on the chance of an immediate battle. \* \* \*

"It must be borne in mind that on entering Pennsylvania without his cavalry General Lee was unable to accumulate supplies. In fact, the subsistence of his army mainly depended on the provisions that could be collected in the vicinity of his line of march by detachments of infantry mounted on artillery and wagon horses. Therefore, if General Lee had adopted the Count's favorite plan of operation and occupied one of the passes of South Mountain, he would have placed his army in a trap that would have, in the absence of a miracle, resulted in its destruction; for Meade, with his superior forces, would have enclosed him without supplies or the means of obtaining them. General Lee would thus have been reduced to the alternative of laying down his arms or of cutting his way out with great sacrifice of life and the loss of his artillery and transportation. \* \* \*

"The above objection is also applicable to the Count's second plan, with the addition that General Lee's line was too much extended to admit of a successful defense against General Meade's superior force. In answer to the Count's third plan it is only necessary to say that the proximity of the two armies and the absence of cavalry on the part of the Confederates rendered maneuvering impracticable. The fourth, the plan least approved of by the Count, is the only one that admitted of the hope of success and was the one adopted by General Lee."

General Longstreet urgently pressed upon Lee to move around by the left of the Federal position, along the line of the Emmittsburg road, and place his army between General Meade and Washington, hoping by thus threatening the Union general's left and rear to force him to leave the position he had taken and to attack the Confederates in such a position as Lee himself might select. This plan, though held by General Longstreet as entirely practicable, would most likely have resulted, if undertaken, in complete failure. General Pleasanton says of it: "As to General

Lee maneuvering to our left, the supposition shows the ignorance existing of our position and the nature of the country. I had two divisions of cavalry, one in the rear of our position, and one on Lee's right flank. This cavalry would have held Lee in check in any such movement, while the Army of the Potomac from Cemetery Hill would have swept down and turned Gettysburg into an Austerlitz." (Annals of the War, page 457.) General Lee had the four alternatives before him when unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, and he chose the one of a direct assault. Probably a worse fate would have befallen him had he adopted either of the others.

On Thursday, June 25th, the day after the last of the Confederate infantry had crossed the Potomac into Maryland, the Federal army also crossed at Edward's Ferry, and by Sunday, the 28th, it lay between Harper's Ferry and Frederick City, in a position to protect Baltimore and Washington from any flank movement by Lee, to fall upon his communications, or to march to any point where he might show himself. The strategy of General Hooker was as faultless as it was successful, but he was not destined to fight the great battle so near at hand. To another that honor was accorded, as will be shown hereafter in its appropriate place.

Having given the strength, position, purposes, and tactics of the two great opposing armies, I will now proceed to give the reader a view of the movements and occurrences of each successive day until the final conflict upon the decisive field of Gettysburg. And that these important events may be given in their proper connection, and in comparison with other events transpiring elsewhere



within the lines of the two great armies, I will detail the events of each day in daily summaries. Let the reader follow me closely through these details and mark well each occurrence and movement, with Harrisburg as Lee's objective up to the night of Monday, June 29th, and after that night, some position about Cashtown, east of the South Mountain, and he will be amazed at the genius and skill displayed by the one man who planned and directed and controlled the whole. I will also detail the movements of the Army of the Potomac, that the equal sagacity and skill of its commander may also be seen.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE ARMIES IN MOTION — ROUT OF GENERAL MILROY AT WINCHESTER.

**B**EFORE proceeding to detail the movements of the two great contending armies, it will be well to inform the reader where they were encamped at the time the movement northward began. The Army of Northern Virginia was in camp on the south bank of the Rappahannock River, about the city of Fredericksburg, and the Army of the Potomac was posted on the north bank of the same river, among the Stafford hills, and opposite to that city. Its various corps and divisions were placed in the following order: The First Corps, under General Reynolds, was encamped in the vicinity of White Oak Church; the Second (Couch's, afterward Hancock's,) near Falmouth; the Third (Birney's, afterward Sickles',) at Boscobel, near Falmouth; the Fifth (Meade's, afterward Sykes',) in the vicinity of Banks', United States, and adjacent fords on the Rappahannock; the Sixth (Sedgwick's) near White Oak Church, with the Second Division (Howe's) thrown forward to Franklin's Crossing, a little below Fredericksburg, near the mouth of Deep Run; the Eleventh (Howard's) near Brooke's Station, on the Aquia Creek Railroad; and the Twelfth (Slocum's) near Stafford Court House and Aquia Landing. The Cavalry Corps, under General Pleasanton, had two divisions in the vicinity

of Warrenton Junction, and one division in the neighborhood of Brocke's Station. Such was the disposition of General Hooker's army on June 5th, and such, with a few unimportant changes in some divisions and brigades, it remained up to June 11th, when the movement northward began.\*

During the latter part of May General Hooker learned from sources which he deemed reliable that an invasion of the North was under contemplation. Indeed such was the confidence of the Confederate leaders in the success of the movement that they did not try to conceal their purpose. For days, and even weeks, before it began some of the leading papers in the South discussed the question of an invasion, the comparative advantages of the different routes by which their army might reach its destination, and the great and glorious results they expected to secure. At length the evidences of the intention of the enemy became so convincing to the Federal commander that, on May 28th, he wrote to the President that an invasion was inevitable, and measures to meet it were proposed. Finally on the 2nd of June the withdrawal of the Confederates from their lines about Fredericksburg, and their concentration about Culpeper Court House, upon General Hooker's right, was begun. On that day Ewell's corps,

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\* For the information relating to the encampments of the various corps of the Federal army prior to the movement northward, as also the daily movements and places of encampment of the same up to the time of the great collision at Gettysburg and afterward until they re-crossed the Potomac in pursuit of the discomfited and retreating foe, I am indebted to a pamphlet kindly furnished me from the Adjutant-General's office, War Department, Washington, D. C., entitled "*Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac, in the Gettysburg Campaign, June and July, 1863, compiled under the jurisdiction of Brigadier-General Richard C. Drum, Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, by Joseph W. Kirkley, of the Adjutant-General's office.*"

preceded by the cavalry, left its encampment and moved to the place stated. On the following day, June 3d, Longstreet's corps, accompanied by General Lee, followed, while Hill was left to observe the movements of General Hooker. By the 8th of June the whole of the Confederate army, with the exception of the last named corps, was concentrated about Culpeper Court House. The departure of these troops was soon detected by the Union commander, who promptly directed General Sedgwick to cross the river by his bridges three miles below Fredericksburg, and ascertain by a reconnoissance if the main body of the enemy had not gone. On the 5th of June Howe's division of the Sixth Corps was sent across the river, and the divisions of Wright and Newton—the First and Third—were moved from their encampment at White Oak Church and placed upon the north bank ready to support him. Upon the appearance of Howe upon the south bank of the river, Hill's corps left their intrenchments to meet him. On the 7th, Wright's division relieved Howe, who returned to the north bank. Some desultory skirmishing took place between these troops and Hill's men, but Sedgwick reported, as his opinion, that the greater part of the Confederate force still held their old position. General Hooker, not satisfied with this statement, determined to ascertain the enemy's whereabouts more fully, and on June 7th ordered General Pleasanton to cross the river with all his available cavalry and make a reconnoissance toward Culpeper for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Confederates were concentrating there. In obedience to this order the cavalry corps consisting of the First Division under General Buford, the Second under General Duffie, the Third

under General D. McM. Gregg, and the Regular Reserve Brigade, supported by detachments of infantry under Generals Adelbert Ames and Daniel A. Russell, moved to Kelly's and Beverly fords, preparatory to crossing the Rappahannock on the following day.

On the same day that the Federal cavalry were preparing for the reconnoissance south of the Rappahannock,—Monday, June 8th,—General Lee reviewed his cavalry, preparatory to their expected departure the next day upon a raid northward for the purpose of interposing between Hooker and Washington, and destroying the railroad to Alexandria, thereby delaying the Federal army in its movements for the relief of the Capital, while Lee himself was to move by rapid marches along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, cross the Potomac in the neighborhood of Poolsville and the Monocacy, and come down upon it from the north. These purposes were ascertained from papers captured from General Stuart's head-quarters the next day. After the review of the Confederate cavalry by Lee, the four batteries of Jones' cavalry brigade moved down toward the river near Beverly Ford to cover the proposed crossing. The remainder of Stuart's command was not posted within easy supporting distance of these batteries. So unsuspecting were the Confederates of the Federal approach that they did not seem to use the usual precautions against a surprise, for a thin line of pickets only lay between these batteries and the river. During that night Pleasanton's cavalry, backed by the two brigades of infantry, stole down to the fords and lay there during the night without fires, ready at the first appearance of day to cross. Buford's cavalry and Ames' brigade

of infantry lay near Beverly Ford, and Duffie's and Gregg's, supported by Russel's infantry, lay opposite Kelly's Ford. In the early morning of Tuesday, June 9th, under cover of a heavy fog, which completely shrouded his movements, Pleasanton crossed at the two fords named. These fords are about eight miles apart, and Brandy Station, which is about three miles from the river and nearly in the apex of the triangle, and a good position from which to operate on Culpeper in case it became necessary to move in that direction, was chosen as the point of concentration of the two forces. To the surprise of the Federal commander he encountered no Confederate pickets on the north bank of the river, and after crossing unobserved the enemy were met, and were taken completely by surprise. Soon the conflict became general and desperate, and the Confederates were driven back. General Stuart's headquarters were not more than a quarter of a mile from the ford, and were soon captured with a copy of Lee's orders, and other important papers, which revealed the Confederate plans.\* After the battle had raged for several hours, during which the advantages were clearly on the side of the Federals, Confederate infantry began to arrive by hurried trains from Culpeper, when General Pleasanton, having fully accomplished all he was expected to, and not deeming it proper to

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\*The foregoing is General Pleasanton's account of the capture of General Stuart's headquarters, and is found in *Annals of the War*, page 449. Major H. B. McClellan, of the Confederate service, says on page 396 of the same book: "No serious loss occurred save that Major Beckham's desk, in which he had placed the orders to march received by him the previous night, was jostled out of the wagon in its hasty retreat, and fell into the enemy's hands, thus revealing authoritatively part of the information which he had come to obtain."

tarry longer and fight nearly the whole of Lee's army, withdrew his forces and returned to the north bank of the river at Rappahannock Station and Beverly Ford. On the following day the cavalry took position in the neighborhood of Warrenton Junction. Its infantry supports of the day previous rejoined their respective commands.

The battle of Beverly Ford, or the battle of Fleetwood, or Brandy Station, as it is sometimes called, is claimed by the Confederates as a victory for them, because the Federals withdrew and left the field to them. General Lee says of this engagement: "On the 9th, a large force of Federal cavalry, strongly supported by infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly's Ford, and attacked General Stuart. A severe engagement ensued, continuing from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, when the enemy was forced to recross the river with heavy loss, leaving four hundred prisoners, three pieces of artillery, and several colors in our hands." General Longstreet, in referring to this engagement, also claims victory for the Confederates, and says: "The failure of General Lee to follow up his advantage by pouring the heavy force concentrated at Culpeper Court-House upon this detachment of Federals, confirmed my convictions that he (Lee) had determined to make a defensive battle, and would not allow any casual advantage to precipitate a general engagement. If he had any idea of abandoning the original plan of a tactical defensive, then, in my judgment, was the time to have done so." (Annals of the War, page 418.) Does General Longstreet suppose that in his zeal to establish his favorite idea of a "strategical offensive but tactical

defensive," the departure from which by Lee at Gettysburg, as he alleges, caused their defeat,—he can cover the fact that in this very battle that plan was departed from? Did not Lee put forth every possible effort to crush the Federal force across the river by hurrying forward troops from Culpeper as fast as the trains at his disposal could carry them? Or did he suppose that the ten or twelve thousand men, after they had succeeded in all that they had been sent to accomplish, would quietly sit down and wait for the whole of Lee's infantry to fall upon them? Or, perhaps, he meant that after the withdrawal of these men, Lee should have pursued them, crossing with his whole army to the north bank of the river, and fallen upon Hooker in his impregnable works. General Hooker would have liked nothing better than this, and General Lee was too shrewd to attempt such folly.

That Lee did hurry forward infantry in support of his cavalry in this fight is clear from the following. In an article referred to in the previous chapter, General Long says: "Early in the morning of the 9th, Pleasanton's cavalry crossed the Rappahannock and attacked Stuart in his position south of that river. A fierce engagement ensued in which the Confederate cavalry was roughly handled, but finally *with the assistance of Rodes' division of infantry* the Federals were repulsed and forced to recross the Rappahannock." Other writers say that while the battle was in progress the running of the trains could be heard bringing infantry from Culpeper.\*

In determining the question as to whether the Federals or Confederates were victorious at the battle of Beverly

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\*See Annals of the War, page 450.



Ford, or Brandy Station, or whatever name it may be called, it should be borne in mind that General Pleasanton's crossing to the south side of the Rappahannock was simply a reconnoissance in force to gain important information. His instructions were to proceed in the direction of Culpeper Court-House, attack the enemy, if necessary, and force him to display his infantry in case any were there, and not to return without positive information of Lee's whereabouts. Now did he accomplish any or all of these results; or was he prevented by the enemy? If he did attain the object he went for, then he undoubtedly had all the advantages he expected and the victory was his. If he was forced to retire before his object was gained, or if he went across the river to defeat the whole Confederate army, or whatever part of it might be brought against him, and hold the position he gained, then his purposes were frustrated and victory was with the enemy. That he did succeed in every object he sought to accomplish in the reconnoissance, is undeniable. The victory, then, was his. General Pleasanton, in summing up the results gained by his reconnoissance, states them thus: First, the fact was established that Lee was at Culpeper Court-House in force; second, that he intended to invade the North; third, that he was forced to change the direction of his march toward the Shenandoah Valley instead of attempting to move along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge and cross the Potomac near Washington, thereby compelling him to operate on an exterior instead of an interior line; fourth, the Army of the Potomac was enabled to take the initiative, based upon the knowledge they had gained of Lee's intentions; and fifth, the Confederate cavalry was so much

crippled by the severe handling it received that it could not carry out the plan assigned to it. These results were undoubtedly secured, and if they were not fully up to the expectations of both Generals Hooker and Pleasanton, then, and then only, the Confederates may have some show of right in claiming the victory in the great cavalry engagement of Beverly Ford.\*

Possessed of positive information of Lee's plans and purposes, as results of the reconnoissance by General Pleasanton, and the capture of important papers in Stuart's headquarters, it became imperative upon the Federal commander to take immediate measures to meet them. His army was accordingly put in motion, and day after day the various corps and divisions were moved from place to place as the exigencies demanded. And that the splendid strategy of General Hooker may be seen, I will place upon record here for the reader's guidance, the movements each day made, as shown by the statement furnished from the Adjutant-General's office referred to in the opening of this chapter:

*Wednesday, June 10.* In order to prevent the threatened crossing of the Rappahannock by General Stuart, and his

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\* The number of men on each side in the battle of Brandy Station was about as follows: General Pleasanton claims that the Confederates had about twelve thousand cavalry and twelve guns. Major McClellan, of Stuart's staff, puts the number at nine thousand, three hundred and thirty-five on the roll, and twenty guns. He also claims that nearly three thousand of these were absent and not in the fight. The Union cavalry, according to General Gregg, amounted to about nine thousand men and six batteries. One third of this force was detached in the direction of Stevensburg, and their operations had but little effect on the general result. The batteries were not brought forward in time to be of much service, and the infantry were only used to keep open communications with the river. The numbers on each side, it will be seen, were about equal. The arrival of Rodes' infantry, however, gave the preponderance eventually to the Confederates.

raid northward, which the papers captured the day before showed was to have begun this day, the cavalry corps took a position in the neighborhood of Warrenton Junction, guarding the fords of the river, and remained there until Monday, June 15th. Stuart, however, made no attempt to carry out the part assigned him, and Lee's purpose to make an effort to turn Hooker's right by rapid movements along the eastern base of the mountain and interpose between him and Washington was also abandoned and the valley route was taken. This route, while not the one chosen by the Confederate commander, had some advantages over the other. The mountain wall, which intervened between the two armies, was a sure defense against any attack the Federals might make, for its gaps could easily have been fortified and held against any possible force. It was evidently expected and desired by Lee that Hooker would attempt to assail him by one of these passes, in which event one corps could have held him in check, while the other two captured Washington.\*

General Long, in speaking of this route taken by the Confederate army, says that the purpose was to "expel from that section (the valley) a considerable Federal force and to create an impression of a flank movement, with the view of interrupting Hooker's communications." He also says that Lee "by a series of bold, strategic movements (reaching the valley with his army,) removed the enemy from his path and accomplished the most difficult step in his plan of operations without opposition." Lee simply passed through a gap of the mountain and proceeded northward by way of the valley. Does it not seem

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\* General Doubleday's Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, page 88.

that instead of removing the enemy from his path, he removed himself from the enemy? As for the danger and difficulty of the movement, it must be confessed that we fail to perceive them. And if, in his taking the valley route, crossing the Potomac west of the Blue Ridge, and marching up the Cumberland Valley, Lee was executing the plans he had originally determined upon, then his strategy was successful; but if in this course he departed from his original plans because of his enemy's possessing his secrets, and taking measures to defeat them, then his strategy was not successful, and General Long's effort to divert attention from this fact is more ingenious than commendable.

Compelled to abandon the route originally chosen by the eastern base of the mountain, General Lee, on this day (Wednesday, June 10th,) put his army in motion, and General Ewell with his corps left Culpeper Court-House, passing through Gaines' Cross Roads, and halted near Flint Hill on his way to Chester Gap and Front Royal.

*Thursday, June 11.* Learning of the withdrawal of Ewell's corps from Culpeper, General Hooker, on this day, ordered the Third Corps to leave its encampment at Boscobel, near Falmouth, and march to Hartwood Church, to prevent any crossing in that vicinity, and confine the enemy to the valley route.

*Friday, June 12.* The First Corps marched from its encampment at Fitzhugh's plantation and White Oak Church to Deep Run; the Third Corps went from Hartwood Church, which it had reached the previous evening, to Bealeton, and with the Third division under General Humphreys advanced to the Rappahannock; and the

Eleventh Corps, from the vicinity of Brooke's Station, marched to Hartwood Church, from which the Third Corps had departed that morning. The positions occupied by these three corps, as will be seen by a glance at the map, were intended to prevent Lee from crossing the river east of the mountain, compelling him to pass into the valley.

*Saturday, June 13.* The First Corps marched from Deep Run to Bealeton, uniting there with the Third, which had reached that place the evening previous; the Fifth Corps left its encampment in the vicinity of Banks' Ford and marched by Grove Church toward Morrisville; Wright's and Newton's divisions (first and third) of the Sixth Corps marched from Franklin's Crossing to Potomac Creek; the Eleventh Corps marched from Hartwood Church, where it had remained over night, to Catlett's Station; and the Twelfth Corps, which up to that time had remained in its encampment near Stafford Court House and Aquia Landing, started *en route* to Dumfries. The Artillery Reserve moved from near Falmouth to Stafford Court House.

General Hill, who had been left at Fredericksburg to watch the Federals, as soon as he saw them leave their encampment and march northward, also left his position and proceeded to Culpeper Court House.

There appears to be some discrepancy in the statements in regard to the precise time when Longstreet and Hill left Culpeper. General Longstreet, on page 418 of *Annals of the War*, says: "General A. P. Hill having left Fredericksburg as soon as the enemy retired from his front, was sent to follow Ewell, who had marched up the valley and cleaned it out of the Federals. My corps left

Culpeper on the 15th, and with a view of covering the march of Hill and Ewell through the valley, moved along the east of the Blue Ridge, and occupied Snicker's and Ashby's gaps, and the line of the Blue Ridge." General Long differs from Longstreet, as will be seen in his statement, which is as follows: "Hill, as soon as the enemy disappeared from his front, withdrew from Fredericksburg and proceeded to close upon the main body of the army. On the 15th, Longstreet was put in motion for the valley, and Hill was directed to follow a day later." Whether or not Hill preceded Longstreet is not material, but it would seem that from the route the latter took, and the duty assigned him of covering the other two corps in the valley, he must have been the last to leave Culpeper. At all events, by the 16th, both of these corps had left—Hill following Ewell into the valley, and Longstreet moving northward along the eastern base of the mountain.

Information of the purpose of General Lee to invade the North, as revealed by the papers captured from General Stuart's head-quarters, as well as the fact of the departure of Ewell's Corps from Culpeper for the Shenandoah Valley, was promptly communicated to the authorities at Washington, and the necessary preparations to meet the emergency were discussed. One of the first of the Federal posts that would most likely be assailed by the advancing foe, was Winchester, in the valley of Virginia. At that place General Milroy was stationed with about ten thousand men, of whom about seven thousand only were effective. These were not enough to insure safety in the threatened advance of Lee's entire army, yet too many to lose. The exposed condition of these men was foreseen,

and it was deemed best to withdraw the military stores and ammunition from Winchester, and hold the place merely as a look-out, to give warning of the enemy's approach. Accordingly on the 11th, probably before the authorities at Washington knew that Ewell's corps had left Culpeper for the valley, General Milroy received orders through General Schenck, his department commander, whose head-quarters were at Baltimore, to send his armament and supplies to Harper's Ferry. General Milroy, informed only of the expected raid by Stuart, and ignorant of the approach of the Confederate army, remonstrated against the withdrawal, declaring that he could hold the place against any force that might come against him. In reply to this remonstrance General Schenck telegraphed him that he might remain, but must be in readiness to fall back whenever circumstances made it necessary. Milroy replied to this that he could be ready to move in six hours. General Milroy then sent a brigade under Colonel A. T. McReynolds out upon his right to Berryville, to observe the adjacent passes of the Blue Ridge and the fords of the Shenandoah river; at the same time his cavalry scouts patrolled the valley as far as Front Royal and Strasburg. On Friday the 12th, he sent out a strong reconnoissance on each road to ascertain if the enemy were in sight. That on the Strasburg road went nearly to Middletown, where its troopers decoyed a Confederate cavalry patrol into an ambush, and routed it with a loss of fifty killed and wounded, and thirty-seven prisoners. Colonel Shawl who was in command of this reconnoitering party, returned to Winchester and reported no force on the road which had not been there for several months. On the

Front Royal road the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Moss commanding, with about four hundred men, went only to Cedarville, twelve miles distant, and returned, reporting that they had been stopped by a large Rebel force. This account General Milroy refused to credit, insisting that they had been too easily frightened, and that if any such force could be there, he should have heard of its approach from either General Hooker, Halleck, or Schenck. He could not believe that an entire Confederate corps was near him, for he supposed Lee's army was still at Fredericksburg. His superiors had failed to inform him, as they should have done by telegraph, that a large part of it had moved to Culpeper. And he further supposed, that if Lee had left Hooker's front at Fredericksburg, the Army of the Potomac would have followed and he would have received full information thereof. Not entirely oblivious of his danger he telegraphed to General Schenck late that night for specific orders, whether to hold on to his post or to retreat to Harper's Ferry, stating that there appeared to be a considerable force in front of him. As the enemy soon after cut the wires, he received no reply to his message.\* Upon the following morning, (Saturday, 13th,) his patrols on the Front Royal road reported the enemy advancing in force; whereupon he signaled Colonel McReynolds to leave Berryville and rejoin him, while he sent out a considerable force to learn what was impending. These had not far to go, for Colonel Ely, on the Front Royal road, was stopped barely a mile from Winchester by a Confederate

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\* For many of the details of the affair at Winchester, I am indebted to Mr. Greeley's history, and to General Doubleday's "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg."



battery, when he fell back after a slight skirmish. General Elliott, on the Strasburg road, advanced a little further, and was halted by observing the enemy in force on his left; that is, on the Front Royal road. Here some cannon balls were exchanged, when the Union forces fell back to Apple-Pie Ridge, next to the city. Skirmishing continued throughout the balance of the day until dark, when a prisoner was taken who rather astonished General Milroy by the information that he belonged to Ewell's — formerly Stonewall Jackson's — corps.

On this same day (Saturday, 13th) "General Ewell, who had left Culpeper on Wednesday, June 10th, marched with Early's and Johnson's divisions directly upon Winchester, while he sent his remaining division, Rodes', to Berryville. Owing to the timely warning Colonel McReynolds had received, his brigade had gotten off in time, his rear being covered by Alexander's battery and the Sixth Maryland cavalry. These detained the enemy two hours, and then caught up with the main body. Jenkins' cavalry came upon the retreating force at Opequan Creek, where he made an attack, which was promptly repulsed by the artillery with canister. After this there was no further molestation, and McReynolds' command reached Winchester at 10:00 P. M. after a march of thirty miles. Rodes' division, after taking Berryville, kept on toward Martinsburg, and bivouacked at a place called Summit Point." — *Doubleday*.

General Milroy's course obviously should have been to fall back to Harper's Ferry at once, when he found himself so pressed by the enemy. But he was confronted by this difficulty: McReynolds' brigade, which had just

arrived, was so much exhausted by its long march of that day that it could go no further that night. To move without it would be to sacrifice it. This Milroy was unwilling to do. Besides, he still hoped that Hooker's army was following up Lee, and would come to his relief.

*Sunday, June 14.* On this day General Hooker moved his head-quarters from Falmouth, and started northward, encamping that night at Dumfries. General Reynolds was put in command of the left wing of the army, which consisted of the First, Third, and Eleventh corps. General Hooker himself accompanied the right wing, which consisted of the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth corps. The movements this day were as follows: the First and Third corps marched from Bealeton to Manassas Junction; the Fifth Corps arrived at Morrisville and proceeded thence *via* Bristersburg to Catlett's Station; Wright's (first) and Newton's (third) divisions of the Sixth Corps, moved from Potomac Creek to Stafford Court-House; the Eleventh Corps from Catlett's Station to Manassas Junction, and thence toward Centreville; the Twelfth Corps reached Dumfries, and the Artillery Reserve moved from Stafford Court-House to Wolf Run Shoals.

During the early part of this day, an ominous silence prevailed about Winchester. The Confederates were pushing forward and working around so as to cut off the retreat of the Federal troops. Early in the morning Milroy sent out a reconnoitering force to ascertain if the enemy had established themselves on the Pughtown or Romney roads. The party returned about 2 o'clock p. m. and reported the roads clear, but soon after the Confederates came in great force from that direction. This completely cut off escape.

by that route. At 4 o'clock P. M. a charge was made up the Front Royal road to the edge of the town, but the enemy were repulsed. Milroy then ordered a counter charge, which revealed the Confederates in great force just out of range of his works. Shortly after this, fire was opened from two eight-gun batteries on the northwest, scarcely a mile from the town; while at the same time the infantry swept up to and over the Federal breastworks, disregarding the fire of their guns, driving out the 110th Ohio regiment under Colonel Keifer with heavy loss and planting their colors in the defenses. This attack was made by Early's division,—Johnson operating on the eastern side of the town. The garrison retreated successfully, under cover of the guns from the main works above, which were held by Elliott's and McReynolds' brigades. An artillery duel ensued, which was kept up without any marked results until 8 o'clock in the evening.

When night closed upon the scene of this day's eventful struggle, General Johnson, leaving one brigade to cut off Milroy's escape toward the east, went off with the remainder of his division to form across the Martinsburg pike, about three miles north of Winchester, to intercept him in that direction.

General Milroy, at this juncture, found himself to be in a perilous position, and shortly after midnight held a council to decide upon what course to pursue. His cannon ammunition was nearly exhausted, and he had but one day's rations for his men. The foe in overwhelming numbers pressed upon him at every side, and all further attempts to hold his position were abandoned. It was resolved to leave the wagon-train and artillery, and attempt to force

their way out through the hostile lines that night. His guns were accordingly spiked and the ammunition thrown into cisterns. Leaving behind him his sick and wounded, at 1 o'clock A. M., he silently moved out through a ravine, and was not molested until he reached the road leading to Martinsburg, about four miles from the town. At this point the enemy were met in force, barring all retreat in that direction. But one thing could be done,—make an effort to break through this line. For over one hour, amidst the darkness of the night, the heroic defenders of the Union engaged in a desperate encounter with the overwhelming numbers of the foe, who were strongly posted, but could not succeed in forcing their line. To add to their seemingly hopeless condition, a signal gun fired at Winchester, showed that the enemy there were aware of their flight, and were in pursuit. At this critical juncture General Milroy determined to try another expedient: he ordered his troops to fall back a short distance and turn to the right. In the darkness and confusion some misunderstanding occurred, and some of the men escaped in the way directed, while the greater number filed to the left and took the road to Bath. It was impossible to reunite the two columns, and that portion which took to the east, and were not pursued, reached Harper's Ferry by way of Smithfield late in the afternoon. Those who moved westwardly on the Bath road, also made good their escape, and crossed the Potomac at Hancock, rallying at Bloody Run. General Milroy claims that about five thousand of his command reported at the two places, and that the two thousand paroled by General Early consisted principally of the sick and wounded. General Lee claims as the

capture from Milroy over four thousand prisoners, twenty-nine guns, two hundred and seventy-seven wagons, and four hundred horses.

The disaster to General Milroy's command was a severe one to the national cause. The General himself was a good soldier, and can hardly be blamed for his mishap. He relied upon his department commander and the authorities at Washington, to inform him of the approach of the enemy in overwhelming force. The latest moment that a communication from either could have reached him, was on Saturday evening, the 13th, when the telegraph wires were cut by the enemy. And as Ewell's corps only left Culpeper for the valley on Wednesday, the 10th, it may be that his moving in that direction was not known in Washington in time to inform Milroy of his approach. If the fact of his going in that direction was known there at any time up to Saturday evening, then the fault was in not forwarding at once this information, and withdrawing him from his perilous position.\* General Milroy evidently held on one day too long. Had he fallen back to the Potomac on Saturday night, instead of delaying until Sunday night, he might have escaped with comparatively little loss. But he was deterred from doing this by his

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\*Captain James H. Stephenson, in an article found in "Annals of the War," pages 634-641, entitled "The First Cavalry," relates the following: "When Milroy found he was surrounded by Lee's army, he sent for a bold officer and fifty men to carry a despatch to Martinsburg, and Major Boyd was detailed with his old company. They knew every cow-path in the valley, and succeeded in flanking the rebel force then between Winchester and Martinsburg, and sent the first intelligence to Baltimore and Washington that Lee's army was at Winchester. That night a despatch arrived at Martinsburg for Milroy, and three men of Boyd's company volunteered to take it through. Their names were Oliver Lumphries, John V. Harvey, and George J. Pitman, all sergeants. After several hair-breadth escapes, they arrived in the beleagured town at midnight, and Milroy called a council of war." The

expectation of receiving orders from Washington, or assistance from General Hooker. Then too he could only have retreated on Saturday night with the loss of McReynolds' brigade, which, after their march of thirty miles from Berryville, were too much fatigued to go any further that night. Had Milroy been advised of the approach of Ewell twenty-four hours earlier, and McReynolds been ordered to fall back upon Harper's Ferry, and he himself had gone to the same place, the disaster of Winchester would have been avoided. This disaster, however, was not without some compensation. The appearance of the enemy there in force, and their detention for a day or two, sent a note of warning throughout the entire North, and afforded time to raise troops and organize them for effective resistance.

As previously stated, while Early's and Johnson's divisions were attacking Milroy at Winchester, Rodes marched upon Berryville. After pursuing for awhile McReynolds, who had received timely notice and had been ordered to proceed to Winchester, Rodes, preceded by Jenkins'

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cavalry referred to were part of the first cavalry regiment of the war. It was known as "The First New York;" and also, "The Lincoln Cavalry." It was this same company under Captain Boyd that covered the retreat of McReynolds' wagon-train, as related in the ensuing chapter, and which engaged Jenkins and the advance of Rodes near Greencastle, Monday, June 22d, in what is known as the first battle of the rebellion upon Pennsylvania soil. And it was another company of this same regiment under the heroic and dauntless Captain Jones, that fought and defeated twice their number of Imboden's men in McConnellsburg, Monday, June 29th, capturing as many of the enemy as there were of their own number, besides killing two and wounding one, and putting the balance to flight. Captain Jones and his brave command figured again in a dash upon the great wagon-train in its retreat from Gettysburg, which will be related in its appropriate place. This regiment was one of the most heroic and gallant in the Federal service, and its achievements as related by Captain Stephenson, will be read with great interest.

cavalry, followed McReynolds' wagon-train, which had headed for Martinsburg instead of following on to Winchester, arriving at the former place late in the afternoon of Sunday, June 14th. This place was held by a small detachment under Colonel Tyler, who formed his men in line outside of the place and resisted Rodes' attack until darkness set in, when his infantry escaped to Shepherdstown, and his artillery and cavalry to Williamsport. The whole force, after suffering the loss of five guns and five caissons rejoined the main body at Harper's Ferry. All the troops now at that place, because of its indefensible position, moved across the river to Maryland Heights, which was strongly fortified.


Immediately upon the defeat of Milroy at Winchester, General Ewell advanced the divisions of Early and Johnson to the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, between Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, where they remained a few days before they crossed the Potomac into Maryland. Jenkins' cavalry continued the pursuit of McReynolds' wagon-train, which crossed the river at Williamsport, and made its way down the valley through Chambersburg. Jenkins' force crossed at Williamsport on the evening of Sunday, June 14th. On the following day (Monday, 15th) the brigades of Ramseur, Iverson and Dole, with three batteries of artillery, also crossed at the same place; and on the following days, the 16th, 17th, and 18th, the balance of the division crossed and all encamped near the town, remaining there until the following week when the advance down the Cumberland Valley commenced. Leaving these troops at the places named, with Hill's corps *en route* for the valley, and Longstreet and

Stuart yet at Culpeper, and with the Army of the Potomac on the march northward east of the Blue Ridge, we next turn our attention to important events transpiring in the loyal states, and also to the advance of Jenkins' cavalry.



## CHAPTER III.


### PREPARATIONS FOR THE RECEPTION OF THE ENEMY — ADVANCE OF JENKINS' CAVALRY.

HE stirring events about to be related will be better understood if the reader is familiar with the geographical features of the country to which the action of the campaign is now to be transferred. In order to supply this knowledge, I will state it thus: Commencing at the Susquehanna River at Harrisburg, and extending down to the southern border of the State and through the States of Maryland, Virginia and North Carolina into Tennessee, is a large and beautiful valley, ranging in width from fifteen to twenty-five miles. It is bounded on the west by a range of mountains, known as the North Mountain; and on the east, by the South Mountain, down to the Potomac, and from thence down through Virginia, by the same general range, called the Blue Ridge. From the Susquehanna to the Potomac this valley is called the Cumberland Valley; and from the last named river down through Virginia, it is known as the Shenandoah Valley. The principal towns through this valley are Harrisburg, fifty-two miles from Chambersburg; Mechanicsburg, forty-three miles; Carlisle, thirty-one miles; Newville, twenty-two miles, and Shippensburg, eleven miles. South of the town are Marion, six miles; Greencastle, eleven miles; Hagerstown, twenty-

two miles, and Martinsburg, forty-two miles. At the time of the war the Cumberland Valley Railroad, commencing at Harrisburg, passed down through this valley to Hagerstown, touching at all the places named, except Martinsburg. It has since been extended to that place. There is also a turnpike road from Harrisburg down through this valley, passing through nearly all the places named. Williamsport, one of the principal fords of the Potomac, is distant from Hagerstown in a south-westerly direction six miles. A good road runs direct from Greencastle to that place, and is some three miles nearer than by way of Hagerstown,—the distance being fourteen miles, and by way of Hagerstown, seventeen miles.

The valley between the Susquehanna and Potomac is crossed by several good roads or turnpikes, the principal of which are, the National Pike, which extends from Baltimore to Wheeling, crossing the South Mountain by Turner's Pass, and passing through Frederick, Boonsborough, Hagerstown, Clearspring, and other places; the road by Monterey Pass above Waynesborough, from which, on the eastern side of the mountain, roads diverge to Frederick, Emmittsburg, and Gettysburg; the pike running from Baltimore to Pittsburg, crossing the mountain by Newman's Pass, and passing through Westminster, Gettysburg, Cashtown, Greenwood, and Chambersburg; and the pike which runs from points east of the mountain to Carlisle and crosses by Mount Holly.

In the public square of Chambersburg the Pittsburg and Baltimore pike crosses the road from Harrisburg to Winchester at right-angles—the former running almost directly east and west. Now taking a stand here and



MARYLAND AND SOUTHERN PENNSYLVANIA, FROM THE POTOMAC TO  
THE SUSQUEHANNA.

facing east, we have Fayetteville, six miles distant, Greenwood—a place of but few houses—eight miles, Cashtown on the east of the mountain, sixteen miles, and Gettysburg, twenty-four miles. A road which runs from Carlisle by Mount Holly and Pine Grove along the South Mountain, comes out into the Baltimore Pike, near the top of the mountain; and roads from both north and south of the pike enter into it at Greenwood. It is these roads that gave this little place, situated at the western base of the mountain, its importance during the invasion. Cashtown on the eastern base of the mountain, like Greenwood on the western, is of value only because of the several roads which radiate from it.

Gettysburg, as already stated, is twenty-four miles distant from Chambersburg. It is the county seat of Adams County, and contains about five thousand inhabitants. A theological seminary and college, belonging to the Evangelical Lutheran Church, are located there. Between two ranges of hills, the Catoclin on the east, and the South Mountain on the west, is a narrow valley which, like the Cumberland, west of the mountain, has always been noted for its beauty and fertility. At the head of this valley, on a gentle western slope, and forming a focal center for roads running north, south, east, and west, lies the town of Gettysburg. A mile to the east runs Rock Creek, the chief of the head-waters of the Monocacy.

Taking a position now in the historic town of Gettysburg, and looking to the north-east, we have the town of York, distant twenty-eight miles; a little further to the left is Harrisburg, thirty-five miles; and across the South Mountain, in a northwesterly direction, is Carlisle,

twenty-eight miles. South of Gettysburg, thirty-two miles, is Frederick; Baltimore, southeast, fifty-two miles; and Washington, nearly due south, sixty-four miles. Hagerstown, by way of Fairfield and Monterey Pass, is thirty-two miles distant in a southwesterly direction. Thus it will be seen that Hagerstown, Chambersburg, and Gettysburg form the three angles of a triangle, the South Mountain passing directly through it, and separating the latter from the former.

As soon as it was apparent that General Lee contemplated a movement northward, the authorities of our State were notified of the fact, and were assured that the condition was such that the Army of the Potomac could not be divided, and Pennsylvania must furnish her own men for her defense. On the 9th of June two new departments were created: that of the Monongahela, with headquarters at Pittsburg, was assigned to Major-General W. T. H. Brooks; and that of the Susquehanna, with headquarters at Harrisburg, was given to Major-General D. N. Couch. On the 12th, Governor A. G. Curtin issued a proclamation, addressed to the people of the State, telling them of the danger which threatened them, and calling for volunteers to meet the emergency. On the same day General Couch, on assuming command of the department, also issued an address, reiterating what Governor Curtin had said, and calling for a general and speedy enlistment. The responses to these calls not being as general and prompt as desired, the President, on the 15th, specifically called upon the State of Pennsylvania and the States nearest, for the following militia: Pennsylvania, fifty thousand; Maryland, ten thousand; New York, twenty thousand; Ohio, thirty

thousand, and West Virginia, ten thousand, — a total of one hundred and twenty thousand men. The governors of these States re-echoed the call, but still the responses were weak. The uniformed and disciplined regiments of New York City generally responded and proceeded to Harrisburg, but the number from the other States, including Pennsylvania, who went to meet the foe was but comparatively small. A liberal estimate of the number who responded was about as follows: Pennsylvania, twenty-five thousand; New York, fifteen thousand; New Jersey, three thousand; Maryland, five thousand; Delaware, two thousand,—a total of fifty thousand. Those of the number who reported at Harrisburg were organized into two divisions, one under General W. F. Smith, and the other under General Dana. On the same day that the President called for troops, the construction of breast-works and the digging of rifle-pits along the river front, and on the opposite bank of the river, were commenced and carried forward from day to day. At the same time these preparations were being made at Harrisburg, similar activity was manifested at Pittsburg. Thus while the work of preparation for the reception of the enemy was going on, he was pressing toward our border, and soon, as we will show, made his appearance in our midst.

The people who lived along the southern border during the war were kept in an almost continuous state of anxiety. The booming of cannon was frequently heard, and the rumors of approaching foes at times threw the whole community into a state of intense excitement. Dr. Philip Schaff, in his notes on Matthew xxiv. 6, as published in Lange's commentary, in a lucid and graphic

manner describes the excitement which prevailed along the border during the week preceding the appearance of the invading army. The doctor, whose ability as a scholar and writer is widely known, resided in Mercersburg, Franklin county, at the time of the war, and the scripture upon which his comments are based is as follows: —“*And ye shall hear of wars and rumors of wars.*” The doctor says: “I beg leave to quote a passage from my diary during the famous Southern invasion of Pennsylvania under General Lee, in June and July, 1863, which may throw some light on this passage (Matthew xxiv:6.) in its wider application to different periods of repeated fulfillment:

*‘Mercersburg, Pa., June 18th, 1863.*—It seems to me that I now understand better than ever before some passages in the prophetic discourses of our Savior, especially the difference between *wars* and *rumors of wars*, and especially the force of the command to “*flee to the mountains,*” (v. 16) which I hear again and again in these days from the mouth of the poor negroes and other fugitives. *Rumors of wars*, as distinct from *wars* are not, as usually understood, reports of wars in foreign or distant countries, for these may be read or heard of with perfect composure and unconcern, but the conflicting, confused, exaggerated and frightful rumors which precede the approach of war to our own *homes* and *firesides*, especially by the advance of an invading army and the consequent panic and commotion of the people, the suspension of business, the confusion of families, the apprehensions of women and children, the preparations for flight, the fear of plunder, capture and the worst outrages which the unbridled passions of brute soldiers are thought capable of committing upon an unarmed community. Such *rumors of wars* are actually often worse than war itself, and hence they are mentioned after the *wars* by way of climax. The present state of things in this community is certainly worse than the rebel raid of General Stuart’s cavalry in October last, when they suddenly at Mercersburg, at noon-day, seized a large number of horses, shoes and store goods, and twelve innocent citizens as candidates for Libby prison, but did no further harm and left after a few hours for Chambersburg. But now the whole veteran army of Lee, the military strength and flower of the South-

ern rebellion is said to be crossing the Potomac and marching into Pennsylvania. We are cut off from all mail communication and dependent on the flying and contradictory rumors of passengers, straggling soldiers, run-away negroes and spies. All the schools and stores are closed; goods are being hid or removed to the country, valuables buried in cellars or gardens and other places of concealment; the poor negroes, the innocent cause of the war, are trembling like leaves and flying with their little bundles "to the mountains," especially, the numerous run-away slaves from Virginia, from fear of being captured as "contrabands" and sold to the South; political passions run high; confidence is destroyed; innocent persons are siezed as spies; the neighbor looks upon his neighbor with suspicion, and even sensible ladies have their imagination excited with pictures of horrors far worse than death. This is a most intolerable state of things, and it would be a positive relief of the most painful suspense if the rebel army would march into town.'

"Shortly after the above was written," adds Dr. Schaff, "various detachments of Lee's army took and kept possession of Mercersburg till the terrible battles at Gettysburg on the first three days of July, and although public and private houses were ransacked, horses, cows, sheep, and provisions stolen day by day without mercy, negroes captured and carried back into slavery, (even such as I know to have been born and raised on free soil,) and many other outrages committed by the lawless guerrilla bands of McNeil, Imboden, Mosby, etc., yet the actual reign of terror, bad as it was, did not after all come up to the previous apprehensions created by the 'wars and rumors of wars', and the community became more calm and composed, brave and unmindful of danger."

Rumors of the threatened invasion of our border became prevalent in Chambersburg toward the latter part of the week previous to the actual appearance of the enemy. On the evening of Saturday, June 13th, the town was thrown into a state of great excitement by a rumor that



the foe was approaching; and towards evening of the following day (Sunday, 14th), the report was in circulation that disaster had fallen upon the Federal forces about Winchester, and the enemy were approaching in force. Immediately, as upon former occasions, when news of the approach of the Confederates was received, great excitement and confusion ensued. The usual work of secreting, or packing and sending away, merchandise and other valuables was commenced. The stores and shops were opened, and all was activity in removing their contents. The firm, of which the writer was a member, boxed and shipped part of its stock of dry goods to Philadelphia, some to the country to be hid in farm-houses, and the larger part was secreted in a fire-proof beer vault under an adjoining building. The officers of the bank removed their valuables, and the officials of the court-house packed and sent away the records and other valuable papers belonging to the county. The railroad men were also prompt to meet the emergency, and by noon of the ensuing day, Monday, 15th, had all their portable property loaded on cars and ready for shipment.

As events of stirring interest are now to be narrated, I will resume the daily summary style, and will commence with—

*Monday, June 15.* On this day we witnessed the greatest excitement which had occurred up to that time during all the history of the war. Early in the morning farmers residing in the southern portion of our county, began to pass through the town and on down the Harrisburg pike with their stock and valuables. The road was crowded with wagons, horses and cattle. Then came large numbers

of colored persons, men, women, and children, bearing with them huge bundles of clothing, bedding, and articles of house-keeping. Many of these had come from the valley of Virginia, while a few were residents of our own county and the neighboring county of Washington, in Maryland. About ten o'clock forty or fifty wagons, drawn by horses and mules, came dashing down Main street. They were attended by a few cavalry, and the affrighted drivers were lashing the poor jaded brutes attached to the wagons. They declared that the enemy were in close pursuit; that a large part of the train had been captured, and that the dreaded foe was about to enter Chambersburg. These wagons were a part of Colonel McReynolds' train, which Jenkins' cavalry had pursued from Berryville, and across the Potomac at Williamsport the afternoon before. As they came dashing down our street, drivers alternately lashing the poor animals and looking back to see if the enemy were in sight, the scenes of terror and confusion were perfectly terrific. Near the corner of Main and Queen streets one of the horses dropped dead from exhaustion. It was said that all along the road from the Potomac to this place wrecked wagons and broken down horses and mules were left by the way. When passing through the public square of this place at head-long speed, Lieutenant Palmer, on provost duty here, observing the needless panic, drew his revolver and ordered the teamsters to halt. His order was obeyed, and from Chambersburg down to Carlisle the teams were driven at a moderate pace. At that place they were taken in hand by the military authorities, and subsequently removed beyond the Susquehanna. This panic, after the teams had passed

through Hagerstown, was wholly unnecessary, as the invaders were not within twenty miles of them, for about the time they reached this place Jenkins entered Hagerstown. Between this force of the enemy and the wagon-train was Company C, First New York Cavalry, under Captain Boyd. This gallant command of about forty men became separated from its regiment, part of which escaped westwardly with part of General Milroy's forces, and crossed the Potomac at Hancock and concentrated at Bloody Run—sometimes called Everett. These troops afterward did good service upon the enemy's flank during the invasion, and this company under Captain Boyd, as well as company A under Captain Jones, will be heard from hereafter in this narrative.

The arrival of this train and the information it brought of the approach of the foe, naturally gave a fresh impetus to the citizens of Chambersburg, and the rush from the town in the direction of Harrisburg assumed larger proportions, while those who remained at their homes—by much the larger number—waited in much suspense for the arrival of the enemy.

At an early hour in the evening of this day, information was received of the approach of Jenkins' troops, and about eleven o'clock at night they reached the southern end of the town. Some six or eight were sent forward into the town to reconnoiter, and about two hundred more were detailed to make a rapid charge after this small force, and these were soon followed by the balance of the command—about two thousand in all.

Seated at an open window in the second story of my residence, overlooking the public square, and listening for the

approaching enemy, I at length heard the clatter of horses' feet coming rapidly down Main Street. When opposite the residence of Mr. H. M. White—but a short distance from the public square—the report of a gun was heard. Almost simultaneously with the report of this gun, some four or five cavalymen rode into the square. In the darkness—the gas in front of the bank building only having been left burning—they became separated, and one of them, evidently the officer in command of the squad, who had ridden over near the bank, called out in a peculiarly southern tone, "*Hawkins! Hawkins!!* I say, *Hawkins*, whar in the —— are you?" If Lieutenant Smith—for such was his name, as will appear shortly—had called upon two of our gallant young men, John A. Seiders and T. M. Mahon, instead of his Satanic majesty, he might have received the information he so earnestly desired, for they were having a little matter of business with his friend "*Hawkins*" across the square and near the court-house at that time. But Lieutenant Smith's anxiety for his friend was soon relieved, for on his going across the square to ascertain what had become of him, he fell into the hands of Seiders, and soon thereafter joined the object of his solicitude, both of them, however, dismounted and disarmed. Following this call for his absent comrade, the officer again called out, "Whar's the *mayaw* of this town? I say, whar's the *mayaw* of this town? If the *mayaw* does not come here in five minutes we will burn the town!" The "*Mayaw*" not responding to this urgent call, the officer rode across the square to the front of the court-house, where he was captured by Seiders. In a short time after the capture of Lieutenant Smith, the two

hundred detailed to follow the reconnoitering party, came thundering down the street, followed after a short interval by the remainder of the command. Some few remained in the town, but the larger part passed on down and out by the Harrisburg pike, and after picketing the various roads, encamped about one mile out. General Jenkins, with his staff, went to the residence of Colonel A. K. McClure, which stood upon the place where Wilson Female College now stands,—the fine building which stood there at that time having been burned in the destruction of our town by McCausland a year afterward. After partaking of a bountiful supper prepared for them, the honors of the table being royally done by the colonel's accomplished wife—the colonel himself being prudently absent—lay down to rest for the night. Leaving Jenkins and his staff so comfortably quartered for the night in Mr. McClure's mansion, and their horses picketed in his clover fields, we will return to town and detail what occurred there during the entrance of the reconnoitering party.

As the scouts came galloping down Main street, with their carbines cocked and levelled, the darkness prevented them from seeing a mortar-bed and some piles of stone and sand in front of Mr. H. M. White's residence, then in process of building, and one of the horses stumbled and fell, throwing its rider headlong into the mortar-bed. The fall caused his carbine to go off, and he, as well as his comrades, supposed that a citizen had fired upon them. Simultaneously with the report of the carbine, Mr. J. S. Brand, then residing in a house near by, threw open the shutters of a second story window in his house to see what was transpiring in the street. A cavalryman, then

opposite this house, hearing the report of the gun and the opening of the shutters, cried out that the shot came from that window. In a short time, after the arrival of the other cavalymen, a number of them, piloted by the one who averred that the shot came from Mr. Brand's house, went to the place and knocked at the door demanding admittance, and declaring the purpose of hanging the man that fired the shot. Mrs. Brand, becoming greatly alarmed for her husband's safety, urged him to go up into the attic and hide himself. At length, to gratify his wife, Mr. Brand complied, but finding his hiding-place under the roof to be very warm, and concluding that if the house was searched and he was found secreted, their suspicions would be confirmed, he came forth determined to face the issue. But as the cavalymen were yet at the door clamoring for entrance and threatening to break it in, he at length at the urgent solicitude of his wife, went into his back yard and crept into a bake-oven and drew to its iron door. But if the attic was *warm*, the oven was *hot*, for it had been used that same day to bake bread. After shifting himself from one hand and knee to the other until he could endure it no longer, he once more came forth to brave the foe. Before it was quite daylight a member of Mr. John Jeffries' family, who lived adjoining, came over to Mr. Brand's and said that the rebels were all about the house waiting for daylight, and declaring their purpose to search it and hang the person found in it. These ladies, Mrs. Brand and Miss Jeffries, then hit upon the expedient of disguising Mr. Brand and having him leave the house. Accordingly, they arrayed him in one of Mrs. Brand's dresses, and a large flowing sun-bonnet was put on his

head to hide his beard. In this disguise Mr. Brand went out of his back door, passed up his lot in the presence of the enemy, and crossed over to the residence of Mr. Jeffries where he was disrobed and where he had no further trouble with the enemy. The situation of Mr. Brand was an alarming one, and he availed himself of the only means of escape which presented itself; and for this he was indebted to the ingenuity of women.

Shortly after the entrance of the advance guard into the public square, one of the cavalry-men rode up to John A. Seiders and T. M. Mahon, as they stood upon the courthouse pavement, and inquired of them in what direction the remainder of the squad had gone? These two men had just returned home from service in the army, and they determined to try their hands on that fellow. Neither of them were armed, but Mahon, using a piece of a plastering lath which he held in his hand as a sword, seized hold of one of the reins of the bridle, and Seiders the other, and quietly demanded his surrender. He at once dismounted, and his sabre and pistol — the other being taken by Seiders — were at once taken by Mahon, who quickly mounted the horse and rode rapidly out Market street to Third, up Third to Queen, and down Queen to the market-house, into which he entered. While there a party of cavalry-men rode down Second street toward Market, and Mahon, as soon as they had passed, started out east Queen at a rapid gait. Near the eastern point, at the junction of Queen and Washington streets, he encountered a squad who called upon him to halt, but he fled on out the Gettysburg pike towards Fayetteville. At Downey's, some four miles distant, he turned from the pike and pro-

ceeded to Scotland, where, on the next day, he gave the horse into the care of a friend, and after witnessing the destruction of the railroad - bridge at that place, he eluded the pickets and returned on foot to Chambersburg and reported the destruction of the bridge to the railroad officials. Finding, however, that the Confederates had secured his name, and were on the hunt of him, he, after having been for some time hid in the house of his law preceptor, William McClellan, Esq., left and sought refuge in safer quarters. Mr. Mahon, to whom I am indebted for this account, desires to present his compliments to Mr. George Hawkins, should he be yet living and see this statement, and to assure him that the saddle, carbine, and case of medicines, borrowed of him under such pressing circumstances, have been safely kept, and he will be happy to return them to him now that "this cruel war is over."

Immediately after the departure of Mahon with his prize—the Confederate having been handed over to several other persons who came upon the scene, and who started to conduct him to the jail, but released him when they found that they were likely to be caught,—another cavalry-man rode up to where Seiders was standing, and inquired what had become of his comrade, Hawkins. Seiders now being armed with one of the captured pistols, presented it and demanded his surrender. To this demand he at once complied and dismounted. Seiders quickly disarmed him, and taking his sabre, pistols, and spurs, mounted his horse and rode rapidly out east Market street. At Market and Second streets he encountered the head of the column which had passed the market-house while Mahon was in it. To their command to halt he paid no



attention, but put his captured animal upon its speed and galloped out to Fayetteville. Arriving at that place he took an inventory of his capture, and it was found to be as follows: A valuable horse, saddle, bridle, four blankets rolled up and fastened behind the saddle, two fine pistols, sabre and belt, and a pair of saddle-bags, containing a dress coat, two shirts, a Testament, a pack of cards, a package of love letters, some smoking tobacco and other articles. Mr. Seiders also desires to present his compliments to Lieutenant Smith, and to assure him that he would be delighted once more to meet him, and return to him whatever of these articles he has preserved. From Fayetteville Mr. Seiders proceeded down through Cumberland county to Harrisburg, and dressed in the captured Confederate uniform, and mounted upon his captured horse, he did excellent scouting service during the invasion.

I return now from this extended but interesting digression to our main narrative, and will detail the events of —

*Tuesday, June 16.* Early this morning the Confederates took possession of what is known as Shirk's or Gelsinger's hill. This is a commanding eminence about four miles north of Chambersburg, and on the road leading to Harrisburg. A line of battle was formed along the brow of this hill by a part of the Confederate force, while detachments were sent out in all directions for the purpose of plundering. General Jenkins and staff, after spending the night under the hospitable roof of Colonel McClure, came early in the day into Chambersburg and established his head-quarters at the Montgomery House. One of his first acts was to summon the burgess and town-council to his head-quarters, when he made a demand for the return

of the two horses and equipments taken, and in case of their not being returned, payment for them, and in default of either, he threatened the destruction of the town. As the captured property was beyond the reach of the council, the matter was adjusted by the payment of \$900, and the handing over to him of the same number of pistols taken. For these he would not receive compensation in money, as he said pistols were of more value to them than money. After a little search the council secured by purchase from some of our citizens the number of pistols wanted, and the \$900 were paid over to him in Confederate scrip. Doubtless he expected to receive United States currency; but as his soldiers had flooded the town with their worthless currency, pronouncing it better than greenbacks, the city fathers took him at his word and paid him in his own money. This was bought up of our business men at about five cents on the dollar. Seiders afterward sold the horse for \$175, and the saddle for \$35. Out of this amount he refunded what the transaction cost the council (\$75), and he had \$135 left.

General Jenkins also issued an order requiring all arms in possession of our citizens, whether public or private, to be brought to the front of the court-house within two hours; and in case of disobedience all houses were to be searched; and those in which arms were found should be lawful objects of plunder. The pretext for this humiliating order was that his troops had been fired on by a citizen the night before. Many complied with this requisition, and a considerable number of guns, good, bad, and indifferent, were carried to the appointed place, where a committee of our people were ordered to take down the

name of each person who brought a gun. This was to secure the houses of all who complied with the order from the threatened search. Some, of course, did not comply, but enough did to satisfy the enemy, and a general search was avoided. Captain Fitzhugh, Jenkins' chief of staff, an ill-natured man—the same person who figured so largely in the burning of the town a year afterward—assorted the guns as they were brought in, retaining those that could be used by their men, and twisting out of shape, or breaking over the stone steps of the court-house, such as were unfit for service.

During the whole of this day foraging parties were sent out to all parts of the surrounding country, gathering horses and cattle, of which large numbers were taken and sent south to Williamsport and handed over to Rodes' infantry. One of these plundering parties on this day visited the Caledonia Iron Works, situated about ten miles east of Chambersburg, at the foot of the South Mountain, and belonging to Hon. Thaddeus Stevens. Under the promise that if all the horses and mules belonging to the establishment were delivered to them the iron works would not be burned, about forty valuable animals with harness, etc., were carried away. Mr. Stevens came near being captured by this party. He was on a visit to that place, and upon the rumored approach of the Confederates, was hurried away to Shippensburg by a by-road, much against his will and earnest protest. A week later, as will be shown in its appropriate place, these iron works were fired by the enemy and wholly consumed.

One of the revolting features of this day was the scouring of the fields about the town and searching of houses

in portions of the place for negroes. These poor creatures —those of them who had not fled upon the approach of the foe —sought concealment in the growing wheat fields about the town. Into these the cavalrymen rode in search of their prey, and many were caught —some after a desperate chase and being fired at. In two cases, through the intercession of a friend who had influence with Jenkins, I succeeded in effecting the release of the captured persons. That this practice of the raid was not confined to the vicinity of Chambersburg alone, but was practiced elsewhere, is proven by the quotation from Rev. Dr. Schaff's diary previously given in which he said that colored persons were taken and sent into southern slavery, even "such as I [he] knew to have been born and raised on free soil." In some cases these negroes were rescued from the guards, who were conducting them South, by the indignant people. A case of this kind occurred in Greencastle, in which a few determined men, armed with revolvers, captured a squad which had in charge a number of these poor frightened creatures, and released them from the unhappy fate which threatened them. This feature of the war indicated the object for which it was waged, to establish a government founded upon human slavery. Thank God, the effort, as well as the iniquitous cause which inspired it, not only failed, but went down never again to be attempted in this age or country. That slavery was the corner-stone upon which the government, sought to be established by the South, was to rest, is proved by the admission of one of the principal persons in the effort.\*

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\*Hon. A. H. Stephens, in what is called his "Corner Stone" address, delivered at Savannah, Georgia, March 21, 1861. That part of this address which relates to slavery will be found in Appendix A.

But that all who participated in the war against the Federal government, either did not entertain the same view as that held by the leaders in the movement, or else changed their minds during the progress of the war, is evident in the following thrilling sentiment, uttered by Mr. Maurice Thompson, a Southern man.\*

"I am a Southerner;  
I love the South; I dared for her  
To fight from Lookout to the sea,  
With her proud banner over me:  
But from my lips thanksgiving broke,  
As God in battle thunder spoke,  
And that Black Idol, breeding drouth  
And dearth of human sympathy  
Throughout the sweet and sensuous South  
Was, with its chains and human yoke,  
Blown hellward from the cannon's mouth,  
While Freedom cheered behind the smoke."

*Wednesday, June 17.* About eight o'clock this morning General Jenkins ordered the stores and shops to be opened for two hours, and that his men should be permitted to purchase such articles as they personally needed, but in all cases must pay for what they got. Business accordingly went on very briskly for awhile with those who had not removed or secreted their entire stock. Fortunately for us and many others, but little was found in our stores; but what little we had which the soldiers could buy under the order was quickly bought up and paid for in all imaginable kinds of scrip. Not only Confederate notes were paid us, but shin-plasters issued by the city of Richmond and other southern corporations. While this traffic was in operation a Confederate soldier seized a number of remnants of ladies' dress goods, which we had left lie on the

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\*This beautiful poem will be found in Appendix B.

counter, not thinking them worth hiding, and putting them under his arm walked out and down past Jenkins' head-quarters. The General came quickly out and caught the fellow by the back of the neck and ran him back into the store on the double-quick, saying to us as he rushed him up to the counter, "Did this man get these here? and did he pay for them?" Upon being told that he had taken them and had not paid for them, the General drew his sword, and flourishing it above the man's head and swearing terribly, said, "I've a mind to cut your head off." Then turning to us he said, "Sell my men all the goods they want; but if any one attempts to take anything without paying for it, report to me at my head-quarters. We are not thieves." Some of the officers visited the drug stores of the town and made liberal purchases, telling the proprietors to make out their bills, or if they had not time to do so to guess at the amount and it would be paid.

About nine o'clock, while we were doing a lively business, a soldier came riding at great speed from where the main body were stationed out on the Harrisburg pike, and reported to Jenkins that the Yankees were coming. The general came out in great haste, and mounting his horse, and in a voice of great power, ordered the men to the front. A rush was made out the Harrisburg pike, and soon the town was free from the enemy, when we at once closed our places of business. In the course of an hour a number of men returned leading the horses, and went on down the road leading to Greencastle to the outskirts of the town and there waited. Jenkins had dismounted his men and was prepared to fight the expected Yankees as infantry. They were armed with Enfield rifles as well as sabres. In the course of about an hour afterward, these dismounted

men fell back and marched through the town and out to where their horses were, and, after remounting, continued to fall back to the vicinity of Greencastle. The news of the occupation of our town by the Confederates was known all over the country, and great numbers of people, as well as some Federal scouts, moved by curiosity, or a desire to ascertain precisely where the enemy were, had come within sight of the men in line of battle on Shirk's Hill. Seeing these, and hearing of the gathering of troops at Harrisburg, and that a large body was advancing, they were alarmed, and, supposing themselves to be in danger of being attacked in overwhelming numbers, or flanked and cut off, they fell back within supporting distance of the Confederate infantry at Williamsport. As Jenkins and his staff rode up street after the dismounted men had all passed nearly out of sight, a number of our citizens were standing upon the pavement in front of the court-house. Supposing that they might be armed and intended to fire upon them, the general and his staff drew their pistols and rode toward the citizens. A stampede, of course, ensued. As the last of the soldiers was leaving the northern end of the town, they set fire to a large frame warehouse then belonging to Messrs. Oaks & Linn, but it was speedily extinguished by the citizens in that vicinity. The firing of that warehouse, and the destruction of the Scotland railroad bridge, were the only acts of real destruction attempted. True, many horses, cattle, and other things were taken, but all was within the rules of war, except the carrying away of free negroes.

After Jenkins withdrew his force to the vicinity of Greencastle, he sent out foraging parties in all directions

in search of additional plunder. One detachment consisting of about two hundred and fifty men under the command of Colonel Ferguson crossed the Cove Mountain by way of Mercersburg, reaching McConnellsburg, the county seat of Fulton County, shortly after daylight on Thursday. This was the first appearance of the Confederates in that place and the inhabitants were terribly alarmed as they arose from their beds to find the town in possession of the dreaded enemy. A vigorous search was at once instituted for horses, of which a large number was taken. The stores and shops were also visited, and although the alarm had extended there and stocks were nearly all removed or concealed, a considerable amount of valuable articles was taken. In some cases these were paid for in Confederate scrip. The streets, after their departure, were lined with old shoes, boots, and hats which had been thrown aside for better ones. About one mile north of the town a drove of fat cattle, valued at about six thousand dollars, belonging to Ex-Sheriff J. W. Taylor of this place, was grazing. These were taken, and together with the horses which had been captured, were driven with them and handed over to Rodes' infantry at Williamsport. On the following Sunday this same body of the enemy plundered the stores and shops of Greencastle. Had it not been that the business men there as elsewhere had removed their stocks, the losses would have been much greater. Another detachment was sent east, and after plundering the rich country about Waynesborough, crossed the south-eastern flank of the South Mountain, where, at the Monterey Pass, on Sunday, the 21st, the Philadelphia City troop and Bell's cavalry of Gettysburg, encoun-



tered their pickets. In the evening of the same day about one hundred and twenty of them entered Fairfield, and returned again by the Furnace road, taking with them all the good horses they could find.

From the time that these cavalymen fell back from this place to below Greencastle — Wednesday, the 17th — until Monday morning, the 22d, the whole southern portion of Franklin county was plundered by these men, and the captures made were transferred to Rodes' division at Williamsport. It would be difficult to estimate the value of the property taken by this raid, but it certainly amounted to not less than one hundred thousand dollars. Then its coming in the season of the year when the farming interests required the use of the horses, and followed a few days afterward by Lee's vast army, which added vastly to the amount taken, increased immensely its inconvenience and loss. Many croppers who had little else than their stock, were bankrupted. The effect of this raid, however, was to arouse the people of Pennsylvania and the whole North, and volunteers for the defense of the border hurried to Harrisburg.

By Monday morning, the 22d, the various detachments of Jenkins' command had all rejoined the main body between Greencastle and Hagerstown, where, on that day, they were joined by Rodes' division of infantry, when the real invasion of the State was begun.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE INVASION.

**D**URING the week while Jenkins was raiding the southern border of Pennsylvania, the corps of Hill and Longstreet were on the march to the Potomac, while the Federal army was moving parallel to them on the east of the Blue Ridge. Resuming our narrative of the daily movements of these two armies where we left off in a previous chapter to detail the disastrous affair at Winchester, and the raid of Jenkins, we commence with:

*Monday, June 15.* The head-quarters of the Army of the Potomac were this day moved from Dumfries to Fairfax Station; the Second Corps moved from Falmouth to near Aquia; the Fifth Corps from Catlett's Station *via* Bristoe Station to Manassas Junction; the Sixth Corps from Aquia Creek and Stafford Court-House to Dumfries; the Twelfth Corps from Dumfries to Fairfax Court-House; the Cavalry Corps guarding the left flank of the army left Warrentown Junction and moved to Union Mills and Bristoe Station; the Artillery Reserve moved from Wolf Run Shoals to Fairfax Court-House; and the Eleventh Corps, after marching all the previous night arrived at Centreville.

*Tuesday, 16.* This day the Second Corps marched from near Aquia *via* Dumfries to Wolf Run Shoals, on the

Occoquan; the Sixth Corps from Dumfries to Fairfax Station; and the Cavalry Corps from Union Mills and Bristoe Station to Manassas Junction and Bull Run.

General Longstreet, after leaving Culpeper Court-House, marched directly across the county east of the Blue Ridge. His object was to cover Ewell and Hill in the Shenandoah Valley. Stuart's cavalry, on this day, left its encampment on the south bank of the Rappahannock and moved along Longstreet's right flank. Longstreet hoped that Hooker might be tempted to turn about and attack either himself, or Hill and Ewell through one of the gaps of the mountain, in which case Stuart was to take advantage of any opportunity which might offer and interpose between the Federals and Washington. General Hooker, however, understood his antagonist's designs, and adhered to his main purpose to make the safety of the National Capital the paramount consideration. Accordingly, he directed the daily movements of his army so as to insure this object, until that army was posted about Centreville, Manassas, and Fairfax Court-House, entirely covering all the approaches to Washington.

About this time while the whole North was in a state of commotion and excitement consequent upon the approach of the foe, the Confederate Capital was also thrown into a state of consternation by the approach of Federal troops from the Peninsula. General Dix, who commanded at Fortress Monroe, received orders from Washington to advance upon Richmond, which, it was believed, was weakly defended at that time. Troops were accordingly sent by water and landed at Yorktown. General Getty, in command of one column of about seven thousand men,

moved as far as Hanover Junction to destroy the bridges over the North and South Anna. At the same time General Keys, with another column of about five thousand men, moved from the White House to secure Bottom's Bridge, on the Chickahominy, and thus leave a clear road for General Getty's column to advance on the city. The consternation in the Confederate Capital was so great that it was in contemplation at one time to recall Lee's forces. Troops were, however, hurriedly brought from the garrisons of South Carolina and other places, which, with the militia that was called out, were sufficient to defend the place.

*Wednesday, 17.* The First Corps marched from Manassas Junction to Herndon Station; the Second Corps from Wolf Run Shoals to Sangster's Station; the Third Corps from Manassas Junction to Centreville; the Fifth Corps from Manassas Junction to Gum Springs; the Eleventh Corps from Centreville to Cow-Horn Ford, or Trappe Rock, on Goose Creek; and the Twelfth Corps from Fairfax Court-House to near Dranesville.

The Cavalry Corps, on this day, left its encampment at Manassas Junction and Bull Run, and moved to Aldie, where, after a sanguinary contest with part of Stuart's force under General Fitz Hugh Lee, which had reached that place by a forced march to anticipate our troops in holding that gap, the enemy were put to flight, and that important pass was taken and held by the Union forces.

*Thursday, 18.* The head-quarters of the Army of the Potomac were this day moved from Fairfax Station to Fairfax Court-House; the Sixth Corps moved from Fairfax Station to Germantown; and the Twelfth Corps from

near Dranesville to Leesburg. J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade advanced from Aldie to Middleburg, and returned to a point midway between the two places.

Sanguinary engagements occurred between the cavalry of the two armies, with continued success for the Union forces.

General Lee with Longstreet's corps arrived this day at Berryville, where he remained several days, perfecting his preparations for the invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania.

*Friday, 19.* The First Corps marched from Herndon Station to Guilford Station; the Third Corps from Centreville to Gum Springs; and the Fifth Corps from Gum Springs to Aldie. The cavalry engagements of the two preceding days were renewed on this day and the enemy were again worsted. General Pleasanton succeeded in taking the two important passes of the mountain, Aldie and Thoroughfare gaps, through which the enemy must pass if he would cross the Potomac east of the mountain, or if he would obtain information of the movements of the Federal army. Pleasanton, therefore, asked for infantry supports in order to secure them against re-capture. Accordingly the Fifth Corps reached Aldie this day.

*Saturday, 20.* The Second Corps, in accordance with General Pleasanton's request, moved from Sangster's Station to Centerville, and thence toward Thoroughfare Gap; the second division (Howe's) of the Sixth Corps advanced from Germantown to Bristoe Station.

*Sunday, 21.* The Second Corps arrived at Thoroughfare Gap. It will thus be seen that these two important places—Aldie and Thoroughfare—were now strongly held by

Federal infantry, the former by the Fifth Corps and the latter by the Second. Apprehending, however, that Stuart would throw his whole force upon Gregg's division at Upperville, Pleasanton went forward with his entire command supported by Barnes' (first) division of the Fifth Corps, to support it. After a series of brilliant engagements, Stuart was driven steadily back into Ashby's, where he took refuge behind a portion of Longstreet's corps, which had come to his support. This day Stahl's division of cavalry, from the defenses of Washington, moved out from Fairfax Court-House *via* Centerville and Gainesville to Buckland Mills.

The situation now may be stated thus: General Hooker had the various corps of his army so placed that every approach to Washington, south of the Potomac, was effectually guarded. In addition to this he had Lee hopelessly enclosed in the Shenandoah Valley, unable either to pass to the east of the mountain and cross the Potomac at the places intended, or to obtain information of the movements of the Federal army. General Pleasanton, in the *Annals of the War*, page 451, in summing up the results of the series of cavalry engagements of the four preceding days, resulting in the capture and holding of Aldie and Thoroughfare gaps, states them thus: "On the evening of the 16th of June, the Cavalry Corps encamped near Manassas, the Army of the Potomac occupying positions between that point and Fairfax Court-House. After consulting with General Hooker it was decided that I should proceed by the way of Aldie, through the Bull Run Mountains, into Loudon Valley, to ascertain if Lee's army, or any portion of it, were in that

vicinity. I started early on the 17th, made a long march of twenty-five miles, and about five o'clock in the afternoon, shortly after we had entered the pass, met the enemy's cavalry coming through. After a hard fight for several hours, we drove them back to the west side of the mountains. On the 18th and 19th we were again engaged, and forced them beyond Middleburg, about nine miles from Aldie, and on the 21st, advancing with Buford on the road to Union, and Gregg on the Upperville road, we swept the Loudon Valley to the base of the Blue Ridge, fighting our way the whole distance. Near Upperville the fighting was severe, several brigades, on each side, being engaged in charging each other; but such was the dash and spirit of our cavalry that the enemy could not withstand it, and retreated through Ashby's gap badly worsted. General Buford, on the right, sent some parties to the top of the Blue Ridge, and they reported large masses of infantry and camps in the Shenandoah Valley toward Winchester. There being no infantry in the Loudon Valley, it was evident General Lee did not intend to cross the Potomac lower down than Shepherdstown. These facts were reported to General Hooker on the night of the 21st of June, and he shortly after set the army in motion for the vicinity of Frederick City, Maryland, Buford's division of cavalry taking up a position at Middletown, to the west of Frederick City."

General Doubleday, in his "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," on pages 101 and 102, in stating these results, says: "It is very certain that the loss of the pass at Aldie was a serious blow to the Confederate cause. This, supplemented by Colonel Duffie's operations, gave Hooker pos-

session of Loudon County, and threw the invading column far to the west. If the enemy had succeeded in posting forces in the gaps of the Bull Run range of mountains, and in occupying the wooded country between Thoroughfare Gap and Leesburg, they would not only have hidden their own movements from view, but would have had command of the Potomac from Harper's Ferry to within thirty miles of Washington, so that they could have operated on either side of the river."

Having posted his army so as to cover completely the National Capital, as well as confine his antagonist to the valley west of the mountain, General Hooker wisely concluded to wait for further developments. He found it difficult to believe that Lee would still further lengthen out his long line from Richmond, and endanger his communications by continuing his course northward, and accordingly determined to hold himself in readiness to meet any exigency which the further movements of his adversary might render necessary. Leaving General Hooker we turn our attention in another direction and note what was transpiring there.

On *Saturday*, 20, General Knipe was sent from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, up the valley with parts of two regiments of New York militia, numbering about eight hundred men. These were the first to reach the State Capital in response to the call of Governor Curtin. The object of these troops was, to assist in rebuilding the railroad bridge at Scotland, a station on the Cumberland Valley Railroad about four miles north-east of Chambersburg, which was destroyed by Jenkins on Tuesday preceding, and then to proceed to the latter place. On the



following day—Sunday, 21,—after completing their task at Scotland, to which place they had come by rail, they came on to Chambersburg and encamped in a grove about one mile south of the town, alongside of the road leading to Greencastle and Hagerstown, where for the present we may leave them.

On this day, *Sunday, 21*, General Lee, then at Berryville, south of the Potomac, issued the following general order:

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

June 21st, 1863.

*General Orders No. 72.*

While in the enemy's country, the following regulations for procuring supplies will be strictly observed, and any violation of them promptly and vigorously punished:

I. No private property shall be injured or destroyed by any person belonging to or connected with the army, or taken, except by the officer hereinafter designated.

II. The chiefs of the commissary, quartermaster, ordnance and medical departments of the army will make requisitions upon the local authorities or inhabitants for the necessary supplies for their respective departments, designating the places and times of delivery. All persons complying with such requisitions shall be paid the market price for the articles furnished, if they so desire, and the officer making such payment shall make duplicate receipts for the same, specifying the name of the person paid, and the quantity, kind, and price of the property, one of which receipts shall be at once forwarded to the chief of the department to which such officer is attached.

III. Should the authorities or inhabitants neglect or refuse to comply with such requisition, the supplies required shall be taken from the nearest inhabitants so refusing, by the orders and under the directions of the respective chiefs of the departments named.

IV. When any command is detached from the main body, the chiefs of the several departments of such command will procure supplies for the same, and such other stores as they may be ordered to provide, in the manner and subject to the provisions herein prescribed, reporting their action to the heads of their respective departments, to which they will forward duplicates of all vouchers given or received.

V. All persons who shall decline to receive payment for property furnished on requisitions, and all from whom it shall be necessary to take stores

or supplies, shall be furnished by the officers receiving or taking the same with a receipt specifying the kind and quantity of the property received or taken, as the case may be, the name of the person from whom it was received or taken, the command for the use of which it is intended, and the market price. A duplicate of said receipt shall be at once forwarded to the chief of the department to which the officer by whom it is executed is attached.

VI. If any person shall remove or conceal property necessary for the use of the army, or attempt to do so, the officers hereinbefore mentioned will cause such property and all other property belonging to such persons that may be required by the army, to be seized, and the officer seizing the same will forthwith report to the chief of his department the kind, quantity and market price of the property so seized, and the name of the owner.

By command of GENERAL R. E. LEE.

R. H. CHILTON, *A. A. and I. G.*

Whether or not this order was printed before the army reached Chambersburg I can not say, but on Wednesday following, along with an order issued by Lieutenant-General Ewell, which, with other papers, was printed at one of the printing establishments in Chambersburg, it was freely distributed upon slips among the people. Its object was, as will be seen by its perusal, to define the general plan of operations of his army while in our State in procuring supplies. This plan, to the credit of General Lee be it said, was designed to confine the demands of his army, and the methods employed in securing them, within the limits of civilized warfare. The execution of these demands, however, would bear heavily upon the people where his army would march, but the humane regulations established would and did prevent entering private houses, and the indiscriminate plunder of private property.

*Monday, 22.* On the morning of this day two companies of home guards, composed of citizens of Chambersburg, went out and joined the New York militia-men. The home guards were mostly sent out on the Greencastle

road to do picket duty, while the militia-men spent much of their time in drill exercise with two beautiful brass howitzers which they had brought with them. These guns they had placed upon a hill adjoining their camp, which commanded the Greencastle road. Sometime in the afternoon a person supposed to be a woman came into the camp. She was attired in mourning apparel, with her face almost concealed in a black bonnet of somewhat antiquated style. She went about the camp pretending to be silly, and inquired where a certain farmer lived whom no one knew. Some of the home guard suspected that the mysterious person was a man in disguise, and advised the colonel in command to arrest her. He replied that she was only a silly woman, and must not be disturbed. At length she left the camp, and when last seen was making her way at a brisk pace southward on the railroad. That this pretended woman was a Confederate scout, sent by Jenkins in advance to ascertain what force and preparations were here for their reception, is clear. This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that previous to every Confederate advance, scouts preceded the main body and mingled with our people. A few days before Jenkins' first advance, two strange men came to Greencastle and remained at a hotel there until the cavalry of this general entered that place, when they threw off their disguise by uniting with the Confederates and telling the landlord to charge their bills to the Southern Confederacy.

At an early hour in the morning of this day, Rodes' division of Ewell's corps, which was encamped about Williamsport for a week, advanced down the valley by the road leading directly to Greencastle, at which place the head

of the column, about 10 o'clock A. M., came up to Jenkins' cavalry. About the time of the arrival of the infantry, Jenkins sent a detachment of cavalry in the direction of Chambersburg for the purpose of reconnoitering. At Marion—six miles south of that place—this force came unexpectedly upon Mr. D. K. Appenzellar, then a young man and a resident of Greencastle, who was on his way to Chambersburg to enter the military service. Having captured him and the fine horse upon which he was riding, and which he was having shod when the force came suddenly upon him, they plied him with questions as to what was the latest news, and where troops were collecting, and how many were in Chambersburg. To their inquiries he said that he had been in Chambersburg the day before and was told there that General McClellan was on the way from Harrisburg with forty thousand men. This was the usual stereotyped story which was always floating around when we were threatened with a raid. The cavalymen seemed to credit Mr. Appenzellar's statement and were inclined to retrace their steps. Just at this juncture Captain Boyd, with his bold and dashing company of the First New York Cavalry, who had covered the wagon train in its rapid flight the Monday before, as related in the previous chapter, came in sight and dashed toward the enemy. Remembering Mr. Appenzellar's story of General McClellan with his forty thousand men, and perhaps supposing that these dashing horsemen were the advance of this force, the Confederates fled back toward Greencastle, taking Mr. Appenzellar with them. When within about half a mile of the town the main body of Jenkins' force, with the advance of Rodes'

infantry, were met, and seeing the scouting party retreating pursued by Captain Boyd and his troopers, and unaware of the number of Federals who might be near at hand and upon them, a line of battle was hastily formed. Fences were torn down to the right and left of the road, and Rodes' infantry took a position upon the high ground of Mr. John Kissecker's farm. Jenkins threw his cavalry forward and formed a skirmish line upon the land of Mr. William Flemming, about a quarter of a mile in advance of the infantry. Jenkins established his headquarters in Mr. Flemming's house. As soon as the Union cavalry came within range of their guns, fire was opened upon them, and for a time the noise and clatter were quite lively. A sister of Mr. Flemming, going to the window to look out, barely escaped a ball which came crashing in through the glass close by her head. As soon as the dash and curiosity of these bold riders were satisfied they withdrew out of range, and were pursued by part of Jenkins force. Mr. Appenzellar, who was a witness of this engagement, says that of all the bold and fearless soldiers he ever saw—and he saw many and had a large experience during the war—these New York cavalymen exceeded any in these qualities. And had they gone but a short distance further they would have come into a cross fire which would have swept them nearly all away. Their foresight, however, was equal to their courage, and they knew when to stop.

The result of this fight was one man killed and one wounded upon the Federal side. The killed was Corporal Rihl. He was shot through the upper lip, the ball passing through his head, his blood bespattering the paling fence

in front of Mr. Fleming's dwelling. The wounded was Sergeant Cafferty, who was shot through the leg. A correspondent of the *Greencastle Pilot*, in its issue of July 28th, 1863, says that the Confederates lost two men killed. This account, however, has not been confirmed by any other authority. Corporal Rihl was buried by the Confederates in a shallow grave, but the citizens of Greencastle, a few days afterward, disinterred his body and placing it in a coffin, reburied it in the Lutheran graveyard of that place. Sergeant Cafferty was taken in charge and cared for in Greencastle, where, attended by one of the physicians of that place, he recovered. Rihl Post of the Grand Army of the Republic of Greencastle was named after this brave soldier who fell in that engagement.

This battle—if such it may be called—was the first to occur upon Pennsylvania soil during the rebellion, and Corporal Rihl was the first to lose his life.\*

As an introduction to the next scene in the interesting chain of events under consideration, I give the following statement by Mr. A. J. Schaff, who was an eye-witness of what he relates:

“On the 22d of June, 1863, I was in Marion with many others for the purpose of obtaining such information as I could in regard to the movements of the Confederates. When on my way home, which was about two miles

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\*On June 22d, 1886, the twenty-third anniversary of this battle, Rihl Post, Grand Army of the Republic of Greencastle, assisted by several other posts from abroad, and an immense gathering of people, again exhumed the remains of this first martyr to the cause of the Union upon Pennsylvania soil, and reinterred them near the place where he fell. A beautiful monument is to be erected over his grave, and the place will henceforth be held as one of the sacred shrines of our country.

south-east of the town, I heard the discharge of guns, and upon looking in the direction of the road leading from Greencastle to Chambersburg, I saw Confederate and Union cavalry approaching each other. The Union troops were moving out from the southern part of Marion, and the Confederates were moving toward them, and were about a quarter of a mile south of them on the Chambersburg road. These were part of Jenkins' force. A few shots from the Union cavalry drove the Confederates back to near Greencastle, where a short engagement took place. The Union cavalry were driven back, and were followed by the Confederates to near Marion, where the latter went into camp upon the land of Michael Slothour, two miles south of the town. While these troops were going into camp, I climbed up into a tree, about a quarter of a mile to the east of them, for the purpose of estimating their numbers, so that I could report the same to the military who were near Chambersburg. Having been in the army, I could make a tolerably fair estimate of their number. After remaining in the tree until I was satisfied as to my estimate, which was that there were not less than one thousand of them, and that all were not then in camp, I descended and started at once for Chambersburg, taking to the fields lest I might be intercepted by the Confederates. When I came to that point where the Gabby road intersects the road to Chambersburg, I encountered a Federal cavalry picket. He asked me what I knew of the Confederates, when I told him they were in force below Marion, and that he had better keep a sharp lookout in all directions. After leaving this picket, I continued on in the direction of Chambersburg, and at a

point about three miles and a half south of the town, I came up to General Knipe and his staff. They were on the Greencastle road, were mounted, but standing still. When I came up to them, General Knipe asked me if I knew anything of the movements of the Confederates. I told him what I had seen, when he inquired of me if there were any roads running parallel with the one he was on, by which the Confederates could get in his rear. I told him that they could by the Warm Spring road, and by the road to the east of the one he was on. Turning to his staff, the general said: 'Men, we can not hold a point this far out.' Leaving the general and his staff, I proceeded toward Chambersburg, and about a mile south of the town came into the camp of the New York soldiers. The officers and men immediately gathered about me, and asked, 'How near are the rebels?' When I informed them that they were in force about six or seven miles south of them, they at once proposed to set fire to their tents and leave. I assured them that by a proper effort they could take their tents and camp equipage with them. This was well on toward evening, and I assisted in loading one wagon and pulling it to Chambersburg, as they had no horses to draw it. I do not know if the remainder of their tents were taken away or permitted to remain, as I started the next morning for Harrisburg."

Such is Mr. Schaff's statement. I give the following account of the further conduct of these men, condensed from the written statements of several of the citizens of Chambersburg, who were witnesses of what they relate:

About five o'clock in the afternoon, a great commotion was observed all over the camp. The officers were run-



ning around and in an excited manner giving commands. The soldiers at the guns hastily abandoned them, and the whole command hurriedly left and marched to the town, leaving guns, tents, and other camp equipage standing. Arriving at Chambersburg, they took passage upon a train of cars and left in the direction of Harrisburg. One of the officers of this regiment—whether the colonel or some other officer, my informants do not know—came in by the railroad, and instead of turning off at the Waynesborough crossing and coming in by Second street, kept on along the railroad. Passing along the track, his horse fell into a cattle-guard, and because of his inability to get him out, and fear of the Confederates, his owner drew his pistol and shot him through the head. Whether he stopped long enough to take off the saddle and bridle, is not known, but it is altogether likely some one got those articles very cheaply. The officer then ran on into the town and took the train with his companions. Two of the men took nervous spasms, one of whom was unable to proceed with his comrades, and was concealed in a house on East Market street during all the period of the invasion, and until the Confederates had retreated after the battle of Gettysburg. The Home Guard, after the cowardly flight of these men, hauled the two abandoned howitzers into Chambersburg and placed them on the cars, and they were taken along down the road. Meanwhile, many persons went to the abandoned camp and helped themselves to what they pleased of clothing and other articles. The next morning some of the citizens went out to the camp and brought in tents and other things which yet remained, among which were sardines

and other delicacies rather suited to a sociable picnic than the stern realities of war. One of the citizens of Chambersburg—Mr. Abram Metz—in the goodness of his heart, loaded a one-horse wagon full of pantaloons, blouses, blankets, buckets, camp-kettles, pistols, etc., which he hauled down to Shippensburg, where the train was lying over, and delivered them to their panic-stricken owners. Upon returning to Chambersburg, he encountered the advance of the Confederates, who relieved him of his horse.

Whether or not General Knipe had returned to camp and given the order for this retreat, I am unable to say. The probability is that he did not, for had he been there the panic and loss of valuable property would not have taken place.

These same New York soldiers, doubtless to cover their own cowardly conduct, returned home and reported that they had been badly treated by the people of Chambersburg—that they were even charged with the water they used. This foul slander is yet held and published by respectable papers. It is untrue, and a base slander upon a people who were profuse in their hospitality to these men when they halted in the town for an hour or two on the previous Sabbath. The facts stated, however humiliating to those concerned therein, are entirely reliable, and can be attested by dozens of living witnesses of undoubted respectability and veracity.\*

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\*In a matter involving so serious a charge as the one stated, the writer, in order to state the affair correctly and do no injustice to the parties concerned, had several eye-witnesses of undoubted veracity write out their own statements, from which this account has been condensed.

The division of General Rodes, having reached Greencastle this day, encamped about the town, the principal encampment being upon the farm of Rev. J. Loose. Shortly after their arrival, Colonel Willis of the Twelfth Georgia Regiment was appointed provost-marshal. Assisted by Captain Carson and the adjutant, with a detail of men, the colonel maintained excellent order throughout the town. Either while in Greencastle or before leaving camp near Williamsport, General Ewell, on this day, issued the following general order:

HEAD-QUARTERS SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

June 22d, 1863.

*General Orders, No. 49.*

In moving in the enemy's country the utmost circumspection and vigilance are necessary for the safety of the army and the success of the great object it has to accomplish depends upon the observance of the most rigid discipline. The lieutenant-general commanding, therefore, most earnestly appeals to the officers and men of his command, who have attested their bravery and devotion to the cause of their country on so many battle fields, to yield a ready acquiescence in the rules required by the exigencies of the case.

All straggling and marauding from the ranks, and all marauding and plundering by individuals are prohibited, upon pain of the severest penalties known to the service.

What is required for the use of the army will be taken under regulations to be established by the commanding-general, according to the rules of civilized warfare.

Citizens of the country through which the army may pass, who are not in the military service, are admonished to abstain from all acts of hostility, upon the penalty of being dealt with in a summary manner. A ready acquiescence to the demands of the military authorities will serve greatly to lessen the rigors of war.

By command of

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL R. S. EWELL.

A. L. PENDLETON, *A. A. General.*

This order was evidently issued by General Ewell in ignorance of the one issued by General Lee the day before. This may be accounted for from the fact that Ewell

was not with Lee, but in advance with his corps. During this day the divisions of Generals Early and Johnson crossed the Potomac—one at Williamsport and the other at Shepherdstown—ten miles south-east in the direction of Harper's Ferry. These two divisions formed a junction at Hagerstown.

*Tuesday, 23.* About ten o'clock in the forenoon of this day, Jenkins' cavalry again entered Chambersburg. Unlike his former entrance, which was made in the night and under evident alarm, and with a wild rush down the streets, he this time came in slowly and confidently. The larger part of the force proceeded on down the Harrisburg pike to Shirk's Hill, which they had occupied for a few days the previous week, and there formed in line. Others remained in town. Shortly after the arrival of these men, Jenkins, through his chief of staff, Captain Fitzhugh, made a requisition upon the citizens of Chambersburg for a large amount of provisions for his command, which were to be brought to the court-house pavement within a stipulated time. He also declared that if this demand was not complied with a general search of the houses would be made, and all provisions found taken. Of course the citizens had to comply with this order, and, like the citizens of Greencastle, who, in response to a similar demand made upon them, brought plentifully of *onions*, the citizens of Chambersburg also seemed to be moved by a similar common impulse and brought *bacon*. And as *fitch* after *fitch*, and *jowl* after *jowl*, with a sprinkling of bread, cakes, and pies, were deposited upon the pile, in front of the court-house, the name of the unwilling contributor to the stomach of the Southern

Confederacy was taken down, by which his residence would be exempted from search in case enough was not voluntarily brought in. It is said that when the officer in charge saw the people of our sister town coming from all directions with baskets full of the delicious antiscorbutics, he asked in amazement whether the people there lived upon onions; so he might have supposed that we here luxuriated upon the greasy product of the hog. We only took advantage of the occasion to clean out our stock, and our visitors did not object to what we brought. It would be an interesting item to see the list of names taken that day, and know who all were in the bacon business, but that paper unfortunately has not been preserved.

During the afternoon of this day, a raid of a most shameful and yet ludicrous character occurred in the neighborhood of where the new depot now stands. Upon the site of this depot stood a large frame building, once used as a forwarding or railroad freight warehouse. In this building were stored a large amount of government stores, such as crackers, beans, bacon, etc. The Confederates had not yet found these stores, and some of our people—mostly those who resided in the eastern outskirts of the town, and had no scruples against taking anything from Uncle Sam, rather than have the Confederates take it—made a raid upon these stores and in a short time cleaned out the whole stock. Men, women, and children came running in crowds, and a general scramble took place, and upon every street and alley leading from the warehouse persons were seen carrying bacon and rolling barrels of crackers and beans. In the general *melee* some came in contact with others, when scolding,

kicking, and fighting ensued. One woman in rolling away a barrel of crackers came in contact with another rolling away a similar prize, and, crowding her too much she turned around and kicked at the other, but not being acquainted with the laws of gravitation and momentum, missed her aim and went sprawling backward over her own barrel. By the time she had gathered herself up some one had rolled away her prize, at which a general fight set in. A reliable witness to whom I am indebted for this description of this shameful and ludicrous occurrence, assures me of its correctness, and says that he saw one man roll away four barrels and put them in his cellar.

Transferring our observations further south, we find that on this day the following requisitions were made upon the authorities of Greencastle by the commissary and quartermaster of Rodes' division:

HEAD-QUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS,

June 23d, 1863.

*To the Authorities of Greencastle:*

By direction of Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell, I make requisition for the following articles: 100 saddles and bridles; 12 pistols. These articles are to be furnished at two o'clock P. M.

J. A. HARMON,

*Maj. and Q. M. Second Corps de Armie.*

Following this requisition came another for onions, sauerkraut, potatoes, radishes, etc., signed by A. M. Mitchell, Maj. and Ch. Com. Then another demanding—

Two thousand pounds of lead; 1,000 pounds of leather; 100 pistols; 12 boxes of tin; 200 curry-combs and brushes. Signed,

WM. ALLEN, *M. and C.*

The chief of the topographical engineers also demanded two maps of Franklin county.

These demands were so heavy that the council felt it impossible to fill them, and no effort was accordingly

made. The Confederates, however, secured some saddles, bridles, and a considerable amount of leather.

During the afternoon of this day, part of Rodes' division advanced toward Chambersburg, encamping over night below Marion. Johnson's division left its encampment near Hagerstown, and closed up upon Rodes at Greencastle; and Early's division deflected to the east at Hagerstown, and passing down by a parallel road, encamped over night near Waynesborough.

*Wednesday, 24.* About nine o'clock in the forenoon of this day, the sound of music was heard up Main street, Chambersburg. Rodes' division of infantry, preceded by a band of musicians playing "The Bonnie Blue Flag," made its appearance on the brow of the hill by the Reformed Church. These were the first Confederate infantry that had ever penetrated a free State. This column of men passed out down through the town, and on out the Harrisburg pike to Shirk's Hill, which Jenkins' cavalry held. On this commanding position a line was formed and a large number of cannon planted. It is said that it was in contemplation to fortify this hill and make a stand there against the apprehended Federal attack. Throughout this entire day long columns of infantry and artillery, with the usual accompaniments of immense trains of wagons and droves of cattle and ambulances, streamed through the streets. The trains were parked in the fields and the men placed in camps between the town and the hill named. According to an estimate made by one of the citizens of Chambersburg, ten thousand three hundred men—infantry, cavalry and artillery—passed through the town this day.

About half-past ten o'clock, a carriage drawn by two horses and accompanied by several horsemen, was observed coming down the street. It was stopped in front of the Franklin Hotel. One of the occupants of this carriage was a thin, sallow-faced man, with strongly-marked Southern features, and a head and physiognomy which strongly indicated culture, refinement and genius. When he emerged from the carriage, which he did only by the assistance of others, it was discovered that he had an artificial limb, and used a crutch. After making his way into the hotel, he at once took possession of a large front parlor, and, surrounded by six or eight gentlemanly-looking men, he was prepared for business. A flag was run out of a window, and head-quarters established. This intellectual-looking and crippled man was Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell, the Commander of the Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia.

General Ewell was a graduate of West Point, and had been for some time a civil engineer on the Columbia Railroad in Pennsylvania. He had been at one time stationed at Carlisle in charge of the United States barracks at that place. Soon after the commencement of the war he joined the Confederate army, and rapidly rose to the position of a lieutenant-general and commander of a corps in Lee's army. He had lost a leg at the second Bull Run battle, and, it was said, when he rode on horse-back, which he seldom did except in battle, he was invariably strapped to his horse. After the death of Stonewall Jackson, he was made commander of that corps, and was, at the time of which I am writing, in command of the advance of the Army of Northern Virginia on its way to Gettys-



burg. It is likely that he was placed in the advance because of his familiarity with the country, especially about York, Columbia, and Harrisburg, where important events were expected to take place. At the time of the evacuation of Richmond he was the military commander of that place, and gave the order for the burning of the Confederate capital. On April 6th, 1865, during the retreat of the Confederate army from Petersburg, General Ewell, with the greater part of his corps, was captured.

But General Ewell was a man of business as well as war, and he at once proceeded to execute his purposes. Among his first acts was to appoint Colonel Willis, of the Twelfth Georgia regiment, provost-marshal of the town. The colonel made his headquarters in the court-house, and from its cupola a flag was displayed. That was the only emblem of the rebellion ever put up in Chambersburg, excepting the one at General Ewell's head-quarters, neither of which was the regular Confederate flag. Following the appointment of the provost-marshal, came a requisition upon several of the hotels for mattresses and bed-clothing, which were taken to the public school building on King street, and a hospital was there established, and a number of sick of the command taken to it. In a short time the following general order, designed to prevent the soldiers from seizing the liquors in the town, was issued. It is to be regretted that this order was not made permanent, here and elsewhere, for all time. The following is that order:

HEAD-QUARTERS SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  
CHAMBERSBURG, June 24th, 1863.

*General Orders.*

I. The sale of intoxicating liquors to this command, without written permission from a major-general, is strictly prohibited.

II. Persons having liquor in their possession are required to report the fact to the provost-marshal, or the nearest general officer, stating the amount and kind, that a guard may be placed over it, and the men prevented from getting it.

III. Any violation of Part I. of these orders, or failure to comply with Part II., will be punished by the immediate confiscation of all liquors in the possession of the offending parties, besides rendering their other property liable to seizure.

IV. Citizens of the country through which the army may pass, who are not in the military service, are admonished to abstain from all acts of hostility, upon the penalty of being dealt with in a summary manner. A ready acquiescence to the demands of the military authorities will serve to lessen the rigors of war. By command of

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL R. S. EWELL.

A. S. PENDLETON, *A. A. General.*

I am not aware to what extent those who had liquor in their possession responded to this order and reported at head-quarters, but very soon after the entrance of the Confederate infantry, guards were stationed at all places where it was kept. If there were any cases of drunkenness among the soldiers, I did not see it. But that there was at least one instance, although it did not come under my observation, will appear in the proceedings of a court-martial shortly to be given.

Following the issue of the general order in regard to liquors, came a summons to our business men to convene in the parlor of the National Bank, which stood next to General Ewell's head-quarters, and the few who had not left at the approach of the invaders repaired to that place. After assembling there three of Ewell's staff officers joined

de and opened up their business, which was to lay before us the following requisitions:

*To the Authorities of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania:*

HEAD-QUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS,

June 24th, 1863.

By direction of Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell, I require the following articles: 5,000 suits of clothing, including hats, boots, and shoes; 100 good saddles; 100 good bridles; 5,000 bushels of grain (corn or oats); 10,000 lbs. sole leather; 10,000 lbs. horse-shoes; 400 lbs. horse-shoe nails; also, the use of printing office and two printers to report at once. All articles, except grain, will be delivered at the Court-House Square, at 3:00 o'clock P. M., to-day, and grain by 6:00 o'clock P. M. to-day.

J. A. HARMON,

*Major and C. Q. M. Second Corps D'Arm.*

HEAD-QUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS,

June 24th, 1863.

By the command of Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell, the citizens of Chambersburg will furnish the following articles by 3:00 this afternoon: 6,000 lbs. lead; 10,000 lbs. harness leather; 50 boxes of tin; 1,000 curry combs and brushes; 2,000 lbs. picket rope; 400 pistols; all the caps and powder in town; also, all the Neat's foot oil.

WILLIAM ALLEN, *M. and C.*

HEAD-QUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS,

June 24th, 1863.

By direction of Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell, the following are demanded: 50,000 lbs. bread; 100 sacks salt; 30 barrels molasses; 500 barrels flour; 25 barrels vinegar; 25 barrels beans; 25 barrels dried fruit; 25 barrels sauerkraut; 25 barrels potatoes; 11,000 lbs. coffee; 10,000 lbs. sugar; 100,000 lbs. hard bread.

This last requisition, which is without signature, was delivered to us by Major Hawkes, Commissary General of Ewell's corps. The signature was probably omitted in copying it. On the evening of Monday, 22d, about eleven o'clock, some four or five of our citizens, in connection with the pastors of the town—five or six in number,—

convened in the cashier's office of this bank to make some arrangements, which were deemed necessary, to receive the approaching enemy. And as the Burgess and Town Council had nearly all left town, and the contingency of meeting the demand for the surrender of the place, which it was expected would soon be made, should be provided for, it was agreed upon that the pastors should act in behalf of the town authorities. The venerable Rev. B. S. Schneck, D. D., was constituted president of this committee. These gentlemen, instead of receiving the demand for the surrender of the town,—our southern friends simply coming in and taking it without asking for it,—found that they had a much greater business on their hands than they had expected, and accordingly called to their assistance a number of our leading business men. These, with the ministers, were now in session to hear what our visitors had to say. After an introduction to the three officers by our chairman, Hon. F. M. Kimmell, who was made such by common consent rather than by any formal action, these papers were read, after which a considerable pause ensued. Here was a chance for business on a magnificent scale, but it was feared the terms would not prove satisfactory. Then, too, it was somewhat out of season for *sauerkraut* but our southern friends seemed to think that as they were among the "Pennsylvania Dutch," that favorite dish would be found the whole year round. They did not know that like their "hog and hominy," *sauerkraut* was especially a home dish, and never set before strangers. Taking the papers into his hand and scanning them for awhile, the judge began to read, "ten thousand pounds of sole leather,—ten thousand pounds of harness leather,—

one hundred thousand pounds of hard bread,—twenty-five barrels of s-a-u-e-r-k-r-a-u-t.” Throwing the papers upon the table he said, “Why, gentlemen, do you wish to insult us? Do you suppose we live on sauerkraut?” “Oh no, dear sir, we mean no insult whatever; sauerkraut is an antiscorbutic, and our men need something of the kind,” replied Major Hawkes. “Well, gentlemen,” said our spokesman, “it is utterly out of our power to furnish these things, and now, if you are going to burn us out you will only have to do it. That’s all I have to say about it.” The Major without any perceptible excitement said, “Why gentlemen, we have not come here to burn and plunder. We are not vandals. We are here to wage an honorable warfare. These things we need, and we only propose to have them under the acknowledged rules of civilized warfare.” “Well,” said the judge, “we have not these things in the town, and how can we comply with your requisitions?” “Send out throughout the county and bring them in. We know the resources of the county. We have studied the census reports and we know these things can be had if you send around and gather them in.” “How can we send out over the county,” said the judge, “all our horses that we have not sent off your army has taken.” “Well,” said the Major, “it will not do for you to say that you *can not* furnish the articles we require. General Ewell will not receive such a report. You must say just what you can do, and now we will give you time to consult together. Let those who deal in certain articles get together and make out a report in writing, saying just what they can do, and we will meet you here again in one hour to receive your reports.”

At the conclusion of the major's directions we at once went to work to make out such reports as the occasion demanded. The writer went around among the merchants—for we all then dealt in groceries—to secure co-operation, but failed to find a single one. Nearly all had fled. He then returned to his store and wrote about thus: "Gentlemen, there are in our cellar the following articles: [Then followed the number of hogsheads and barrels of molasses and syrup, tapped and untapped, hogsheads and barrels of sugar, etc.] I have endeavored to see other dealers in these articles in order to meet your requisition, but have failed to find a single one. I now submit the question to you as honorable gentlemen, whether it would be right to take the whole of our stock, or let the burden fall equally upon all?" Signing our firm name to this paper, I went to the bank at the time specified and handed it to Judge Kimmell, telling him of its contents. When the officers returned, additional requisitions were laid before us for some drugs, and also for a first-class field glass for the signal corps. Handing the papers to Major Hawkes, Judge Kimmell said, "Here, major, is a paper which you will see deserves special consideration. It is Mr. Hoke's," pointing to me. We were then directed to remain together until the papers were taken to General Ewell's head-quarters for examination, and in a short time one of the staff returned and directed us to go to our respective places of business, as the general was not satisfied with our reports, but would send around a guard to examine for themselves. At this announcement we all went to our respective places, and in a short time Major Hawkes, riding past and observing our sign, stopped and

thus addressed me: "You are Mr. Hoke, are you not?" Replying that I was, he continued, "General Ewell says that you have made the only satisfactory report, and your groceries shall not be disturbed. We may be under the necessity of having a couple of barrels of that New Orleans molasses for our hospitals, but otherwise you shall not be disturbed." As I thanked the major for this consideration, he rode away, and in a short time squads of six or eight men, under command of an officer, were seen going around the town for the purpose of making the examination. When one of these squads came to our store, and the officer in command ordered me to unlock the door, I told him what Major Hawkes had said, when he replied, "That's all right, sir; I've got my orders. Open your door." Opening the door the officer entered alone—the soldiers crossing bayonets to prevent any one else from going in—and passing to the rear and out again, he ordered me to lock it up, saying: "All right, now; you will not be disturbed." He did not go into the cellar where our groceries were stored. After these squads had reported at head-quarters, our grocery, drug, hardware, book and stationery, clothing, boot and shoe stores were all relieved of most of their remaining contents. In this work of plunder Major Todd, a brother of the wife of President Lincoln, took a prominent part, and came near losing his life; for while attempting to enter the cellar of Dr. Richards, the doctor's daughter flourished an axe over his head, and threatened to split it open if he persevered, when the miscreant ingloriously fled.

It is out of my power to give any estimate of the value of the property taken that day. But it must be recol-

lected that the losses of that day, as well as the losses by the Stuart and Jenkins raids, were afterward supplemented by other depredations during the continuance of the invasion—on the Sunday following especially—and by the destruction of the town a year afterward. This much, however, can be said, that many persons who had toiled and economized for years to gain an honorable support, as well as lay up something for old age, were reduced to poverty. I am aware that the appropriation of our property for the use of the invading army was in accordance with the rules of war, and in conformity with General Lee's order regulating the taking of supplies, and in most cases was paid for in worthless scrip, but why it is that the Government, which reimburses loyal men in the South for their losses, refuses the same to loyal persons in the North, is a problem that seems hard to solve.

On the day following that on which the depredations just stated occurred, Major Hawkes rode up to me when standing in front of our store, and said that he was under the necessity of having two barrels of our New Orleans molasses for hospital purposes. These were taken and the major paid me for them in Confederate scrip. After this our cellar was undisturbed until the Sunday following, when it was cleaned out by Longstreet's corps, as will be shown hereafter. Major Hawkes informed me that he was born, I think, in New York, but for a number of years had resided in Charlestown, West Virginia, where he had been engaged, when the war broke out, in the manufacture of carriages.

Among the things demanded in the requisitions made, as will have been seen, was "the use of a printing office



and two printers." As no response was made to this demand, the printing fraternity were dealt with as the merchants and shop-keepers, and a guard was sent to take possession of the printing establishment of the Reformed Church. To Rev. Samuel R. Fisher, D. D., editor and business manager of the establishment, the proposition was made that if he would do the printing they wanted he would be paid for it, and a guard placed over the building; but if he would not voluntarily do so, the establishment would be used and neither pay nor protection given. Having a considerable amount of valuable machinery and stock on hand, the doctor wisely concluded to accede to their demand, and for a few days he was busily engaged upon their job. In addition to the general orders of Lee and Ewell, some of which have been already given, and other military papers, many thousands of parole papers were printed. With these they doubtless intended to parole the Army of the Potomac, the defeat and capture of which they seemed to believe would certainly be effected. That it was also their intention to parole the citizens of the country through which their army passed seems to be inferred in the parole papers for *citizens* which they had printed. The following is a copy of one of these papers, which was preserved by one of the persons who was compelled to print them. It is probably the only one now in existence, and is in my possession:

## HEAD-QUARTERS RODES' DIV.

.....186

.....a citizen of.....is hereby released on condition that he will give no information concerning or serve in any capacity whatever against the Confederate States, until regularly exchanged for a citizen of the Confederate States.

.....

The execution of this work of printing took several days, and when it was completed war prices were charged and the bill was paid in Confederate scrip. Rev. Dr. Fisher, whose financial ability was unsurpassed, succeeded in disposing of this worthless paper at the rate of twenty-five cents on the dollar to one of our tanners, who paid it to one of the commissary officers for the hides of the cattle they slaughtered for their army. This was the best conducted business transaction with the invaders that occurred about here to my knowledge. I shall have another one to relate further on in this narrative, which displayed similar acuteness, and the actor in it was a preacher also. After the presses were put to work to execute this job of printing, our town was flooded with printed slips containing Lee's and Ewell's orders. A few of these interesting papers only have survived time and the ravages of fire when Chambersburg was destroyed by the Confederates a year later; but I was fortunate in obtaining a single one of the number—General Ewell's order No. 1, regulating the liquor traffic. The whole of the papers, however, were published in the *Franklin Repository* of July 8th and 15th, 1863, from which I have taken them. As to the correctness of the copies I have given I can clearly testify from personal knowledge.

The infantry having now come up and taken a position upon Shirk's Hill, Jenkins' cavalry left that place and went on further down the valley.

Early's division, which encamped on the previous night in the vicinity of Waynesborough, marched parallel with Rodes' down the valley by way of Quincy and Funkstown, coming out into the pike leading from this place to Gettysburg at Greenwood, at which place it encamped.

At an early hour this morning,—Wednesday, 24th,—Stewart's brigade of infantry, numbering about twenty-five hundred men, and about three hundred cavalry, left the main column at Greencastle and went westwardly by way of Mercersburg across the North Mountain to the village of McConnellsburg, in Fulton County. These troops reached Mercersburg, ten miles distant from Greencastle, about the middle of the day, and at once made themselves at home. Learning that a theological seminary was located there, Stewart placed a guard about the property for its protection. The soldiers were forbidden to enter either the seminary or private houses under the penalty of severe punishment. The stores and shops were ordered to be opened, and the soldiers permitted to purchase whatever they needed. To their credit it must be said that everything was done in an orderly manner. No pillaging was permitted, and whatever was taken was by officers who made out bills and paid in Confederate scrip. There were at this time in the vicinity of McConnellsburg the Twelfth Pennsylvania Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Moss, a regiment of emergency men under Colonel Zinn, and an independent company of emergency men from Huntingdon County under Captain W. W. Wallace. Colonel Zinn's regiment was encamped on the top of the Cove, or North Mountain, on both the Chambersburg and Mercersburg pikes, in strong natural positions, with some fortifications. Colonel Moss, with his regiment, was encamped down in the valley, east of the town, and Captain Wallace, with his company, was in McConnellsburg. It was known that the Confederates were about Williamsport and Greencastle, and Jenkins was roaming all over the

southern part of Franklin County—a detachment of his force having visited this same town a week before—and these troops were on the lookout for them. Accordingly it was arranged that if the Confederates approached by either the Chambersburg or Mercersburg pike, Zinn was to fire a small gun, when the troops down in the valley were to go to his assistance. Some time in the afternoon of this day the signal gun was heard on the Mercersburg pike, and a scout came dashing into town with the information that the enemy was approaching in force. At once all was excitement. Captain Wallace prepared to go with his handful of men to the top of the mountain to assist Colonel Zinn, and a number—some half dozen men—who resided in the village, agreed to accompany him. Those who volunteered to go, armed themselves with old muskets, which were formerly used by a volunteer company. Before starting, Captain Wallace sent his flag to prevent its being captured to Fort Littleton in charge of a detachment of his command. It was supposed, of course, that Colonel Moss would take his regiment out to help dispute the passage of the mountain by the Confederates, but for reasons best known to himself he headed his men westward and marched away from the foe. One of his men, however, Lieutenant McDonald, declared that he was not going to run away, and he accompanied Captain Wallace. As this little company reached the foot of the mountain, it met Colonel Zinn's regiment on the retreat. Wallace halted and begged Zinn to remain with him, but his course, like Colonel Moss', was westwardly, away from the approaching foe. A young man by the name of Freeburn, of Lewis-

town, Pennsylvania, however, agreed to go with Wallace's band, and he and Lieutenant McDonald, both well mounted, consented to act as scouts, and rode forward to discover the whereabouts of the enemy. When the scouts first saw the enemy he was well down on the east side of the mountain, so that Colonel Zinn, had he remained, would have had plenty of time to have posted his men strongly; and had Colonel Moss and Zinn both remained, that Confederate brigade might not have crossed the mountain that day, and there would be a page in the history of the war which would record the battle of the *North Mountain* as a twin to the battle of the South Mountain. When about half way up the mountain Captain Wallace divided his men into five squads and placed them about sixty feet apart, and about the same distance above the pike. In a short time the two scouts came dashing by, pursued by the Confederates who opened fire upon them. Young Freeburn was wounded, but succeeded in making his escape. After several hundred of the enemy had passed Captain Wallace opened fire upon them, when they called a halt and demanded a surrender of the attacking party. They also returned the fire, the bullets striking the bushes and rocks like hail. Finally they threw out flanking parties, which soon almost surrounded the little band, when the whole command took to their heels, each man taking care of himself. The party became scattered, some of them being within the Confederate lines for several days. All, however, finally escaped.

Colonel Moss was an efficient and brave officer, and his regiment which was with Milroy at Winchester and had escaped to Bloody Run, had seen considerable service and

proven its bravery. He doubtless felt that he had sufficient reasons for avoiding a conflict with the enemy on this occasion. The only place where a successful stand could have been made was upon the mountain, but what could cavalry do in such a place? Had they been armed with carbines and fought as infantry, they might have been successful. Sabres and pistols would have been of but little avail in such a place. Then, too, Colonel Moss knew that but little reliance could be placed upon the raw and inexperienced men of Colonel Zinn's command in a battle with the tried veterans of General Stewart. As for the effort made by Captain Wallace with his thirty or thirty-five men, we are compelled rather to call in question his judgment than to admire his courage. It was rash and imprudent, and jeopardized the lives of men too brave and patriotic to be unnecessarily sacrificed.

The only casualty upon the Federal side in this affair was the slight wounding of Lieutenant Freeburn. It was claimed that several of the Confederates were killed and a number wounded. This is extremely doubtful. Indeed, the Confederates afterward during their occupancy of McConnellsburg spoke of the affair as of but little importance, and without loss to them. It was also claimed that the first blood shed upon the soil of Pennsylvania during the rebellion was at this engagement. This, too, is incorrect. This honor belongs to the engagement which occurred on the Monday previous near Greencastle. This affair then, if it is worthy of the name of a battle, may be called *the battle of North Mountain*.

Undue importance has been given to the affair on the North Mountain in its relation to the intentions of the

enemy in this movement. It was supposed that the object of this expedition across the mountain into Fulton County was to advance up the valley to Mount Union and burn the bridges and tear up the track of the Pennsylvania Railroad at that place and about the Narrows east of Lewis-town, for the purpose of preventing the moving of troops and supplies over that road, and that the check received on the mountain defeated that purpose. In this view of the case General Couch, who commanded the Department of the Susquehanna, issued a complimentary order to the company, and the directors of the Pennsylvania Railroad further complimented them with a resolution of thanks. It may be safely assumed that the only object the enemy had in view was to look after the troops of Milroy's command, which had escaped from Winchester and had crossed the Potomac at the lower end of this valley. These, it would be supposed, might operate upon the left flank of the main column of the invading army; and it was doubtless to prevent this that this lateral movement was made. Had a raid upon the railroad at Mount Union been contemplated, the Confederate commanders were too shrewd to detach infantry to effect that object. By the time they could have traversed the thirty miles from McConnellsburg up the valley, forces could have been concentrated to defeat the movement, as well as cut to pieces the whole force before it could have regained the main column. If the destruction of the railroad was in the programme at all, Imboden's command of cavalry would undoubtedly have been chosen. They had been engaged in a similar work along the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, from Cumberland to Hancock, and within a short time after the de-

parture of Stewart's command, this formidable force crossed the Potomac near that place into southern Pennsylvania.

After the short delay occasioned by the affair with Captain Wallace's company, just related, Stewart's command resumed its march and reached McConnellsburg soon after dark. When about a half mile east of the place a line of battle was formed and the cavalry dashed into the town. They expected to find Milroy's force there. As soon as the infantry had entered the town it was placed under guard and the citizens were ordered to remain in their houses. A few, however, who were anxious to see what was going on, ventured out into the streets, and were arrested and held for awhile. The invaders disturbed nothing during the night, but in the morning they entered the stores and shops and helped themselves to whatever they wanted, in some cases paying in Confederate scrip. About one third of the cavalry went north up the valley as far as Burnt Cabins, gathering horses from the farmers along the way, and picking up others which had been sent from Franklin County for safety. From Burnt Cabins they re-crossed the mountain by Fannettsburg, and thence on to Chambersburg, where they rejoined the main column. In passing out of Horse Valley by the Strasburg Pass, this force came near getting into collision with some of the mountaineers who had fortified the pass, but were absent from their works when these men passed out over the mountain. The infantry and the remainder of the cavalry remained in and about McConnellsburg until early on Friday morning when they finally left, re-crossing the North Mountain by the Loudon road and rejoining the column at Chambersburg.



This day the corps of Generals Hill and Longstreet crossed the Potomac—the former at Shepherdstown, and the latter, with the supply trains, at Williamsport. These two corps formed a junction at Hagerstown.

*Thursday, 25.* On the morning of this day General Ewell removed his head-quarters from the Franklin Hotel in Chambersburg to a Mennonite church, which stands in the midst of a beautiful grove, one mile north of the town, along the pike leading to Harrisburg. At this place there was held on that day a court-martial for the trial of four persons for breaches of discipline. The following is the official order concerning that trial:

HEAD-QUARTERS SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

June 25th, '63.

*General Order No. 51.*

I. Before the military court, convened at the headquarters of the army corps of Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell, and of which court Colonel R. H. Lee is presiding judge, were arraigned and tried. (The specifications in the various cases being lengthy and minute, are omitted.)

1st. Lieutenant J. B. Countiss, Twenty-first Georgia Regiment.

Charge I. Drunkenness on duty.

Charge II. Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline.

Finding: Of the specifications of first charge, guilty.

Of the first charge, guilty.

Of the specifications of the second charge, guilty.

Of the second charge, guilty.

Sentence: And the court do therefore sentence the said Lieutenant J. B. Countiss, Twenty-first Georgia Regiment, to be cashiered.

2nd. Private Charles Smith, Company C, Forty-fifth North Carolina Regiment.

Charge : Desertion.

Finding : Of the specification, guilty.

Of the charge, not guilty, but

Of absence without leave, guilty.

Sentence : And the court do therefore sentence the said private Charles Smith, Company C, Forty-fifth North Carolina Regiment, to forfeit three

months' pay, and to be branded on the left hip with the letter S, two inches in length, in the presence of his regiment.

3d. Private Louis M. Waynock, Company B, Forty-fifth Regiment.

Charge : Desertion.

Finding : Of the specification, guilty.

Of the charge — not guilty, but

Of absence without leave, guilty.

Sentence : And the court do therefore sentence the said Louis M. Waynock, Company B, Forty-fifth North Carolina Regiment, to forfeit three months' pay, and to be branded on the left hip with the letter S, two inches in length, in the presence of his regiment.

4th. Private Patrick Herne, Company C, Fifth Alabama Regiment.

Charge: Violation of 9th Article of War.

Finding : Of the specification, guilty.

Of the charge, guilty.

Sentence : And the court do therefore sentence the said Patrick Herne, Company C, Fifth Alabama Regiment, to forfeit his pay for three months, to perform extra police and fatigue duty for two months, and to be bucked two hours each day, for seven days.

II. The proceedings, findings and sentence in the case of Lieutenant J. B. Countiss, Twenty-first Georgia Regiment, are approved, and the sentence will be carried into effect; and Lieutenant J. B. Countiss ceases, from this date, to be an officer of the Confederate States Army. He will be enrolled and conscripted by his brigade commander, and will be allowed to join any company in his present brigade that he may select.

The proceedings, findings and sentence in the cases of private Charles Smith, Company C, Forty-fifth North Carolina Regiment, and Louis M. Waynock, Company B, Forty-fifth North Carolina Regiment, are approved, and the sentences will be carried into effect, except so much of them as inflict the punishment of branding, which is hereby remitted.

The proceedings, findings and sentence in the case of private Patrick Herne, Company C, Fifth Alabama Regiment, are approved, and the sentence will be carried into effect.

By command of Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell.

A. S. PENDLETON, A. A. General.

The superior discipline of the Southern army will be seen in this, that officers in command were promptly cashiered for drunkenness, and not permitted to remain in

positions which would endanger others. And when cashiered they were not permitted to resign their commissions, or leave the army and return to civil life, but were reduced to the ranks and compelled to do service in that humble position. If that kind of discipline had prevailed in the Union army there would have been fewer disasters from the use of intoxicating liquors. The penalty inflicted upon others for the violations of the rules of war, as stated in the charges and specifications given, requiring the forfeiture of three months pay, did not amount to much, for the pay of a private soldier in Confederate scrip was worth only the value of the paper it was printed on. For the benefit of those who do not know what "bucking" is, I will state that it consisted in tying a person's hands together and closing his arms around his knees and passing a stick through to keep him in that helpless and ludicrous position.

Some time during this day two young men—officers connected with the artillery—came with a requisition for all the flannels and other woolen goods we had, suitable for making cartridges for cannon. We having previously removed everything of value out of the store, they found only a few remnants which we did not think worth secreting. These they had me to measure for them, one of them noting down the lengths. When asked the price I told him I should have a dollar a yard, counting upon Confederate scrip as the pay. He inquired what we sold them at, saying they would not allow me more for them than our usual price, for their money was as good as ours, and if it was not they intended to make it so before leaving the State. After striking an average price he wrote and gave me a

paper of which the following is a correct copy,—the original I yet have in my possession:

I hereby certify that I have received of J. Hoke & Co., merchants, Chambersburg, Pa., this 25th day of June, 1863, and in accordance with General Order No. 72, Head-quarters, and have furnished duplicate vouchers, 9 (nine) yards flannel at 63½ cents per yard, \$5.90.

JOHN M. GREGORY, JR.,

First Lieut. and Ord. Officer Art'y 2d Corps.

Throughout the day there were numerous calls made upon us for tea for the hospitals, castile soap, etc., all of which were paid for in Confederate scrip. The officers with whom we had dealings were in every case courteous and gentlemanly. Some of the privates, however, when they had access to the store were the reverse, and unlike the officers, who invariably asked for what they desired to purchase, went searching through the store, opening drawers, and looking for concealed goods. These always examined our fire-proof safe, which, to prevent its being broken open, was unlocked and its contents removed. Frequently when articles were asked for, which we had secreted or sent away, the almost universal remark was, "Well, we will get these things when we get to Philadelphia, or Baltimore, or Washington." Some would inquire, "Do you think the merchants of Harrisburg have sent off their goods, too?" Occasionally efforts were made, as we believed, to ascertain whether we had actually sent our goods away, or had hidden them. A citizen would come to us and say that colonel, or major, or captain so-and-so had desired him to procure for him a web of shirting, or something of the kind, for his own family use, and if we would furnish it he would pay for it in gold. Our reply always was, "We have these things hidden away in a

beer vault and can not get at them; besides this, if we would furnish these things it would reveal the fact that goods are in town, and a general search might be ordered."

In the morning of this day Johnson's division commenced passing through the town, and throughout the whole of it until evening, regiment after regiment, and brigade after brigade of infantry, with long trains of artillery, wagons, and ambulances passed through Chambersburg and on down the Harrisburg pike and encamped about Shirk's Hill.

Hill's corps marched from Hagerstown and encamped over night between Greencastle and Chambersburg.

General Early, on this day, rode from his encampment at Greenwood to General Ewell's head-quarters, one mile north of Chambersburg, to consult with him as to his future course. He was directed to proceed on the following morning by way of Gettysburg to York, break up the Northern Central Railroad, seize the bridge across the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, and wait there for further orders.

As soon as the Confederate forces began to pass through Chambersburg, we saw the propriety of sending information of their number and movements to the authorities at Harrisburg. This we could do by eluding the pickets north of the town, crossing the North Mountain into the valley beyond, and thence passing up to about Newport, on the Pennsylvania Railroad, about forty miles above Harrisburg. To communicate directly with Washington we could not, but as telegraphic communications from the capital of our State to the National Capital were uninterrupted, we knew that to send information to the

former would insure its transmission where most needed. In accordance with our purpose, then, to keep our authorities well informed, a number of our citizens made careful estimates of the number of troops and guns that daily passed through the town. This information, with the directions taken by the troops, was carried to Harrisburg by a number of young men of Chambersburg and Franklin County. Hon: F. M. Kimmell, at one time the presiding judge of this district, and who had acted as provost-marshal during the time Chambersburg was under martial law in 1862, had been directed by Governor Curtin to exercise a general supervision here during the war. This fact was unknown to us, yet by general consent we co-operated with him in collecting and forwarding information. The judge invariably wrote the dispatches. These were small slips of paper about an inch or two square, and simply stated the number of troops and guns that passed that day, and the route they took. Messages were in some cases carried verbally, and whenever anything which we considered of special importance occurred, we made it a point to dispatch a messenger as soon as possible. Several of these special occasions, with the perilous trips of the scouts, will hereafter be given. In the lapse of time since the war I am unable to remember the names of all the heroic young men who rendered such valuable service to their country. The following were some of them: Shearer Houser, Benjamin S. Huber, J. Porter Brown, Anthony Hollar, Sellers Montgomery, T. J. Grimeson, Stephen W. Pomeroy, and Mr. Kinney. The archives of the Government contain the names of all who rendered this service, for, in addition to procuring the services of a scout when

one was specially needed, it fell to the writer's lot to furnish them with money to defray their traveling expenses, which, with an additional sum to each one, was refunded to him by General Couch when he moved his head-quarters to Chambersburg, after the battle of Gettysburg.

Some of the scouts who made these perilous journeys to Harrisburg had narrow escapes. In almost every case they were either chased, fired upon, or captured in passing through the Confederate lines. When capture seemed inevitable they would chew and swallow their dispatch. This was sometimes inserted in the end of a plug of tobacco, which could be conveniently bitten off, or in the boots, or somewhere about the clothing. Various devices were resorted to to throw the Confederates off their guard in case of capture. A bundle with two or three dirty shirts and as many pair of socks, would be carried along, and the enemy were made believe that the bearer was an unsophisticated country school-master going home to get his clothes washed. This ruse was successfully played by Mr. Kinney, the principal of the academy at Chambersburg. He and Mr. A. Hollar were caught some six or eight miles from town on the morning of Sunday, June 28th, while bearing a dispatch of great importance, and having swallowed the small piece of paper on which it was written, they affected ignorance of what was going on, and said they were engaged in teaching school and were going home to get some washing done. The ruse took and they were allowed to proceed. Having reached the pass of the mountain at Strasburg, Mr. Hollar returned to town, leaving Mr. Kinney to proceed alone, but when passing up through Perry County he was arrested by some Federal

soldiers, who refused to believe his story that he had important information and took him a prisoner to Harrisburg, supposing him to be a spy. At the capital he established his identity and delivered his message.

All of us who were engaged in this work of communicating with our authorities were aware that according to the laws of war, our lives would be forfeited in case we were detected, but we were careful to do our work so as to avoid suspicion. On one occasion General Couch sent us this message by one of our scouts: "Tell the gentlemen who are engaged in sending us this information that what they are doing is of great importance, and I hope they will continue it, but they must exercise the greatest caution, for if they are detected they will surely be executed."

*Friday, 26.* This day was fraught with great events, and stands marked in the history of Chambersburg. This will appear in the following facts:

At an early hour in the morning of this day—Hill's corps being close at hand—Rodes' division left its encampment about Shirk's Hill, where it had been since the Wednesday preceding, and moved on down the Harrisburg road. Throughout the whole of this day, until after dark, the road was lined with soldiers, cannon, and wagon trains. This division encamped that night somewhere about Newville. Johnson's division, following Rodes, moved but a short distance below Greenvillage.

About eight o'clock in the morning Heth's division of Hill's corps entered the town, but, instead of following Rodes and Johnson down the Harrisburg pike, turned east in the diamond, or public square, and proceeded on out the Gettysburg road and encamped near Fayetteville. About



nine o'clock A. M., General A. P. Hill, the commander of the Third Corps, attended by one or two of his staff, came in. Dismounting in the diamond and hitching his horse in front of a grocery store, the general entered into conversation with one of our citizens. As General Hill had at one time been stationed at the United States Barracks at Carlisle, he inquired of the citizen concerning a number of persons with whom he had been acquainted at that place. The citizen gave him whatever information he could, and then inquired of him when he expected General Lee to arrive. Hill replied, "I am expecting him every moment." Casting his eyes up Main Street, he said, "There he comes, now." The citizen,—Mr. Bishop, the photographer,—at once set out for his photograph gallery, and having made everything ready to take a picture of the general when he should arrive, threw open his window and pushed the camera out. This attracted the attention of some soldiers and teamsters, who were sitting along the curbstones, and they rose to their feet, exclaiming, "See, we are going to have our pictures taken." This unexpected occurrence prevented Mr. Bishop from executing his purpose, which is deeply to be regretted, for the occasion was one worthy the genius of the best artist.

General Hill seemed to be a man of splendid physique. Of ordinary height, his figure was slight but athletic, and his carriage erect. His dress was the ordinary Confederate gray, and was plain and without ornament, except the stars upon the collar of his coat, which designated his rank. His appearance indicated a man of robust health, and one who cared not for the tinsel of military trappings, or the honors of his high position.

He fell upon April 2d, 1865, when General Grant broke the Confederate lines about Petersburg.

Returning to the second story of my dwelling, on the north-east corner of the diamond, where I had been to take a look at General Hill, I found there a number of the ministers of the town. They had been in the habit of meeting there to look upon the hosts of invaders, for from the windows of that room an uninterrupted view could be had of Main Street, from the Reformed Church to the Presbyterian, at the lower end. Seeing a group of about fifteen or twenty finely mounted horsemen coming over the brow of the hill, opposite the Reformed Church, I called the attention of the persons present to them, when one of them exclaimed, "That's General Lee and his staff." Snatching our hats we made rapid strides down the stairs and out into the diamond to see them enter. Taking a position in front of the printing establishment of the Reformed Church, then known as the Mansion House, I watched the entrance of these men and the memorable scenes which there transpired. Lee and his staff stopped directly in front of where I stood. General Hill had, upon perceiving the approach of General Lee, mounted his horse, and riding slowly toward him, held his hat gracefully above his head. The two generals—Lee and Hill—then rode a short distance away from the group, and held a short, whispered consultation. As a large part of Heth's division of Hill's corps had already passed through Chambersburg, not following the two divisions of Ewell's corps down the valley toward Harrisburg, but turning eastward and going out on the pike leading to Gettysburg, I concluded that if Lee followed in the same direction, Balti-



GENERAL LEE AND STAFF IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE OF CHAMBERSBURG. LEE AND HILL IN COUNSEL,  
from a Crayon by Professor Dice.

more and Washington were his destination. With this impression upon my mind, I watched with intense interest the result of the council then taking place, and, observing Mr. Benjamin S. Huber, who resided a few miles from town, standing by my side, and remembering that he had been sent a few days before with a message to Harrisburg, and that he could be relied upon for any duty, I said to him, "There, Ben, is perhaps the most important council in the history of this war, and the fate of the Government may depend upon it. If General Lee goes on down the valley, then Harrisburg and Philadelphia are threatened; if he turns east, Baltimore and Washington are in danger, and the Government ought to know which way he goes as soon as possible." To this Huber replied, "Well, I have just got back from Harrisburg and I am tired, but as soon as he starts so that I can see which way he goes, I will be off again for Harrisburg." In a short time the council between the two generals ended, and Hill falling back and Lee riding in advance, the whole cavalcade moved forward. Reaching nearly the middle of the diamond, where the road leading to Harrisburg is crossed at right angles by the pike leading to Gettysburg and Baltimore, Lee drew the right-hand rein and his horse turned eastward. Looking around for Huber, I saw him elbowing his way through the crowd of citizens to convey this important information to Harrisburg. The following is his own account of his trip:

"I struck at once across the country for Roxbury, at the base of the North Mountain, and as I was acquainted with every foot of the way, I had no difficulty in eluding the rebel pickets. At Roxbury I secured the services of

Mr. S. L. Sentman (the same who a few days later furnished Mr. S. W. Pomeroy with a horse), and under his guidance—he being mounted and I on foot—we passed through the gap into Dothan Valley. We had to cross Trout Run several times, and as I was walking and had to wade it, the water came up nearly to my knees. When we reached Amberson's Valley, Mr. Sentman left me, and I pursued my way alone, and passed into Perry County near Germantown. Upon entering Amberson's Valley, I pressed a horse, and at Germantown I had my horse fed and got my supper. Here I came near being arrested as a rebel spy, but I was at length allowed to proceed. About eight o'clock I left Germantown for Newport, some forty-two miles distant. This distance I rode in about seven hours without dismounting. Arriving at Newport, on the Pennsylvania Railroad, about forty miles above Harrisburg, near three o'clock in the morning, I put my horse at a hotel, and, a train coming along soon after, I took passage for the capital. Shortly after daylight we reached Harrisburg, and when I got out of the car I met Hon. D. W. Rowe, then in the military service, now judge of this district. I told Judge Rowe the news I brought, when he at once conducted me to the capitol. Upon entering one of the rooms I found myself in the presence of a number of distinguished persons, among whom were Governor Curtin, General Couch, and General Smith. After telling them my statement I was put through a close examination by one of the generals—General Smith, I think it was. After the close of the examination the general said, 'Well, gentlemen, the information this young man brings is of the most vital importance, if we can rely

upon it.' William McClellan, Esq., at that time a prominent attorney here, with whom I was well acquainted, happening to be present, said, 'Gentlemen, I know this young man; you can rely upon every word he says.' After a short consultation between the governor and the military men, dispatches were hurriedly written and the telegraph operators in the room were set to work. After a



BENJAMIN S. HUBER,

The scout who bore to the authorities the first intelligence of the direction General Lee and staff were going. (From a photograph taken during the war.)

little while I arose to leave, when the governor took me by the hand, thanking me for the information I had brought, and gave me a paper entitling me to return free on the cars to Newport. Returning to Newport I mounted my horse and rode home the way I had come, and upon nearing home I again encountered Confederates, one of



whom took my hat from my head. Reaching home, I found it empty and deserted. While I was away the Confederates were swarming all over that part of the country, and my wife becoming alarmed shut up the house and went to a relative of hers. During her absence the Confederates entered the house and carried off nearly all our clothing, so that I was left without a change of clothing or a hat to replace the one taken from me."

The authorities at Washington were aware on Saturday, the 27th, that Lee had passed through Chambersburg the day previous, and had gone east. Is it not fair to suppose that this important fact was made known to them by the message carried by Mr. Huber?

General Lee, as he sat on his horse that day in the public square of Chambersburg, looked every inch a soldier. He was at that time about fifty-two years of age, stoutly built, of medium height, hair strongly mixed with gray, and a rough, gray beard. He wore the usual Confederate gray, with some little ornamentation about the collar of his coat. His hat was a soft black without ornament other than a military cord around the crown. His whole appearance indicated dignity, composure, and disregard for the gaudy trappings of war and the honor attaching to his high station. Any one who had ever seen his picture, as it is found in the various histories of the war, would have had no difficulty in singling him out in a crowd. General Lee seemed to have not only the most profound respect of his men—officers and privates—but their admiration and love. With some few exceptions among the officers, some of whom quietly expressed their feelings to some of our citizens, and seemed to fear that they had

made a mistake in coming into our State, the whole army had the most unbounded confidence in their commanding general, and would unhesitatingly follow him wherever he would lead them.

The men composing the general's staff were a splendid looking body. Finely mounted, neatly dressed, and excellent in horsemanship, they presented an appearance which those who witnessed them will be likely ever to remember.

There were with the Confederates, presumably with that group, two officers of the British army and one of the Prussian. Those officers were, no doubt, expecting and desiring to witness the downfall of the Republic. That such was the case with at least one of them—Colonel Freemantle of the British service—is demonstrated in an article he afterward wrote for *Blackwood's Magazine*, in which he narrates the events of the Pennsylvania campaign. His abuse of the people of the border, and of the ladies of Chambersburg, whom he calls "viragoes," his congratulations to General Longstreet upon the apparent success of Pickett's great charge on the afternoon of the third day's battle, and his regret at their repulse, clearly show his hatred of our country and its institutions. We heard at the time of the presence of these foreign officers, but did not distinguish them from others.

In that group of distinguished men were the brains of the vast, moving host which came swarming through our borders, and while we were inclined to admire their genius, we yet looked upon them as the enemies of our country, and could only hope and pray that they would meet the terrible overthrow which they deserved. In precisely one week from the day of this imposing pageant, our hopes and



prayers were realized, and the defeated hosts were thrown back from the heights of Gettysburg, and with their crushing defeat commenced the decline and downfall of the cause for which they fought.

General Lee selected for his head-quarters a grove which then stood along the pike leading to Gettysburg, near the eastern edge of Chambersburg. It was once known as "Shetter's Woods," but afterward as "Messersmith's Woods," after the late George R. Messersmith, Esq., who at the time referred to owned it. It was for many years the place where picnics and Fourth of July celebrations were held. The Centennial Anniversary of American Independence, on July 4th, 1876, was held there. The grove has recently been cut down, and the place is now a cultivated field. It was a beautiful location, and from Friday, June 26th, to Tuesday morning, 30th, General Lee and his staff tarried there. There he held his councils of war, there he received reports from the various parts of his vast army, and there he planned and ordered an attack on the capital of our State, and there on the night of Monday, 29th, when Longstreet's scout brought information of the whereabouts of the Army of the Potomac, he recalled that order and decided to cross the South Mountain and fight a battle upon the direct line to Baltimore and Washington. Other acts of importance which transpired upon this historic spot during those memorable four days of General Lee's residence there, will be given in their appropriate places.

In the morning of this day—Friday, 26th,—Early's division left its camp at Greenwood, where it had remained

over the previous day, and proceeded by the pike to Gettysburg on its way to York, according to instructions given General Early by General Ewell at the visit of the former to the latter's head-quarters near Chambersburg the day before. While on their way across the mountain they burned the Caledonia Iron Works, which belonged to Hon. Thaddeus Stevens. These works were situated about two miles east of Greenwood, at the base of the South Mountain, and about ten miles from Chambersburg. They consisted of a large charcoal furnace, forge, rolling mill, coal house, shops, stables, and other buildings. On Tuesday, June 16th, as has been said, while Jenkins' cavalry occupied Chambersburg, a marauding party visited these works, and upon the condition that they should be spared, all the horses and mules belonging to the premises were delivered to them. Hon. John Sweeney, Mr. Stevens' business manager, says that he had an interview with General Early, as he sat upon his horse that day, and endeavored to dissuade him from executing his threat to destroy these works. He told him that so far as Mr. Stevens was concerned, he would be better off if his works had been destroyed ten years before, but for the sake of the many poor people who were dependent upon them for support, and would be thrown out of employment if they were destroyed, he should spare them. To this appeal General Early replied, "That is not the way Yankees do business. They do not go on unless they make money. Then, Mr. Stevens is an enemy of the South. He is in favor of confiscating their property and arming the negroes. His property must be destroyed." General Early then specially detailed Colonel French to

apply the torch, and the whole was soon a mass of smouldering ruins.\*

In the afternoon of this day Early's division reached Gettysburg, when a requisition was made upon the authorities for sixty barrels of flour, seven thousand pounds of pork or bacon, one thousand two hundred pounds of sugar, one hundred pounds of coffee, one thousand pounds salt, forty bushels onions, one thousand pairs shoes, five hundred hats; or, ten thousand dollars in money. To this demand the town council, through its president, Mr. D. Kendlehart, made the following reply:

GETTYSBURG, June 26th, 1863.

GENERAL EARLY:

*Sir*—The authorities of the borough of Gettysburg, in answer to the demand made by you upon the said borough and county, say that their authority extends but to the borough, and that the requisition asked for can not be given, because it is utterly impossible to comply. The quantities required are far beyond that in our possession. In compliance, however, to the de-

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\* I am indebted to Professor J. Fraise Richard, the historian, for a copy of a letter from General Early to him, in response to an inquiry as to his reasons for destroying Mr. Stevens' iron works. General Early says in his letter from Lynchburg, Virginia, May 7th, 1886:

"No column of our troops was sent to burn the iron works of Thaddeus Stevens, near Greenwood, in the campaign into Pennsylvania, in 1863. My division of Ewell's corps was ordered to move along the western base of South Mountain until it came to the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, which I did, passing through Waynesborough and one or two smaller villages. I found the iron works above mentioned on the road aforesaid, where it begins to ascend the South Mountain, and they were burned by my order, and on my own responsibility. My reasons for giving the order were founded on the fact that the Federal troops had invariably burned such works in the South, wherever they had penetrated, and notably among them the iron works of Hon. John Bell, of Tennessee, who was the Constitutional candidate for the presidency in 1860, and who was too old to take any part in the war then pending. Moreover, in some speeches in congress, Mr. Stevens had exhibited a most vindictive spirit toward the people of the South, as he continued to do to the day of his death. This burning was simply in retaliation for various deeds of barbarity perpetrated by Federal troops in some of the Southern States, as was the subsequent burning of Chambersburg in 1864.

"Respectfully yours, etc.,

J. A. EARLY."

mands we will request the stores to be opened and the citizens to furnish whatever they can of such provisions, etc., as may be asked. Further we can not promise.

By authority of the council of the borough of Gettysburg, I hereunto, as president of said Board, attach my name. D. KENDLEHART.

General Early's orders required him to proceed without delay to York, and as no response was made to his requisition, it was not pressed. Leaving him *en route* to that place, we again turn our attention to our southern border and note some events transpiring there.

Previous to crossing the Potomac, General Lee had sent General Imboden with his cavalry, consisting of about thirty-three hundred men, to break up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in order to prevent any forces from the West from coming in from that direction upon his rear. Starting in at Cumberland, Maryland, he moved eastwardly along the railroad, doing considerable damage to the track, bridges, and depots, as well as the canal boats and locks of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, as far down as Martinsburg. After the execution of this work he crossed the Potomac, either on this day or the preceding one, at Cherry Run Ford, a point about eight miles east of Hancock. From this ford the main part of his force came up into and through Little Cove, in the southern part of the (Franklin) county to the Cove Gap. At the Maryland line a detachment left this body, and following up Licking Creek entered the Great Cove and passed up to Webster Mills, six miles south of McConnellsburg in Fulton County, and thence crossed the mountain by Hunter's Road and rejoined the main body at the gap. While in the cove this force did great damage. The farmers lost nearly all their stock, and Robinson's store at Big Cove

Tannery, and Patterson's at Webster Mills, were completely stripped of their contents. In many cases houses were entered and private property taken. Promising the reader that he will hear from these men again, we leave them in their camps at the Cove Gap, east of the North Mountain, and at Mercersburg, three miles further to the east.

On the evening of this day Longstreet's corps encamped about four miles south of Greencastle. Hood's division, and probably one other, came directly from Williamsport by the pike leading to the former place.

*Saturday, 27.* At about ten o'clock in the forenoon of this day Jenkins' cavalry entered and passed through Carlisle, and went into camp at Kingston, thirteen miles from Harrisburg. In the afternoon Rodes' division of infantry entered and took possession of the place, encamping between it and Kingston.

General Knipe, who commanded the advanced Federal troops in the valley, steadily fell back from Shippensburg, where he rallied the frightened New York militia previously spoken of, to about two miles south of Carlisle, at which place he intended to make a stand against the advancing foe. Rifle pits were prepared, in which he was assisted by citizens of the town, several hundred of whom were under arms to assist in the defense of the place. But having received on Wednesday night information of the approach of Rodes' division, he prudently fell back toward Harrisburg. That Johnson's division, if it left its encampment about Greenvillage at all until it left for Gettysburg on the Tuesday morning following, did not go much further down the valley, is proved in the fact that when the con-

centration commenced, it marched from its camp to Greenwood in a single day. This march, which was made directly across the county by the roads, which are not always good, might have been made from the neighborhood of Shippensburg, but not any further down the valley.

As previously stated, on the preceding day Heth's division of Hill's corps passed through Chambersburg and on out east to Fayetteville, where it encamped. Following this division during the afternoon of the same day and the forepart of the day following — Saturday, the 27th, — were Pender's and Anderson's divisions — Pender in advance. Throughout the entire afternoon of the day, and until late in the evening, the three divisions of Longstreet's corps passed through and went on out the Harrisburg pike, turning off at the Mennonite Church, where General Ewell had his head-quarters a few days before, and went into camp along the east bank of the Conococheague Creek. Hood's division encamped on the farm of Mr. Peter Lehman, two and a half miles north-east of Chambersburg; Pickett's division upon Mr. John N. Long's farm, and McLaws' still further up along the creek.

On this day General Lee at his head-quarters near Chambersburg issued the following general order:

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,  
CHAMBERSBURG, PA., June 27th, 1863.

*General Order, No. 73.*

The commanding general has observed with marked satisfaction the conduct of the troops on the march, and confidently anticipates results commensurate with the high spirit they have manifested.

No troops could have displayed greater fortitude, or better performed their arduous marches of the past ten days.

Their conduct in other respects has, with few exceptions, been in keep-

ing with their character as soldiers, and entitles them to approbation and praise.

There have, however, been instances of forgetfulness on the part of some that they have in keeping the yet unsullied reputation of this army, and that the duties exacted of us by civilization and Christianity are not less obligatory in the country of the enemy than in our own.

The commanding general considers that no greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it, our whole people, than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon the unarmed and defenseless, and the wanton destruction of private property, that have marked the course of the enemy in our own country.

Such proceedings not only degrade the perpetrators and all connected with them, but are subversive of the discipline and efficiency of the army, and destructive of the ends of our present movement.

It must be remembered that we make war only upon armed men, and that we can not take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of our enemies, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in vain.

The commanding general, therefore, earnestly exhorts the troops to abstain, with most scrupulous care, from unnecessary or wanton injury to private property, and he enjoins upon all officers to arrest and bring to summary punishment all who shall in any way offend against orders on this subject.

R. E. LEE, *General*.

This order, unlike the former one issued on the 21st, it will be seen, was written by General Lee himself, and not by his adjutant. The object of the former one was, as has been stated, to prevent the indiscriminate plunder of our people and to confine the demands of the army, and the methods to be employed in securing them, within the limits of civilized warfare. Under the regulations prescribed private property was to be respected, and in no case taken except when needed by the army, and then only by officers specially charged for that duty. Candor compels me to say that in the main these humane regulations

were observed. The taking of groceries, provisions, stationery, hardware, clothing, hats, boots and shoes, drugs, horses, cattle, corn, oats, hay, etc., was clearly within the rules of civilized warfare, and nothing more than the Federal army did when in the enemy's country. And having been recognized as belligerents in the exchange of prisoners, and in other ways, the Confederates had the right while in our country to the usages accorded to armies in an enemy's country. This, to their credit be it said, they exacted of us without many acts of wanton and useless plunder. Indeed I must say that from all the conceptions I had formed from history of the desolation produced by an invading army—in a civil war especially, which is usually attended with more rancor and bitterness than one between opposing nations—this invasion of our State widely differed. With the exception of a few instances, where stragglers from the main line committed some depredations, private houses were not entered with hostile intent. But one person—a Mr. Strite—was killed. He resided a few miles south of Chambersburg, and some distance from the main road over which the army passed. While standing in his yard, in front of his house, three stragglers from Hill's corps came up to him and demanded his money, which he immediately gave them. Soon afterward two more stragglers came and made a similar demand, and having no more to give them, they killed him and concealed his body under the manure in the adjoining barnyard. In a few instances persons were relieved of watches, pocket-books, boots, etc., by stragglers, but never in the presence of an officer. But of all the adepts at appropriating hats, some of these Confederate soldiers displayed an



ingenuity that was indeed remarkable. As they marched along the streets, sometimes close to the pavements, and in a few cases upon them because of the mud, those possessing hats having them crushed into a shapeless mass under their arms, it required but an instant to grab a hat from the wondering on-looker and place it where it could not be recognized by the owner. This was repeatedly done in the presence of officers, who invariably tried to have the offending person pointed out, that the stolen property might be restored and the offender punished, but in the similarity of the men and the necessity for the column to keep moving on, not a single one was detected.

But that the humane intentions of General Lee were not wholly regarded, and acts of plunder were committed, is clearly established by this second order from the commander in chief, in which he refers to some acts of disobedience and expresses his regret at the same. In further proof of this fact I introduce extracts from a report of the Pennsylvania campaign, written by Colonel Freemantle, one of the British officers who was with the Confederate army, and published in *Blackwood's Magazine*, of September, 1863. Colonel Freemantle says: "So completely was the country through which the Confederate army passed robbed and plundered, that all the cattle and farm horses having been seized by General Ewell, farm labor had come to a complete standstill." In another place the same writer says: "Lee's retreat was encumbered by Ewell's immense train of plunder." Why it was that General Ewell's corps gained this distinction over the other two for its plundering propensities, may probably be

accounted for in the fact that it always went in advance and left but little for the others to take.

During the time the Confederate army occupied this valley, marauding parties were sent out into all parts of the country in search of horses. The mountain passes and gaps were especially visited, and every nook and corner from Mercersburg to Newburg was searched, and many valuable animals were captured and taken away. In two cases armed resistance was made to these marauders. One of these was at what is known as Keefer's Gap. At this place an old path crosses the mountain into Horse Valley. The farmers in the neighborhood of this gap to the number of about twenty or twenty-five formed a camp at this place, erecting several tents, and laying in a stock of provisions and food for their horses. They then brought to the place from one hundred to one hundred and twenty-five horses. The men in charge were all well armed and determined to protect their property. Some fifteen or twenty were kept continually on duty while the rest attended to the horses and brought in needed supplies. The roads and paths were well guarded, and when a suspicious person would come along, two of the guards would take him in charge and conduct him to the top of the mountain, and with orders not to be seen around there any more would let him go. At intervals of about five minutes a gun was discharged, and in this way a continuous booming was kept up. This deterred the enemy from approaching the place, and while every other gap in the mountain was visited and horses taken, not a visit was made to this place.

The other instance of armed resistance was at the Stras-

burg Pass leading into Horse Valley. This valley is very narrow and of considerable length, and being surrounded by mountains which are passable only at a few places, resistance seemed to be practicable. Mr. Stephen Keefer, the supervisor of the township, summoned his neighbors, who like himself were all hardy mountaineers, and by felling trees across the road which enters the valley from Loudon at its southern end, effectually closed it against all intruders in that direction. On the top of the mountain, covering the approach by the Strasburg road, breastworks of logs and stones, masked by bushes, were erected, and about thirty of the hardy mountaineers with their trusted rifles stood guard. At the upper end of the valley, which was closed by the obstructions already referred to, several hundred valuable horses belonging to the farmers residing there, and to persons east of the mountain, who had sent them there for concealment, were placed. One day the guard was withdrawn for a time, when the detachment of about one hundred cavalry, which had left General Stewart's brigade at McConnellsburg and proceeded up the valley as far as Burnt Cabins, and recrossed the mountain by Fannettsburg and Horse Valley, and out into the plains to the east by this pass, came along, but found the breastworks empty. Had the mountaineers been at their post a battle would most certainly have taken place, but to the serious loss of those brave defenders of their property, for the enemy came upon their entrenchments to the rear. Or had these marauders gone up the valley some six or eight miles, they would have augmented their captures by some two or three hundred horses. The reader might inquire, how did these invaders,

unacquainted with these mountain roads, find their way into and out of these intricate places? They had procured maps of our county which they had studied well. And that they were guided by some sympathizer in their cause, of which there were some among us, seems clear from the fact that a man rode with them having his face covered with a handkerchief. That traitorous guide, notwithstanding his disguise, was recognized by some, but fearing that they might be mistaken and an innocent person be consigned to eternal infamy, his name was not given.

In addition to the instances of resistance just given, there were several gallant dashes made upon the Confederate communications by squads of Federal cavalry, which deserve mention. After the main body of the Confederate army had passed, the communications with Virginia were kept open by detachments of cavalry. Ignorant of Lee's destination, and discouraged by the hosts of defiant and boastful Confederates who had passed along, the surprise and joy of the people of Greencastle knew no bounds when, on Thursday, July 2d, a company of Union cavalry dashed into that place. These men were under the command of Captain Uhlrick Dahlgren, who was afterward killed near Richmond. They had come across the mountain from the Federal column by Monterey Pass. If a band of angels had come down into the town they could not have been more unexpected or welcome. It required only a few minutes to apprise the people of their presence, when all Greencastle seemed to be in the street. Hats flew into the air and cheer followed cheer. Even the old and staid ministers forgot the proprieties and many wept for joy. Their leader, the gallant Dahlgren, though a

mere youth, had the entire confidence of his men, and he seemed to handle them with perfect ease and skill. Captain Dahlgren immediately ordered all the citizens off the streets, and, after hiding his men behind the recesses of the public square, went up into the steeple of the Reformed Church, where, with his glass, he scanned the country for miles around. Perceiving a company of Confederate cavalry coming from the south, and hurriedly estimating their number, he rapidly descended, and declared his determination to give battle, notwithstanding their number was double that of his own. He hastily placed his men so that the advancing enemy could not see them until they would reach the square, and then, pistol in hand, and leaning forward until he touched his horse's neck, with every nerve strained with eagerness to meet the foe, he waited until they were within a few hundred yards, when the word was given, and with a wild yell, the charge was made upon the astonished and panic stricken enemy. Although from the superior number of the Confederates it was feared that these heroic men would be annihilated, yet they put the enemy to flight, capturing seventeen of their number, three of whom were officers. This party had in charge a mail-bag from Richmond, and in it were found important papers from the Confederate President for General Lee. As soon as the importance of his capture was seen, Dahlgren hastily left by the way he had come. Galloping out the Waynesborough road, he detailed a number of men to remain and barricade it on the hill east of the town to prevent pursuit and recapture. This they did by piling wagons, hay-ladders and other things across the road. The guard, after having erected the barricade

and remained there awhile to resist any pursuit that might be made, at length left and went after their companions. This mail, with the prisoners, was delivered to the Federal army east of the mountain.

On the morning of Saturday, July 4th, Captain Dahlgren and his brave band again visited Greencastle, at which time a similar engagement took place. This engagement resulted in the capture of seventeen Confederate infantry and seven cavalry, and a number wounded. In both these brilliant affairs the Union soldiers escaped any injury.

About noon of Wednesday, July 1st, a single Confederate soldier rode into Fayetteville in the direction of Chambersburg, when he was halted by a citizen and compelled to surrender, which he did by handing to his captor a small pouch of letters. The courage of the citizen then unhappily failed him and he allowed the soldier to return to General Imboden's camp at Greenwood. The capture of the letters was reported, and in a brief time a detachment of cavalry under command of Captain McNeil, of Virginia, rode into the town and arrested six or seven of the citizens and took them to Imboden's camp. That night the command moved on toward Gettysburg, taking their prisoners with them. After a narrow escape from being hung they were, on the 3d, released and permitted to return to their homes.

*Sunday, 28.* At nine o'clock in the morning of this day, the advance guard of Jenkins' cavalry reached Mechanicsburg, some eight miles from Harrisburg. Two cavalymen bearing a flag of truce dashed into the town, and, halting in the public square, inquired for the civil

authorities, and also demanded the flag which had been floating until a short time before their entrance, which was taken down at the suggestion of some of the Federal cavalry-men as they withdrew from the town. The burgess making his appearance, they demanded of him the flag, under the threat that the place would be shelled if their request was not immediately complied with. As there was no alternative the flag was surrendered, and the citizens had the mortification to see one of the Confederates riding away seated upon it. After satisfying themselves that the town would be surrendered without resistance, the entire Confederate force of cavalry and mounted infantry under General Jenkins, with four pieces of artillery, made their appearance, and passing through the town encamped about one mile out. After seeing his men encamped, Jenkins returned to the town and took up his head-quarters at the Ashland House. Soon after his return he issued a requisition upon the place for fifteen hundred rations to be delivered at the Town Hall within an hour and a half. About two o'clock the general and his staff left town and proceeded to his camp.

In the morning of this day Early's division, which had left Gettysburg some time on Friday afternoon, reached the town of York. This division had marched from Gettysburg to the latter place by two different roads. One part of the division went by way of East Berlin, while the remainder passed through Hanover to the junction of the Northern Central Railroad, about ten miles from York. The railroad at this place was effectually broken up, thus severing connection with Baltimore by that line. As the division approached York, the burgess, Mr. David Small,

went out several miles to meet the advancing Confederates and surrender to them the town. Special immunity was expected because of this voluntary surrender, but no sooner were the enemy in possession of the town, than demands were made for a large amount of supplies, among which were two hundred barrels of flour, thirty thousand bushels of corn, and one thousand pairs of shoes. This requisition was soon followed by another, demanding the sum of one hundred thousand dollars in cash. The furnishing of this money was to be the consideration for sparing the town from plunder and destruction, and notwithstanding twenty-eight thousand dollars—all that could be obtained at the time—were paid over, General Early issued the following order, or address, to the people.

*To the Citizens of York:*

I have abstained from burning the railroad buildings and car shops in your town, because, after examination, I am satisfied that the safety of the town would be endangered; and, acting in the spirit of humanity, which has ever characterized my government and its military authorities, I do not design to involve the innocent in the same punishment with the guilty. Had I applied the torch without regard to consequences, I would have pursued a course that would have been vindicated as an act of retaliation for the many authorized acts of barbarity perpetrated by your own army upon our soil. But we do not war upon women and children, and I trust the treatment you have met with at the hands of my soldiers will open your eyes to the monstrous iniquity of the war waged by your government upon the people of the Confederate states, and that you will make an effort to shake off the revolting tyranny under which it is apparent to you all you are yourselves undergoing.

J. A. EARLY, *Maj. Gen. C. S. A.*

If this levy of money upon a defenseless town, which had been surrendered, and which had evinced a meek and unresisting spirit, and in default of its payment the declared intention to destroy the place, was at all justifiable, or within the rules of civilized warfare, it would be diffi-



cult to see how many of the charges of inhumanity and heartlessness made against Federal officers in the South, can be sustained. Shortly after the entrance of the Confederates into York, General Gordon was sent with his brigade to Wrightsville, on the west bank of the Susquehanna, twelve miles distant. The object of this expedition was to seize the bridge which crossed the river from that place to Columbia on the eastern bank.

As considerable importance has been attached to this effort upon the part of the Confederates to seize this bridge, I shall detail with some minuteness the manner of its destruction. As soon as it was known at the headquarters of the Department of the Susquehanna that the Confederates were entering the southern border of Pennsylvania preparations were made to hold this bridge. On Wednesday, 24th, Colonel Jacob G. Frick took command of the men who had been collected at Columbia. These consisted of a few men from the Twentieth and Twenty-seventh Regiments Pennsylvania Volunteers, the Philadelphia City Troop, under command of Captain Samuel J. Randall, the Patapsco Guards, and several companies of the citizens of Columbia and adjacent places. Among these was a company of colored volunteers from Columbia. These were probably among the first colored soldiers in the war, and they did excellent service. Colonel Frick sent his men to the west side of the river, where breastworks were thrown up and other preparations made for the expected enemy. Orders from head-quarters were issued to Colonel Frick that in the event of the approach of the enemy, and his inability to hold the bridge, he should destroy it, and in no case permit it to fall into the

enemy's possession. The following is the order of General Couch, the department commander:

HARRISBURG, June 28th, 1863.

By the Atlantic and Ohio Telegraph Lines.

TO MAJOR HALLER, U. S. A. — A. D. C.:

When you find it necessary to withdraw the main body of Colonel Frick's command from Wrightsville, leave a proper number on the other side to destroy the bridges, and use your own discretion in their destruction. Keep them open as long as possible with prudence.

D. N. COUCH.

The duty of superintending this work was laid upon Mr. Robert Crane, who was assisted by Messrs. E. K. Smith, William Faesig, Isaac Real, Henry Berger, John Gilbert, Frederick Bost, H. P. Moore, W. Green, Michael Libhart, J. B. Bachman, Davis Murphy, W. W. Upp, Michael Shuman, Henry Duck, and I. C. Turner. These men cut the roof of the bridge, removed some of the timbers, and bored all the arches, charging them with powder and attaching fuses. Four men were placed in charge of these fuses, who were to apply the match when the order was issued by Colonel Frick. We will now let Colonel Frick tell the result in his official report to General Couch:

"Late in the evening of the same day I crossed the river, assumed command and disposed of my forces for defense. During the night my force was increased by four companies from Columbia, three white and one colored, numbering 'about one hundred and seventy-five men. Early next morning, having obtained trenching tools from citizens of Columbia and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, my own men and the negro company (the other three companies having left for their homes) began the work of intrenching. During the morning a detachment of convalescent soldiers from York, and the Patapsco

Guards, with about two hundred and fifty more men joined my command, and were posted on the left of town, protecting the left flank of my position. These men I placed under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Green. These were also joined during the morning by scattered fragments of the Twentieth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sickles, which I posted on the right of town as a protection to the right flank. The work of intrenching was continued until the approach and attack of the enemy, about half-past four o'clock P. M.; and whilst the work was in progress I selected with the assistance of Major Haller, A. D. C. to the commanding general, the several points at which to post my limited number of men. The main body of the enemy, about twenty-five hundred strong, composed of cavalry, artillery and infantry, took up their position about six o'clock P. M., on the turnpike, in the immediate front of my troops, and within three quarters of a mile of our rifle pits. A force of cavalry and infantry moved down the railroad on our left and attacked our skirmishers, who after replying to their fire for a short time retired to the main body, which kept up a steady fire and held the enemy in check until they received orders to retire to the bridge.

“The Confederates succeeded in getting a battery in position on the elevated ground on our right and a section in our immediate front. These guns were used most vigorously against those of my command occupying the rifle pits. In the meantime they sent a column of infantry under cover of a high hill on our right, within a few hundred yards of the river. None but their skirmishers approached within range of the guns of our men occupying

the rifle pits, and those being in a grain field obscured from our view, except when they would rise to fire, it was difficult to do them much harm or to dislodge them. They depended exclusively upon their artillery to drive us from our position here. Having no artillery ourselves on that side of the river with which to reply, and after retaining our position for about one hour and a quarter, and discovering that our remaining longer would enable the enemy to reach the river on both my flanks, which I was unable to prevent because of the small number of men under my command, and thus get possession of the bridge, cut off our retreat and secure a crossing of the Susquehanna, which I was instructed to prevent, I retired in good order and crossed the bridge to the Lancaster County side. Before the enemy had left York for the river here, I made as I supposed every necessary arrangement to blow up one span of the Columbia bridge. When they got within sight, the gentlemen charged with the execution of that work repaired promptly to the bridge and commenced sawing off the arches and heavy timbers, preparatory to blowing up with powder which they had arranged for that purpose. After an abundance of time was allowed them, and after I supposed every man of my command was over the river, and when the enemy had entered the town with his artillery and reached the barricade at the bridge-head, I gave the order to light the fuse. The explosion took place, but our object in blowing up the bridge failed. It was then that I felt it to be my duty, in order to prevent the enemy from crossing the river and marching on Harrisburg in the rear, destroying on the route, railroads and bridges, *to order the bridge to be set on fire.*"

The bridge was owned by the Columbia Bank; it was five thousand six hundred and twenty feet long, and cost one hundred and fifty-seven thousand three hundred dollars. Its destruction was necessary to prevent the enemy from crossing into eastern Pennsylvania.

This affair at Wrightsville, if it was of sufficient magnitude to be called a battle, was the third engagement of the war in Pennsylvania.

This expedition to Wrightsville, it will be remembered, was ordered by General Early, who doubtless received his orders from his corps commander, General Ewell. General Ewell, several years before the war, was employed as a civil engineer upon the Harrisburg and Columbia Railroad. He was familiar with the whole country, and doubtless had other objects in view in attempting to seize this bridge than plundering Columbia and breaking up railroad communications with Philadelphia. It was supposed at that time that it was designed to throw Early's division and Hill's corps, which was then marching in that direction, across the Susquehanna at that place, with the purpose of attacking Harrisburg from the east, while Rodes and Johnson attacked it from the south. This movement would have been exceedingly hazardous, for whatever forces might have crossed, would have been separated from the chief command by a river a mile wide, with neither bridge nor ford between Columbia and Harrisburg—a distance of about twenty-eight miles.

General Long, in the extract from his article in the *Philadelphia Times*, given in our first chapter, says: "Before entering upon the execution of his plans, General Lee had marked out his line of operations, which was to ad-

vance into Pennsylvania, with Gettysburg or York for his objective points, as circumstances might dictate. It was his determination to give battle at one or the other of these places." If a battle with the Federals in the neighborhood of York was expected by General Lee, the possession of the Columbia bridge, to prevent the approach of troops from that direction, was a necessity. That either a battle at that place, or crossing the river and marching upon Harrisburg by its east bank, was expected, is clear from the fact that up to the night of Monday, 29th, when the plan of the campaign was suddenly changed, the movements of troops were nearly altogether in the direction of York.\*

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\*Colonel W. H. Swallow, Adjutant-General to General Rodes, in a letter to the writer, dated at Nashville, Tennessee, May 7th, 1886, says:

"General Ewell, and Colonel Turner of his staff, both told me in confidence at Berryville, before crossing the Potomac, that York, Pennsylvania, or that vicinity, was to be the ground where General Lee expected to concentrate his army. I believe that if Longstreet had not tarried so long at Chambersburg, York would have been the point of concentration on the 30th, instead of Gettysburg."

As stated elsewhere, Longstreet's corps reached Chambersburg late in the afternoon of Saturday, June 27th, and went into camp near the town. On Monday morning the divisions of Hood and McLaws left their encampment and marched to Greenwood—some eight miles distant. At that place they remained until the afternoon of Wednesday, 1st, when they proceeded across the mountain and reached Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, before 11 o'clock the same night. This encamping over Monday night at Greenwood, after but eight miles march, was, as General Longstreet says, by Lee's order; and the delay there until the following Wednesday was, he says, occasioned by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, and the latter's wagon train, fourteen miles in length, which had the right of way. Pickett's division was, by Lee's order, left near Chambersburg to protect the rear, until early on the morning of Thursday, 2d, when, summoned to the front, it by a forced march reached the field about three o'clock in the afternoon. That there was considerable delay in Longstreet's movements is true, but whether or not he was responsible for it, except probably for his inactivity on Sabbath, the 28th, is for the reader to judge. General McLaws, in a recently published article in the *Philadelphia Press*, says that if Stuart's cavalry had not taken the circuitous route it did, and had been in communication with General Lee, it

I return now to the occurrences about Chambersburg. There were but few movements of troops through the streets this day (Sunday, 28th). The last of Hill's forces had passed through town the day previous, and were encamped about Fayetteville and Greenwood. Longstreet's corps was encamped a few miles north-east of the town. Religious services were held in their camps, and the men were quietly resting from the fatigue of their weary march.

Notwithstanding this quiet in the camps, however, important events, so far as the business men of the town were concerned, were transpiring. Squads of men, each in charge of one or more officers, visited the town and cleaned out the stores of what the troops which preceded them had left. Sitting in my house connected with our store about one o'clock P. M., the sound of an axe chopping somewhere about the front was heard. Repairing to the place I found a party of soldiers chopping away the cellar door leading to where our groceries were kept, and after effecting an entrance, an officer with blank book and pencil noted down the contents. Having finished his inventory of our stock, a guard was placed over the same until it could be removed. This guard, after the departure of the officer, ransacked our private or family cellar in the rear of the store cellar, and carried away whatever they could lay their thieving hands on. When the officer returned to remove our groceries, I informed him of what the guard had done, at which he seemed to become very indignant, but one of the men showed him a can of preserved fruit, and after a few whispered words between

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would have been left to protect the rear, at Chambersburg, and Longstreet's whole corps would have moved at once to the front. General Longstreet, then, is not to blame for his delay at Chambersburg.

them, the can was placed in a wagon and the officer's wrath suddenly subsided. Similar scenes were at the same time being enacted all over the town, and scarcely a store or shop escaped. About four o'clock in the evening a number of teams were brought into town, and distributed around at various places, and the contents of every store, shop and cellar were taken and loaded into these wagons. The dry goods men at that time dealt also in groceries, and all suffered the loss of their entire stock. We had in our cellar a considerable amount of molasses, syrup, sugar, etc., which General Ewell had kindly spared us. These we would have removed with our stock of dry goods, but the cellar was deep and the hogsheads heavy, and we were unable to draw them out. The Confederates, however, were equal to the occasion, and when thirty or forty of them took hold of the ropes, they soon had them all up in front of the store. When all were up, and before loading them into their wagons, an officer with a blank book noted down the number of gallons in each hogshead and barrel, and also the amount of sugar, etc. He seemed to be acquainted with the business of handling groceries, and in deciphering the marks upon the vessels, and when fixing upon the number of gallons in such as were tapped he would form his estimate after several liftings, which were always satisfactory to both sides in the transaction. In all this process he would have me by his side to see that he was acting fairly. Before giving the order to load into the wagon, he directed me to select whichever of the tapped vessels I wanted to retain for my own use, and after designating one, he had the men put it back into the cellar. This was the largest sale of groceries we



had ever made in one day, and that' was on the Sabbath too. Our loss was heavy, but so was it with every other business establishment of the town. This, be it remembered, was but one of the instances in which we were made to suffer by the enemy, and a year later, when McCausland's band visited us, nearly the whole town was laid in ashes.

I was not aware on that day that a requisition had been made upon us. That one, however, was made, not upon the citizens, but upon the Borough officials, who failed to respond because they had left town, is evident in Colonel Freemantle's account of the transactions of that day, in *Blackwood's Magazine*. Colonel Freemantle says:

"Major Moses tells me that his orders are to open the stores in Chambersburg by force, and seize all that is wanted for the army in a regular and official manner, giving in return its value in Confederate money or a receipt. The store-keepers have, doubtless, sent away their most valuable goods on the approach of the Confederate army. Much also has been already seized by Ewell, who passed through nearly a week ago. But Moses was much elated at having already discovered a large supply of excellent felt hats hidden away in a cellar, which he annexed at once."

The hats referred to were taken from one of the enterprising dealers, and were valued at about two thousand dollars. That man has never recovered from his loss on that day.

Colonel Freemantle continues: "Moses proceeded into town at eleven o'clock A. M. with an official requisition (from General Longstreet), for three days' rations for the

whole army in this neighborhood. These rations he is to seize by force, if not voluntarily supplied. \* \* Neither the mayor nor the corporation officers were to be found anywhere, nor were the keys of the principal stores forthcoming until Moses began to apply the axe. \* \* I returned to the camp at six o'clock p. m. Major Moses did not get back till very late, much depressed at the ill success of his mission. He had searched all day most idelafatigably, and had endured much contumely from the Union ladies, who called him a 'thievish, little rebel scoundrel,' and other opprobrious epithets. But this did not annoy him so much as the manner in which everything he wanted had been sent away or hidden in private houses, which he is not allowed by General Lee's order to search. He has only managed to secure a quantity of molasses, sugar, and whisky."

That molasses was taken from us; the whisky from the building adjoining.

The following day Major Moses, commissary-general of Longstreet's corps, rode around to each place plundered and paid for the things taken. When he came to settle with me, he drew from his pocket a book in which the articles were carefully noted down. Taking his seat at my desk he wrote in a hurried and business-like manner an itemized bill. He then asked me the price at which we sold each article, which he scrutinized for awhile and then set down what he thought was right. Footing up the whole he paid me in Confederate scrip. While writing so hurriedly I said to him, "Why, major, you write just like a Philadelphia lawyer." "That's just what I am," he replied. "I studied law on Walnut Street, Philadelphia, but

some years ago I removed South, where I have resided ever since." After receiving my pay in his worthless scrip, I said to him, "Now, major, tell me what to do with this *money!*" Straightening himself up and listening to what I said, he replied, "Well, now, that is an important question, and deserves the best answer I can give. My advice to you is to invest this money in Confederate bonds. They are at least as good as the money, and if our cause succeeds, as we expect it will, the bonds will be paid. If we fail, then of course our bonds will be worthless, but so will yours, for your government will be bankrupt by that time." The reader may, perhaps, be curious to know whether I took the major's advice, or what I did with my "money." It will be recollected that when telling of the shrewdness of Rev. Dr. Fisher in disposing of the scrip given him for printing done for the Confederates, I stated that the doctor did the best in his dealings with the Confederates of any man I knew, with one exception, and that was a preacher also. The present is perhaps the time to tell of that incident. Shortly after the retreat of the Confederates from our State, an elderly gentleman came into our store and, after purchasing a few things, took me aside and proposed to leave a deposit of a considerable sum of Greenbacks, for the purpose of buying up all the Confederate scrip I could get. He did not inform me what he wanted it for, nor where he lived, but I learned afterward. He instructed me to pay from four to five cents on the dollar, and because of my consenting to rid our county of this worthless trash, with which it was flooded and which was considered of no value, he allowed me *six cents* on the dollar for mine. Major

Moses allowed us fifty cents per gallon for molasses and syrup. Six cents on the dollar for our scrip netted us just *three cents per gallon* for what not long after we could have gotten one dollar per gallon for. The reader can have some idea of the profit or loss of that day's transaction, when in addition to our whole stock of sugar and other groceries, eight hundred gallons of molasses and syrup were taken.

I have often felt anxious to know what the Confederates did with our molasses. Perhaps the solution of this question is given by General Imboden in an article contributed by him to the *Galaxy* of November, 1871. Speaking of General Lee's great simplicity, and sharing the lot of his soldiers, General Imboden says: "On one occasion some molasses was obtained and sent to the field. One of General Lee's staff, who was caterer that week—that is, he drew the rations for the head-quarters mess—set a small pitcher of molasses before the general at dinner, who was delighted to eat it with his hot corn bread. Seeing his satisfaction the catering colonel remarked, 'General, I secured five gallons for head-quarters.' 'Was there as much for every mess the size of ours?' 'Oh, no, the supply won't last a week.' 'Then, I direct, colonel, that you immediately return every drop you have, and send an order that no molasses shall be issued to officers or men except the sick in hospital.'"

In a few weeks my strange friend called again, and taking what scrip I had procured, left another deposit. This he continued until he had gotten about all that could be had. But who was the strange man who was dealing in Confederate money? The following was his history as I

afterward learned it: He was a Presbyterian minister, and resided somewhere in the valley of Virginia, and being an uncompromising Union man he thundered the terrors of the law upon the heads of his Confederate congregation until they locked the church against him. When the Confederates advanced near where he lived he would flee north across the Potomac, and when the Union forces would occupy the territory he would return, and, surrounded by a guard of Union soldiers, would open his church and preach again. Three of his neighbors desiring to sell their property and move further down in the Confederacy, he bought their farms, payable in *currency*, and would thus follow the wake of the Confederate army and buy up their scrip and pay it over for the farms. He was a sharp financier, and what became of him and how he made out with his purchases I never heard.

While the scene of plunder just related was taking place in Chambersburg the following interesting incident took place at General Lee's head-quarters; and as the sequel of it is so interesting, I will allow the principal actor therein to relate her own story. The person referred to is Mrs. Ellen McLellan, widow of a former citizen of Chambersburg, William McLellan, Esq.:

MR. J. HOKE:

*Dear Sir*-- I take pleasure in complying with your request, and will give you a brief account of my interview with General Lee, as nearly as I can recollect it now. The mills, provisions, and stores throughout the town and surrounding country were all in the hands of the enemy, and in many families supplies were running short. On the Sunday before the battle of Gettysburg (June 28th), matters had become so serious that it became necessary for some one to seek an interview with the enemy and obtain flour. I sent for one of the body-guards, and a captain came in response. From him I learned that I could see General Lee by going to his head-quarters in Messersmith's

woods. This captain offered me an escort, but assured me that I could go alone with perfect safety, showing me a copy of General Lee's order that any one who would insult a woman by word, look, or act, would be instantly shot. I then decided to decline an escort, and taking my young daughter I set out for the camp. I found the rules were stringently enforced, but had no difficulty in passing through the ranks. Everything was in most perfect order; even the horses were picketed so as to do no injury to the trees in the grove where their tents were pitched. Reaching head-quarters I found the General seated with his officers at the table. A subordinate met me and learning my errand placed two camp-stools, and in a short time I found myself seated by General Lee himself. I stated to him our need, and told him starvation would soon be at hand upon many families unless he gave us aid. He seemed startled by this announcement, and said that such destitution seemed impossible in such a rich and beautiful grain-growing country, pointing to the rich fields of grain all around his camp. I reminded him that this growing grain was useless to us now, and that many of our people had no means to lay in supplies ahead. He then assured me that he had turned over the supplies of food he found, to his men to keep them from ravaging our homes. He said, "God help you if I permitted them to enter your houses. Your supplies depend upon the amount that is sent in to my men." He then told me to send one or two of our prominent men to him. I replied that they had nearly all gone away, fearing that they would be seized and taken off. (I feared to give him the names of any of our gentlemen.) He then asked me to send a miller who could give him an idea of the quantity required. On leaving I asked for his autograph. He replied: "Do you want the autograph of a rebel?" I said, "General Lee, I am a true Union woman, and yet I ask for bread and your autograph." The general replied, "It is to your interest to be for the Union, and I hope you may be as firm in your principles as I am in mine." He assured me that his autograph would be a dangerous thing to possess, but at length he gave it to me. Changing the topic of conversation, he assured me the war was a cruel thing, and that he only desired that they would let him go home and eat his bread there in peace. All this time I was impressed with the strength and sadness of the man.

I trust these few facts may prove of use to you. I am glad to see that you are getting up these bits of unwritten history. Of course I have just given you an outline of the affair and you are at liberty to use it as you see fit.

MRS. ELLEN McLELLAN.

The sequel to this visit of Mrs. McLellan will appear

in the following fact. Judge Kimmell says that on the same day of Mrs. McLellan's visit to General Lee's headquarters, or the day following, he can not now say which, an officer of General Lee's staff came to his residence and rapped at his door. Upon opening the door the officer said, "Are you Judge Kimmell?" Replying in the affirmative, the officer handed him a paper, saying, "General Lee sends you this." The Judge says that it had become known to some that he was engaged in sending information of the Confederates to the authorities at Harrisburg, and knowing that his life would be forfeited if found out, he thought as the officer handed him the paper from General Lee that "the very mischief was to pay." His fears, however, quickly subsided when he read the paper and found that it was an order from General Lee on the guard at Stouffer's mill for a number of barrels of flour for the poor of the town. Before he could use the order, General Lee had left and it was of no assistance.

In the evening of this day — Sunday, 28th — the camp fires of the advance of Heth's division, which had marched from its camp about Fayetteville on that day, were seen from Gettysburg on the eastern slope of the mountain above Cashtown.

*Monday, 29.* On this day Jenkins' cavalry moved from their encampment one mile east of Mechanicsburg toward Shiremanstown and also toward Bridgeport on the bank of the Susquehanna by the Harrisburg pike. When approaching Oyster's Point — a place on the turnpike about equally distant between Mechanicsburg and Bridgeport — they came in conflict with a force of infantry sent forward by General Couch. The brief skirmish which ensued

ended in an artillery duel, the Union guns being planted at the Point and those of Jenkins at the Stone Church about a half mile north of Shiremanstown. There were no casualties on either side. This was the fourth skirmish of the war upon Pennsylvania soil.

On Sunday, 28th, a company of the Twelfth Pennsylvania cavalry, which had escaped from Winchester at the time of Milroy's rout, and retreated to Bloody Run in Bedford County, Pennsylvania, and subsequently with others of these escaped forces had advanced to McConnellsburg in Fulton County, was surprised on the east side of the Cove, or North Mountain, by a detachment of General Imboden's force, which, it will be remembered, was encamped about the Gap and Mercersburg. In this affair a number of this company were captured by the enemy. In the afternoon of the same day a company of Imboden's men, thought to have been the same who had the skirmish in the morning with these Pennsylvanians, dashed into McConnellsburg, but finding no Federal soldiers there they did not dismount, but returned by the way they had come—in the direction of Mercersburg. At an early hour on Monday morning Company A, First New York Cavalry, commanded by Captain Jones, which had also escaped from Winchester into Pennsylvania, entered McConnellsburg from the direction of Bloody Run. Shortly after the arrival of this small force a company of mounted militia-men arrived from Mount Union, a small town thirty miles up the valley on the Pennsylvania Railroad. Jones was seated in a hotel, and his men were sitting about the door, their horses hitched near by. The militia-men remained upon their horses in a cross street. Presently some of



Jones' scouts came dashing in from the mountain and reported the approach of the enemy by the Mercersburg road. Jones very composedly inquired the number of the approaching force, and when informed that they did not exceed seventy-five—nearly double the number of his command, he having thirty-eight—declared his purpose to fight them. He at once ordered his men, who were nearly all Irishmen, and fond of a fight, to examine their arms and fall into line. The men examined their pistols and then stuck them into their boots. Jones then proposed to the captain of the militia-men that he should place his men in the cross street where they would be entirely unseen by the Confederates until he should have drawn them down below where they were stationed, when they were to make some demonstrations merely to frighten the enemy by the show of their numbers, leaving whatever fighting was to be done to him and his command. To this the captain of the militia-men consented and his men were placed according to the plan agreed upon. Jones then placed his little command of thirty-eight in line—he taking the rear—and as the Confederates entered the town from the east, he fell slowly back and thus drew them on. But before the enemy had reached the cross street in which the militia-men were concealed, Captain Irvine, who commanded the Confederates, ordered his men to “Charge the —— Yankees.” But they did not charge, for some of the militia-men, anxious to see what was going on, ventured down to the corner, where they were discovered. Captain Irvine, seeing these men, concluded that a job was being put up upon him, and these men were to come in on his rear. Instead then of charg-

ing the Yankees, Jones, seeing their apparent indecision, in a voice like a clap of thunder shouted, "Right-about face—charge." At this instant the militia-men took a sudden notion that they had business at home, and the whole command took to their heels and ingloriously fled. Reports say that they did not stop until they reached Burnt Cabins, twelve miles distant. Captain Jones' brave command, however, were equal to the occasion, and with terrific yells they dashed toward the enemy who turned and fled by the way they came. Before the edge of the town was reached firing began, but the whole population of the place rushed into the street, and ran after the pursued and pursuing, yelling and hallooing at the top of their voices. The pursuit was continued for about a mile, when all the enemy whose horses were not fleeter than Captain Jones' were captured. Two of the Confederates were killed and two wounded. Captain Irvine's command consisted of sixty-three men. Jones had thirty-eight. Besides the two Confederates killed, Jones took thirty-two men and thirty-three horses. He had no other casualties in his command than one man wounded. When the citizens saw the party return to McConnellsburg, the Confederates being about as many as Federals, they could not at first know which side was victorious. Jones, wisely concluding that the few who had escaped would soon report their misfortune across the mountain, and bring a heavier force against him, hurriedly left toward Bloody Run with his prisoners and captured horses. The citizens went out to where the dead lay, and placing them in coffins, interred them near where they fell. While this interment was taking place a Confederate cavalry force

came down from the direction of Mercersburg, while another force crossed the mountain by the Hunter's road, six miles down the valley, coming into McConnellsburg from the west while the others entered from the east. Thus the town was again in the enemy's hands, but Captain Jones was not there to be caught. This Confederate force consisted of about four hundred men, and they had with them three pieces of artillery, which they planted upon an eminence to the east of the town. They were part of Imboden's command. Expecting to find Federal soldiers secreted in the town, a search was made, but failing to find any, they left again about dark. The citizens who were engaged in burying the Confederate killed, were taken by this command, notwithstanding they displayed an improvised flag of truce, consisting of a white handkerchief attached to a stick. They were, however, speedily released when the officer in command saw what they were doing and how decently they were interring his fallen comrades.

This is the *fifth* battle of the war upon Pennsylvania soil, and for dash and gallantry, as well as for the magnitude of its results in proportion to the numbers engaged, is perhaps without a parallel in the whole struggle.

This day the balance of Heth's division crossed the mountain and joined the advance, which had crossed the day previous. It was this addition that increased the Confederate camp fires about Cashtown, as seen from Gettysburg in the evening. (Prof. Jacob's Battle of Gettysburg, page 21.)

In the morning of this day the divisions of Generals McLaws and Hood of Longstreet's corps left their encamp-

ments along the eastern bank of the Conococheague Creek, two and three miles north-east of Chambersburg, and proceeded directly across the fields to Fayetteville, where they encamped. The Engineer Corps went before and prepared the way by removing the fences. Dr. McClay, of Greenvillage, who stood upon Shirk's Hill and witnessed their march, says: "The Confederates passed right across the country in a direct line for Fayetteville, regardless of roads, and evidently in a hurry. From Monn's Mill down to Hargleroad's they lay in immense numbers. They were all moving when we looked over the fields from the highest point on the hill. Drums were beating, and the ear-piercing fife and the shrill notes of the trumpet were all calling to arms. We gazed on the scene and silently invoked the God of battles to protect our army and nation from this great force of misguided men." The other division of this corps—Pickett's—remained behind until the morning of Thursday, July 2d, to protect their rear and preserve their line of communications. In the meantime, during the three days it yet remained, detachments were employed in destroying the railroad. This they did by prying up the rails and then piling up the ties and rails from the fences, with the rails upon the top, and setting fire thereto. When the latter became heated they were bent out of shape by their own weight, and thereby became unfit for use. On Wednesday, July 1st, they destroyed the railroad shops. Fearing to involve the surrounding buildings by setting these shops on fire, the walls were battered until they fell. Ten or more men would take a long iron rail, such as are used for railroad purposes, and use it as a battering ram, and in this way

they soon succeeded in throwing down these buildings. A large lot of lumber was carried from one of these shops and piled upon the turn-table and then set on fire. This not only secured the destruction of the lumber, but the turn-tables also.

In the early part of this day Dr. J. L. Suesserott, one of the leading physicians of Chambersburg, visited General Lee at his head-quarters at Messersmith's woods. The object of his visit and what he saw are thus stated by the doctor:

MR. J. HOKE:

*Sir*—On Monday, June 29th, 1863, I visited General Lee at his head-quarters, near Chambersburg, for the purpose of having a blind mare, the property of one of my neighbors, exempted from capture. All of the other available horses having been either captured or removed to safe quarters, I wanted to have the use of this one for the purpose of having my corn plowed. After having stated to the general the object of my visit, and while the paper was being prepared according to his order, I employed my time in watching the features and movements of the great commander. Never have I seen so much emotion depicted upon a human countenance. With his hand at times clutching his hair, and with contracted brow, he would walk with rapid strides for a few rods and then, as if he bethought himself of his actions, he would with a sudden jerk produce an entire change in his features and demeanor and cast an inquiring gaze on me, only to be followed in a moment by the same contortions of face and agitation of person. The order for the safety of the horse having been finished and given me, I left and made rapid strides toward town, only to find that the Medical Purveyor of the Confederate Army had taken the horse, and my corn, which badly needed working, had to do without it and take its chance along with hundreds of acres within the county in the same condition.

J. L. SUESSEROTT.

That General Lee was not entirely happy in the position he then occupied, and that his mind was somewhat tinged with eager anxiety, if not with sadness, is apparent in this statement by Dr. Suesserott, as well as in that of Mrs. Ellen McLellan, who was accorded an interview with him

on the preceding day, and whose statement has been previously given. To her he said that he only desired that they would let him go home and eat his bread there in peace. The "strength and *sadness*" of the general deeply impressed her.

There were special reasons for the deep anxiety and sadness of General Lee on the day under consideration. He was then in the great Cumberland Valley, one of the most beautiful, thrifty, and productive places in all the country. All of this would appear in wide contrast with the war-desolated and slavery-cursed country from which he came. Then, too, there was the extreme crisis which he must have known was near at hand, and which would result in the destruction of thousands of lives, and spread desolation and grief in many of the homes he saw all around him. Add to these considerations the uncertainty as to his course. If, as General Longstreet says in his first contribution to *Annals of the War*, page 419, the scout Harrison, whom he had sent into the Federal lines, reported the whereabouts of the Army of the Potomac in the night of the 29th, then Lee was entirely ignorant of where his opponent was, and his situation was certainly embarrassing. Or if, as Longstreet says in his second article, in which he corrects the statement and places the return of the scout in the evening of the 28th, (*Annals of the War*, page 632,) then orders for the concentration of the army to the east of the mountain had already been issued. In either case there was ground for much anxiety. At all events it seems clear that General Lee had lost much of his equanimity. Other instances yet to follow will show a similar state of mind.

The main body of the Confederate army having nearly all passed from our midst, a brief, general description may be given to assist the reader in forming his conception of the appearance of such an immense host.

First, as is usually the case with armies on a march, comes a brigade or two of cavalry. After an interval of probably a day, the different regiments composing a brigade, and the various brigades composing a division, and the several divisions of a corps, pass, with their immense trains of artillery, caissons, forges, ambulances, and ammunition wagons. These wagons are each drawn by four or six horses or mules, and in passing along the macadamized streets they make that grinding noise which indicates immense weight of freightage. In some instances herds of fifty to one hundred cattle are driven along for the use of the men. Scattered here and there along the line at the heads of brigades, are bands of musicians. "Dixie," "My Maryland," and the "Bonnie Blue Flag" were the favorite pieces played. The passage of a corps usually occupied from a day to a day and a half, and sometimes a division or a corps was so closely succeeded by another that it was impossible for the uninitiated to fix upon the precise time when one departed and another came. Many of the wagons, horses, mules, and cannon bore the inscription, "U. S.," and were either captured in battle, or taken from the government. Each regiment and brigade had its flag, but there seemed to be no two entirely alike. Some bore the insignia of the State from which it came, and others some other device, and but few the stars and bars of the Confederacy. This diversity of flags was typical of the cause for which the Confederates

fought—for a government composed of a number of independent sovereignties. Not so the Federal Army. It carried but one flag—the glorious stars and stripes, which represents one government, one sovereign head, with many members.

The Confederate infantry, as they marched through Chambersburg, presented a solid front. They came in close marching order, the different brigades, divisions, and corps, all within supporting distance of each other. Their dress consisted of nearly every imaginable color and style, the butternut largely predominating. Some had blue blouses, which they had doubtless stripped from the Union dead. Hats, or the skeletons of what had once been hats, surmounted their partly covered heads. Many were ragged, shoeless, and filthy, affording unmistakable evidence that their wardrobes sadly needed to be replenished. They were, however, all well armed and under perfect discipline. They seemed to move as one vast machine. Laughing, talking, singing, and cheering were not indulged in. Straggling was scarcely seen, but when some of them did wander from the lines, and caught any of our people in retired places, they did not hesitate to appropriate to themselves hats, boots, watches, and pocketbooks. This proves that their good behavior when under the eyes of their officers was due to discipline rather than innate honesty and good breeding.

There was a perceptible difference in the character of the cavalry-men and that of the infantry. The former, as a class, were superior to the latter in all respects. This may be accounted for in the fact that the cavalry-men were mostly the well-to-do in the South, the educated, the



aristocracy, the slave-holders, while the rank and file of the infantry were the uneducated, the lower classes, many of whom were conscripted into the service. Many of these seemed to have no intelligent understanding of the cause of the war, of what they were fighting for, or of the value of the Government they were undertaking to overthrow. When interrogated upon these points they would say that they were fighting for *their rights*. What rights they had which they were in danger of losing, they did not attempt to tell. There was a marked difference in these men, which seemed to be a peculiarity of all from the same State. Those from Mississippi and Texas were more vicious and defiant than those from other parts of the South. Usually the discontented, those who sought opportunity to escape, were from North Carolina. Many declared that when the war first broke out they were in favor of the Union, but having been forced into the army, they only desired that their side should win. Here and there were some geniuses and lovers of fun. They supposed that as they were in Pennsylvania they were among the "Pennsylvania Dutch," that the German language was mostly spoken, and that the people lived on sauerkraut and lager-beer, and many and rich were the jokes they got off against some of our people of Teutonic form and appearance. Passing along the road in front of a house, before which stood a person whose ample form and stomach and rubicund face indicated good living and plenty of lager, a soldier said to another by his side, "I'll bet that old fellow drinks lots of beer." "No, no," said the man, who overheard the remark, "I never drink beer." At this the soldier cried out in imitation of Penn-

sylvania Dutch, "Och, mine countree! mine countree!" Another soldier, meeting one of our citizens whose appearance invited the question, inquired of him, "Can you tell where a fellow can get a little whisky?" "No, sir, I can't tell; I never drink whisky," replied the man. Looking him squarely in the face, and judging the truthfulness of what he said by the redness and fullness of the same, the soldier replied, "Well, I guess not."

Many of the men of the army seemed specially to hate President Lincoln. They had been made to believe that he was responsible for the war, and that he was brutal and barbarous. A report was in circulation among them that he had fled from Washington to Boston, and that the Army of the Potomac was yet in Virginia, and that they would have only Pennsylvania militia to overcome, and then Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington would fall into their hands.

The officers in command of the infantry, like the men composing the cavalry, were also of the high and cultivated class. Many of them with whom we had business transactions seemed to be perfect gentlemen; and while compelled under the exigencies of the occasion to appropriate our property to the use of their army, to be paid for in scrip which they knew was of no value, they did it in an apologizing way. Some of these men were overheard to express their fears that they had run into a trap by coming over here, and would not be able to get out again without severe loss. In looking upon the large number of persons who in some way managed to come into the town from the surrounding country, the supposition of some of these officers was, that they were soldiers in disguise. When

assured that such was not the case, and that the fighting population of the North was scarcely touched yet, they seemed greatly astonished. The following case will illustrate this point: A number of officers were seated one morning in front of the residence of one of our citizens, their horses being hitched to the shade trees. When the gentleman of the house appeared at the door, one of the officers thus addressed him: "How long, sir, is this war going to continue?" The gentleman replied, "You can answer that question better than I can." "What do you mean by that?" said the Confederate. "I mean that this war will continue as long as you Southern people are able to fight. If you can stand it twenty years more, then the war will last twenty years yet," said the citizen. Seeing that his words made some impression upon the soldiers, the gentleman was emboldened to say further: "You, gentlemen, must have seen for yourselves since you have come North that there are any number of able-bodied men yet to draw upon, and the people here have scarcely yet awakened to the fact that there is a war upon their hands; but this invasion will open their eyes to the fact, and if it were possible for you to annihilate the whole of our armies now in the field, that would only bring out another and larger one to take you some morning before breakfast." The officers listened respectfully to what the citizen said, and one of them, who was seated upon a cellar door, arose and addressing his companions, said, "There is more truth than fun in what he says." This remark led to considerable discussion among them about the large number of men they had seen since they had entered Pennsylvania.

It was a subject of frequent remark by the Confederates, while here, about the magnificent country and the many large and flourishing towns they had seen since coming North. The dwelling houses of the farmers and the large and excellent barns also excited their astonishment and admiration. Letters written while in Chambersburg to be sent to their friends in the South, but lost from their pockets and picked up by some of the citizens, expressed astonishment at the rich and beautiful country, the excellent farming, fine houses and barns, and thrifty and flourishing towns they had seen. The evident superiority of the country north of the Potomac to that south of it, and the hopelessness of their cause from the immense resources of our people yet untouched, exercised a discouraging effect upon the soldiers, and many stealthily disappeared from the ranks. In disguising and assisting them to escape, some of our citizens lent their aid. The following instance will show how this assistance was given: On the evening of July 1st, a soldier called at the residence of one of our citizens and declared his intention to make an effort to escape from the army and remain in the North. After satisfying himself that the man was sincere and not endeavoring to get him into difficulty, the citizen arranged to meet him at a designated place early the next morning with a suit of clothing. According to agreement he met the soldier, and after putting off his Confederate uniform and arraying himself in a citizen's suit, leaving his benefactor his musket, which he yet retains, the soldier leaped over the fence, exclaiming, "Farewell to Jeff Davis and the Southern Confederacy." This soldier, before leaving, assured his friend that many in the army were disheartened

after seeing the North. The South, he said, had put all its available force in the field, while here in the North they saw any number of able-bodied men who could yet be drawn upon. The deserters from the Confederate army, while in Chambersburg, were numerous, and there are now several of them residing there. A number of colored persons also made their escape from the army while in Pennsylvania, some of whom are yet living there. Said the writer to one of these soon after the war, "Where were you born, Sam?" "I was born in Georgia, sah," replied my sable friend. "How did you get up here?" I inquired. "I come Norf wid my young master; I was his sarvant, and he was an offisser, and when he got wounded at de battle of Gettysburg I just dun run away." "Did the colored people of the South understand what the war was about, and that the Yankees were their friends?" "O, yes sah, dey all know'd dat. My master used to tell us dat de Yankees would kill us and eat us up. Dey try to make us believe dey got ho'ns." "Did you believe these stories?" "We dun let's on we be mighty skeerd, but no nigger beliebed it." These poor, downtrodden creatures took advantage of their opportunity, and now, thanks to the providence of God, they are free men and citizens of the Republic.

During the time we were under Confederate rule, we were without information of what was transpiring in the country outside of the lines, only as an occasional paper was brought through by our scouts. The first information we received of the battle of Wednesday, July 1st, and the death of General Reynolds, was by one of the Philadelphia dailies, which Mr. Benjamin S. Huber, one of our

scouts, brought from Harrisburg. Our Southern visitors, however, received their regular mails from Richmond, and an occasional Richmond paper would be received, in which glowing accounts were given of the success of the Confederate cause elsewhere. One edition of these papers received announced that General Johnston had defeated General Grant and raised the siege of Vicksburg. The object of these false statements doubtless was to cheer and encourage their army in our State. These statements, however, in connection with the presence of the vast army in our midst, had a fearfully depressing effect upon us, and some feared that our grand and glorious Government would be overthrown. This depressed feeling we entertained until the information came that the invaders had been defeated at Gettysburg and were retreating southward, when the revulsion from despondency to exultation was so great that we had not language sufficient to express it.

The people of Chambersburg did not attempt to conceal from the enemy their patriotic principles. And while all felt the necessity of prudence in not unnecessarily obtruding these upon the invaders, they were nevertheless declared when the exigency required it. To the credit of our enemies, however, be it said that they expressed their respect for those who honestly held to their principles, even though differing from them, but equally denounced such as attempted to hide them, or shield themselves behind a profession of neutrality or sympathy. They as Southern men claimed the right to adhere to what they supposed to be the principles of the South, and expected that those residing in the North would maintain the principles supposed

to be peculiarly Northern. Honest in their convictions, as we believe the most of them were, they equally detested servility and professed friendship where they had no right to expect it.

It has been said by a recent southern writer\* that Chambersburg, at the time Lee's army passed through it, was a town of flags, and that the national colors floated from nearly every building. This is not correct. The people here understood the proprieties of the occasion too well to expose their flags to capture by flaunting them in the faces of the invaders. The only flags exposed to view were small miniature ones pinned to the bosoms of some of our ladies. While not concealing their predilections, nor treating with unlady-like conduct the strangers who were among them, they won the regard of all by their consistent behavior. I stood one evening in front of a house where a number of ladies were assembled and singing patriotic songs, and at the conclusion of the Star Spangled Banner, which was sung with good effect, a Confederate soldier, who, with about a half dozen others, was standing upon the pavement and listening respectfully, said: "It is the prettiest flag the world ever saw."

The great preponderating impression which was made upon the mind by looking upon an army like that which passed through here on its way to Gettysburg was its *immenseness*. No idea of its magnitude can be formed by any description which can be given. If the whole army with its appendages—Early's Division and Stuart's cavalry, which did not pass through this place,—the artillery

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\*Colonel R. M. Powell of the Texas brigade, Hood's division, in the Philadelphia *Weekly Times* of December 13th, 1884.

and wagon trains, ambulances, cattle, etc., had all been placed in a line in usual marching order, it would have extended nearly from Chambersburg to Harrisburg—fifty miles. This may seem incredible, but its truthfulness will appear when I state that I shall have occasion hereafter to tell of a single wagon train *fourteen miles long*, and of another *twenty-five miles in length*. And I give it as my opinion, based upon what that army did both before and after the invasion, that all the unorganized, undisciplined, and inexperienced militia of the State could not have withstood or vanquished that mighty host. It required an army equal in numbers, arms, organization, discipline, and experience to accomplish this. Like a huge serpent, it slowly and cautiously made its way into our State, turning its head now in one direction and then in another, until its tail was threatened to be trodden upon when it turned eastwardly and crossed the South Mountain. But thanks be to God—ten thousand thanks, the grand and glorious Army of the Potomac met it, and upon the heights of Gettysburg crushed its venomous head. Upon that “Altar of Sacrifice,” that “Field of Deliverance,” that “Mount of Salvation,” and amidst those “Munitions of Rocks” the Rebellion received its death blow, and like the tradition concerning the serpent, which says that notwithstanding its deadly wounds, it yet lingers in fitful life until the going down of the sun, this great monster of secession dragged its slimy length along until the sun of the rebellion set at Appomattox, when it yielded up its life.

I now resume my narrative, and as we are upon the eve of momentous events, I invite the reader's close attention to what is to follow.



In the evening of this day — Monday, June 29th,—some time after dark, in company with two of our citizens, I went up into the steeple of the Reformed Church to take observations. From that elevated position we had an uninterrupted view for miles around us. The line of the railroad could be traced by the numerous fires still burning. The sound of the drum was heard in the direction of Pickett's Camp. Along the South Mountain, for miles up and down the valley, innumerable lights were seen. That these lights were used as signals for communicating information, we well knew, but of their occasion and import we were of course ignorant. Perhaps the fact about to be related will solve this problem. Some time in the after part of this night, probably about one or two o'clock, I was awakened by my wife who told me to come to the window for some important movement was going on among the Confederates. Peering cautiously through the half-closed shutters we saw a continuous stream of wagons driven hurriedly through our street. They were coming back from the direction of Harrisburg, and turning east at the Public Square, drove on out the Gettysburg pike. Although these wagons were heavily loaded, as the grinding noise they made indicated, they were sometimes driven at a trot. A low, rumbling noise could be heard which sounded strange in the stillness of the night, as if the whole valley were filled with moving trains. These wagons proved to be part of Ewell's train, and their rapid passage eastward was a part in the great act of the concentration about Gettysburg, which will be fully described hereafter.

But what was the cause of the sudden change in General Lee's plans, and the rapid concentration of his army

to the east of the mountain? It was on the evening of this day, according to General Longstreet's statement, that the scout he had sent into the Federal lines came to his head-quarters near Chambersburg, and reported that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac, and that the head of it was about Frederick City to the east of the mountain. General Longstreet says that the importance of the information brought by this scout was such that he sent him at once to General Lee's head-quarters, where he imparted the startling information he brought. Owing to General Stuart's course around the Federal army, Lee had been deprived of all information of Hooker's movements, and supposed that he was yet south of the Potomac watching the approaches to Washington. The information brought by this scout opened his eyes to the danger which threatened his communications, and he was compelled at once to turn about and meet his foe. That this was the first information of the whereabouts of the Army of the Potomac which Lee received after entering Pennsylvania, is clear from the further statement by Longstreet in the article referred to. The General says, "We had not heard from the enemy for several days, and General Lee was in doubt as to where he was; indeed, we did not know that he had yet left Virginia."\*

In the absence of the knowledge of the whereabouts of the Union army, or rather upon the presumption that it was yet south of the Potomac, General Lee had determined to attack Harrisburg, but upon receiving the informa-

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ending of the scout Harrison, and  
Chambersburg, is given in the first

tion brought by this scout, the plan was at once changed, and the orders already issued countermanded. That such were the facts will appear from the following additional statement by General Longstreet in the article already referred to. That statement is as follows: "General Lee had already issued orders that we were to advance toward Harrisburg." Again he says that upon meeting General Lee the next morning, after the arrival of Harrison, he asked him "if the information brought by the scout might not involve a change of direction of the head of the column to the right?" To this remark he says General Lee "immediately acquiesced in the suggestion, possibly saying that he had already given orders to that effect." He then adds, "the movement toward the enemy was begun at once."

Whatever uncertainty there may be as to whether Longstreet's scout reported to him and Lee on the evening of Sunday, 28th, or of Monday, 29th, according to the first-named general's contradictory statements given of this affair, as previously referred to, there can be no question as to the precise time when the concentration in the direction of Gettysburg occurred. This is placed beyond dispute by the facts in the case yet to be related, as well as by General Longstreet himself, who says that "about noon (Tuesday, 30th,) the road in front of my corps was blocked by Hill's corps (the two divisions which had been in camp about Fayetteville and Greenwood) and *Ewell's wagon train, which had cut into the road above.*" (Annals of the War, page 420.)

As has already been shown, up to the night of Monday, 29th, Lee's objective was Harrisburg. "But," it may be

replied, "if General Lee contemplated an attack upon Harrisburg, why did he send two corps of his army to the east, in the direction of Gettysburg, and but two divisions of one corps—Rodes' and Johnson's—down the valley upon the direct line to the capital?" This may be accounted for as follows: A glance at the map will show that Lee rested his army at that time in the form of a triangle. The vertex of this triangle was at Chambersburg, the left side extended to near Harrisburg—fifty-two miles distant; the right side to York, fifty-three miles, and the Susquehanna River formed the third side. The distance from York to Harrisburg is twenty-eight miles; by way of Columbia, and along the eastern bank of the Susquehanna, it is forty miles. Troops concentrated in the neighborhood of York could be used upon either flank. Then, too, General Lee, notwithstanding his seeming contempt for the Army of the Potomac, was too wise and cautious, in the absence of any knowledge of the whereabouts of that army, to leave so important a pass in the mountains unguarded as the one leading from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, thereby increasing the danger to his line of communications in case of the advance of all his forces upon Harrisburg by the Cumberland Valley. He might have supposed, and certainly had reason to suppose, that his old antagonist would follow him up and strike him at the most favorable opportunity. To prepare for such a contingency was but common prudence: hence the movement of the larger part of his army across the South Mountain.

But before giving an account of the concentration of the Confederate army, let us look at the situation, and see where the various divisions and parts of it were on that

Monday night, and we will be the better prepared to follow them in their course toward the decisive field.

1. *Ewell's Corps.* Early's division was at York; Rodes' division about Carlisle; Johnson's somewhere about Shippenburg; Jenkins' cavalry about four or five miles from the defenses of the capital on the west bank of the Susquehanna. Two brigades of cavalry belonging to Stuart's Corps, commanded respectively by Generals William E. Jones and Beverly Robertson, which did not accompany their chief in his erratic course around the Federal army, but accompanied Lee's infantry up the valley, were encamped somewhere about Carlisle.

2. *Hill's Corps.* Heth's division was east of the South Mountain at Cashtown; Pender's and Anderson's about Fayetteville and Greenwood.

3. *Longstreet's Corps.* The divisions of McLaws and Hood were about Fayetteville. Pickett's division was about three miles northeast of Chambersburg.

*Imboden's Cavalry* was at Mercersburg and the Gap, three miles out at the mountain.

*Stuart's Cavalry* was at Union Mills, in Maryland, some distance north of Westminster.

Imagine a vast fan with the base of its handle at Lee's head-quarters near Chambersburg, and its circumference extending from Mercersburg on the left, through Carlisle to York, its extreme right, and you will be able to form some idea of the positions occupied by the Confederate army on the night of Monday, June 29th. With the exception of Pickett's division, which was to remain at this place to protect their line of communications, and Imboden's cavalry, which was to keep the way open for the

brigades of William E. Jones and Beverly Robertson, who were to protect the rear of Ewell's wagon train, and then themselves follow on to Gettysburg, all the scattered parts of this great host, with their immense trains, were to be called together at one point near their extreme right. All this must be done without confusion, and upon different roads; or where the same road was used by different corps and divisions, the right of way must be determined, and the time allotted to each declared. To each of these commands at some of the points named couriers must have been sent, while others may have been notified by signals. May not the mysterious fires we saw that evening from the church steeple have been the signals employed? Five hours after the order for the concentration of these forces was issued, a copy of it could have been carried to every point, except to General Early at York, and he could have been notified by courier in eight hours, allowing a rider to go at the rate of seven miles an hour. \*

*Tuesday, 30.* The hasty passage of the wagon train through Chambersburg in the night of the 29th, convinced us that Lee was concentrating his army, and that no time should be lost in sending this all-important information to the authorities at Harrisburg. Rising early in the morning to see after procuring a person to convey a message to the capital, I was called upon by Judge Kimmell, and after exchanging a few words upon the importance of the fact, he left me, and in a short time procured the services of Mr. Stephen W. Pomeroy, then a young

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\*General Doubleday says in his "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg" that General Early received Lee's order to march to Gettysburg sometime in the afternoon of Monday, 29th. If General Doubleday is correct in this statement, then Longstreet's scout reported to him on the evening of Sunday, 28th.

man residing in the valley in the northern part of our county, but now an honored minister of the Presbyterian Church. Mr. Pomeroy, in the following letter to ex-Governor Curtin, relates the circumstances of his trip:

MOUNT UNION, Pennsylvania, November 13, 1883.

HON. A. G. CURTIN:

*Dear Sir*—In compliance with your request, I send you the account of how I came to send you the telegram of the concentration of the Confederate army at Gettysburg during the war. After being discharged from the nine months' service of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, I happened to be home, at my father's—Judge Pomeroy, of Roxbury, Franklin County,—when the enemy were marching down the Cumberland Valley. There was, of course, great excitement, for the enemy were at our doors and taking what they would. Farmers hid their horses and other stock in the mountains, as far as possible. One day three hundred cavalry marched into Roxbury. When we learned of their coming, ten of the men who had been out in the nine months' service armed ourselves as best we could and went out to intercept them; but the odds were too great, so we retired. Anxious to hear the news and render what service we might to our country, a number of us walked to Chambersburg, a distance of fourteen miles, reaching there in the afternoon. That night the Confederates were concentrating at Gettysburg. Next morning Judge F. M. Kimmell, with whom my father sat as associate judge, learned that a son of Thomas Pomeroy was in town. He sent for me to come to him at once. I found the judge on the street that leads to McConnellsburg, a short distance from the Franklin Hotel, where the Central Presbyterian Church now stands. As the town was full of Confederates and a Confederate had his beat near us, the judge asked me in a low tone if I was a son of Judge Pomeroy. I replied in the affirmative. With apparent unconcern he asked me to follow him. I did so, and he led me into a little dark back room, and told me that the Confederates were concentrating at Gettysburg and Governor Curtin did not know it. He said it was of the utmost importance that the governor should know it at the earliest possible moment, and asked me if I would take a telegram to the nearest point on the Pennsylvania Railroad and send it to him. He added: "It is of infinite importance to him and to the country." I replied that I would try it. The telegram was already written, so he cut a hole in the buckle strap of my pantaloons and deposited the telegram to be sent there, and said: "Get this safely and in the shortest time possible to the governor." Assuming indifference I came to the street and

met the Confederate guard, who did not disturb me. Some of those who came with me wishing to return to Roxbury, we set out together.

We met many at the edge of the town returning, who could not get through the guard who were stationed around the town.

Coming to the forks of the Strasburg and Roxbury roads we found both cavalry and infantry. On the left there was a slight hollow, also several wheat fields, and beyond these there were woods. This was the only way to hope for escape. At my proposal we crept along this hollow, at the end of which there were some wheat fields; we kept these between us and the guard till we reached the woods. When getting over the fence into the woods we were seen by the enemy. They called, rode after us and leveled their muskets at us, but we ran on, and as they did not fire or follow far we escaped. Still fearing capture we kept to the fields. Before we reached Strasburg all had fallen back but one. We must have walked about seventeen miles before we got to Roxbury. As the horses were hid in the mountains I was in dread lest I should not get a horse, but I met Mr. S. L. Sentman riding into town to get feed for his horses in the mountains. Telling him of the message I was carrying he gave me his horse. Informing my father of my errand I set out on my trip at once. It was about noon. The Amberson Valley road was, I knew blockaded with trees to prevent the marauders from entering the valley to steal horses. On this account I crossed the mountain into Amberson Valley by a foot path, then another mountain into Path Valley. Reaching my uncle's, W. R. Pomeroy, at Concord, and telling him my business he got me another horse. The Narrows, below Concord, were blockaded by citizens of Tuscarora Valley, many of whom knew me. The report having reached them that I was killed while trying to hinder the Confederates from entering Roxbury, the obstacles and excitement of my friends at finding me alive hindered me about ten minutes. Free from them, I hastened down the Tuscarora Valley as fast as my horse could carry me. At Bealtown Mr. Beal, now the Rev. D. J. Beal, speedily got me a fresh horse. When I reached Silas E. Smith's I did these two things, got lunch and proved to the future Mrs. Pomeroy that I was not dead, as she supposed, but good for many years to come. From thence I rode to my uncle's, Joseph Pomeroy, at Academia, found them likewise mourning my supposed death, and he supplied another horse, the fastest he had. That carried me to within a mile of my destination, when a soldier on guard called, Halt! I told the sergeant on guard my mission and requested one of the guard to go with me, that I might get the telegram off to Harrisburg in the shortest time possible.

Getting on the horse behind me we rode in a few minutes to the office. Finding the operator, he cut the telegram out of the strap of my pantaloons



and sent it at once to you. The excitement and journey being over, and the telegram being off to you, I began to look at the time and found it about midnight. I had walked that day about seventeen miles and ridden about forty-one miles. Anxious as I was about the critical state of the country, I was so tired I had to seek the house of my kinsman, Major J. M. Pomeroy, in Perryville, now Port Royal, for rest.

The above is the history of that telegram, that, I believe, first gave you notice of the concentration of the Confederate troops at Gettysburg, just before the famous battle in that place.

Respectfully yours,

STEPHEN W. POMEROY.



REV. STEPHEN W. POMEROY,

The scout who bore the first intelligence to the authorities of the concentration of the Confederate Army. (From a recent photograph.)

WASHINGTON, December 11th, 1883.

*My Dear Sir:*

Your dispatch was the first authentic information I received of the concentration of the army of General Lee on Gettysburg, and, treating it as true, acted on it.

Yours truly,

A. G. CURTIN.

*Rev. S. W. Pomeroy.*

It will be seen from Mr. Pomeroy's statement that he

reached Port Royal about *midnight of Tuesday, 30th*. Presuming that no time was lost in forwarding this important dispatch from Port Royal, and that equal promptness was made in Harrisburg in forwarding it to Washington, it is fair to suppose that the fact of Lee's concentration was made known at General Meade's head-quarters sometime that same night. General Meade was at that time at Taneytown, thirteen miles south of Gettysburg. Is there any evidence of the reception there of this information? Colonel James G. Biddle, in the *Annals of the War*, page 208, says that "*on the night of the 30th, after the Army of the Potomac had made two days marches, (from Frederick to Taneytown,) General Meade heard that Lee was concentrating his army to meet him.*" There were other ways by which the knowledge of this concentration east of the South Mountain might have been conveyed to General Meade, but it is fair to suppose that the information referred to by Colonel Biddle was conveyed by Mr. Pomeroy.

Early in the morning of this day—Tuesday, 30th,—General Longstreet rode from his head-quarters about three miles north-east of Chambersburg to Lee's head-quarters in Messersmith's woods, upon the eastern suburbs of the town, when, after a short consultation with the latter, in which he informed him that he had countermanded his order for an attack on Harrisburg, and had determined to cross the South Mountain and meet the Army of the Potomac, in consequence of the information brought by the scout Harrison, the two generals proceeded together to Greenwood, where they encamped and remained over that night. On the following morning—Wednesday, July 1st,—they resumed their journey, and

after proceeding together some three or four miles, heavy firing was heard in the direction of Gettysburg, at which Lee rode rapidly forward to ascertain the cause, leaving Longstreet to see after the hurrying forward of the two divisions of his corps, which were in camp about Fayetteville. After attending to this duty, General Longstreet again went forward and rejoined Lee about five o'clock in the evening in the rear of the line. (Annals of the War, pages 419, 420.)

The two divisions of Hill's Corps—Pender's and Anderson's—left their encampments about Fayetteville and Greenwood, and proceeded across the mountain and rejoined Heth at Cashtown. From that place the divisions of Heth and Pender moved toward Gettysburg and encamped over night at Marsh Creek, four miles out. Anderson's division remained at Cashtown.

Early's division of Ewell's Corps left York and marched by way of East Berlin to Heidlersburg, where it remained over night. White's battalion of cavalry of Imboden's command, moved from York to Gettysburg by the turnpike, thus protecting Early's flank and rear.

Rodes' division of the same corps left its encampment below Carlisle and marched across the South Mountain by the turnpike leading through Mount Holly and Petersburg (sometimes called York Springs), and thence to Heidlersburg, where it rejoined Early, and with his division encamped for the night. Heidlersburg is distant from Carlisle twenty-two miles, from York twenty miles, and from Gettysburg ten miles. The remaining division of Ewell's Corps—Johnson's—retraced its steps from the neighborhood of Shippensburg to Greenvillage, six miles

north-east of Chambersburg, and from thence went by the country road directly across through Scotland to Greenwood, where it remained over night.

General Johnson's wagon train, instead of following him across the country, came up to Chambersburg and, turning east in the public square, proceeded toward Gettysburg. Part of Rodes' wagon train also retraced its way to Chambersburg, and joining with Johnson's, passed on toward the same destination. This was the train which passed through Chambersburg during the night, as previously narrated, and these two, when united, were, according to the statement of General McLaws in *Annals of the War*, page 440, *fourteen miles in length*. Its importance may be inferred from the fact that it was given the precedence over Longstreet's two divisions, and it was the detention caused by it that prevented these divisions from reaching the field of battle as soon as was expected.\*

The divisions of Generals McLaws and Hood, which were unable to proceed until Ewell's wagon train had all passed, were detained at their encampments about Fayetteville until the following afternoon, when by a forced march the former reached Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and the latter got within about the same distance at twelve o'clock at night. The artillery belonging to these two divisions did not get the road until two o'clock the following morning (Thursday, July 2d.) †

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\*General Longstreet, General McLaws, and Dr. Cullen, Medical Director of Longstreet's corps, in *Annals of the War*, pages 420, 439, and 440.

†The facts stated in regard to the detention of Longstreet's two divisions and artillery train are so important, and so much relied upon by that general in vindication of his alleged tardiness in attacking the Federal left on Thursday, July 2d, that we quote his precise words. The reader will do well to

The withdrawal of General Rodes' division was covered by Jenkins' cavalry, which remained below Carlisle until the ensuing day—Wednesday. On Tuesday an engagement took place between two New York regiments and Jenkins' men some four miles from the earthworks thrown up on the high hills on the west bank of the Susquehanna. On the Union side three or four were wounded, and about ten on the Confederate side. This was the *sixth* engagement of the war upon Pennsylvania soil. In the evening a small force of this command entered Mechanicsburg, and planting a battery a short distance below the town, fired a few shots, after which they fell back to Carlisle. On the ensuing day—Wednesday—the whole force followed Rodes' infantry by the pike across the mountain. Arriving at Petersburg about the middle of the day, Jenkins made a demand upon the citizens for a large amount of provisions. His men at the same time instituted a search for horses, and stores were broken into and robbed. The hotels and restaurants were closed by an order from Jenkins, and all drinking was prohibited. Mr. E. Hiteshew, a leading citizen and merchant of that place, in order to secure protec-

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keep these facts well in remembrance as they will be referred to hereafter in important connections. General Longstreet says: "Our march on this day was greatly delayed by Johnson's division of the Second Corps, which came into the road (the Gettysburg pike) from Shippensburg, and the long wagon trains that followed him. McLaws' division, however, reached Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood's division got within nearly the same distance of the town about twelve o'clock at night." (*Annals of the War*, page 310.) Again, on page 420, the general says: "About noon, the road in front of my corps (the two divisions of McLaws and Hood) was blocked by Hill's corps (Pender's and Anderson's divisions) and Ewell's wagon train, which had cut into the road from above (at Chambersburg). The orders were to allow these trains to precede us, and that we should go into camp at Greenwood, about ten miles from Chambersburg. My infantry was forced to remain in Greenwood until late in the afternoon of the 1st; my artillery did not get the road until two o'clock in the morning of the 2d."

tion to that part of his stock which had not been sent away upon the approach of the enemy, invited Jenkins and his staff to dine with him. The invitation was accepted, a guard was placed about his premises, and while at dinner the following conversation between Mr. Hiteshew and the officers took place. Mr. Hiteshew inquired, "General, have you any recent intelligence from Vicksburg?" "Oh yes," said Jenkins, "Grant is in a tight place. He has put himself in a bad position and his army is being terribly slaughtered." Then taking a piece of bread he improvised a miniature representation of Vicksburg, and said, "You see nature has made Vicksburg impregnable, and Grant has shown his want of judgment in putting his army where they will all be either killed or captured." That conversation occurred on July 1st, and on the 4th, — three days afterward — Vicksburg was surrendered to General Grant. Mr. Hiteshew then said, "Do you expect to take Baltimore and Washington, general?" "Most certainly we do; we expect to remain here all summer," replied Jenkins. "But," continued Mr. Hiteshew, "don't you think you will meet the Army of the Potomac somewhere before you reach Baltimore?" At this Captain Fitzhugh, Jenkins' chief of staff, said, "Oh, the Army of the Potomac is away down in Virginia; they will most likely cross the river about Shepherdstown and advance over the battle field of Antietam." "No," said Jenkins, "that is too far up the river; I suspect they will cross lower down, and we may meet them between this and Baltimore." Dinner over, Jenkins and Mr. Hiteshew, lighting their cigars, took a stroll to the top of a hill below the town where the sound of distant firing was heard. Presently a cavalry-

man dashed up and handed Jenkins an envelope. Hastily opening it, he said, "Mr. Hiteshew, the Army of the Potomac is at Gettysburg now." The order to mount was quickly given, and in a short time the whole command was *en route* for the scenes of strife, where, during that same afternoon, Jenkins received a slight wound by a piece of a shell grazing the top of his head.

The withdrawal of Rodes and Johnson from the valley left it open to an advance of the Emergency men, congregated at Harrisburg, upon Lee's communications, and the cavalry brigades of Generals W. E. Jones and Beverly Robertson were left to prevent this. General Imboden was also ordered from Mercersburg to Chambersburg to relieve Pickett, who was to proceed to Gettysburg. About four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, July 1st, Imboden's force entered Chambersburg, and shortly afterward an official requisition was made upon the citizens for a large amount of provisions, among which were five thousand pounds of bacon. As the people were utterly unable to comply with this new demand, the Confederates became indignant and threatened to break open every store and house and institute a vigorous search. The consternation produced by these men exceeded any the people had suffered up to that time during the war, and had not some sudden emergency called them away scenes of violence would doubtless have taken place. In the midst of their threats, and when squads were already going in different directions to execute them, to the people's great relief they quickly withdrew from the town and proceeded out toward Gettysburg. The cause of their sudden departure has been given by General Imboden himself in



an article contributed to the *Galaxy* of April, 1871, which is as follows: "That night (Wednesday, July 1st,) I received a brief note from General Lee, expressing the apprehension that we were in danger of being cut off from communication with him by the Union cavalry, and directing us to move next morning as far as South Mountain on the road to Gettysburg, and keep it open for Generals William E. Jones and Beverly Robertson, whose brigades of cavalry were in the direction of Shippensburg." Evidently the points where danger to the communication between Chambersburg and Gettysburg was apprehended, were at Greenwood and Newman's Pass, near the top of the mountain, where roads from down the valley intersected the pike. At these places a comparatively small force could have effectually prevented the passage of troops, and Imboden at once moved out to these points and remained there until Pickett's division passed on the ensuing day—Thursday—and the cavalry brigades of Jones and Robertson, just before midnight, after which he followed on to Gettysburg. The two named brigades of cavalry—Robertson in advance—were the last of the Confederate army which passed through Chambersburg to Gettysburg.

Having given an account of the concentration of Lee's army we turn our attention to the front and notice an event which transpired there on this day—June 30th. About half past nine o'clock in the morning a detachment from Heth's division under General Pettigrew left their encampment at Cashtown and advanced upon a reconnoissance to within about one mile of Gettysburg. They had with them a number of wagons, and it was supposed



that they intended to enter Gettysburg and fill these wagons with plunder. Approaching the town, this detachment halted, and after a careful observation by the officers, through their field-glasses, they withdrew and encamped at Marsh Creek.

As we are now upon the eve of the first day's battle, it is important that the reader have a correct knowledge of the position of the various corps and divisions of the Confederate army at the close of this day. The following statement will give this information: the divisions of Heth and Pender of Hill's corps were at Marsh Creek, four miles west of Gettysburg; Anderson's division of the same corps was at Cashtown, four miles further west. The divisions of McLaws and Hood, of Longstreet's corps were about Fayetteville and Greenwood, and Pickett of the same corps, near Chambersburg. Early and Rodes of Ewell's corps were at Heidlersburg, ten miles north of Gettysburg, and Johnson of the same corps was at Greenwood, sixteen miles west of the last-named place. Jenkins' cavalry was below Carlisle; the brigades of Jones and Robertson, about Shippensburg; Imboden's at Mercersburg, and Stuart was somewhere north-west of York.

Leaving these troops to rest during this eventful night, we will next turn our attention to the Federal army.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE ADVANCE OF THE FEDERAL ARMY.

**I**N a previous chapter, the daily movements of the Army of the Potomac from June 11th, when it left its encampment about Falmouth and started northward to checkmate Lee, until Sunday, 21st, when it had reached Fairfax, Centerville, and Leesburg, were given. Upon that day the different corps of that army were so posted that all the approaches to Washington south of the Potomac were completely covered. Besides this the gaps of the Blue Ridge were so strongly held that Lee was shut in the valley, and could cross the Potomac only to the west of the mountain instead of to the east, as originally intended. And now, having traced out the lines of march of each corps and division of the Confederate army in its northward movement, up to the evening of Tuesday, June 30th,—the night previous to the first day's engagement at Gettysburg, I will resume the daily record of the movements of the Federal army from the point where I left off until I shall have brought it face to face with its foe.

The paramount purpose of General Hooker was to secure the safety of the National Capital, and to effect this he was not to be diverted either by the strategy of Lee or the clamors of the people. In accordance with this purpose he tarried in the position he had taken, covering



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Washington, until he was certain that the point of danger was further north, when he again put his army in motion.

The movements of the army during the days intervening from June 21st to the 25th, as will be seen in the statement yet to follow, were but few compared with those of the succeeding three days. This was because the purpose of Lee had not yet been fully developed. On Monday, 22d, Early's and Johnson's divisions of Ewell's Corps had crossed the Potomac, and followed Rodes of the same corps, who had crossed a week before, down the valley. And on Wednesday, 24th, Hill and Longstreet had also crossed and gone in the same direction. On the 25th, however, it became apparent that Lee's immediate objective was the Susquehanna, and General Hooker's course was at once clear. Unlike Lee, who was in an enemy's country, with a hostile population all about him who reported to the authorities his every movement, and his eyes bandaged because of the absence of his cavalry, and therefore compelled to feel his way, Hooker was not under the necessity of this caution, nor of guessing his enemy's intentions, but could act promptly and intelligently. The significance of this will appear in the fact that the march from Fairfax to Frederick in Maryland was one of the most rapid of the war. The Eleventh Corps, it is said, marched fifty-four miles in two days.

The plan adopted by General Hooker was to move in a parallel line with Lee on the east side of the South Mountain and occupy its gaps and thus be prepared to meet him in case he turned east toward Baltimore and Washington. He also intended, in case an opportunity offered, to fall upon his enemies' communications. With Washington,

then, for its pivotal point, the Federal army, like a vast moving fortress, with a frontage of one hundred thousand glittering bayonets, stood as a wall of steel between the Capital and its foes, and ready to be swung around to meet whatever exigency might arise. With these purposes in view the reader will be better prepared to understand the details yet to be presented.

I come now to narrate the movements of the Federal army, and commence where I left off in a former chapter.

*Monday, June 22.* The Cavalry Corps and Barnes' First Division of the Fifth Corps, retired from Upperville to Aldie. Stahl's Cavalry Division marched from Buckland Mills *via* New Baltimore to Warrenton.

*Tuesday, 23.* Stahl's cavalry moved from Warrenton *via* Gainesville to Fairfax Court-House.

*Wednesday, 24.* Newton's (Third) division of the Sixth Corps moved from Germantown to Centreville, and the Eleventh Corps from Cow Horn Ford, or Trappe Rock, on Goose Creek, to the south bank of the Potomac at Edward's Ferry. Stahl's cavalry moved from Fairfax Court House to near Dranesville.

*Thursday, 25.* This day important movements were to be made. Hooker was fully aware of his enemies' purposes and movements, and was about to put his army again in motion to meet them. The vast force was accordingly swung around, throwing its left wing, consisting of the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps, the whole under the command of Reynolds, across the Potomac at Edward's Ferry. At night these three corps encamped respectively at Barnesville, the mouth of the Monocacy, and at Jefferson in Maryland, completely covering Cramp-



ton's and Turner's passes. The Second Corps withdrew from Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville and proceeded to Gum Springs. As soon as this corps left Thoroughfare Gap, Stuart emerged from his forced position in the valley, and set out upon his intended expedition northward, but unexpectedly coming upon the Second Corps at Haymarket, he was, after a short engagement compelled to withdraw and return to Buckland and Gainesville. Howe's (second) division of the Sixth Corps moved from Bristoe Station to Centerville, Crawford's division (two brigades) of Pennsylvania Reserves, from the defenses of Washington, marched from Fairfax Station and Upton's Hill to Vienna. Stannard's Vermont Brigade, also from the defenses of the Capital, left the mouth of the Occoquan *en route* to join the Army of the Potomac, and Stahl's cavalry moved from near Dranesville, Virginia, *via* Young's Island Ford, on the Potomac, *en route* to Frederick City, Maryland. The Reserve Artillery moved from Fairfax Court House, across the Potomac to near Poolesville.

*Friday, 26.* This day some changes were made in the positions occupied by the left wing, with the view to the more complete covering of Turner's Pass, through which the National Pike passes. The First Corps marched from Barnesville to Jefferson; the Third Corps from the mouth of the Monocacy to Point of Rocks; and the Eleventh Corps from Jefferson—the First taking its place there—to Middletown. The Second Corps advanced from Gum Springs to the north side of the Potomac at Edward's Ferry; the Fifth Corps from Aldie *via* Carter's Mills, Leesburg, and Edward's Ferry, to within four miles of the mouth of the Monocacy; the Sixth Corps from German-

town and Centerville to Dranesville; the Twelfth Corps from Leesburg *via* Edward's Ferry to the mouth of the Monocacy; the Cavalry Corps (Buford's and Gregg's divisions) from Aldie to Leesburg; Stahl's cavalry division continued on its way to Frederick City, and Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves moved from Vienna to Goose Creek. The head-quarters of the army were moved from Fairfax Court House *via* Dranesville and Edward's Ferry to Poolesville.

*Saturday, 27.* The head-quarters were this day moved from Poolesville to Frederick City; the First and Third Corps were moved from their respective camps at Jefferson and Point of Rocks to Middletown, joining at that place the Eleventh, which had reached there the day previous. The left wing of the army was now all massed against Turner's Pass, which rendered any advance by the enemy by that route impossible. The Second Corps marched from near Edward's Ferry *via* Poolesville to Barnesville; the Fifth Corps from a point between Edward's Ferry and the mouth of the Monocacy to Ballinger's Creek, near Frederick City; the Sixth Corps from Dranesville *via* Edward's Ferry to near Poolesville; the Twelfth Corps from near the mouth of the Monocacy *via* Point of Rocks to Knoxville; and Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves moved from Goose Creek by the same ferry to the mouth of the Monocacy. The whole of the infantry having now crossed the river into Maryland, Buford's and Gregg's cavalry, which had remained at Leesburg to cover this crossing from an attack by Stuart, also crossed. The former proceeded to the vicinity of Jefferson, and the latter in the direction of Frederick City. Stahl's cavalry on this day reached the last named place.

On this day Stuart, who had been driven back by the Second Corps, upon which he unexpectedly came, on the 25th, succeeded, after considerable difficulty, in crossing the Potomac into Maryland in the vicinity of Dranesville, and started on his erratic course around the Federal army. Here at this point Stuart made his great mistake. Instead of following in the rear of Lee where the mountain passes south of the Potomac were closed against him, and taking possession of Crampton's, Turner's, and Monterey passes on the north of the river, thereby masking Lee's movements, protecting his line of communications, harassing the Federal forces, and reporting their presence, he departed from his proper connection with the army and went upon a raid to the east, and only reached his own friends in the evening of Wednesday, July 2d. In consequence of this course, the Confederate commander was in ignorance of the whereabouts of his adversary, and only learned of him in the evening of Sunday, June 28th, or Monday, 29th.

It is claimed by some Southern writers that the great disaster of the Pennsylvania campaign was owing to the course pursued by General Stuart, and by some he has been severely blamed. Let us consider where the responsibility for his course rests. General Lee says of his orders to Stuart: "General Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains and to observe the movements of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede as much as possible, should he attempt to cross the Potomac. In that event General Stuart was directed to move into Maryland, crossing the Potomac on the east or west of the Blue Ridge, as in his judgment should be best, and take position on the right of our column as it advanced."\* Gen-

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\* *Annals of the War*, page 419.


eral Longstreet says: "My corps left Culpeper on the 15th, and with a view of covering the march of Hill and Ewell through the valley, moved along the east side of the Blue Ridge. General Stuart was in my front and on my flank, reconnoitering the movements of the Federals. When it was found that Hooker did not intend to attack, I withdrew to the west side, and marched to the Potomac. As I was leaving the Blue Ridge, I instructed General Stuart to follow me, and to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown, while I crossed at Williamsport, ten miles above. In reply to these instructions, General Stuart informed me that he had discretionary powers from General Lee; whereupon I withdrew. General Stuart held the gap for awhile, and then hurried around beyond Hooker's army, and we saw nothing more of him until the evening of the 2d of July, when he came down from York and joined us, having made a complete circuit of the Federal army."\* It will be seen from the foregoing that if General Lee is not directly responsible for the course pursued by Stuart, he *indirectly* is, for he gave him discretionary power to pursue whatever course his own judgment dictated. Stuart had made several circuits around the Federal army during the war, and had gained some advantages and much celebrity, and using the discretion given him, he chose that course again. A prudent commander, unless he held his adversary in contempt, would scarcely have given such discretion to a subordinate upon the eve of an invasion of his territory.†

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\* Annals of the War, page 418.

† General Stuart has been severely blamed for the route he took around the Federal army. Several Confederate officers, among them Generals Wilcox, Long, and Alexander, and Colonel Walter Taylor, in papers contributed to





General Lee expected of Stuart that he would "harass and impede" the Federal army in case it should "attempt to cross the Potomac." Did he suppose that General Hooker would fail to find out that he was no longer in the valley threatening Washington, but off upon an invasion of Pennsylvania? or that, aware of these facts, he would sit down in idleness and permit him to go where he pleased? or that Stuart could prevent an army of a hundred thousand brave and patriotic men from crossing the Potomac for the rescue of their imperilled country? or that he could detain them until he could capture Harrisburg, and perhaps Philadelphia? If he did, then his credulity can only

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the "Southern Historical Society," at Richmond, Virginia, attribute the failure of the Pennsylvania campaign to Stuart's erratic course, and that it was "a fatal blunder," and was made by Stuart "solely to gratify his ambition for sensational display in disobedience of the orders of General Lee." These charges against General Stuart have called forth several articles in the General's defense, from which I select the following: General Stuart in his official report, says that in a personal interview with General Lee, on the 23d of June, he first broached the subject of his circuit around the Federal army and subsequently received his consent. His language is: "I submitted to the commanding general a plan of leaving a brigade or so of cavalry in my present front, and passing through Hopewell, or some other gap in the Bull Run Mountains, attain the enemy's rear, and moving between his main body and Washington, cross the Potomac into Maryland and join our army north of that river."

General Lee, in his report, says: "Upon the suggestion of General Stuart that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so. \* \* \* General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with part of his command as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac, and with the remainder to pass into Maryland and place himself on the right of General Ewell. It was left to his discretion whether he should enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed also to lose no time in placing himself on the right of the column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward."

In all these instructions to General Stuart there is no warrant for him to make a complete detour of the Federal army. The only discretion granted him was as to whether he should cross the Potomac into Maryland *east or west of the Blue Ridge*. He was, however, to rejoin the army *somewhere in Maryland*. In order to get around this difficulty Major McClellan, of Stuart's staff, says that "With the orders from Lee to Stuart was a letter from General

be accounted for upon the adage that "Whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad."

I resume now the daily movements of the army with

*Sunday, 28.* The continued advance of the Confederates into Pennsylvania calling for a further forward movement of the Federal army, Crampton's and Turner's passes were left in charge of Buford's division of cavalry, and the infantry moved forward as follows: The First Corps marched from Middletown to Frederick City; the Second Corps from Barnesville to Monocacy Junction; the Third Corps from Middletown to near Woodboro'; the Sixth

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Lee to Stuart marked confidential. The letter discussed the plan submitted during the day by Stuart, at the personal interview with Lee, of passing around the enemy's rear. It informed Stuart that General Early would move on York, Pennsylvania, with the right wing, and that it was desirable to place his cavalry, as speedily as possible, with Early's division. The letter also suggested that, as the roads leading northward from Shepherdstown and Williamsport were already incumbered with the artillery and transportation of the army, the route in that direction would consume more time than the proposed one of passing to the enemy's rear. This letter also informed Stuart that he could take either route his discretion might dictate, but that if he chose the latter General Early would receive instructions to look out for him at York, Pennsylvania. York was particularly mentioned as the point at which Stuart was to look out for Early, and as the probable point of concentration."

In confirmation of the foregoing, I now quote from the official report of General Stuart, which is in the archives of the Government at Washington. General Stuart says: "I was advised by General Lee that the Army of Northern Virginia would move in two columns for the Susquehanna. General Early commanded one of the divisions to the eastward, and I was directed to communicate with him as speedily as practicable after crossing the Potomac, and place my command on his right flank. It was expected that I would find him at York, Pennsylvania. It is believed that had the corps of Hill and Longstreet moved onward, instead of halting near Chambersburg, three or four days, that York could have become the point of concentration instead of Gettysburg. Moreover, considering York as the point of junction, the route I took to get there was certainly as direct and far more expeditious than the alternate one proposed."

It will be perceived from the foregoing that in the event of Stuart taking the circuitous route around the Federal army, General Lee was to notify Early to be on the look-out for him at York. No such notice was received by General Early. May it not be inferred that, ignorant of Stuart's intended or forced circuit, Lee did not send the order?



Corps from near Poolesville to Hyattstown; the Eleventh Corps from Middletown to near Frederick; and the Twelfth Corps from Knoxville to Frederick City. Gregg's cavalry division reached Frederick City and marched thence to New Market and Ridgeville. Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves marched from the mouth of the Monocacy and joined the Fifth Corps at Ballinger's Creek.

On this day important events transpired. General Hooker, who had exhibited such consummate skill in handling his army, was succeeded in command by General George G. Meade. The circumstances which led to this change were as follows: On Friday, 26th, General French was placed in command of the garrison at Harper's Ferry—supposed to be ten or eleven thousand strong, and strongly posted upon Maryland Heights. On the same day that General French assumed this command, General Hooker sent the Twelfth Corps under General Slocum as far as the mouth of the Monocacy, with the view that the two corps should operate upon the enemy's line of communication by following up his rear, capturing his couriers and trains, and intercepting him in case of his defeat. He therefore inquired of the authorities at Washington by telegraph as follows:

"Is there any reason why Maryland Heights should not be abandoned, after the public stores and property are removed?"

This dispatch was forwarded at half-past ten o'clock on Saturday, 27th, and brought the following reply from General Halleck:

"Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I can not approve of their abandonment, except in case of absolute necessity."

In response to his inquiry, General Hooker at once sent the following rejoinder:

"I have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I find ten thousand men here in condition to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account. They can not defend a ford of the river; and, so far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of them for them. This is my opinion. All the public property could have been secured to-night, and the troops marched to where they could have been of some service. Now, they are but a bait for the rebels, should they return. I beg that this may be presented to the secretary of war, and his excellency, the president.

"JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major-General.*"

Before General Hooker had time to receive a reply to this last communication, he sent the following additional one:

"SANDY HOOK, June 27th, 1863.

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK, *General in Chief*:

"My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my numbers. I beg to be understood, respectfully but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition, with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major-General.*"

General Halleck had never regarded General Hooker with much favor, and the relations between them were not at all friendly and cordial. He therefore very naturally improved his opportunity to get rid of one whom he did not regard as a suitable person for the command of the army, and, using his influence with President Lincoln as his military adviser, induced him to accept General Hooker's resignation and place General Meade, who was in command of the Fifth Corps, in the chief command. In accordance with this arrangement, at two o'clock in the morning of the day following the interchange of messages

between Generals Hooker and Halleck—Sunday, 28th,—Colonel Hardie of the War Department reached Frederick with the official orders making these changes.\*

General Hooker, upon receiving the official acceptance of his resignation, issued the following characteristic order:

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
FREDERICK, MARYLAND, June 28, 1863.

In conformity with the orders of the War Department, dated June 27th, 1863, I relinquish the command of the Army of the Potomac. It is transferred to Major-General George G. Meade, a brave and accomplished officer, who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of the army on many a well fought field. Impressed with the belief that my usefulness as the commander of the Army of the Potomac is impaired, I part from it, yet not without the deepest emotions. The sorrow of parting with the comrades of so many battles is relieved by the conviction that the courage and devotion of this army will never cease nor fail; that it will yield to my successor, as it has to me, a willing and hearty support. With the earnest prayer that the triumph of this army may bring successes worthy of it and the nation, I bid it farewell.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major-General*.

General Hooker took leave of the principal officers of the army on the afternoon of the same day he relinquished command. They were drawn up in line, and he passed along shaking hands with each and laboring in vain to stifle his emotions. The tears rolled down his cheeks. The officers also were deeply affected. The scene was similar to the final separation between Washington and his officers at the close of the war of the revolution.

General Hooker at once set out for Baltimore according to his instructions, and waited there three days for further orders from the adjutant-general's office, but as none came he went over to Washington, where he was forthwith arrested by General Halleck for visiting the Capital with-

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\*Colonel James G. Biddle in *Annals of the War*, page 207.

out leave, and in violation of the rule which forbade officers to do so.

General Hooker was undoubtedly right in the course he wished to pursue, and the general voice of history will sustain him in it. He may have acted hastily in tendering his resignation, but whatever faults he may have had, his high position, the distinguished services he had rendered, the masterly manner in which he handled his army, and the hold he had in the confidence and love of that army upon which the destiny of the government hung, should have secured to him better treatment. It was not the first time, however, that patriotism and devotion to duty have been sacrificed to official jealousy and personal spite.

The order placing General Meade in command of the army was a complete surprise to him. He had never sought promotion, and was as modest as he was brave. He had entered the war as a brigadier in the Pennsylvania Reserves, and commanded a division at Antietam and at Fredericksburg, and the Fifth Corps at Chancellorsville. He was loved and respected by his own soldiers because he was always ready to endure hardships with them. Plain in dress and speech, and familiar in conversation, he was accessible to all. He enjoyed in a high degree, especially after the battle of Fredericksburg, the confidence of President Lincoln. General Meade was not elated by his promotion, but on the contrary was evidently deeply impressed with a sense of the great responsibility which rested upon him. The destiny of the Republic was in his hands. One false step now and the Union would be lost. And yet he did not shrink from taking the position which, unsought and unexpected, had been assigned him, and he announced

to the army his acceptance of the command in the following modest and appropriate words:

“HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

“June 28th, 1863.

“By direction of the President of the United States, I hereby assume command of the Army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obeying this order—an order totally unexpected and unsolicited—I have no promises or pledges to make. The country looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile invasion. Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests involved, and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an all-controlling Providence the decision of the contest. It is with just diffidence that I relieve in the command of this army, an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements; and I rely upon the hearty support of my companions in arms to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been confided to me.

GEORGE G. MEADE,

“*Major-General Commanding.*”

Such a change of commanders of a great army upon the eve of battle, in which the destiny, not only of the nation but of republican institutions, was at stake, was a fearful experiment. It reflects great honor upon the patriotism of the men composing that army, that demoralization, to some extent, did not result, but they cheerfully accepted the fact of the change, and pressed on to meet their foe without as much as an hour's delay. Can history produce anything like it?

General Meade, as soon as he entered upon the command, sought an interview with General Hooker, and used every effort to obtain of him information concerning the strength and position of the different corps of the army, and the movements of the enemy. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he said, “My predecessor, General Hooker, left the camp in a very few

hours after I relieved him. I received from him no intimation of any plan, or any views that he may have had up to that moment, and I am not aware that he had any, but was waiting for the exigencies of the occasion to govern him, just as I had to do subsequently." \* Thrown entirely upon his own resources, General Meade summoned his trusted friend, General Reynolds, to his side, and the two together agreed upon a plan which ended in the victory at Gettysburg. † It should be stated here that what was denied General Hooker was granted to General Meade, and he was given the option to do as he pleased with the men at Harper's Ferry. He, however, either did not approve of Hooker's project to send these men in conjunction with the Twelfth Corps to operate upon Lee's line of communication, or else he supposed the time for that movement had passed, and he could use these men to better advantage elsewhere. He accordingly ordered General Slocum to rejoin the main army, and the bulk of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, under General French, was directed to take a post as a reserve at Frederick when our forces moved forward. General Couch, with his emergency men at Harrisburg, estimated at twenty thousand, was also placed under his orders.

Among the first official acts of General Meade, after assuming the command of the army, was to ask the assent of the government at Washington to the appointment of General Kilpatrick to the division of cavalry under General Stahl, and the promotion of Custer, Merritt, and Farnsworth, three young captains, to the command of brigades

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\* Colonel James G. Biddle in *Annals of the War*, page 207.

† Major Joseph G. Rosengarten in *Annals of the War*, page 62.

in that division. The request was at once acceded to, and the subsequent career of these men attested the wisdom of that change. Shortly after the dispatch from Washington was received, granting this request of General Meade, a second message came over the wire announcing that Stuart with his cavalry was making a raid near the Capital; and in a short time thereafter the wire was cut and telegraphic communications for a time ceased.\* Stuart, after crossing the Potomac on the day previous, passed close to Washington and Baltimore, creating considerable excitement in those cities. At Rockville he came upon a large wagon train, filled with supplies, on its way from Washington to the army at Frederick. This train, with its escort, he captured and took with him to Gettysburg, handing it over there to the Confederate quartermaster. Colonel Walter Taylor, of General Lee's staff, in a contribution to the Southern Historical Society papers, says that the capture of this train was unfortunate for Stuart, for in capturing and bringing it away he was considerably delayed. After the capture of this train, Stuart kept on his way in a northerly direction through Brookville, travelling all night.

*Monday, 29.* As the army was now approaching that

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\*The proximity of General Stuart to the National Capital, and the severing of telegraphic communications with the head-quarters of the army, produced deep anxiety in Washington. General Halleck, on Monday night, 29th, telegraphed to General Couch, in command of the Department of the Susquehanna, at Harrisburg, as follows: "I have no communication with General Meade." Hon. Edgar Cowan, then in Washington, telegraphed to Governor Curtin at Harrisburg: "Stanton can hear nothing from the Army of the Potomac, and we all fear that it has met with some disaster." Secretary Seward, on the night of the 29th, telegraphed to Hon. Thurlow Weed, at Albany, New York, to urge Governor Seymour to send on the New York militia, and that the government was in extreme peril."

important pass in the mountain—Newman's Pass, where the pike leading through Gettysburg to Baltimore crosses, and where, if at all south of the Susquehanna, Lee would concentrate for battle—it became all important to have it well in hand and some well defined plan. The following was therefore agreed upon: A strong cavalry force was to be thrown out to the left to cover Monterey Pass, and thus protect the flank and rear from an attack from that quarter; and to the right, to look after Stuart, who was moving around in that direction. The seven corps of infantry were to radiate from Frederick upon seven different roads, which, while diverging from that place, all tended northward and converged at Gettysburg. The plan will be best understood by imagining a vast fan, with the base of its handle resting upon Frederick, the point of divergence, and the seven different corps, like the sticks of the fan, radiating therefrom. This immense force could be pushed northward to the Susquehanna, or swung around to interpose between the enemy and Philadelphia, in case he should go in that direction, or be concentrated at Gettysburg or any other point, if necessary.

In accordance with the general plan already stated, the First and Second brigades of Buford's cavalry, commanded respectively by Generals Gamble and Devin, left Middletown and crossed through Turner's Pass to Boonsborough, west of the South Mountain. Finding no enemy in that vicinity, they turned north and passed through Cavetown to Monterey Springs, recrossing the mountain there and encamping over night near Fairfield. This reconnoissance developed the fact that the enemy were all further down the valley, and that no danger was to be feared from that



direction either from the left flank or rear. Merritt's brigade of the same division proceeded from Middletown to Mechanicstown; Gregg's division marched from New Market and Ridgeville to Westminster; and Kilpatrick's division, formerly Stahl's, went from Frederick to Littlestown.

Stuart, after riding all the previous night, reached at the dawn of day the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at Sykesville. The bridge at this place was burned, and the track about Hood's mill was torn up. Resting here during the forepart of the day, the command some time in the afternoon resumed its march, and reached Westminster about five o'clock p. m. At this place a spirited engagement took place between this force and the First Delaware Cavalry, which was at length driven off and pursued some distance toward Baltimore, adding much to the panic there. Gregg's division of the Federal cavalry, which was marching in that direction to intercept Stuart, was delayed by the infantry and trains, and did not reach Westminster until some hours after Stuart had passed. At night the head of Stuart's column rested at Union Mills, half way between Westminster and Littlestown.

The movements this day were as follows: The army head-quarters were moved from Frederick City to Taneytown, and the artillery reserve from the first named place to Bruceville. The First and Eleventh corps marched from Frederick to Emmittsburg—the last named by a road parallel to the Emmittsburg road leading through Cregerstown; the Third and Twelfth corps moved on parallel roads to Taneytown and Bruceville, where they encamped; the Second Corps from Monocacy Junction *via*

Liberty and Johnsville to Uniontown, still further east; the Fifth from Ballinger's Creek *via* Frederick and Mount Pleasant to Liberty; and the Sixth, following Gregg's cavalry, went from Hyattstown *via* New Market and Ridgeville, to New Windsor. The outer line of the great fan, it will thus be seen, extended from Emmittsburg on the left to New Windsor on the right—the First Corps under Reynolds forming the left of the army, and the Sixth under Sedgwick its right. This was the position of the Army of the Potomac on the evening of Monday, June 29th,—the night before the concentration of Lee's forces began in the direction of Gettysburg.

*Tuesday, 30.* The First Corps on this day started from Emmittsburg for Gettysburg, but hearing that the enemy were reported to be upon the Fairfield road, General Reynolds halted it at Marsh Creek. The Third Corps marched from Taneytown in the direction of Emmittsburg, and encamped at Bridgeport; the Twelfth Corps marched from the same place, and rested over night at Littlestown; the Fifth Corps from Liberty *via* Johnsville, Union Bridge, and Union to Union Mills; and the Sixth went from New Windsor to Manchester. The Artillery Reserve moved from Bruceville to Taneytown. Gregg's cavalry division left Westminster and proceeded to Manchester, and Kilpatrick's division went from Littlestown to Hanover to intercept Stuart. Stuart, who had bivouacked over night at Union Mills, midway between Westminster and Littlestown, hearing that Kilpatrick was at the last named place waiting for him, attempted to avoid an encounter by going through cross roads to Hanover, but Kilpatrick, who was aware of this change, anticipated him and reached that

place first. When Stuart arrived at about ten o'clock in the forenoon, a desperate engagement, which lasted four hours, ensued between Kilpatrick and the Confederate rear under General Wade Hampton. Both sides claim the victory in this engagement; the Confederates, however, were driven further northward.

When at Hanover, Stuart was but twelve miles from Gettysburg, and fourteen from York. Ignorant of the concentration of the Confederate army at the first named place, and expecting to unite with Early at York, as he says General Lee directed, and unaware that Early was then *en route* from that place to Gettysburg, he pressed on further northward, crossing the tracks of both White's battalion of cavalry and Early's whole division, and yet failed to ascertain the departure of these troops, or the course they had taken. Had he known of Early's departure from York, and the direction he had taken, he could have effected a junction with him before sundown somewhere about East Berlin.\* Or had he fallen in with White's battalion, which on that day had gone by the York pike toward Gettysburg, he could have joined it and reached the Confederate advance at Marsh Creek that same night. But he was ignorant of the movements of these two commands, and they were equally ignorant of his approach, for no notice, such as it is alleged General Lee had promised to send Early, had reached him. Had Early known that Stuart had taken the circuitous route around the Federal army, he might have been on the look-out for him, but he was also ignorant

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\*Colonel W. H. Swallow, in the *Southern Bivouac* of November, 1885, page 365.

of this. Indeed at one time on that day Stuart was within seven miles of Early's infantry—the latter actually hearing his guns—and yet they were mutually ignorant of each other's proximity. Surely the people who resided in that neighborhood must have been very loyal to their government, and known how to keep their own counsels, or Stuart failed to interrogate them.

At a late hour this day Stuart learned that Early had left York, but was misinformed as to the direction he had taken. He was told that he had gone in the direction of Shippensburg. Misled by this report, he abandoned his design upon York, and turned the head of his column in the direction he supposed Early had gone. Encamping over night somewhere west of York, he resumed his march next morning, and passing through Dillsburg and Churchtown, reached Carlisle in the evening. Here he was surprised to hear that Rodes had marched in the direction of Gettysburg, and the town was in possession of Pennsylvania and New York militia-men under General Smith, who had advanced that day from Harrisburg. After demanding the surrender of the town, and throwing a few shells into it, and burning the United States barracks situated outside of the place, he hastily left and hurriedly made his way to Gettysburg, which he reached in the evening of the ensuing day. And this was the bold rider who was to "harass and impede" the patriot army in case it should "*attempt* to cross the Potomac" in pursuit of the invaders of its soil, and the would-be destroyers of its government.

The cavalry brigades of Gamble and Devin, under the command of General Buford, which had rested over night near Fairfield, after their reconnoissance west of the moun-

tain the previous day, marched by way of Emmittsburg to Gettysburg, and proceeding westwardly on the pike leading to Chambersburg, encamped over night about one mile and a half from the town.

Aware of the fact that indications pointed to a probable collision with the Confederate army in a short time, General Meade, soon after assuming command of the army, directed General Reynolds to proceed to Gettysburg and report to him the character of the ground there, at the same time ordering General Humphreys to examine the ground in the vicinity of Emmittsburg. These precautions were taken, not with the purpose to halt the army there and wait for an attack, but to be prepared for any emergency which might arise,—the army in the meantime still pressing forward. On the night of Tuesday, 30th, information reached head-quarters that Lee was concentrating his army east of the mountain in the vicinity of Gettysburg, and General Meade, “ignorant of the nature of the ground in front of him, at once instructed his engineers to select some ground having a general reference to the existing position of the army, which he might occupy by rapid movements of concentration, and thus give battle on his own terms, in case the enemy should advance across the South Mountain. The general line of Pipe Creek was selected, and a preliminary order of instructions issued to the corps commanders, informing them of the fact, and explaining how they might move their corps and concentrate in a good position along the line.” \* These were but ordinary precautions, which any commander, who had any reasonable sense of the responsibili-

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\* Colonel James G. Biddle, in *Annals of the War*, pages 208, 209.

ties of his position, would have taken, and yet they have been made the ground of an accusation that General Meade contemplated a retreat from Gettysburg to the position selected at Pipe Creek. This accusation does great injustice to General Meade, and the fact that he was not unduly committed to that line, nor unwilling to meet the enemy elsewhere, is proven by General Humphreys, who says that in the instructions issued to the corps commanders relating to the line of Pipe Creek, it was expressly declared that "Developments may cause the commanding general to assume the offensive from his present positions." A very few hours after these instructions were issued, circumstances did cause a change. General Meade himself says: "It was my firm determination, never for an instant deviated from, to give battle wherever and as soon as I could possibly find the enemy."

Simultaneously with the issuing of the instructions to the corps commanders regarding Pipe Creek, General Meade circulated the following timely order:

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

June 30th, 1863.

The commanding general requests that previous to the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding officers will address their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense issues involved in the struggle. The enemy are on our soil; the whole country now looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe; our failure to do so will leave us no such welcome as the swelling millions of hearts with pride and joy at our success would give to every soldier of this army. Homes, firesides, and domestic altars, are involved. The army has fought well heretofore; it is believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely than ever, if it is addressed in fitting terms. Corps and other commanders are authorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails in his duty this hour.

By command of

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

S. WILLIAMS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

As we are now upon the eve of battle, the two great armies having been brought almost face to face, it will be well to recapitulate the positions occupied by each.

Positions occupied by the Confederate army on the night of Tuesday, June 30th:

The divisions of Heth and Pender, of Hill's Corps, were at Marsh Creek, four miles west of Gettysburg, on the Chambersburg road, and Anderson's division of the same corps was four miles further west on the same road, at Cashtown. The divisions of McLaws and Hood of Longstreet's Corps were about Fayetteville and Greenwood, sixteen miles from Gettysburg, on the Chambersburg pike, and Pickett's division of the same corps was in the neighborhood of Chambersburg. Early and Rodes of Ewell's Corps were at Heidlersburg, ten miles north of Gettysburg, and Johnson's division of this corps was at Greenwood. Jenkins' cavalry was below Carlisle; the brigades of Jones and Robertson were about Shippensburg; Imboden at Mercersburg, and Stuart somewhere north-west of York.

Positions occupied by the Federal army on the night of Tuesday, June 30th:

The First Corps, under General Reynolds, was at Marsh Creek, between Emmittsburg and Gettysburg, and four miles from the last named place; the Eleventh Corps, General Howard, was at Emmittsburg, ten miles from Gettysburg; the Third Corps, General Sickles, was at Bridgeport, twelve miles from Gettysburg; the Twelfth Corps, General Slocum, was at Littlestown, ten miles; the Second Corps, General Hancock, was at Uniontown, twenty miles; the Fifth Corps, General Sykes, was at Union Mills, six-

teen miles; and the Sixth Corps, General Sedgwick, was at Manchester, twenty-seven miles. Gregg's cavalry division was at Manchester; Kilpatrick's at Hanover; and the brigades of Gamble and Devin, of Buford's division, were about one mile and a half west of Gettysburg, on the Chambersburg road. This vast fan was now about to be closed, and as the Confederate army, in its concentration, was swung to the right and closed upon its right support, the Federal army was to be swung to the left, and close upon its left. The point of contact between the two great opposing forces was Gettysburg, and the parts which would first come in contact were, Reynolds upon the Federal left, and Heth upon the Confederate right. The reader will do well to watch in the coming details the times and places where the various parts of these two great hosts came into collision.




## CHAPTER VI.

### THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE AT GETTYSBURG — WEDNESDAY, JULY 1ST, 1863.

**I**N the morning of Wednesday, July 1st, Heth's division of Hill's Corps advanced from Marsh Creek upon Gettysburg. General Buford, as stated in the previous chapter, held the ridges west of the town with the cavalry brigades of Generals Gamble and Devin. About half-past nine o'clock these men appeared in front of Buford's videttes, and skirmishing commenced on the farm of Hon. Edward McPherson, and thus the series of battles at Gettysburg began.

The object of this advance by General Heth is thus stated by Colonel W. H. Taylor, General Lee's adjutant-general, in *Annals of the War*, page 307: "Instructions had been sent to General Heth to ascertain what force was at Gettysburg, and, if he found infantry opposed to him, to report the fact immediately, without forcing an engagement." General Buford, however, was aware of the presence of the enemy in his front, and had prepared for them by dismounting a large part of his force and placing them in line. His batteries also had been planted at commanding points.



VIEW FROM PENNSYLVANIA COLLEGE.  
From a Photograph by Tipton.)

As soon as General Heth found himself in the presence of Buford's dismounted cavalry, he formed his men in line of battle, with Archer's and Davis' brigades in front, and Pettigrew's and Brockenborough's in the rear. Unaware that any Federal infantry were near, Heth sent word to General Hill at Cashtown that the advance of his division had encountered the enemy's cavalry near Gettysburg.

At an early hour in the morning General Reynolds received a dispatch from General Buford, informing him of the proximity of the Confederates, at which he set out at once to his assistance with the nearest division—that of Wadsworth, leaving General Doubleday, his second in command, to draw in the pickets, assemble the artillery and the remainder of the corps, and follow after as soon as possible. He also dispatched a courier to General Howard at Emmittsburg, ordering him to advance to the front as rapidly as he could. This order reached General Howard

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NOTE. — Pennsylvania College, a view from which is illustrated on the opposite page, fronts south, and the elevation to the right is Seminary Ridge, upon which, extending about three miles south, the Confederate line was placed during the second and third days' engagements. This view shows where the battle of the first day commenced. It extended down below the theological seminary, which is seen upon the ridge, and northward and eastward for about a mile and a half. Reynolds' Grove, in which that general was killed, is seen near the seminary. The road leading westward, by which the main body of the Confederates came—the Chambersburg road—passes up over Seminary Ridge, as is shown.

There are two roads entering Gettysburg from the west—the one from Chambersburg, and the other from Fairfield and Monterey Pass, which comes in somewhat diagonally from the south-west. Both these roads are intersected by ridges running north and south. That one nearest the town turns somewhat toward the east, and is called Seminary Ridge, because on it a Lutheran theological seminary is located. Between this ridge and another one farther west, a small stream of water, called Willoughby's Run, passes. The battle in the forepart of this day was fought principally upon these heights on both sides of the stream. In the afternoon, when Howard's Corps came up, the line was extended around north and north-east of the town.

at eight o'clock, and he at once put his corps in motion — Barlow's division taking the most direct route, and the divisions of Generals Schurz and Steinwehr proceeding by Horner's Mills — a distance of thirteen miles. Having thus put his corps in motion, General Howard, accompanied by his staff, pushed forward in advance to the scene of strife.

At about ten o'clock General Reynolds dashed into Gettysburg in advance of his troops, and pushing on out by the Chambersburg road to Seminary Hill, took a survey of the situation. Seeing the enemy was there in force, and that Buford's dismounted cavalrymen were being badly pressed, he rode rapidly back again into the town and out the Emmittsburg road about a mile, and there met the head of his column, which he turned directly across the fields toward the seminary. The men hurriedly formed in line under cover of the ridge, when the right moved to the north side of the Chambersburg pike and across the bed of the abandoned railroad, and the left advanced to the west of the ridge near the seminary.

From the time the conflict opened, up to the arrival of Wadsworth's division, Buford's men, though hotly pressed, resisted the approaches of the enemy most stubbornly, and by taking advantage of every favorable point to protract the struggle, succeeded in holding on until the expected assistance at length came. But while the formation of the line was in progress, the heroic Reynolds, seeing the pressure which was made upon Buford's slender lines, led Cutler's brigade forward for their relief. Hall's Second Maine battery was posted in the road, and the Fourteenth Brooklyn and the Ninety-fifth New York were advanced a short distance on the left. General

Wadsworth was also directed to place the three remaining regiments of his brigade, the One Hundred and Forty-seventh New York, the Seventy-sixth New York, and the Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania on the right of the road. When this formation was completed, the cavalry brigade under Gamble, which had been most heavily engaged, withdrew and formed in column on the left of the infantry. Between the Fairfield and Chambersburg roads was a piece of woods, which both parties were contending for. Archer's brigade, preceded by a line of skirmishers, was crossing Willoughby's Run to enter these woods on one side as the Iron Brigade was going in on the other. General Reynolds, anxious as to the result, rode forward a short distance to reconnoiter, and raising his field glass to his eyes he sought to take in the full situation, when a ball from a sharp-shooter's musket struck him on the back of the head, coming out near the eye, and he fell dead.

Major Joseph G. Rosengarten, of General Reynolds' staff, in an article contributed to the *Annals of the War*, pages 64, 65, thus describes the fall of his distinguished chief: "In the full flush of life and health, vigorously leading on the troops in hand, and energetically summoning up the rest of his command, watching and even leading the attack of a comparatively small body, a glorious picture of the best type of a military leader, superbly mounted, and horse and man sharing in the excitement of the battle, Reynolds was, of course, a shining mark to the enemy's sharp-shooters. He had taken his troops into a heavy growth of timber on the slope of a hillside, and, under the regimental and brigade commanders, the men did their

work well and promptly. Returning to the expected division, he was struck by a minnie ball, fired by a sharpshooter hidden in the branches of a tree almost overhead, and killed at once; his horse bore him to the little clump of trees, where a cairn of stones and a rude mark on the bark, now almost overgrown, still tell the fatal spot." \*



WHERE GENERAL REYNOLDS FELL.

From a Photograph by Tipton.

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\* Major-General John Fulton Reynolds was born in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in 1820; he had served his country in Mexico and in California, as well as in nearly every important action yet fought in Virginia; and now returning to his native state to defend her from her invader, he yields up his life almost in sight of his home. He was, in the estimation of those who knew him well and were the best able to judge, the greatest soldier the Army of the Potomac ever lost in battle. General Meade said of him, "He was the noblest as well as the bravest gentleman in the army."

The body of General Reynolds was at once borne to the rear and placed



With the fall of General Reynolds, the command devolved upon Major-General Abner Doubleday, who had, after executing Reynolds' orders and setting the remaining two divisions of the corps in motion, pushed on ahead to the field of battle. General Doubleday at once set to work to meet the advancing enemy, and for another hour the work of destruction went on, until the Federal line fell back to Seminary Ridge. As Wadsworth fell back with his left, and Archer pressed forward on his heels, the right of our division was swung around in the rear of the pursuers, enveloping the Confederate advance, and making prisoners of General Archer and several hundred of his men.\*

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for awhile in a little house on the Emmittsburg road. In the heat of the battle it was put into an ambulance and taken by his faithful orderly and a small escort to the nearest railroad station, whence it was borne to Baltimore, thence to Philadelphia, and finally to Lancaster, his former home. Here, on the fourth of July, while the defeated hosts of rebellion were seeking safety in flight, it was interred in the tranquil cemetery, where he lies in the midst of his family, near the scenes of his childhood, and in the soil of his native state.

\* Colonel Swallow, in the *Southern Bivouac* of December, 1885, in an interesting article on the first day's battle of Gettysburg, thus relates the circumstances of the capture of General Archer and part of his command. The account is of value, not only for the details of this event, but for the circumstantial description of the opening of the great series of battles at this place from a Confederate standpoint. His account is as follows:

"The division of General Heth, of A. P. Hill's Corps, which began the battle of Gettysburg, was composed of four brigades, as follows: Archer's Tennessee brigade, Davis' Mississippi brigade, Pettigrew's North Carolina brigade, and Brockenborough's Virginia brigade. Archer's Tennessee brigade was composed of the First, Seventh, and Fourteenth Tennessee regiments, Thirteenth Alabama and Fifth Alabama battalion. In marching down the Chambersburg pike on Wednesday morning to Gettysburg, Archer's Tennessee brigade was in the advance. Willoughby's Run crosses the Chambersburg pike about a mile and a half from town, and runs south toward the Emmittsburg road. Now, as Archer's men were marching on toward the town, nothing transpired until they came within two miles of the town, when the pickets of General Buford's dismounted cavalry were first seen along the road, and to the right and left of it, by the Seventh Tennessee regiment.

"The Fifth Alabama battalion was deployed at once to the right of the Chambersburg pike as skirmishers. General Archer with his brigade now

At length, shortly after eleven o'clock, the two remaining divisions of Reynolds' Corps came upon the field, together with Cooper's, Stewart's, Reynolds', and Stevens' batteries. General Doubleday's own division, then commanded by General Rowley, was at once taken to the front and placed in position; the division of General Robinson was placed in reserve at the seminary. Pender's Confederate division had also by this time come up from Marsh Creek, and was formed in the rear of Heth. The Confederate batteries, too, were posted on the ridge west of Willoughby's Run, as well as upon every other commanding position, the fire from which swept the field in every direction and proved terribly destructive.

At half-past eleven o'clock A. M., General Howard, in

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formed in the rear of his skirmish line. At the same time Davis' Mississippi brigade formed in line on the left of the pike, and, moving forward in this order, Archer's men pushed in Buford's pickets for a half a mile or more, when the pickets suddenly disappeared, and the advance division of Reynolds' Corps loomed into view.

"This advance force of Reynolds were the two brigades of Wadsworth's division, commanded by Cutler and Meredith. This force, when first seen by Archer's men, seemed to be in some confusion, and were apparently getting into position. General Wadsworth took three regiments of Cutler's brigade, with a battery, and placed them to the Federal right of the Chambersburg road, and between the road and an unfinished railroad cut, which ran parallel with the turnpike into town. This force was directly in front of Davis' Mississippi brigade, who held Heth's left. The remainder of Reynolds' force, composed of the two remaining regiments of Cutler's brigade and all of Meredith's brigade, was posted to the right of the Chambersburg pike and almost in front of General Archer. He placed Meredith's brigade on our right flank. It was protected by a strip of woods. Archer's men were pushing ahead, and had advanced to near Willoughby's Run, when Reynolds' force first came in sight.

"Archer now waited some moments, until his artillery came up, when the first gun was fired and the battle of Gettysburg was begun. The first man killed on the Confederate side was Henry Raison, Company B, Seventh Tennessee. He fell dead on the skirmish line. The company was commanded by Captain John Allen.

"It is a coincidence that Archer's Tennessee brigade, which opened the battle, was the brigade that, in Heth's division, but then commanded by Pet-



advance of his troops, came upon the field, and, ignorant of the death of Reynolds, sent messengers in search of him, and asking for instructions. While waiting the return of his aids, he went to the top of the college, which is situated about half a mile a little north of east of the theological seminary, to reconnoiter the surrounding country. His aid, Major Biddle, soon came back and reported the sad intelligence of the fall of Reynolds, and that the command now devolved upon himself. He at once assumed the command, turning over his corps to General Carl Schurz. It is claimed that while upon the top of the college General Howard saw the advantages of Cemetery Hill, and at once gave orders to halt Steinwehr's division of his corps there, and form a strong line, supported by artillery, as a rallying place in case of defeat

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tigrew—in what is known as Pickett's charge—burst into the Federal breastworks in front of Hancock's Corps with desperate valor. It was the tattered remnant of this same brigade that fought the last battle north of the Potomac, at Falling Waters, on the line of the retreat, when General Pettigrew, then in command of Heth's division, was killed, dying while defending the lives of the sick and wounded of his command, whom the fortunes of war had committed to his care.

"As soon as Archer's artillery opened, his command crossed Willoughby's Run, driving the enemy before them—who were disputing its passage—into a skirt of woods. Here they were again attacked by the Confederates, who moved on rapidly, firing while advancing. General Reynolds, who had placed a brigade on Archer's extreme right, concealed by a wood, seeing a part of Archer's brigade on the east side of the run ordered a charge, and Meredith's brigade swept down on the Confederates rapidly, and those that had crossed the run were captured—probably about two hundred—including General Archer. While this was going on General Reynolds, the Federal commander, while brandishing his sword and issuing orders, was observed by one of Heth's sharpshooters, concealed in a tree, who instantly raised his rifle and shot him dead. This took place behind the seminary and near Willoughby's Run.

"After Archer and his men were captured, the remainder of his brigade fell back some distance to a new position, and awaited the arrival of Pettigrew and Brockenborough. At the same time the Fourteenth Brooklyn and Ninety-fifth New York, who had contested the passage of the run, now changed

upon the position they then occupied. For this act he received the thanks of Congress.

The claim made for General Howard that he was the first of the Union generals to perceive the advantages of Cemetery Hill, is disputed by some, who give this credit to General Reynolds. Reynolds' claim rests on the following statement, made by General Doubleday: "Buford gave way slowly, taking advantage of every accident of ground to protract the struggle. After an hour's fighting he felt anxious, and went up into the steeple of the theological seminary, from which a wide view could be obtained, to see if the First Corps was in sight. One division of it was close at hand, and soon Reynolds, who had preceded it, climbed up into the belfry to confer with him, and examine the country around. Although there is no positive testimony to that effect, his attention was doubtless attracted to Cemetery Ridge in his rear, as it was one of the most prominent features of the landscape. An aid of General Howard—presumably Major Hall—soon after Reynolds descended from the belfry, came up to ask if he had any instructions with regard to the Eleventh Corps.

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front and attacked Davis' Mississippi brigade who, up to this time had been driving the three regiments before them on our left. These three regiments retreated down the Chambersburg pike to the eastern slope of Seminary Ridge.

"When Davis found himself vigorously attacked in flank, his command moved a little further to the left and rushed into an unfinished railroad cut, which extended all along the Chambersburg pike into the town. Now, when these three regiments, who had been driven down the Chambersburg pike by Davis' command, leaving their battery behind them, discovered the position he was in, they hastily returned, and joining their former associates surrounded the Mississippians in that plight and captured some six hundred of them.

"All these occurrences had taken place by twelve o'clock, or perhaps a little after, and they may properly be considered as the beginning of the Gettysburg conflict."

Reynolds, in reply, directed that General Howard bring his corps forward and *form them on Cemetery Hill* as a reserve. General Howard has no recollection of having received any such orders, but as he did get orders to come forward, and as his corps was to occupy *some place* in the rear, as a support to the First Corps, nothing is more probable than that General Reynolds directed him to go there; for its military advantages were obvious enough to any experienced commander. Major Rosengarten, of General Reynolds' staff, states positively that he was present and heard the order given for Howard to post his troops on Cemetery Ridge. The matter is of some moment, as the position in question ultimately gave us the victory, and Howard received the thanks of Congress for selecting it. It is not to be supposed that either Howard or Rosengarten would misstate the matter. It is quite probable that Reynolds chose the hill simply as a position upon which to rally his force if driven back, and Howard selected it as a suitable battle-field for the army. It has been universally conceded that it was admirably adapted for that purpose."\*

Professor Jacobs, in his *Battle of Gettysburg*, page 25, says: "Early in the morning the hills around Gettysburg had been carefully examined by *the general* and his signal officers. At half past eight o'clock A. M., one of these officers was on the college cupola making observations, when his attention was specially directed to that hill by one of the officers of the college, as being of the highest strategic importance, and commanding the whole country around for many miles. Doubtless he had satisfied himself of the pre-eminent advantages it offered as a position of

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\*General Doubleday's "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," pages 126, 127.

offense and defense, and therefore determined to take and hold it." Professor Jacobs does not say what general this was. As the survey of the surroundings of Gettysburg was made *early in the morning*, and the observations from the college cupola occurred at *half past eight o'clock A. M.*, it could not have been either Reynolds or Howard, for the former did not reach the town until *ten o'clock* and the latter until *half past eleven*. The only general then in or near the place was Buford, and the suggestion to hold Cemetery Ridge may have been first made by him.

General Howard at once saw that the First Corps was contending against large odds, and sent back for the Eleventh Corps to come forward as quickly as possible. He also sent a dispatch to General Meade, who was then at Taneytown, thirteen miles distant, informing him of the death of General Reynolds, of the large Confederate force present, and the probability that Lee was concentrating his whole army at that point, as well as the favorable position there for a battle. Dispatches were also sent to General Slocum, who, with the Twelfth Corps, had left Littlestown early in the morning and was then resting at Two Taverns, five miles south of Gettysburg, and to General Sickles, who had marched from Bridgeport to Emmitsburg, informing them of the perilous position of the First and Eleventh Corps, and urgently calling upon them to hasten to their assistance. Owing to the direction of the wind, the sound of the guns did not reach Taneytown, and General Meade was not aware that a portion of his army had met the enemy, and that Reynolds had fallen, until one o'clock P. M., when Howard's courier arrived. Upon the reception of this dispatch he sent General Han-

cock to the front, with orders to assume command of all the troops, and to report to him concerning the nature of the ground there, and the practicability of fighting a successful battle at that place.\* General Meade has been blamed for sending General Hancock to supersede officers who were his superiors in rank. His justification for doing this is as follows: Congress had passed an act authorizing the President to put any general over any other superior in rank if, in his judgment, the good of the service demanded it, and General Meade then assumed this power in the name of the President, believing that the exigencies of the situation required it. That there was not the best of feeling existing between some of the general officers then at the front is painfully evident in some of their actions and writings. General Buford was doubtless aware of this when he penned the following dispatch to General Meade:

HEAD-QUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION,

July 1st, 1863,—3:20 P. M.

General Reynolds was killed early this morning. In my opinion there seems to be no directing person.

JOHN BUFORD.†

\*The following is General Meade's order to Hancock, through his chief of staff, General Butterfield, to proceed to the front and assume command and report upon the position there for a battle:

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

July 1, 1:10 P. M., 1863.

COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SECOND CORPS (HANCOCK):

The Major-General Commanding has just informed me that General Reynolds has been killed or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the command of your corps to General Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds' death, you assume command of the corps there assembled, viz.: the Eleventh, the First, and the Third, at Emmittsburg. If you consider the ground and position there a better one to fight a battle under existing circumstances, you will so advise the general, and he will order all the troops up. You know the general's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see General Reynolds.

D. BUTTERFIELD,

*Major-General and Chief of Staff.*

†Colonel James G. Biddle, in *Annals of the War*, page 210.

General Slocum declined, without orders from Meade, to go to the assistance of the First and Eleventh corps. He was aware of the commanding general's circular fixing upon Pipe Creek for the field of battle, and he probably thought it unwise to bring on a general engagement elsewhere. Not so, however, with Sickles. He, too, had received Meade's circular, and when, at two o'clock P. M., Howard's dispatch calling for assistance was received, he was for a time perplexed. From indications on the day previous, it was feared that the enemy would attempt to flank the Union line by its left by way of Fairfield and Emmittsburg, and he was under orders from the commander-in-chief to hold the latter place at all hazards. Through General Tremaine, one of his aids, he had received but a short time before a suggestion from General Reynolds that he had better come to the front, but no positive order to that effect. And now when Howard's dispatch was received he at once determined to hasten to the rescue; and leaving two brigades and a battery to hold Emmittsburg, he put the balance of his corps in motion for Gettysburg, arriving there after the broken and shattered survivors of the First and Eleventh corps had taken their new position upon Cemetery and Culp's hills. A letter was also sent to General Meade, informing him of what he had done, and asking his approval of it, which approval was subsequently given.\*

We turn again to the field of strife to note what was transpiring there. Nearly two hours of desperate fighting had taken place since the two divisions of Reynolds' Corps

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\*It has recently been charged that General Sickles had received, at one o'clock A. M. of this day, an order from General Reynolds to proceed at daylight to Gettysburg, which he deliberately disobeyed. This subject will be considered at length in Appendix C.

had reached the field in aid of the first. During this time hundreds were slain and many more wounded, but the patriot troops were holding their own. At length, at one o'clock P. M., the head of the Eleventh Corps reached Gettysburg. Schimmelpfennig's division led the way, followed by that of Schurz, now temporarily commanded by Barlow,—Schurz taking command of the corps while Reynolds commanded the field. These two divisions were directed to prolong the line of the First Corps along Seminary Ridge. The remaining division under Steinwehr, with the reserve artillery under Major Osborne, were ordered to occupy Cemetery Hill, in the rear, or south of Gettysburg, as a reserve.

While these newly arrived troops were taking the positions assigned them, Buford's scouts reported the approach of a large Confederate force from the north, directly upon the right of the Federal line. It will be remembered that Rodes' division from Carlisle and Early's from York had reached Heidlersburg, ten miles north of Gettysburg, the previous evening. These were the troops approaching. Lee's orders to Ewell were to recall these two divisions and have them concentrate about Cashtown. In accordance with this order they left their encampment at Heidlersburg about ten o'clock A. M.,—Early proceeding upon one road and Rodes by the one diverging to the right and leading by Middletown to Cashtown. While *en route* to that place, the sound of cannonading in the direction of Gettysburg was heard, and at Middletown, seven miles north-west of the first named place, General Ewell, who was traveling with Rodes, hearing that Hill's troops were marching toward Gettysburg, in the exercise of a dis-

cretion which is sometimes allowable, turned the head of his column in the same direction. The increasing sound of the guns, as he approached the town, convinced him that the Federals were there in force, and caused him to make immediate preparation for the battle.\*

At half past one o'clock p. m., a battery belonging to Rodes' division reached Oak Hill, an eminence about one mile north-east of the seminary, and opened fire. At the same time Rodes' infantry moved forward into position. They were formed across Seminary Ridge, facing south, with Iverson's brigade on the right, supported by Daniels and O'Neil in the center, and Dole on the left. Ramseur was held in reserve. While these preparations were being hurriedly made by the Confederates, similar preparations were being made by the newly arrived divisions of the Eleventh Corps, the last of whom only reached the field at forty-five minutes after one o'clock p. m. Colonel Taylor, of Lee's staff, in the same article previously referred to, further says: "On reaching the scene of conflict, General Rodes made his dispositions to assail the force with which Hill's troops were engaged, but no sooner were his lines formed than he perceived fresh troops of the enemy extending their right flank, and deploying in his immediate front. With this force he was soon actively engaged, and the contest became sharp and earnest."

When it was known that Rodes and Early were approaching the field, General Howard sent another urgent request to General Slocum, who with his magnificent corps was but five miles distant and resting in the fields, to hasten to their assistance; and as these powerful accessions to the

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\* Colonel W. H. Taylor, of Lee's staff, in *Annals of the War*, page 307.



Confederate force entered into the engagement, messenger after messenger bore with tremendous speed appeals for help, but it came not. At length when Howard saw that the crisis was approaching, he sent his brother, Major Charles Howard, a member of his staff, to urge Slocum to come in person if he would not send his troops. To this last appeal General Slocum replied that he "declined to go to the front or take any responsibility, as he understood that General Meade did not wish to bring on a general engagement."\* General Slocum had before this proven himself to be a good soldier, and on the following two days did excellent service, as well as subsequently to the close of the war. He doubtless felt that he had sufficient reasons for his course that day, but history will record his refusal to hasten to the relief of his imperilled comrades as a grave error. His conduct contrasts widely with that of Sickles. General Sickles had also received Meade's circular indicating Pipe Creek as the ground chosen for battle, and was at Emmittsburg on his way to Middleburgh to take the position assigned him in the intended line, when he received at that place Howard's dispatch stating the situation at the front and urgently calling upon him for assistance. Had he, like Slocum, adhered to the letter of his instructions, which were only given to provide for a possible contingency, he, too, would have paid no attention to the call of his imperilled comrades; but his heroic soul responded to the appeal, and he at once set his columns in motion.

After the arrival of Rodes and the formation of his

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\* Charles Carleton Coffin, in "The Boys of '61," page 272. See also the "History of the Pennsylvania Reserves," page 453, and Greeley's "American Conflict," volume 2, page 373.

troops, confronting those of the Eleventh Corps, which had reached the field but a short time before, the battle raged with varied results for over an hour, when, at three o'clock P. M., Early came in upon Rodes' left and struck the Union right. Almost simultaneously with this, Pender's division of Hill's Corps, which had been in reserve, came in upon the extreme left of the line, and both flanks being turned, retreat or capture became inevitable. Rodes, observing the effect of Early's attack, ordered his line forward and the Union lines were broken. The right, which was considerably wearied by their hurried march from Emmittsburg, and had borne the fierce onslaughts of Rodes' and Early's divisions, was the first to yield. It fell back steadily and in tolerable order, covered to some extent by Buford's cavalry, until the town was reached, when it was thrown into inextricable confusion as the men became intermingled in the various cross streets, during which several thousand of them were captured. In the meantime the sturdy left wing, which had stood like a wall of adamant against the foe since morning, was also compelled to fall back before Pender's tremendous onslaught. In vain the heroic Doubleday and Robinson and Wadsworth attempted to stay the tide. To remain longer under such a withering fire, with their left overlapped by Pender a quarter of a mile, was certain death or capture. The retreat of this part of the force, however, was conducted in a more orderly manner than the right, the men firing and falling back and at length reaching Cemetery Hill through the suburbs of the town. Some idea of the losses sustained by the patriot forces that day may be inferred from the fact that Wadsworth's di-

vision entered the fight with four thousand men and came out of it with but sixteen hundred. Rowley's division also suffered almost as severely, and Stone reported that two thirds of his brigade had fallen. Severe and terrible, however, as were the losses of the Union troops, the Confederates suffered as severely in killed and wounded.\* In prisoners taken, the Federals lost most, chiefly in the numbers taken in Gettysburg, among whom were their wounded, who had been taken there from the field.

Deeds of heroism were displayed, during the engagement of this day, that deserve everlasting remembrance. The following only, related by Colonel Swallow, a Confederate officer and eye-witness, can be given. The Colonel says:

“A little to the left of Hays' command, a tattered Federal regiment faced to the right and attempted to make a stand. But in a very few moments, overcome by the hopelessness, if not the folly, of their position, the greater part turned and fled. Just at this moment a most gallant young officer, riding bravely forward, waving his hat and brandishing his sword, cried out, ‘Don't run, men; none but cowards run.’ Some of our men cried out, ‘Don't shoot that man; don't shoot him.’ Several companies swung around with the intention of capturing him and his little band of heroes, when a volley fired from the right struck him, and he tumbled dead from his horse, to fill up the long, sad roll of the unknown. General Hays, who was near at the time, expressed his deep regret when the gallant hero fell.”

The broken and defeated but not demoralized patriots, who had been compelled to fall back before overwhelm-

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\* As evidence that the Confederates also lost heavily this day, I quote from General Heth's official report. The general himself was severely wounded. He says: “In less than twenty-five minutes my division lost, in killed and wounded, over twenty-seven hundred men.”

ing numbers, at length reached the Hill of Refuge, south of Gettysburg, where, by the prudent forethought of that Christian soldier, General Howard, a rallying place had been prepared. Steinwehr's division had been formed in double lines, and artillery placed so as to command every approach by the north, and as our wearied men approached



EAST CEMETERY HILL, UPON WHICH THE UNION FORCES WERE RALLIED.

From a Photograph by Tipton.

they were rallied and placed in position by Howard, Steinwehr, Schurz, and Hancock, who had now come up. And as the pursuing Confederates pushed up through the fields to the northern slope of the hill, Weidrick's battery poured grape and canister upon them, compelling them to halt.

It was about half past four p. m. when the defeated

troops of the First and Eleventh corps reached Cemetery Hill; and about the same time General Hancock arrived, who, in obedience to Meade's order directing him to proceed to Gettysburg and examine the position chosen by Howard, as also to take command of all the forces there, had hurried to the front and arrived at this most critical period. General Hancock informed Howard of his instructions, and at once set about rallying the men and placing them in position to meet any attack the enemy might make.\*

General Hancock, after a brief survey of the position chosen, was much pleased with it, and immediately dispatched to the commander-in-chief that it was admirably adapted for fighting a defensive battle, but liable to be turned by way of Emmittsburg, and that he would hold on until he could arrive and judge for himself. This dispatch reached General Meade at half past six P. M. Before it arrived, however, General Meade, satisfied from the reports brought by officers returning from the field, that Lee was concentrating his whole army there, issued orders to the Fifth and Twelfth corps to proceed to that place;

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\* General Doubleday, in his "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 151, says that when General Hancock informed Howard of General Meade's order superseding him, that quite a scene occurred, and that Howard for a time refused to receive any orders from Hancock. Charles Carleton Coffin, in his "Boys of '61," page 273, states it differently, as follows: "General Hancock met General Howard and informed him of his instructions, saying, 'General Meade undoubtedly supposed that I was your senior, but you outrank me.' 'It is no time to talk about rank,' replied Howard, 'I shall most cheerfully obey your instructions and do all in my power to co-operate with you.'" Thus readily did General Howard waive the command, which was his by right. As Mr. Coffin was much with General Howard, and enjoyed opportunities of ascertaining his feelings in regard to the matter at issue, and as his statement is just what would be expected from a Christian and patriot, as General Howard has proven himself to be, his version is more likely to be accepted.

and when Hancock's dispatch arrived he sent out orders to all his corps commanders to move to Gettysburg.\* At seven o'clock General Slocum reached the field, and, being the senior officer, Hancock turned over the command to him and went back to see General Meade at Taneytown to inform him of the condition of affairs at the front.



CULP'S HILL, FROM EVERGREEN CEMETERY AND BALTIMORE PIKE.

From a Photograph by Tipton.

Reaching head-quarters at nine P. M., he was informed by General Meade that he had decided to fight at Gettysburg, and had given orders accordingly. At eleven P. M. both generals, with the head-quarters staff, left Taneytown and reached the front at one A. M. of the second of July.

During the brief time General Hancock was upon the

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\*Colonel James G. Biddle, in *Annals of the War*, page 211.



field—from half past four to seven P. M.—and ably assisted by Generals Howard, Doubleday, and others, he made the best disposition of the forces at his command which he possibly could. With magnificent judgment his military genius took in the whole situation. Culp's Hill, a commanding position about a half mile to the east, must be held, and Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, or rather what was left of it, was at once sent there. Round Top, three miles to the south, did not escape his eagle eye, and although he had not troops enough to extend the line down to it, he at once sent Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, when it arrived, to take position there, one brigade of which was thrown upon that eminence. The survivors of the Eleventh Corps were placed in the front and right center; and the remaining two divisions of the First Corps joined the left of the Eleventh and extended the line down on the left, toward Round Top. To this the cavalry were joined. The line thus formed made a considerable show of strength, but could easily have been broken, or the position turned, had a determined effort been made. This effort, however, was not made, and Sickles' Corps from Emmittsburg, and Slocum's from Two Taverns, coming up about seven o'clock, the opportunity was lost. The two Confederate divisions of Anderson and Johnson, which soon after came upon the ground, again gave the enemy the preponderance, but it was then too late in the evening to make the attempt.

The new position chosen by the Union forces was one of great strength, and had the Confederates followed up the advantages gained, and stormed Cemetery Hill at once, the results of the next two days fighting might have been



LITTLE AND BIG ROUND TOP, FROM THE NORTH. W.E.S.T. (From a photograph by Tipton.)

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sadly different from what they were. That this position could have been carried, had an attack been promptly made, is asserted by one entirely competent to judge, — General Doubleday, who says, “Both Hill and Ewell had received stunning blows during the day, and were disposed to be cautious. They, therefore, did not press forward and take the heights, *as they could easily have done at this time.*”\*

The failure of the Confederates to attack Cemetery and Culp’s hills in the three hours which intervened between the time when the broken and shattered Federals took possession of them and the darkness of evening, was fraught with consequences of such vast importance that the reasons for it deserve special consideration. The following, taken from the highest and most important sources, is to the point. General Doubleday, in the same connection above referred to, says:

“General Lee reached the field before Hancock came, and watched the retreat of the First and Eleventh corps, and Hancock’s movements and dispositions, through his field glass. He was not deceived by the show of force, and sent a recommendation — not an order — to Ewell to follow us up; but Ewell, in the exercise of his discretion as a corps commander, did not do so. He had lost three thousand men, and both he and Hill were under orders not to bring on a general engagement. In fact they had had all the fighting they desired for the time being. Colonel Campbell Brown, of Ewell’s staff, states that the latter was preparing to move forward against the height, when a false report induced him to send Gordon’s brigade to reinforce Smith’s brigade on his extreme left, to meet a

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\*General Doubleday’s “Chancellorsville and Gettysburg,” page 152.

supposed Union advance in that direction. The absence of these two brigades decided him to wait for the arrival of Johnson's division before taking further action. When the latter came up, Slocum and Sickles were on the ground, and the opportunity for a successful attack had passed."

Colonel W. H. Taylor, Lee's adjutant-general, says:

"General Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through Gettysburg, and up the hills beyond. He then directed me to go to General Ewell, and say to him that, from the position which he occupied, he could see the enemy retreating over those hills, without organization, and in great confusion; that it was only necessary to press 'those people' in order to secure possession of the heights; and that, if possible, he wished him to do this. In obedience to these instructions, I proceeded immediately to General Ewell, and delivered the order of General Lee; and, after receiving from him some message for the commanding general in regard to the prisoners captured, returned to the latter, and reported that his order had been delivered. General Ewell did not express any objection, or indicate the existence of any impediment, to the execution of the order conveyed to him, but left the impression on my mind that it would be executed. In the exercise of that discretion, however, which General Lee was accustomed to accord to his lieutenants, and probably because of an undue regard for his admonition, given early in the day, not to precipitate a general engagement, General Ewell deemed it unwise to make the pursuit. The troops were not moved forward, and the enemy proceeded to occupy and fortify the position which it was designed that General Ewell should seize. Major-General Edward Johnson, whose division

reached the field after the engagement, and formed on the left of Early, in a conversation had with me, since the war, about this circumstance, in which I sought an explanation of our inaction at that time, assured me that there was no hinderance to his moving forward; but that, after getting his command in line of battle, and before it became seriously engaged, or had advanced any great distance, for some unexplained reason, he had received orders to halt. This was after General Lee's message was delivered to General Ewell."\*

General Ewell, in his official report, states his reasons for not ordering the attack, which are as follows:

"The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position that was known to us as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town I received a message from the commanding general to attack the hill if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it; all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson was close to the town with his division, the only one of my corps that had not been engaged, Anderson's division of the Third Corps having been halted to let them pass. Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined, with Johnson's division, to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up, the Federals were reported moving to our left flank—our extreme left—and I could see what seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction. Before this report could be investigated by

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\*Colonel W. H. Taylor, in *Annals of the War*, pages 308, 309.

Lieutenant T. T. Turner of my staff and Lieutenant Robert Early, sent to investigate it, and Johnson placed in position, the night was far advanced."\*

Napier Bartlett, Esq., in the "Military Annals of Louisiana," speaking of the subject, says:

"General Hays had received orders, through General Early, from General Ewell (though Lee's instructions were subsequently the reverse), to halt at Gettysburg, and advance no further in case he should succeed in capturing that place. But Hays now saw that the enemy were coming around by what is known as the Baltimore road, and were making for the heights—Cemetery Ridge. This ridge meant life or death, and for the possession of it the battles of the second and third were fought. \* \* \* Owing to the long detour the enemy was compelled to make, it was obvious that he could not get his artillery in position on the heights for one or two hours. The immediate occupation of the heights by the Confederates, who were in position to get there at the time referred to, was a matter of vital importance. Hays recognized it as such, and presently sent for Early. The latter thought as Hays, but declined to disobey orders. At the urgent request of General Hays, however, he sent for General Ewell. When the latter arrived, many precious moments had been lost. But the enemy, who did not see its value until the arrival of Hancock, had not yet appeared in force."

General Longstreet, who cites the foregoing in proof that the failure to follow up the advantages of the day by attacking Cemetery Hill at once was one of the great mistakes at Gettysburg, further says:

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\*Annals of the War, page 435.

“General Hays told me, ten years after the battle, that he could have seized the heights without the loss of ten men. Here, then, we see General Early adhering to orders when his own conviction told him he should not do so, and refusing to allow General Hays to seize a point recognized by him as of vast importance, because of technical authority, at a moment when he admitted and knew that disregard of the order would only have made more secure the point at issue when the order was given.”

Colonel Swallow, of the Confederate army, in the *Southern Bivouac* of December, 1885, says:

“As there has been much acrimonious controversy on the question as to why General Early did not advance and occupy Culp’s Hill on Wednesday evening, the writer, who was on the spot and witnessed all that passed, will relate what he knows of it. Before we met Hays, Captain Hotchkiss, who saw what was going on (the efforts of the Federals to occupy the hill), turned to the writer and Captain Brockenborough, saying, ‘I will go at once and bring General Early.’ But when told that General Hays was ahead of us, he rode up to him. The General was watching the Federals just then in the cemetery and trying to reach the pike. Hays would have moved his brigade and occupied Culp’s Hill had it not been that he and Gordon had received positive orders from General Ewell, through Early, not to advance beyond the town if they should succeed in capturing it. General Hays sent for Early and pointed to him the importance of moving the whole division on Culp’s Hill, and occupying not only it, but the Baltimore pike. General Early then said: ‘I am satisfied that you are right; it should be occupied on the spot, but

I can not disobey orders,' and then, turning away from us a few yards, said, more to himself than to Hays, 'If Jackson were on the field I would act on the spot.' General Hays then spoke a few animated words to Early, when the latter said, 'You are right, General, you are right. I'll send to Ewell for orders at once.' Early's division was now moved up so as to support Hays in the occupancy of Culp's Hill as soon as the orders came from Ewell. Moment after moment passed away. They were restless and anxious moments to us, who were watching what was going on in our front. We saw the enemy drag a battery on the pike, followed by a large force, and could see from their movements their intentions. Regiment after regiment crossed the pike and took a good position. They were lined up in short order. Ewell arrived, but it was now too late. The afternoon was far spent, and Wadsworth's division of Reynolds' Corps were on the heights before us in line of battle. These were the same men who opened the battle in the morning at Willoughby's Run. In this state of things it was decided by General Ewell that it was not expedient to attack the enemy. While these things were transpiring, Generals Lee and Longstreet were in the rear of the line of battle. The question now is, why was not Culp's Hill occupied on Wednesday evening? Where does the responsibility rest for this fatal mistake, the first among the reasons why Lee lost Gettysburg? Fatal as this mistake was, it was followed by others equally disastrous before the battle ended." \*

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\*General Meade, in a letter to G. G. Benedict, of Burlington, Vermont, dated March 16th, 1870, and published in the *Philadelphia Press* of August 11th, 1886, referring to a conversation he had with General Ewell since the war upon this subject of occupying Culp's Hill, says:

General Lee explains his reason for not sending positive orders to Ewell to attack the heights at once, as follows:

"The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of the troops. Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and, in the meantime, every effort was made to ascertain the numbers and positions of the enemy, and find the most favorable point of attack."

General Longstreet, in referring to some of the causes of their failure in the Pennsylvania campaign, cites among others General Lee's seeming loss of decision and equanimity. The following are his words:

"There is no doubt that General Lee, during the crisis

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"Lieutenant-General Ewell, in a conversation held with me shortly after the war, asked what would have been the effect if, at four P. M. on the 1st, he had occupied Culp's Hill, and established batteries upon it. I told him that, in my judgment, in the then condition of the Eleventh and First corps, with their morale affected by their withdrawal to Cemetery Ridge, with the loss of over half of their numbers in killed, wounded and missing (of the six thousand prisoners we lost on the field, nearly all came from these corps on the first day), his occupation of Culp's Hill, with batteries commanding the whole of Cemetery Ridge, would have produced the evacuation of that ridge and the withdrawal of the troops there, by the Baltimore pike and Taneytown and Emmittsburg roads. He then informed me that at four P. M. on the 1st he had his corps, twenty thousand strong, in column of attack, and on the point of moving on Culp's Hill, which he saw was unoccupied and commanded Cemetery Ridge, when he received an order from General Lee directing him to assume the defensive, and not to advance; that he sent to General Lee urging to be permitted to advance with his reserves, but the reply was a reiteration of the previous order. To my inquiry why Lee had restrained him, he said our troops (Slocum's) were visible, and Lee was under the impression that the greater part of my army was on the ground, and deemed it prudential to await the rest of his."

Either General Meade's or Ewell's memory is at fault in the foregoing statement. Johnson's division did not reach Gettysburg until about eight o'clock in the evening, and at no time previous to that, nor at any time that day, were the two divisions on the ground—Early's and Rodes'—in position as General Ewell stated. If they were, all the authorities quoted are at fault.

of that campaign, lost his matchless equipoise that usually characterized him, and that whatever mistakes were made were not so much matters of deliberate judgment as the impulses of a great mind disturbed by unparalleled conditions. General Lee was thrown from his balance (as is shown by the statement of General Fitzhugh Lee) by too great confidence in the powers of his troops, and (as is shown by General Anderson's statement) by the deplorable absence of General Stuart and the perplexity occasioned thereby."

The statements of Generals Fitzhugh Lee and Anderson, referred to by General Longstreet in the foregoing, are as follows. General Fitzhugh Lee says:

"He (General Lee) told the father of the writer (his brother) that he was controlled too far by the great confidence he felt in the fighting qualities of his people, who begged simply to be 'turned loose,' and by the assurances of most of his higher officers."

General Anderson says:

"About ten o'clock in the morning (Wednesday, July 1st,) I received a message (at Cashtown, where I was resting with my division,) notifying me that General Lee desired to see me. I found General Lee intently listening to the fire of the guns, and very much depressed. At length he said, more to himself than to me: 'I can not think what has become of Stuart; I ought to have heard from him long before now. He may have met with disaster, but I hope not. In the absence of reports from him I am in ignorance as to what we have in front of us here. It may be the whole Federal army, or it may be only a detachment. If it is the whole Federal force we must



fight a battle here; if we do not gain a victory, those defiles and gorges through which we passed this morning will shelter us from disaster.'"\*

Is it not evident that the reason why the advantages gained by the first day's battle at Gettysburg were not improved by an immediate attack upon Cemetery and



GENERAL LEE'S HEAD-QUARTERS.  
From a Photograph by Beidel.

Culp's hills, was because of doubt and confusion among the leaders of the Confederate hosts? Plainly the God of Nations was in it, and it was not the first time that He caused confusion among the counsellors of rebellion, that the nation they sought to overthrow might live.†

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\* "Annals of the War," pages 420, 421.

† See II. Samuel, xvii: 1-16.

After the battle of this day, General Lee established his head-quarters in a stone-house on the Chambersburg road, about a quarter of a mile from the seminary, in front of the division of General Heth. The position gave him a full view of Gettysburg, of his own army, and the Federal line of battle. The General, during the succeeding two days, took observations from the cupola of the college. This building was occupied as a hospital, and had the flag denoting that service at the time he so used it.

Having given the details of the first day's engagement, as well as stated the condition existing when night fell upon the scene, we next turn our attention to another point and note what transpired there. As soon as it was known at Harrisburg that the Confederates, who had been threatening that place, had fallen back in the direction of Gettysburg, General Smith, with several regiments of New York and Pennsylvania militia, advanced to Carlisle. Shortly after the arrival of these troops at that place, and when the men were in the act of preparing their supper, about three thousand cavalry-men of Stuart's Corps, under command of General Fitzhugh Lee, advanced upon the town from the direction of York. The militia-men at once fled to arms, and cannon were planted to meet the coming foe. Fitzhugh Lee was evidently disappointed in finding that General Rodes had left the place, and much disconcerted in finding himself confronted by a Federal force, and at once, without any notice, opened a fire of shell, round shot, and grape and canister upon the town. After keeping this up for some time a flag of truce was sent in, demanding the surrender of the place, to which a most decided negative was given. The flag

had hardly left when a second shelling was commenced, which lasted until midnight. At ten o'clock the several buildings upon the outskirts known as the United States Barracks, were fired and entirely destroyed. After this unwarranted act of firing into a town filled with helpless women and children, without previous notice, the Confederates withdrew and again set out in search of their army. Considerable damage was done by the shot and shells thrown into the town, but no lives were lost.

Leaving that part of the Federal army which had reached the field during this day and up to a late hour in the night, actively engaged in preparation for the renewal of the conflict, we turn to those parts of it which had not arrived, and note their location. The Second Corps marched from Uniontown, where it had remained since the evening of Monday, 29th, and passing through Taneytown reached the vicinity of Gettysburg, where it bivouacked until morning. The two brigades of the Third Corps, which General Sickles had left to hold Emmittsburg, when he marched at the call of Howard for the field of battle with the remainder of his command, remained at that place until an early hour in the morning; the Fifth Corps marched from Union Mills by Hanover and McSherrystown to Bonaughtown, five miles from Gettysburg, and there encamped over night; and the Sixth Corps was on its way from Manchester, marching all night. Gregg's cavalry division, having left the same place, encamped over night at Hanover, fourteen miles from the field, while Huey's brigade returned to Manchester. Kilpatrick's division moved from Hanover by Abbottsville to Berlin, sixteen miles from Gettysburg; and

Kenly's and Morris' brigades, of French's division, from Maryland Heights, reached Frederick, where they remained as a reserve until Saturday, July 4th, when they marched to Turner's Pass in the South Mountain.

The Confederates were all in position that night except the divisions of Hood and McLaws, which reached the vicinity of Marsh Creek, four miles west of Gettysburg, about midnight; and Pickett's division, which remained about three miles above Chambersburg. Imboden's cavalry were about Greenwood; the brigades of W. E. Jones and Beverly Robertson were below Shippensburg, and Stuart was about Carlisle.

Thus the curtain of night fell upon the scene, hiding from view the thousands of dead, wounded, and suffering men of both armies, who lay scattered over the field. The telegraph, meanwhile, carried the news of the sad results to the national cause all over the loyal North, producing gloom, anxiety and fear. Here we close this chapter, proposing to resume the narrative with the incidents of the morning.

## CHAPTER VII.

THE SECOND DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG — THURSDAY,  
JULY 2D, 1863.

**I**N order to a correct understanding of the details of the two days' battles which are yet to be given, it is essential that the reader have an idea of the positions occupied by the two great contending armies. They may be described as follows: Approaching Gettysburg from the south-east, by the Baltimore pike, we ascend by a gradual slope a high ridge, which is in shape somewhat like a horse-shoe, with its left side or flange longer than the other.\* Upon this ridge, and conforming to its natural outline, the Union line was established. The toe of this horse-shoe reaches the southern outskirts of the town, and rests upon what is called Cemetery Hill, because upon it the local cemetery of the town is situated. Its right side, or flange, extends somewhat eastward and then curves sharply to the south, ending with Culp's Hill—a wooded and rocky eminence.† Rock Creek, a stream of some considerable size, runs by its eastern base, and passing south, at length enters the Monocacy. This flank was well protected by the nature of the slope, which is high

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\*The Federal line was somewhat in the shape of a *fish hook*—its point resting upon Culp's Hill; its curve, Cemetery Hill, and its heel, Round Top.

†A view of this place was given in the previous chapter.



VIEW FROM THE CUPOLA OF THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, LOOKING SOUTH-EAST.

From a Photograph by Tipton.

Cemetery Hill and Ridge are visible in the distance, along the upper line.

and commands the entire country around it. The distance from the toe of the horse-shoe—the Federal center—to the termination of the line at Rock Creek is about three quarters of a mile.

The left side, or flange, which is considerably longer than the right, follows the ridge in a south-westward direction, and terminates at two high, well-defined, and rock-sided hills, or cones, called Round Top and Big Round Top.\* The last named—Big Round Top—was the Federal left. It is high, rocky, rugged, and exceedingly rough. Its twin—Round Top, sometimes called Little Round Top, because so much less than its brother by its side, and also Weed's Hill, because General Weed was killed upon it during the battle,—was a position of highest importance. The artillery upon its summit commanded the entire country around. In front of these two strangely formed hills the ground is exceedingly rough, and covered here and there with immense granite boulders; while the western faces are but piles upon piles of the same rough stones, making the scaling of them almost an impossibility. Behind these hills the ground gently slopes toward the east, and afforded an excellent protection to the reserves and ammunition trains. From the toe of the horse-shoe—the Federal center—to this, its left heel, was about three miles. The ridge between the center and the extreme left is a continuation of Cemetery Hill, and diminishes in height as it runs southward. Near the base of Little Round Top it flattens out into a plain. This was the weakest point in the Federal position, but it was completely covered by the guns on the hill. The

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\*These hills are finely illustrated in the preceding chapter.





[196] VIEW FROM THE SOLDIERS' NATIONAL MONUMENT, LOOKING WEST. (From a Photograph by Tipton.)  
The stone wall marks the Union line on the 2d and 3d. Seminary Ridge is seen in the distance. The left of Reynolds' Corps occupied that part of this ridge on Wednesday, and Hill's (Confederate) Corps on Thursday and Friday. The South Mountain is in the extreme distance.



Baltimore pike runs diagonally from the south-east through the horse-shoe and comes out at its toe. The Taneytown road enters from the south and crosses the ridge and extends along the line, intersecting the Baltimore pike a little beyond the toe. The road from Emmittsburg comes in from the south-west, and runs nearly parallel with the Union line, and unites with the Baltimore pike near the same place.

About three quarters of a mile west of Cemetery Hill is Seminary Ridge, which runs nearly parallel with the left of the Union position, to its center. The illustration given affords a fine view of this ridge down to the right of Hill's Corps; the continuation of it down to opposite Big Round Top is given in the illustration, "A view from Little Round Top, looking west," in chapter XIII. Along the wooded crest of this ridge the Confederate line was formed up to a point above the town, and from thence it continued upon elevated ground across the Federal center and terminated at Wolf Hill, opposite Culp's Hill. From the extreme right of this line, which considerably over-lapped the Federal left opposite Round Top, to Wolf Hill, its extreme left, was about four and a half or five miles.

The superiority of the Federal position will be readily seen in the descriptions of the two thus given. Cemetery Hill formed the apex of the triangle on which the Union forces were stationed. It perfectly commanded the town, and the entire country over which the Confederates must pass to attack their center, as well as the right or left of their line. The Federal lines gradually diverging from this central tower of strength to the south-west and south-east, formed the sides of this triangle, outside of which,

and therefore upon a larger triangle, the enemy was compelled to operate. This gave the Federals the incalculable advantage of moving on an interior and shorter line, and enabled them to throw their reserves with rapidity to any place along the line, either east or west, where they might be needed. Such, then, were the positions of the two armies; we will now turn our attention to the preparations made during the night and early morning for the renewal of the conflict.

At the close of the previous day the Confederate forces then upon the field were posted as follows: Ewell's Corps occupied Gettysburg, the line extending from Rock Creek on the south-east to Seminary Ridge on the west. Johnson's division, which had come up by way of Greenwood in advance of the great wagon train referred to in a previous chapter, and only reached the front about dusk, was placed on the left, opposite Culp's Hill. Early joined Johnson and extended the line to the Federal Center; and Rodes, uniting with Early's right, and occupying Middle street through the town, extended the line to Seminary Ridge. Hill's Corps took position on the ridge in the following order: On the left, and resting on the Chambersburg road, was Heth; next came Pender, and then Anderson. The latter had been halted at Cashtown, which he had reached the evening before, to permit Johnson to pass, and consequently did not reach the field to participate in the engagement of that day. Such were the positions of the Confederate forces that night, and up to the time in the afternoon of the following day (Thursday), when McLaws' and Hood's divisions arrived from Marsh Creek, which they had reached about mid-

night, and were placed upon the extreme right, opposite Little and Big Round Top.

When General Hancock, at 4:30 p. m., reached the front, in accordance with the order of General Meade, after assisting in rallying the troops as they fell back from the field west and north of Gettysburg to the new position, which by General Howard's happy forethought had been selected and prepared for them, he at once saw the importance of Culp's Hill and Round Top, and, as stated in the previous chapter, sent Wadsworth's division of the First Corps to occupy the first named, and Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps to the latter. The remainder of the First Corps and the Eleventh were placed upon Cemetery Hill,—the First Corps under General Newton, who had just reached the front and had been assigned the command by General Meade, on the right center; while the Eleventh under Howard occupied the center. At seven o'clock Sickles' Corps, with the exception of two brigades which he had left to hold Emmittsburg, upon receiving Howard's dispatch calling for assistance, and the Twelfth Corps under Slocum, reached the field, and were assigned to positions. The Third filed into line on the left of the Eleventh, extending the line along the left centre, and the Twelfth, with the exception of Geary's division, took position on Culp's Hill. Stannard's Vermont brigade also arrived and reported to the commander of the First Corps, to which they were assigned, and were placed in reserve behind the center.

The commander in chief, as stated in the previous chapter, arrived upon the field an hour after midnight; namely, one o'clock a. m. of Thursday, July 2d. In company with Howard

and other general officers, he rode along the line and inspected the position. He also directed his troops to erect such defensive works as were possible before the opening of the expected battle; wherever, therefore, the ground was sufficiently open, musketry trenches and rifle pits were dug; cover for the artillery was thrown up wherever it



FEDERAL BREASTWORKS UPON CULP'S HILL.

From a Photograph by Tipton.

was practicable; trees were felled, stones piled up, and every possible means of protection was provided.\* Few, indeed, were the moments given to sleep throughout that night by either officers or privates, although they were

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\*Some of these defensive works yet remain. The breastworks upon Culp's Hill are shown in the accompanying illustration. The marks of the bullets are also seen.

greatly exhausted by the marching and fighting of the previous day. The full moon, veiled by thin clouds, shone down upon the strange scene. The silence of the night was only broken by the heavy tramp of armed men, the neighing of horses, the rumbling of the artillery as it was hurried into position, the click of the pick and spade, and the cutting of axes. Thus hour by hour throughout the entire night, and until the shock of battle again broke forth towards evening of the next day, these energetic citizen soldiers, under the direction of skilled engineers, worked and dug and builded until the position they held was made too strong to be carried by direct assault.

At six o'clock in the morning the Second Corps and the Reserve Artillery came up; and an hour later—at seven A. M.—the Fifth Corps, under General Sykes, and the two brigades of the Third which had been left at Emmittsburg, also reached the field. The Second Corps, under Hancock, was assigned the place held during the night by that part of the Third which had come up—the left center,—and the Third was directed to form below Hancock and down to and upon Round Top. The Fifth Corps was placed in reserve within supporting distance of Slocum, behind the Federal right. General Sedgwick, in command of the Sixth Corps, received at Manchester, twenty-eight miles distant, at seven P. M. the previous evening, Meade's order to move to Taneytown, and after marching seven or eight miles, a second order was received, requiring him to proceed at once to Gettysburg, which he reached by an all night's march at two P. M. General Sedgwick needed no other motive to prompt him to hurry forward than the knowledge that the enemy was

at Gettysburg, and that he was needed there. Promptly the head of the column was changed, and encouraged and urged forward by the enthusiasm of their heroic leader, without bivouac, and almost without rest, these veteran heroes marched throughout the entire night and the greater part of the next day, and reached the field, fifteen thousand four hundred strong, in time to insure victory to the Union forces. Arriving upon the field a short time before the fierce engagement commenced, these men were placed in reserve in the rear of Round Top. General Sedgwick says of his march, "I arrived at Gettysburg at about two o'clock, having marched thirty-five miles from seven o'clock the previous evening. I received no less than three messages by his (Meade's) aids, urging me on."

General Meade in the early morning contemplated an attack upon the Confederate left by throwing the Fifth and Sixth corps, when they came up, in connection with the Twelfth, upon Johnson and Early. Slocum and Warren, however, after a careful reconnoissance of the ground in front of Culp's Hill, reported that such an attack was impracticable, and it was abandoned. General Doubleday, in speaking of this proposed attack, says: "It seems to me that this would have been a very hazardous enterprise, and I am not surprised that both Slocum and Warren reported against it. The Fifth and Sixth corps would necessarily be very much fatigued after making a forced march. To put them in at once, and direct them to drive a superior force of Lee's veterans out of a town where every house would have been loop-holed, and every street barricaded, would hardly have been judicious. If we had succeeded

in doing so, it would simply have reversed the battle of Gettysburg, for the Confederate army would have fought behind Seminary Ridge, and we would have been exposed in the plain below. Nor do I think it would have been wise strategy to turn their left, and drive them between us and Washington, for it would have enabled them to threaten the capital, strengthen and shorten their line of retreat, and endanger our communications at the same time."\*

It has been charged that General Meade was dissatisfied with the position chosen at Gettysburg, and contemplated a retreat to the position selected at Pipe Creek. General Butterfield, Meade's chief of staff, says that General Meade directed him to make out in the morning a general order of retreat from Gettysburg, prescribing the route each corps should take. General Meade earnestly denied that he ever intended to retreat, and that this order was only a precautionary measure in case it became necessary to withdraw. This seems reasonable, for a wise general, while determined to maintain his position to the utmost, would take all necessary preliminary measures in time for any possible emergency. The hurry and confusion of defeat would not be a favorable time to attend to these matters.

After the project to attack the Confederate left had been abandoned, General Meade, thoroughly understanding the strength and advantages of his position, and knowing that Lee could not afford to remain quiet in the midst of a hostile country, with his communications constantly in danger of being severed, determined to act wholly on the

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\* General Doubleday's "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 157.



defensive. In accordance with this purpose all possible preparations were made to meet the enemy wherever he might make the attack.

After the battle of the previous day the Confederates were jubilant and boastful. They entertained the idea that they could easily defeat the comparatively small number of men in their front, and that the remaining corps and divisions coming upon the field separately, and worn down by long and weary marches, would be met and cut up at their pleasure. But when Thursday morning dawned, and they saw that the little band upon Cemetery Hill had been largely reinforced, and other troops were yet arriving, and that the heights had been fortified and were bristling with guns at every point, they began to give evidence that their minds were undergoing a change, and that after all they might have some hard and bloody work to do. Notwithstanding, however, their confidence during the night, the Confederates also improved their time in erecting defenses all along their line.

Daylight at length dawned; the hours wore away, noon came, and the afternoon, and yet no attack was made. The morning was pleasant, the air was calm, the sun shone mildly through a smoky atmosphere, and the whole outer world was quiet and peaceful. There was nothing to foretoken the sanguinary struggle that was to ensue ere the closing of the day. What was the cause of this delay? It will be given shortly. But was not the hand of God in it? Like their failure to drive the Federals from Cemetery Hill the evening before, this delay was doubtless the salvation of the Nation. Hon. Edward Everett, in his address at Gettysburg, says:



"I can not but remark on the providential inactivity of the Confederate army. Had the contest been renewed by it at daylight on the 2d of July, with the First and Eleventh corps exhausted by the battle and retreat, the Third and Twelfth weary from their forced march, and the Second, Fifth, and Sixth not yet arrived, nothing but a miracle could have saved the army from a great disaster. Instead of this the day dawned, the sun rose, the cool hours of the morning passed, the forenoon, and a considerable part of the afternoon, wore away without the slightest aggressive movement on the part of the enemy. Thus time was given for half of our forces to arrive and take their place in the lines, while the rest of the army enjoyed a much needed half day's repose."

Evidently the delay of the Confederates in renewing the battle was because of the difficulties which confronted them. They had unexpectedly come upon the foe, and in such position that a successful withdrawal without an engagement was impossible. General Lee, in his official report, says:

"It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy; but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of

the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack."

General Longstreet relates the following:

"When I overtook General Lee, at five o'clock that afternoon (Wednesday, July 1st,) he said, to my surprise, that he thought of attacking General Meade upon the heights the next day. I suggested that this course seemed to be at variance with the plan of campaign that had been agreed upon before leaving Fredericksburg. He said: 'If the enemy is there to-morrow, we must attack him.' I replied, 'If he is there, it will be because he is anxious that we should attack him—a good reason, in my judgment, for not doing so.' I urged that we should move around by our right to the left of Meade, and put our army between him and Washington, threatening his left and rear, and thus force him to attack us in such position as we might select. I said that it seemed to me that if, during our council at Fredericksburg, we had described the position in which we desired to get the two armies, we could not have expected to get the enemy in a better position for us than the one he then occupied; that he was in a strong position and would be awaiting us, which was evidence that he desired that we should attack him. I said, further, that his weak point seemed to be his left; hence I thought that we should move around to his left, that we might threaten it if we intended to maneuver, or attack it if we determined upon a battle. I called his attention to the fact that the country was admirably adapted for a defensive battle, and that we should surely repulse Meade with crushing loss if we would take position so as

to force him to attack us; and suggested that, even if we carried the heights in front of us, and drove Meade out, we should be so badly crippled that we could not reap the fruits of victory; and that the heights of Gettysburg were, in themselves, of no more importance to us than the ground we then occupied, and that the mere possession of the ground was not worth a hundred men to us; that Meade's army, not its position, was our objective. General Lee was impressed with the idea that, by attacking the Federals, he could whip them in detail. I reminded him that if the Federals were there in the morning, it would be proof that they had their forces well in hand, and that with Pickett in Chambersburg, and Stuart out of reach, we should be somewhat in detail. He, however, did not seem to abandon the idea of attack on the next day. He seemed under a subdued excitement, which occasionally took possession of him when 'the hunt was up,' and threatened his superb equipoise. \* \* \* On the night of the 1st I left General Lee without any orders. On the morning of the 2d I went to his head-quarters at daylight, and renewed my views against making an attack. He seemed resolved, however, and we discussed the probable results. We observed the position of the Federals, and got a general idea of the nature of the ground. About sunrise General Lee sent Colonel Venable, of his staff, to General Ewell's head-quarters, ordering him to make a reconnoissance of the ground in his front, with a view of making the main attack on his left. A short time afterward he followed Colonel Venable in person. He returned at about nine o'clock and informed me that it would not do to have Ewell open the attack. He finally determined

that I should make the main attack on the extreme right. It was fully eleven o'clock when General Lee arrived at this conclusion and ordered the movement."\*

Colonel W. H. Taylor, of Lee's staff, in the same book, page 309, says: "The prevailing idea with General Lee was to press forward without delay; to follow up promptly and vigorously the advantage already gained. Having failed to reap the full fruit of the victory the night before, his mind was evidently occupied with the idea of renewing the assault upon the enemy's right with the dawn on the second. The divisions of Major-Generals Early and Rodes, of Ewell's Corps, had been actively engaged, and had sustained some loss, but were still in excellent condition, and in full enjoyment of the prestige of success, and consequent elation of spirit, in having so gallantly swept the enemy from their front, through the town of Gettysburg, and compelled him to seek refuge behind the heights beyond. The division of Major-General Edward Johnson, of the same corps, was perfectly fresh, not having been engaged. Anderson's division of Hill's Corps was also now up. With this force General Lee thought that the enemy's position could be assailed with every prospect of success; but after a conference with the corps and division commanders on our left, who represented that, in their judgment, it would be hazardous to attempt to storm the strong position occupied by the enemy, with troops somewhat fagged by the marching and fighting of the first day; that the ground in their immediate front furnished greater obstacles to a successful assault than existed at other points of the line, and that it could be

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\* General Longstreet, in *Annals of the War*, pages 417, 421, 422.

reasonably concluded, since they had so severely handled the enemy in their front, that he would concentrate and fortify with special reference to resisting a further advance just there, he determined to make the main attack well on the enemy's left, indulging the hope that Longstreet's Corps would be up in time to begin the movement at an early hour on the second. He instructed General Ewell to be prepared to co-operate by a simultaneous advance by his corps."

The reconnoissance made upon the Confederate left, as referred to by General Longstreet and Colonel Taylor, was as follows, as reported by Colonel Swallow, in the *Southern Bivouac* of January, 1886:

"Immediately after the interview between Generals Lee and Longstreet, which took place at the head-quarters of the commanding general early in the morning, Lee sent Colonel Venable, of his staff, to Ewell, and followed himself soon after in order to make preparations for an immediate attack upon the enemy. Early, Johnson, and Rodes were summoned. General Hays, who was present, told the writer that the General (meaning Lee) was full of fight. He appeared to be deeply impressed with the importance of an immediate attack. He frequently repeated the expression, 'The attack must be made *at once, at once.*' He wanted Ewell to lead an attack on the spot. Ewell and all his division commanders dissented from General Lee in making the attack first on his left. They pointed out to the commanding general the almost impregnable position, both of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, and submitted to General Lee a plan of making the opening attack on the Confederate extreme right, held by

General Longstreet, where the Federal line was much weaker and more easily broken.

“It was represented to General Lee, as the united opinion of all present, that a bold and spirited attack on our right by Longstreet would undoubtedly turn the left flank of the enemy and gradually endanger the rear of Meade’s army, that the events consequent upon Longstreet’s attack would compel Meade to detach many troops from Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill and send them to his left and rear. This being done, Ewell’s Corps might then, by a bold and daring onset, assail the whole line on Cemetery and Culp’s hills, and drive the enemy from these strongholds. To this reasoning General Lee assented, with the modification that just as soon as Longstreet opened on the right Ewell should lose no time, and immediately attack Cemetery and Culp’s hills. This was the exact understanding, and General Lee, as he mounted his horse, remarked, ‘I will return to head-quarters at once and issue the necessary orders, so that the right and left will be under fire by ten o’clock.’ General Lee then rode back to his head-quarters.”

Thus it will be seen that the capture of Cemetery Hill, which might have been effected the evening previous, was now considered impracticable, if not impossible, and another plan of attack upon some other part of the line had to be arranged for, and this arrangement caused several hours of delay. At length General Lee had his plans matured, and issued his orders as follows: General Longstreet was directed to place the two divisions of his corps then up,—McLaws’ and Hood’s,—upon the right of Hill, extending the line down a little below Big Round Top.

McLaws connected with Hill, and Hood held the extreme right. These two divisions were to "envelop the enemy's (Federal) left, and begin the attack there, following up, as near as possible, the direction of the Emmittsburg road. Simultaneous with the attack upon the Federal left, Ewell was directed to favor this attack by an assault upon the right, and Hill, who held the center, was to hold himself in readiness to throw his strength where it would have the greatest effect. Such was the plan of battle, and had it been executed at any time prior to two o'clock, when the Sixth Corps came upon the field, it might, and the probability is that it would, have been successful. But delay occurred, and the attack was not made until near four o'clock; and to this delay the failure of the Confederate plan has been attributed.

It is claimed by several Southern officers who participated in the Pennsylvania campaign, that General Lee ordered Longstreet to commence the attack at nine A. M., and to his delay until a late hour in the afternoon they attribute their failure. General Longstreet, in the extract from his article in the *Annals of the War*, previously quoted, says that "on the night of the 1st I left him (Lee) without any orders at all," and that it was nine o'clock before the General returned from the conference with the corps and division commanders on the left, and eleven o'clock before he had so far matured his plans as to issue his orders for their execution. On the other hand, General A. L. Long, in an article in the *Philadelphia Weekly Times* of November 1st, 1884, says:

"Having been present on the occasion referred to, I can speak from personal knowledge. General Lee had no

sooner reached the field on the afternoon of the 1st of July than he determined to pursue the advantage that had been gained by Generals Ewell and Hill. Finding it, however, unadvisable to renew the engagement that evening, he determined to attack as early as practicable the next morning, and so expressed himself to Generals Hill and Longstreet. His visit to Ewell was to learn the condition of his troops and arrange preliminaries for the intended battle. Before retiring for the night, General Lee had formed his order of battle based on reconnoissances made before the close of the afternoon. About daylight on the morning of the 2d General Longstreet received his final instructions. It had always been General Lee's habit, on the eve of battle, to designate the work to be done by each corps commander, leaving the manner of its execution to their discretion. This confidence had never been abused, and he had then no reason to doubt the faithful execution of his orders."

The Count of Paris, in his recently published work on the War of the Rebellion, says:

"We have seen how important it is for him (Lee) to carry out this determination without delay, yet when he returns from his conference with Ewell on the evening of the 1st of July he does not appear to have as yet clearly decided upon his plan of battle for the following day. He, no doubt, desires to wait for daylight in order to reconnoitre the ground, but this uncertainty causes him to lose much precious time. At daybreak of the 2d he is in the saddle; he has decided to make the attack on the right, and orders Longstreet to place his two divisions on that side along the prolongation of Hill's line, so as to be able to begin it at once. But he does not appear to have as yet determined



either upon the hour when it is to be made, the point against which it is to be directed, or the number of troops to take part in it.

“Accustomed to find in Jackson a lieutenant to whom it was not necessary to give any precise instructions—who upon a mere suggestion would adopt all necessary measures for striking the point designated for his attack with the greatest rapidity and with the utmost possible vigor—Lee on this occasion did not take into consideration Longstreet’s character, with whose strong and weak points, his energy and tardiness, he must, however, have been well acquainted. It is evident to us that from the evening of the 1st of July there was a misunderstanding between these two generals.”

The question as to whether or not General Lee ordered Longstreet to an early attack is one of recollection and veracity, with the probabilities strongly against it, but accepting the latter’s own version, which seems to be the most reasonable, that he received his orders about eleven A. M., he is yet open to the charge of grave tardiness. The whole plan, it will be seen, was dependent upon the two divisions of Longstreet, which, according to his own admission had reached Marsh Creek, four miles west of Gettysburg, the evening previous. From this place to the positions assigned them in the line was not over *four miles*, and yet for some reason which General Longstreet has never yet satisfactorily explained, these troops were not in position and ready for the part assigned them *until four o’clock in the afternoon*.

General Longstreet states a number of causes for his delay in getting his troops into position. He says that

Law's brigade was detached by permission of General Lee for special duty elsewhere, and although ordered "to move with the portion of his command that was then up," he took upon himself the responsibility of postponing the execution of this order of the commanding general until this brigade could be recalled. He says, too, that the engineers were endeavoring to conduct his troops into their positions unobserved by the Federal Signal Station upon Round Top, and this caused considerable delay. Other causes, also, are assigned, but none of them seems to explain the delay.

Colonel W. H. Taylor, Lee's adjutant-general, says of General Longstreet's tardiness:

"It is generally conceded that General Longstreet, on this occasion, was fairly chargeable with tardiness, and I have always thought that his conduct, in this particular, was due to a lack of appreciation, on his part, of the circumstances which created an urgent and peculiar need for the presence of his troops at the front. As soon as the necessity for the concentration of the army was precipitated by the unexpected encounter, on the 1st of July, with a large force of the enemy, near Gettysburg, General Longstreet was urged to hasten his march; and this, perhaps, should have sufficed to cause him to push his divisions on toward Gettysburg, from which point he was distant but four miles, early on the 2d. But I can not say that he was notified, on the night of the 1st, of the attack proposed to be made on the morning of the 2d, and the part his corps was to take therein. Neither do I think it just to charge that he was alone responsible for the delay in attacking that ensued *after* his arrival on the field. I well

remember how General Lee was chafed by the non-appearance of the troops, until he finally became restless, and rode back to meet General Longstreet, and urge him forward; but, then, there was considerable delay in putting the troops to work after they reached the field; and much time was spent in discussing what was to be done,—which, perhaps, could not be avoided. At any rate, it would be unreasonable to hold General Longstreet alone accountable for this. Indeed, great injustice has been done him in the charge that he had orders from the commanding general to attack the enemy at sunrise on the second of July, and that he disobeyed these orders. This would imply that he was in position to attack, whereas General Lee but anticipated his early arrival on the second, and based his calculations upon it. I have shown how he was disappointed, and I need hardly add that *the delay was fatal.*”\*

As already stated, upon the arrival, at six o'clock in the morning, of the Second Corps, General Hancock was directed to take the position on the left centre occupied during the night by that part of the Third Corps which had reached the field the evening previous, and Sickles was ordered to move his corps down below Hancock's, and occupy the ground where Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps had been sent by Hancock the preceding evening. At a later hour, when General Sickles sought more definite instructions, General Meade told him that he was to join his right with Hancock's left, and extend his left down to and upon Round Top *if practicable*. General Sickles, for some unaccountable reason, concluded that there was no position upon Round Top, and taking advantage of the

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\* Annals of the War, page 311.

discretion given him concerning his occupying that place,—or, rather construing it liberally, so as to include his whole position,—moved forward to a slight ridge about three quarters of a mile in advance of the prolongation of Hancock's line, and wholly disconnected by an intervening ravine from the proper line. His reason for so doing was, that the ground between the left of Hancock and Round Top was considerably lower than that along the Emmittsburg road, and his position, in case he occupied that ground, would be untenable if the enemy was permitted to occupy the higher ground in front. General Geary, when he received Meade's order on the morning of the second, to rejoin his own corps upon Culp's Hill, fearing that Round Top, which he had occupied during the night by one of his brigades, would not be occupied, sent a staff officer to General Sickles with instructions to explain the position and its importance, and ask for troops to be sent to take his place there. No troops, however, were sent, and no officer came to inspect the position, and after waiting as long as his orders permitted, he reluctantly left it.\*

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\* General Meade, in a letter to Mr. G. G. Benedict, of Burlington, Vermont, dated March 16th, 1870, and recently published, says: "When I wrote my report of the battle I honestly believed General Sickles did not know where I wished him to go, and that his error arose from a misapprehension of my orders, but I have recently learned from General Geary, who had the day before been sent by Hancock to hold the left, and who in doing so had seen the great importance of Round Top and *posted a brigade on it*, that on the morning of the 2d, when he received my order that he would be relieved by the Third Corps and on being relieved would rejoin his own Corps, (Twelfth,) on the right, after waiting for some time to be relieved, he sent to General Sickles a staff officer with instructions to explain the position and its importance, and to ask, if troops could not be sent to relieve him, that General S. would send one of his staff to see the ground, and to place troops there on their arrival. He received for reply that General S. would attend to it in due time. No officer or troops came, and after waiting till his patience was exhausted General Geary withdrew and joined his corps. Now my first orders

General Sickles has been blamed for the grave error he is supposed to have committed in this matter. It is due him to state that there are many strong reasons in favor of the position he chose, and military men are, it is said, about equally divided in opinion as to the wisdom of his choice. Some claim that had he not taken the advanced position he did, Hood's division, seeing the hopelessness of an attack upon Round Top, would have turned the Federal left and interposed between their army and Washington, and thus have forced them to abandon their position. Then, too, the enemy wasted his strength in gaining Sickles' position, without any particular advantage to him, and was not in a condition for much further service, and in this way, although many valuable lives were lost, the battle fought there was of immense value in its effect upon the final result. It should also be stated that General Sickles claims to have had the implied sanction of General Meade, who, at his request, sent General Hunt, his chief of artillery, to assist him in locating his line. †

Sickles' line, then, was as follows: The center was at what has become historically known as the Peach Orchard. This was nearly opposite Little Round Top, and about one

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to General Sickles were to relieve the Twelfth Corps Division (Geary's) and occupy their position. Here is evidence that he knew the position occupied by Geary's division, or could have known, and yet failed to occupy it. Furthermore, when he came to my head-quarters at about noon and said he did not know where to go, I answered, 'Why, you were to relieve the Twelfth Corps.' He said they had no position; they were massed, awaiting events. Then it was I told him his *right* was to be *Hancock's left*, his *left* on *Round Top, which I pointed out.*'

† This whole matter of General Sickles' alleged disobedience of the orders of the commander in chief on this day will be considered at length in Appendix D.

mile distant from it. It occupied the angle formed by the Emmittsburg road, and a narrow road or lane coming in from the east. The right wing, which was under General Humphreys, extended from the Peach Orchard some distance northward along the Emmittsburg road; the left wing, under General Birney, made a right angle at the



ENTRANCE TO THE DEVIL'S DEN.

*From a Photograph by Tipton.)*

orchard, and bent around south-eastwardly, following the conformation of the ridge, or the high ground, covering the front of Little Round Top at its base and resting at the Devil's Den, a rocky formation of peculiar shape. This line, in military parlance, was in the air, for neither of its flanks was protected. About three o'clock in the afternoon, General Meade, who says that he "was in doubt

concerning Sickles' line," rode to the left, when he discovered the advanced position he had taken. Sending at once for him, the commander in chief expressed his disapproval of his position and pointed out the line he expected him to take. Sickles at once proposed to withdraw his force to the line indicated, but Meade told him that he did not think the enemy would permit him to withdraw without a fight. Simultaneously almost with these words, the enemy's batteries opened a furious fire, and General Sickles put spurs to his horse and galloped rapidly to the front. General Longstreet, although unaccountably tardy, had nevertheless been busily engaged in perfecting his arrangements for the battle, and when they were disclosed they were seen to be admirable. He had massed nearly sixty pieces of artillery to bear upon Sickles' angle at the Peach Orchard, all of which rained a perfect torrent of shot and shell upon that part of the line. At the same time massive lines of infantry, in the shape of a crescent, and about a mile and a half long, came into view as they advanced against the front and left flank, and poured into the patriot troops a terribly destructive fire.

General Meade at once saw that Sickles could not possibly maintain his position, and that he must be withdrawn to a new line, where he could be assisted, or else he must order forward supports, abandon his strong position, and fight the enemy in the open plain. He wisely decided upon the former, and at once hurried the Fifth Corps, which had been placed in reserve in the rear of Culp's Hill, over to the left, where it was formed in line on the left of Hancock and extended down to Round Top. This



line, formed in the position originally intended for Sickles, was to be the rallying place for the Third Corps.

The Confederate force engaged in the effort to crush General Sickles, was composed of the divisions of McLaws and Hood, of Longstreet's Corps, and the brigades of Wilcox, Wright, and Perry, of Anderson's division of



INSIDE OF THE DEVIL'S DEN.

From a Photograph by Tipton.

Hill's Corps, in all about twenty thousand men. Hood's division occupied the right of this line next to Round Top, with McLaws next, and the brigades of Wilcox, Wright, and Perry on the left, in front of the Emmittsburg road. These were all veteran soldiers, as were also those of Sickles' command, and the conflict of course would be terrific.



The severe artillery fire which was opened against the two sides of the angle at the center, was but the prelude to a furious and determined infantry attack against the left. This part of the line was held by the brigade of General J. Hobart Ward, — his left resting on the Devil's Den. The Confederate line overlapped the Federals' at this point nearly a quarter of a mile, and it was against Ward that the enemy made his first efforts, attempting to outflank him and to seize Little Round Top. The importance of this high and commanding position was seen by the Confederates, and the task of seizing and holding it was specially committed to Hood's men. The engagement here was most determined and furious, and in a short time it extended all along the line to the Peach Orchard, where it became specially severe. Against the angle at that place the fire of eleven batteries was concentrated, and at length the line was broken, the flanks of both wings being exposed. This disaster was irreparable, and a backward movement was unavoidable. Humphreys' division, threatened upon the flank and pressed upon the front by Wilcox, Wright and Perry, fell back slowly, fighting as it went. Back, back, inch by inch, fighting, falling, cheering, dying, the men retired. The enemy came on more furiously, halting at intervals and pouring in volleys that struck down the troops in scores. At length the enemy came within reach of Hancock's guns, when volley after volley was sent into their advancing ranks. Men fell as leaves fall in autumn before these terrible discharges. At length Perry's brigade, which occupied the center of the Confederate line, hesitated, then halted, and finally fled to the rear. Wright and

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Wilcox pressed on, and finally the former pierced the Federal line. It was a fearful crisis. The destiny of the Republic hung in the balance. But reinforcements sprang into the breach, and the foe was forced to relinquish his hold and fall back. Humphreys at length succeeded in reaching the crest of the hill and rallied his men behind the line formed by the Fifth Corps. He had lost two thousand men of the six thousand he had taken into the action.

Birney's line, also assailed in flank and front, was likewise compelled to recede. Sickles was wounded and Birney succeeded to the command. The batteries along the lane poured into the advancing foe torrents of iron hail, before which they quailed and faltered, but their officers could be seen through the smoke galloping and swinging their swords and urging their men forward. Crash! crash! with discharges deafening, terrible, the fire went on, and the enemy, reforming after each discharge, sprang forward as if to break through the lines by mere weight of numbers. Colonel McGilvery, commanding the artillery of the Federal Third Corps, seeing that a further backward movement was inevitable, directed the artillerymen to hold their position until he could place a new line of batteries, drawn from the reserve, in the rear as a rallying place. The men stood to their guns until the enemy pressed up to the very muzzles, when they were blown to pieces by the terrible discharges of grape and canister. Still on and on others pressed with demoniacal yells, climbing upon the limbers and shooting the horses. At length McGilvery's new line was established, and the men who had succeeded in maintaining their position commenced

THE VALLEY OF DEATH. (From a Photograph by Nessel,

[1913]



to withdraw their pieces. Some guns for want of horses had to be abandoned, but the cannoneers brought away the rammers, and the pieces could not be turned upon their slowly retreating owners. Others were withdrawn by their own rebound. A single shell from a Federal gun killed and wounded thirty Confederates out of a company of thirty-seven. At length, after the most determined resistance, Birney's line was forced back to near Trostle's house—about a quarter of a mile in front of Little Round Top—when new actors came upon the scene. Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps, composed of Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades, came to the assistance of the sorely pressed troops. After a gallant but short fight, these men were forced back across what has become historic—the Wheat Field. Next came Caldwell's division of the Second Corps. Into the Wheat Field they plunged, and after losing General Zook, Colonel Cross, and many other excellent men, were enfiladed and flanked and driven back. Then came Ayres of the Fifth Corps with his division of Regulars. These men were the heroes of many battles. They had been lying east of Little Round Top, and when the order to advance was given, they moved upon the double quick through the woods to the summit of the hill. Said one: "The whole scene was before them; the turmoil and commotion in the woods below,—Barnes going in and the shattered regiments of the Third Corps coming out. Some batteries were in retreat and others were taking new positions. They dashed down the hillside, became a little disorganized in crossing Plum Run, but formed again and went up the ridge among the boulders, disappeared in the woods, stayed a few minutes, and then, like

a shattered wreck upon the foaming sea, came drifting to the rear." An officer of the Seventeenth Regulars, who participated in this charge, says: "We went down the hill upon the run; it was like going down *into hell!* The



THE WHEAT FIELD, OR THE SCENE OF THE WHIRLPOOL OF THE BATTLE. This view is from the west, and shows the lane, Zook's Monument, and Round Top beyond the Valley of Death. (From a Photograph by Tipton.)

enemy were yelling like devils. Our men were falling back. It was terrible confusion: smoke, dust, the rattle of musketry, the roaring of cannon, and the bursting of shells." \*

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\*Charles C. Coffin in "Boys of '61," page 285.

The fighting in the Wheat Field has been called, "The Whirlpool of the Battle," because of the confusion, the surging backward and forward, the whirling round and round, which prevailed. It is said that regiments from three corps, and eight or ten brigades, were fighting there promiscuously. The Confederate lines were also in confusion. The ground in this field and in the Peach Orchard, after the battle, was drenched with human gore, and covered with the dead and wounded. Five hundred Confederates were found dead in the Wheat Field alone. With the probable exception of the Bloody Angle at Spottsylvania, on no other places of equal extent upon this continent has so much human blood been shed. The fighting here, and throughout the whole of the engagement of this afternoon, was not exceeded by any in all the previous history of war for stubborn pertinacity and destructiveness.

At about five o'clock P. M., while this terrible conflict was going on, and when the sound of the strife indicated that the National troops were being driven back, General Warren, Meade's Chief Engineer, rode to the signal station, which had been established upon Little Round Top, to get a better view of the field. Arriving there he saw at once the immense importance of that elevated position, and at the same time he beheld the long line of the enemy approaching it. Even then the advance of Hood enveloped the Union force below. They had skirted the base of the hill, clambered over the rocks by the "Devil's Den," and were making desperate efforts to seize the hill. Seeing the danger if the heights were taken, and knowing that once in the enemy's possession the whole line would be



untenable under the guns that would be planted there, Warren determined at all hazards to secure the position. Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps was just then going forward to the charge already referred to, and Warren with the utmost speed dashed down to Barnes and detached Vincent's brigade and hurried it up the hill. The men did not take time to load their pieces, but advanced with the bayonet and reached the crest in time to save it. But still on came the enemy. They were specially instructed to take that hill, and had pledged their word that they would do so, and were determined at all hazards to keep their pledge.\* The rocks around the heights were swarming with the defiant enemy and the contest soon became fearful. An eye-witness thus describes the scene:

“At the base of the hill was Barnes' division—all brave men—Michigan, Maine, Pennsylvania, and New York. Furiously the enemy threw themselves upon them. Round Top must be held if the battle were not to be lost. Loud, even above the deadly roar of the cannon, rang out the gallant Vincent's words, ‘Don't yield one inch!’ But, at the same instant, his inspiring voice was silenced. Down, from the exposed rock on which he had leaped, waving his sword in the air, he fell, bleeding, in the agonies of a shattered thigh. The whole division of Barnes stood as firm

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\*If, as is alleged by Southern writers, Lee and Longstreet had seen the importance of Little Round Top, and had given explicit orders to Hood to take and hold it, the subordinate officers seem to have been ignorant of it, as will be seen in the following statement by Colonel Swallow, who, in a letter to the writer, says:

“The Fifteenth Alabama Regiment, Hood's right regiment, *passed immediately over the summit of Round Top*. I had this not only from General Hood many times before he died, but I was on the ground in August, 1880, with Colonel Oats, who commanded that regiment. *But its value at the time was not appreciated.*”

as the ground they were determined to hold. The enemy came on yelling and running with the fixed bayonet charge which so few troops can withstand; but the patriots did not waver. It was not an attack in line, it was not a charge, it was a *melee*, a carnival of death. Men hewed each other's faces; they grappled in close embrace, murder to both; and all through it rained shot and shell from one hundred pieces of artillery along the ridge."\*

Another description of this terrific scene is thus given:

"Before Vincent fell he sent word to Barnes that the enemy were upon him in overwhelming numbers, and Hazlett's regular battery, supported by the One Hundred and Fortieth New York, under Colonel O'Rourke of Weed's brigade, was sent as a reinforcement. The battery was dragged with great labor to the crest of Little Round Top, and the One Hundred and Fortieth was posted on the slope on Vincent's right. They came upon the field just as the enemy, after failing to penetrate the center, had driven back the right. In advancing to this exposed position, Colonel O'Rourke, a brilliant young officer who had just graduated at the head of his class at West Point, was killed, and his men thrown into some confusion, but Vincent rallied the line and repulsed the assault. In doing so he exposed himself very much, and was soon killed by a Confederate sharp-shooter. General Weed, who was on the crest with a battery, was mortally wounded in the same way, and as Hazlett leaned over him to hear his last message, a fatal bullet struck him also and he dropped dead on the body of his chief."†

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\* Abbott's "Civil War," volume 11, page 407.

† General Doubleday's "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 169.



It will be of interest, after having descriptions of the terrific struggle for the possession of Round Top from Federal witnesses, to have a statement from a participant on the Confederate side. The following account is from an article contributed to the *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, of December 13th, 1884, by Colonel R. M. Powell, of the Texas brigade, Hood's division:

"Captain Gorce, of Longstreet's staff, after communicating orders to General Hood, rode down the line and remarked that the possession of Little Round Top—pointing to its rugged heights—was necessary. The Texans were expected to take it.

"'We'll do it!' was the reply.

"The signal was given and a sheet of flame sprang along the enemy's lines, hurling defiance at the advancing Confederates. Smoke from either side rolled in billows, meeting and writhing in conflict in the valley midway the engaging armies. Soon the artillery duel ceased and rattling musketry announced that the serious work had begun.

"On rushed the Texans, sweeping from their path cavalry which met them on the Emmittsburg pike, on through the 'Devil's Den,' blazing with infernal fire, crushing and destroying opposing forces at the foot of the mountain, onward and upward they struggled over precipitous rocks, where the enemy, lying in ambush, was surprised. The ascent was so difficult as to forbid the use of arms. At last, weary and almost exhausted, we reached the topmost defenses of the enemy. Now the conflict raged with wild ferocity. We were caught in a *cul-de-sac* or depressed basin, surrounded on three sides by projecting or shelving

rocks surmounted by a stone fence. Captain Cleveland, with a voice heard above the din of battle, offered a purse to the first man over the works. Sergeant Ross sprang forward to earn the reward when Cleveland ordered him back to his post, remarking: 'File closers not included.'

"Swing up the left, Major Rogers.'

"I'll do it, colonel, by jingo.'

"Just at the moment of these utterances there was a sudden cessation of firing, and the last words, 'by jingo,' were distinct and sounded so ludicrous as to excite laughter.

"The scene was strikingly like a devil's carnival. Another yell and desperate charge followed, succeeded by a sudden and an awful hush, just as if every one had been stricken with death. I raised my head from the ground, where I lay prostrated by a wound. The only moving man I saw was Sergeant Ross. He leisurely approached the enemy's line and taking his ramrod, which had been left leaning against a rock, he walked deliberately to the rear. I could see men lying around in every direction and in all attitudes. This desolate silence continued at least thirty minutes; to me it seemed like thirty hours. The twilight was fading into night before the victors came to gather spoils and take charge of the wounded. To their regret the wounded were the only ones who had crossed the enemy's works."

But the contest for the possession of Round Top was not yet ended. The enemy had stolen around and were pressing up between Little and Big Round Top. Colonel Chamberlain with the Twentieth Maine, who held the extreme left, seeing them coming until they moved past his flank, immediately extended his own left flank by forming

his men in single rank, and although greatly outnumbered he still maintained his position. He also called for assistance, but before reinforcements could reach him, Hood's men had gained the eastern side of the hill and were pressing him from that direction. The Twentieth Maine, in order to meet the enemy in this new direction, formed its line in the shape of the letter U, with the yelling and howling Confederates in front, on their left flank, and in their rear. It was a critical moment. The crisis had come. If Round Top was taken the battle was lost, and the defeat of the National army assured. But it was not lost. Help was at hand. The greater part of the Twelfth Corps had been summoned from the right, and leaving their breastworks they went upon the double-quick to the assistance of the sorely-pressed troops upon the left. Stannard's brigade of Vermonters, up to that time held in reserve, went with a wild run to strengthen Hancock's line. But the grand *finale* was left to the gallant sons of Pennsylvania. General S. Wiley Crawford, who commanded the third division of the Fifth Corps, composed of Pennsylvania Reserves, was ordered to drive back the foe. General Crawford immediately directed Colonel McCandless, commanding the first brigade, to form his command and charge down the slope. McCandless formed his brigade in two lines; the second massed on the first. General Crawford, in a few well chosen words, called upon his men to defend the soil of their native state, and then seizing the colors of one of the regiments, led the way against the foe. The first line, after advancing some distance, delivered two well-directed volleys upon the enemy, and then with terrific yells dashed upon them, and

bore the whole force headlong down the slope and across Plum Run. The enemy made a short resistance at a stone fence some little distance in advance, but were soon driven from it. This stone wall, thus gained, was held by the Reserves. This gallant charge turned the fortune of the day, but it was attended with the loss of many men, among whom was Colonel Frederick Taylor, commander of the Bucktail Regiment.

Upon the repulse of Hood's men from Round Top, General Longstreet, who had Hood's place—that general having been wounded—rode forward to reconnoitre, and seeing two brigades of the Sixth Corps, which had been called into position to meet any further efforts upon that eminence, became discouraged and abandoned the contest. Round Top was saved, and during the night it was fortified and transformed into a Gibraltar. Big Round Top, too, although not so important as its lesser companion, because artillery could not be taken to its summit, was also occupied and breastworks thrown up.

An incident occurred about the closing hour of this battle that deserves special mention. Stannard's Vermont brigade, although nearly all raw and inexperienced soldiers, accomplished prodigies of valor. After having successfully driven back Wright's brigade, it, at the instigation of General Hancock, retook from the enemy a battery of four guns, which had been abandoned in the neighborhood of Cordori's house. After bringing these guns in, pursued by the enemy, the brigade was reinforced by the Fourteenth Maine regiment, when it recharged upon the pursuing Confederates, and captured two more cannon and eighty-three prisoners. These were also brought into

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Hancock's lines amidst the cheers and congratulations of his men.

As has been said before, the numbers engaged in this battle on both sides have been greatly exaggerated. The truth of history requires that facts alone should be stated. If the reader would see a specimen of Confederate arithmetic, he has only to refer to General Longstreet's second contribution to the Annals of the War, pages 621, 622. General Longstreet states the number of his own forces engaged as *thirteen thousand*; and in a foot note to page 626, he says subsequent information showed that he had but about *twelve thousand*. The number of Federals opposed to him he places at *sixty-five thousand*, as follows: The Third Corps, eleven thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight; the Fifth Corps, ten thousand one hundred and thirty-six; Sixth Corps, fifteen thousand four hundred and eight; Pennsylvania Reserves, four thousand five hundred; Lockwood's Maryland brigade, two thousand five hundred, and detachments from the Twelfth and other corps, about twenty thousand. The fallacy of the general's estimate will be seen in this, that the Pennsylvania Reserves formed part of the Fifth Corps, while the Sixth and Twelfth corps did not participate in the engagement at all. Two brigades of the Sixth Corps were drawn up in line to meet any further attempt to take Round Top after the charge by the Reserves, and that part of the Twelfth Corps which was sent to assist the left arrived there too late to fire a single gun. Longstreet's force consisted of the four brigades of McLaws' division, four of Hood's, and three of Anderson's division of Hill's Corps. These eleven brigades were composed of *fifty regiments*. Now if General Longstreet's esti-

mate is correct, these regiments averaged but two hundred and forty men each, leaving out the artillery entirely. The fallacy of the general's statement is too apparent to require any further notice. The Federal forces engaged were the Third and Fifth corps, and Caldwell's division of the Second Corps, and probably a few others. The total number did not exceed thirty thousand. The advantage of numbers was undoubtedly with the Federals, but not to the extent that General Longstreet claims.

In this terrific engagement of about three hours, the losses on both the Federal and Confederate sides were very heavy. General Sickles was severely wounded, necessitating the amputation of one of his limbs above the knee. Generals Zook, Weed, and Vincent, and Colonels O'Rourke, Taylor, Cross, Ellis, and several other eminent officers were killed, and many others wounded. General Longstreet, in *Annals of the War*, page 426, admits a loss of four thousand five hundred and twenty-nine in his two divisions which were engaged. The losses of the three brigades of Anderson's division of Hill's Corps, which were also in the engagement, although not stated, were also very heavy. Among the distinguished officers who suffered upon the Confederate side, were General Barksdale, of Mississippi, killed, and Generals Hood, Semmes, and Heth, wounded.

As a striking illustration of the unnatural and fratricidal character of the strife, the following occurrence is related: In the yard attached to the house which stands in the angle of the road across the lane from the Peach Orchard—marked upon the maps of the battle field, "Wentz's House"—stood a Confederate battery, commanded by

Lieutenant Wentz. This officer was brought up in that house, and his parents, at the time of the battle, yet resided there. Some years before the outbreak of the war, he went South, and now came back in command of a Confederate battery, and by a singular coincidence, his battery was ordered into position in his father's yard. Before his guns opened upon the patriot troops, some of whom were his former neighbors and associates (in the Pennsylvania Reserves were a number of men whose homes were in sight of Round Top), this recreant son of Pennsylvania placed his aged parents in the cellar of their house to save them from the missiles of death which his guns would draw upon them.

It will be recollected that Lee's plan for the battle of this day contemplated a simultaneous attack upon both wings of the Federal army, while Hill, who occupied the Confederate center, was to throw his force in whatever direction he could accomplish the most. But for reasons which are as inexplicable as the delay of Longstreet in opening the battle upon the left, Ewell delayed his attack upon the right until Longstreet's assault had been repulsed, and the engagement upon that part of the field was over. And even when his assault was made, it was not made in concert, but disjointed and consequently unsupported.

It was nearly eight o'clock—one hour after the battle had ended on the Federal left—before Ewell's troops were in position to commence the attack. Previous to that time there had been some sharp firing along the center and right, but nothing like a general engagement had taken place. General Ewell had advanced Johnson's division, which had

been posted on the extreme left of the Confederate line, and had been directed to assail the right of Culp's Hill; and with the purpose of preventing reinforcements from being sent from the center, Early was directed to carry Cemetery Hill by assault. Rodes' division was to support Early in this attack. Pender's division of Hill's Corps was also expected to take part in the engagement, if circumstances made it necessary. Early moved forward, Hays' brigade on the right, Hoke's brigade on the left, and Gordon's in reserve. As these troops approached, the powerful batteries upon the hill were brought to bear upon them with fearful effect, and the left and center were compelled to fall back. The right, however, composed of the renowned fighters known as "The Louisiana Tigers," under the shelter of the houses of the town, were enabled to approach the Federal line, and after driving Von Gilsa's brigade, which it encountered at the foot of the hill, they made a sudden and irresistible rush for the summit. Weidrick's battery was captured, and two of Ricketts' guns were spiked. These captured guns were about being turned upon the Federal right, when a brigade of Schurz's troops fell upon the temporarily successful Tigers, and a most desperate hand to hand fight ensued, which for ferocity and determination had no parallel in all the war. The bayonet was freely used on both sides, and brains were beaten out with clubbed muskets, hand-spikes, cannon-rammers, and even stones. The troops occupying this hill had been addressed by their officers, and the importance of holding it to the last had been impressed upon them. At length General Hancock, seeing that no demonstration upon his lines was intended, and fearful that the



hill would be carried and his position flanked, and thus the army compelled to retreat, sent Carroll's brigade to the rescue. Carroll was joined by the One Hundred and Sixth Pennsylvania and some reinforcements from Schurz's division. These troops went in upon the enemy with a cheer, and finding that they were about to be overwhelmed, with no one coming to their assistance, the Confederates fell back. In their retreat they suffered fearfully from the Federal batteries, which poured into them tremendous discharges of grape and canister. The Louisiana Tigers had met their match, and Howard's Germans redeemed themselves from the reproach of Chancellorsville. This whole engagement lasted but a short time, but in that short space these noted fighters were sadly worsted. The severity of their losses may be seen in the fact that Hays' and Hoke's brigades, which were engaged in the assault, lost respectively three hundred and thirteen and three hundred and forty-five men. The Louisiana Tigers belonged to the former.

The failure of General Rodes to support Early in this attack is accounted for as follows: General Rodes, it will be remembered, occupied the town of Gettysburg from Early's right to Seminary Ridge. His explanation of his failure to be on hand in time is thus stated by himself:

"After I had conferred with General Early on my right and General Lane upon my left, and arranged to attack in concert, I proceeded at once to make the necessary preparations; but as I had to draw my troops out of the town by the flank, change the direction of the line of battle, and then traverse a distance of twelve or fourteen hundred yards, while General Early had to move only



THE ASSAULT UPON CEMETERY HILL. (From a Photograph by Tipton )

half that distance, without change of front, it resulted that, before I drove in the enemy's skirmishers, General Early had attacked and been compelled to withdraw."

Johnson's division, which had been sent to attack the Federal right, did not reach a position to become engaged until after Early had been repulsed on the center, and consequently he failed to receive any benefit from that attack. The part of the Federal line which he assailed had been weakened by the withdrawal of the greater part of the Twelfth Corps to assist the left in repelling Longstreet, and was held by Greene's brigade alone, and of course this attack upon this weakly defended position was successful. The few troops there, after a gallant resistance, were driven from their intrenchments before reinforcements could be sent to their assistance, and their works were occupied by the enemy. Had Johnson been aware of his exact position, and pushed on a few hundred yards further, he would have taken possession of the Baltimore pike, been in the rear of the Federal center, possibly capturing General Meade's head-quarters, and the ammunition trains, which were parked but a short distance below. But he did not know the full extent of the advantage he had gained, and sat down and waited for the morning, expecting then to push forward. How he succeeded in that purpose will be told in the ensuing chapter.

At about ten o'clock at night the series of battles of this day closed, and the situation was as follows: The Federal

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NOTE.—The illustration on the opposite page represents the scene upon East Cemetery Hill immediately upon the repulse of the Louisiana Tigers. General Meade and staff are seen to the right, upon Culp's Hill, and an officer is reporting the repulse of the enemy. The poplar tree to the left, amidst the smoke, stands upon the summit of the hill, near the Cemetery gate. The Christian Commission is also represented ministering to the wounded.

line was intact except upon the right where Johnson occupied a portion of their works. Longstreet on the left occupied the ground taken by Sickles, but the line as originally intended was intact and firmly held. Evidently no decided advantage had been gained by either of the contestants, but the results upon the whole were favorable to the Federals, and the Confederates were less exultant and boastful. General Lee, in his official report of this day's operations, says:

"After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in gaining possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed; and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would be able to dislodge the enemy. The battle closed at dark. These partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day."

General Longstreet, in *Annals of the War*, page 426, says that when he ordered his troops to withdraw from the contest, he "dispatched a courier to General Lee, informing him of the day's work." Colonel Freemantle, of the British army, who was with General Longstreet at the battle, says in his communication to *Blackwood's Magazine*, that the message Longstreet sent to Lee contained these words: "We are doing well." General Hill, in referring in his official report to the condition of Longstreet's right at the close of the battle, says: "Hood's right was held as in a vise." There seems to be a lack of unanimity among these distinguished officers, and we rather think General Hill was correct in his statement, for in the attack of the following day, Longstreet's right was held so tightly that he himself concedes that he could not use it.\*

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\* *Annals of the War*, page 627.

The mistakes made this day by the Confederates may be stated thus:

1. The delay of General Longstreet in getting his troops into position and commencing the attack.

Had the attack upon the left been made early in the day, when the lines were but weakly held, they would most certainly have been broken. Or had it been made soon after Lee decided upon his plan and issued his orders—say from eleven A. M. to two P. M., when the Sixth Corps arrived,—success might have been reasonably expected. It seems surprisingly strange that *ten hours*—say from six o'clock in the morning, when the divisions of McLaws and Hood could have been put in motion, until four o'clock in the afternoon, when the battle began—were consumed in marching *four miles* and getting ready for action. General Longstreet will have to offer more plausible reasons for this delay than any he has yet given, or history will hold him accountable for the failure of this day.

2. The failure of General Hill to support Wilcox, Perry, and Wright. These three brigades formed the left of Longstreet's line, and, after driving Humphreys back from his position along the Emmitsburg road, they not only followed him up, inflicting heavy losses upon him, but actually pierced the main Federal line. Perry's brigade, which occupied the center of these pursuing forces, was driven back by the fire from the main line, but Wright and Wilcox pressed on, and the former actually pierced the line and held it for a short time, but was compelled to abandon it because he was not supported. In this affair Wilcox claims to have captured twenty guns and Wright eight, but they were not able to hold them or take them

along in their retreat. Had these two brigades been promptly supported, as Lee's orders to Hill contemplated, the results to the National cause would have been disastrous indeed; but for want of support they were compelled to relinquish the hold they had gained.

A correspondent of the *Richmond Inquirer*, writing from Hagerstown on July 8th, 1863,—a few days after the battle—speaking of this failure to support Wilcox and Wright, says:

“We now had ‘the key’ to the enemy’s stronghold, and, apparently, the victory was won. McLaws and Hood had pushed their line well up the slope on the right; Wilcox had pierced the enemy’s main line on the summit of McPherson’s heights, capturing his heavy batteries, thus breaking the connection between the right and left wings. I said that, apparently, we had won the victory. It remains to be stated why our successes were not crowned with the important results which should have followed such heroic bravery. Although the order was peremptory that all of Anderson’s division should move into action simultaneously, Brigadier-General Posey, commanding a Mississippi brigade, and Brigadier-General Mahone, commanding a Virginia brigade, failed to advance. This failure of these two brigades to advance is assigned, as I learn upon inquiry, as the reason why Pender’s division of Hill’s corps did not advance—the order being, that the advance was to commence from the right, and be taken up along the whole line. Pender’s failure to advance caused the division on his left—Heth’s—to remain inactive. Here we have two whole divisions, and two brigades of another, standing idle spectators of one of the most des-

perate and important assaults that has ever been made on this continent—fifteen thousand or twenty thousand men resting on their arms, in plain view of a terrible battle, witnessing the mighty efforts of two little brigades (Wright's and Wilcox's, for Perry had fallen back overpowered,) contending with the heavy masses of Yankee infantry, and subject to a most deadly fire from the enemy's heavy artillery, without a single effort to aid them in the assault, or to assist them when the heights were carried."

General Hill's failure to support these two brigades is as inexplicable as Longstreet's tardiness.

3. The failure to send into the fight Pickett's division. Pickett reached the field about three o'clock, and had his division been thrown into the engagement about six o'clock, when the result seemed to be so doubtful, it might have enabled Longstreet to drive the Federals from their position and turn their left. This would have been fatal to them and insured their defeat. In the event that Pickett had been thus used, the only troops that could have been brought against him would have been the Sixth Corps. This corps had only reached the field, after a forced march of thirty-five miles, at two o'clock, and were, like Pickett's men, tired and needing rest. Pickett's division, however, had only marched twenty-five miles, and had not lost the previous night's rest, as did Sedgwick's men, who had been upon the road continuously since seven o'clock the previous evening. History abounds with instances in which wearied troops, after long and hard marching, have been thrown immediately into action and turned the tide of battle, and, in some instances, changed the course of history. Dessaix, after a long and forced march, from early morning until



four o'clock in the afternoon, went immediately into action and changed Napoleon's defeat into the splendid victory of Marengo. Blucher reached the field of Waterloo at six o'clock in the evening from a long and fatiguing march, and changed the tide of battle and saved the allied armies of Europe from complete overthrow. And Claudius Nero, after marching day and night, went right into battle, overthrew the Carthaginians and saved Rome. Pickett, however, was not used because of the wearied condition of his men.

4. The failure of General Ewell to attack the Federal center and right simultaneously with Longstreet's attack upon the left.

Instead of opening his attack upon Cemetery and Culp's hills at the same time that Longstreet attacked upon the left (about four o'clock P. M.), General Ewell was not ready for his advance until nearly dusk, or about eight P. M., when the battle there was entirely over. If Longstreet is chargeable with inexcusable tardiness in getting his troops into position, when they had four miles to march from the vicinity of Marsh Creek, where they tarried over night, what must be thought of General Ewell's failure to be ready to advance to the assault at the same time that the former did, when his troops were resting within their lines all through the day and night previous? And as in the case of the former, so with the latter, the excuses and causes assigned are entirely inadequate and unsatisfactory. General Longstreet, in retaliation for Ewell's complaints and charges against him touching this matter of his tardiness, says that the real cause of the latter's failure to commence the attack at the same time he did was, that he had



broken his lines by sending off two of his brigades on some duty up the York road. \*

5. The inexplicable folly of General Early in the posting of his troops for the assault on Cemetery Hill. Colonel Swallow, in his letter to the writer, elsewhere referred to, says:

"The line, which was formed in the morning, was in the following order: The right of Early's division was held by Gordon, the center by Hays, and the left by Smith. But this was changed in the attack that followed. Early removed Gordon to a position behind the railroad running to Hanover, a short distance from the York pike. Smith's brigade was sent to Stuart's cavalry. This foolish move on the part of Early broke our line of battle. The attack was really made on Cemetery Hill, in the evening of the 2d, by Hays' and Hoke's brigades, while Gordon was in *reserve* on the north side of the railroad, and Smith's brigade was guarding the York pike for Stuart's cavalry. Although upon General Rodes' staff, I had been detached at Hagerstown by order of General Ewell to accompany Early's division to Gettysburg and York, by reason of my familiarity with the country, the roads, cross-roads, and many of the people, especially in and about York. In the evening, just before the attack upon Cemetery Hill was ordered, I was sent by General Hays to Rodes to ask him to rally on our division and assist us in the attack. I found my old commander completely choked up in the narrow streets of the town with his division, and consequently he could not aid us."

General Early would do well to satisfactorily explain his

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\* General Longstreet, in *Annals of the War*, page 428.

reasons for this breaking of his line *at such a critical time*, before his criticisms of General Longstreet are admissible. He knew that he was expected to assault the Federal center simultaneously with Longstreet's assault on the left, and he had every reason to believe that that assault might be made at any moment, and yet, notwithstanding these weighty considerations, he broke his line, and was unprepared to act simultaneously, and when he did act it was not done with sufficient force. Had the line as originally formed been intact, and the assault been made by four brigades instead of but two, the result might have been far different from what it was. If Rodes had not gotten into confusion, but assisted Early in the assault, the results might have been still more disastrous to the Federals. And had Rodes, Early, and Johnson all attacked simultaneously, when the assault was made, even though they did not act in concert with Longstreet on the other flank, success would have been highly probable. The whole affair, it will be seen, was badly managed and sadly disjointed. There was an utter want of co-operation and harmony in the movements of the several commands, and for these causes no decisive results were achieved:

6. Another very serious failure of the Confederates was in not taking advantage of the position Johnson had gained within the Federal lines upon their right. The position won was of immense importance. Its capture was an open breach in the line of defense, through which troops might have been passed in force, and the stronghold on Cemetery Hill rendered untenable. General Ewell certainly was not aware of the importance of this position, or he undoubtedly would have passed Rodes' division

through the gap. Had he done so the consequences might have been terribly disastrous to the Federals. Says an eminent Southern writer, "If any man can answer truly and give the reason why the position gained by Ewell's Corps, under General Johnson, on Thursday night, was not followed up and reinforced, he will give one of the strongest reasons why Lee lost Gettysburg."

Is it not clear, then, that the confusion in the counsels of the Confederate chieftains, which was so conspicuous in their failure to follow up the advantages which they gained in the first day's fight, by carrying and occupying both Cemetery and Culp's hills, still adhered to them, and caused them to blunder on until their final defeat?

But the mistakes of that day were not all upon the Confederate side. The Federal commanders committed some grave errors, which might have proved fatal to the National cause; and fidelity to the truth of history requires that they be stated. These errors were as follows:

1. General Sickles certainly erred in posting his corps upon the advanced position he chose. Suppose that Hood, instead of attacking him upon the line he was expected to take, had flanked him and passed around and below Big Round Top, and threatened an attack from that direction, or interrupted the Federal communications, was not the Sixth Corps, numbering fifteen thousand men, sufficiently able to have attended to him? And was not that corps in precisely the right place—in reserve behind Round Top—to meet such an emergency as that? And suppose, too, that Longstreet had occupied the high ground, which Sickles supposed would render the line on the lower ground in the rear untenable, that would

not have insured him the advantage which Sickles feared its possession would give. General Longstreet occupied that very ground after he drove Sickles from it, and yet he could not use it to much advantage in the battle of the third day.

2. General Meade should have known before three o'clock in the afternoon just where Sickles' line was. Especially is this true when he, as he himself says, "was in doubt concerning his left." He had ample time—from seven o'clock in the morning when the last of the Third Corps reached the field—to have seen to this matter. It would seem that a judicious commander would desire personally to see after so important a matter as a flank of his army in the presence of a powerful foe.

3. The failure to perceive the importance of, and properly occupy Little Round Top, until it was accidentally seen and occupied, is one of the inexplicable wonders of that day. Hancock and Geary discovered its immense importance and did all they could to occupy and hold it, but their efforts seem not to have been seconded by either General Meade or Sickles. The Confederates perceived the importance of this hill, and explicit instructions were given the men to seize and hold it at all hazards; but the discovery of its importance by the Federal commanders, especially by those whose special duty it was to see after such things, seems to have been entirely accidental. Nay, worse than this: that position was rejected by Sickles as of no account. It seems that General Meade directed General Sickles to occupy Little Round Top "if it was practicable to occupy it," and he reported that "There is no position there." And yet that hill was, as is

universally admitted, the key to the whole position, and the issue of the battle, and probably the destiny of the government depended upon its occupation. General Longstreet says:

“The importance of Round Top as a *point d'appui* was not appreciated until my attack. General Meade seems to have alluded to it as a point to be occupied ‘if practicable,’ but in such slighting manner as to show that he did not deem it of great importance. So it was occupied by an inadequate force. As our battle progressed, pushing the Federals back from point to point, subordinate officers and soldiers, seeking shelter as birds fly to cover in a tempest, found behind the large boulders of its rock-bound sides, not only protection, but rallying points. These reinforcements to the troops already there, checked our advance on the right, and some superior officers, arriving just then, divined from effect the cause, and threw a force upon Round Top that transformed it, as if by magic, into a Gibraltar.”\*

4. It was undoubtedly an error to withdraw the Twelfth Corps from so important a position as the right, thereby exposing it to easy capture. Reinforcements should have been called from the Sixth Corps, which was in reserve within convenient distance. The weakening of the line on the right cost hundreds of precious lives the following day.

Such were undoubtedly some of the mistakes which were made on the memorable day under consideration. The God of Nations, however, overruled all, and gave victory to the right. He did not intend that the Republic should be overthrown.

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\*Annals of the War, page 425.

General Meade had made his head-quarters in a small frame house, sixteen by twenty feet, on the western brow of Cemetery Ridge, near the center and along side the Taneytown road. The situation was such that it seemed to be sheltered from exposure, and from which the commander in chief could easily communicate with all parts



GENERAL MEADE'S HEAD-QUARTERS.

From a Photograph by Bidel.

of his lines. In that unpretentious cottage, in the evening after the close of the bloody battles of this day, the Union chieftains were assembled. General Meade had called them together to take into consideration the situation and advise him what was best to do. The questions submitted to them were:

*First.* Under existing circumstances is it advisable for

this army to remain in its present position, or to retire to another nearer its base of supplies?

*Second.* It being determined to remain in its present position, shall the army attack or wait the attack of the enemy?

*Third.* If we wait attack, how long?

To these momentous questions the following answers were given, as recorded by General Butterfield, Meade's chief of staff:

GENERAL GIBBON. — *First*, correct the position of the army, but would not retreat; *second*, in no condition to attack the enemy; *third*, until the enemy moves.

GENERAL NEWTON. — *First*, correct the position of the army, but would not retreat; *second*, by all means not attack; *third*, if we wait it will give them a chance to cut our line.

GENERAL HANCOCK. — *First*, rectify position without moving so as to give up the field; *second*, not attack unless our communications are cut; *third*, can not wait long, can not be idle.

GENERAL HOWARD. — *First*, remain; *second*, wait attack until four P. M. to-morrow; *third*, if the enemy do not attack, attack them.

GENERAL SEDGWICK. — *First*, remain; *second*, wait attack; *third*, at least one day.

GENERAL WILLIAMS. — *First*, stay; *second*, wait attack; *third*, one day.

GENERAL BIRNEY. — Same as General Williams.

GENERAL SYKES. — Same as General Williams.

GENERAL SLOCUM. — Stay and fight it out.

Of the corps commanders, two, it will be seen, were ab-



sent from this meeting. Reynolds was dead, and his honored remains were at his former home at Lancaster, Pennsylvania; and Sickles was undergoing the amputation of one of his legs in a neighboring hospital.

This council was held after the desperate and bloody battles of the two previous days, the first of which had been a disaster, and the second without material advantage to the Union army. It was reasonable to assume that as the results so far had been rather in favor of the Confederates, that they would repeat their attacks the next day, and that their most desperate and deadly blow was yet to be delivered! With such momentous results hanging over him, with the destiny of a nation in his keeping, it was but prudent and right that General Meade should call together the men upon whom he would have to depend, and ascertain their views and secure their counsel. And it was right too that he should have every preparation made to carry into immediate execution the decision they arrived at. Hence he came to this council with an order to retire to the line at Pipe Creek previously selected, prepared by his chief of staff, General Butterfield, to be used only in case the reports from his corps commanders made evident the necessity of changing the field. This was a wise precaution, but General Meade has been unjustly criticised for it, and his enemies have tried to make it appear that he was timid and undecided. But when this council was held, and the universal sentiment was to remain and meet the issue upon that field, he at once decided to remain at Gettysburg and fight the battle there, which decided the fate of the Confederacy.

Before closing this chapter it will interest the reader to



take a look into General Lee's head-quarters in the night after this day's series of battles. A Southern officer, who was present there, describes the scene in the *Southern Bivouac*. He says:

"About ten o'clock at night of Thursday, July 2d, while conversing with General Rodes, the writer received a note from Rev. Dr. Pryor, a chaplain in Ewell's Corps, informing me that I was wanted at army head-quarters. These were situated near the Chambersburg pike. In riding through the town it was filled with Confederates, who, soldier-like, were busy in preparing their meals all along the streets. They appeared to be in the highest spirits. On reaching army head-quarters it was crowded with staff officers from all quarters of the field. All seemed gratified with the results of the day: certainly nobody looked gloomy or despondent. Pickett's division had arrived from Chambersburg and was posted in line. About eleven P. M. all faces were made cheerful and all hearts made glad by the arrival at head-quarters of Generals J. E. B. Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee. General A. P. Hill came in, shaking hands with his friends, and as soon as the commanding general heard the voice of General Hill he moved through the crowd and, shaking Hill by the hand, said, 'It is all well, General, everything is all well;' and taking Hill aside spoke to him privately for nearly a quarter of an hour.

"The commanding general looked well. He was all himself, and never appeared to better advantage. This was the first time the writer had seen General Lee since the night of the battle at Beverly's Ford, June 9th. It was one o'clock before Colonel Marshall announced my name,

when General Lee arose and said, 'I am expecting General Imboden in the morning, and I am desirous to send to Virginia at once as many of our wounded as possible. Doctor Pryor has told me that you and Captain Brockenborough are acquainted with the fords of the upper Potomac, and I want you both to report to General Imboden at ten o'clock to-morrow. Colonel Taylor will issue the necessary orders.' I informed the commanding general that Doctor Pryor was mistaken, that neither I nor Brockenborough knew anything of these fords, except the ones at Shepherdstown and Williamsport; that we were both well acquainted with the fords of the Rappahannock, but not of the Potomac; that Mr. Logan, of Winchester, who was in Rodes' command, was well informed on the subject. Turning quickly around, the commanding general said, 'Hunt up Mr. Logan and send him to me at once.' He was full of business, and his strong mind and intellectual energies were taxed to their utmost. The fences all around the head-quarters were lined with soldiers who had participated in the struggle of the day, relating their experiences. The writer remained with these until the morning sun appeared on Friday, July 3d, when he returned to his command."





Wm. F. Hancock  
Major General U. S. Army

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971) using a Shimadzu 1010 spectrophotometer. The concentration of chlorophyll was expressed in  $\mu\text{g mL}^{-1}$  of the sample.

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## CHAPTER VIII.

THE THIRD DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG — FRIDAY,  
JULY 3D, 1863.

**D**URING the night succeeding the terrible battles which have been described in the previous chapter, there were some readjustments made in the lines preparatory to the renewal of the conflict on the succeeding day. Pickett's division of Longstreet's Corps, which, it will be remembered, had been left in the vicinity of Chambersburg to protect the rear, left its encampment early on Thursday morning and reached the field of battle about three o'clock in the afternoon. This division was placed to the left of Anderson and to the right of Heth, and directly opposite to the Federal left center, where the Second Corps under Hancock was stationed. Johnson's division, which had gained a foothold within the line upon the Federal right, was reinforced with Daniel's and O'Neill's brigades of Rodes' division. This was done so as to be ready, by the dawn of day, to improve the advantage gained, and, if possible, obtain complete possession of Culp's Hill and the Baltimore pike. Thus massed, General Ewell designed to throw his whole force upon the Federal right, while Longstreet with his newly arrived division, assisted by large detachments from Hill's Corps, was to perform a similar work upon the left

center. Stuart's cavalry, which had only reached the field from its erratic course around the Federal army about four o'clock in the afternoon of the day previous, was placed near the Confederate left. The Federal forces were not inactive during the night. Round Top had been made invulnerable, and its batteries of heavy artillery had complete control of the field. The Federal cavalry, too, relieved from the pursuit of Stuart, had reached the field, and were judiciously posted upon the respective flanks. But the point which required the first and most careful attention was the right. Johnson's position there endangered the safety of the whole army, and General Slocum was directed to storm his intrenchments. Geary's division, which had been detached the evening before to assist the sorely pressed left, returned about midnight and joined Green who had remained. Shaler's and Wheaton's brigades of the Sixth Corps and Lockwood's Maryland brigade, were sent to reinforce the Twelfth. Batteries of artillery were established on all prominent points, and all possible preparations were made to renew the fight at the break of day. General Slocum, seconded by Geary, and others, was determined to drive back the Confederates at all hazards. General Ewell, too, was equally determined, not only to hold the position he had gained, but to push his advantage and if possible get into the rear of the Federal right center. The immense importance of the occasion was now understood by both the contending parties, and both were determined to do their utmost in the approaching struggle.

As soon as objects could be discerned in the early daylight of the morning, the Federal batteries opened upon



the enemy. As Johnson, on account of the nature of the ground, had not been able to bring his artillery with him, he was unable to reply, and he determined at once to charge in the hope of driving the Federal troops, and securing a better position upon higher ground. His men—the old Stonewall brigade leading—rushed forward, but were bravely met by Kane's brigade of Geary's division. In a few minutes the battle became general along the whole of Slocum's line, and for six hours it raged most furiously. The fighting at this point, like that of the afternoon preceding upon the left, was regarded as the most obstinate and deadly of the war. With fiendish yell and mad contempt of death, the enemy time and again hurled his solid masses against the Federal lines, but they stood like a wall of devouring fire. At length, at about ten A. M., Johnson was compelled to fall back before a charge by Geary's division. Slowly, reluctantly, inch by inch, fighting, falling, dying, the Confederates were pressed back out of the breast-works, which they had temporarily occupied, and up to Rock Creek. As they retreated and came under fire of the Federal batteries, they were mercilessly cut down by repeated and tremendous discharges of grape and canister. Nothing during the war exceeded this engagement in carnage. The slain were lying literally in heaps. In front of Geary's position were more Confederate dead than the entire list of casualties in the whole of the Twelfth Corps. Human beings, mangled and torn, in every manner, from a single shot through the body or head to bodies torn to pieces by exploding shells, were everywhere. The Stonewall Brigade, like the Louisiana Tigers the evening before, had met their match. Their

reputation for invincible courage was unimpeached, but the stone-wall this time stood in their way, and they had to yield to the inevitable. At eleven o'clock the battle ceased, and the Federal line was once more intact.\*

General Longstreet, who, it will be remembered, did not favor an attack upon the Federal position, but counseled Lee to move around by the left and get between them and Washington, and thereby compel General Meade to march out and meet him in the plain, sought at an early hour in the morning to see his commander and, if possible, have him adopt this plan. General Longstreet says of this interview: "I did not see General Lee that night. On the next morning he came to see me, and, fearing that he was still in his disposition to attack, I tried to anticipate him by saying: 'General, I have had my scouts out all night, and I find that you still have an excellent opportunity to move around to the right of Meade's army, and maneuver him to attacking us.' He replied, pointing with his fist at Cemetery Hill, 'The enemy is there, and I am going to strike him.' I felt that it was my duty to express my convictions. I said: 'General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as any one, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arrayed for battle can take that position,' pointing to Cemetery Hill. General Lee, in reply to this, ordered me

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\*The severity of this engagement upon the Federal right may be seen in the fact, that Johnson's division, which was mainly engaged, lost 1,188 in killed, wounded, and missing. The Twelfth Corps, which opposed Johnson, lost 1,081 men. Other troops on both sides who were also engaged, lost as heavily in proportion.

to prepare Pickett's division for the attack. I should not have been so urgent had I not foreseen the hopelessness of the proposed assault. I felt that I must say a word against the sacrifice of my men; and then I felt that my record was such that General Lee would or could not misconstrue my motives. I said no more, however, but turned away. The plan of assault was as follows: Our artillery was to be massed in a wood, from which Pickett was to charge, and it was to pour a continuous fire upon the enemy. Under cover of this fire, and supported by it, Pickett was to charge."

General Lee, having now attacked both flanks of the Federal army, and failed in both, had but two alternatives,—either to attack the center, or withdraw his forces. He chose the former, and after riding along his line with Longstreet, and reconnoitering and planning, at length committed to that general the execution of his plan. Pickett's division, which was supposed to be the flower of his army, had only reached the field the afternoon before, and had not therefore been engaged. With this choice division of well-tried and veteran troops, supported by others whom we shall mention hereafter, it was proposed to pierce the Federal left center. Preparatory, however, to this great charge, the artillery was to concentrate its fire upon Cemetery Hill with a view to dismount the guns, demoralize the men, and thereby prepare the way for the assault. General Alexander, Longstreet's chief of artillery, massed several batteries close together on the elevated ground near the Peach Orchard, (south of the Emmittsburg road,) which had been taken from Sickles the day before. All along the north side of the Emmittsburg

road, extending towards Gettysburg, as far as Codori's house, many batteries were placed. It was on this line that the celebrated Washington artillery, under Eshelman, was posted, while Deering's artillery was still further to the left of the line toward the town. All along the top of Seminary Ridge, partly concealed by a skirt of woods, and still further on in a circle, all around the ridge to the Harrisburg road, batteries upon batteries were placed, ready to join in the horrid din and hurl their missiles of destruction upon the Federals. It is said that General Alexander, in his official report, shows the number of pieces in position to have been nearly two hundred, of which about one hundred and forty were in and around the Confederate center, while the remaining sixty pieces were on the right and left of the line. This number is probably too large. Federal authorities place the number at about one hundred and twenty.

Let us now, before proceeding to detail the greatest and most momentous struggle that ever occurred upon the American continent, pay a visit to General Meade's headquarters and see what is transpiring there, and what preparations are being made for the great event. Orderlies were gathered about the door. Others were continually coming in with reports. Signal officers were sending in reports telegraphed from signal stations. The staff were about the commanding general, engaged in earnest consultation. The plan of the enemy was well understood, and the gravity of the situation was duly appreciated. There was no fear, but a solemn determination to resist the expected shock, and overcome at all hazards. Such, too, was the spirit which prevailed throughout the entire

army. It was the determination of all to repulse the attack or die in the effort.

From eleven o'clock, when the battle ceased upon the right, until one P. M. silence prevailed. It was the solemn pause of preparation, as if both sides were nerving for the last, the supreme effort. At length at precisely seven minutes past one o'clock, the awful silence was broken by a signal gun upon Seminary Ridge. This was immediately followed by the terrific roar of one hundred and twenty guns, the fire of which was concentrated upon that part of the line commanded by General Hancock. This command comprised the First, Second, Third, and Eleventh Corps. Owing to the convex shape of the Federal line, but eighty guns could be placed to answer the Confederate fire. These, however, belched forth defiance and death. This horrid din continued for nearly two hours, and was not exceeded by anything like it that ever occurred upon this continent, and it may be upon the entire globe.\* The very heavens seemed to be rent asunder by a succession of crashing sounds as if the artillery of the skies were let loose upon earth. The air was filled with whizzing, screaming, bursting shells, which sent many a mortal to his last account. A single shell which exploded in the Cemetery, killed and wounded twenty-seven men in one regiment. Two Federal batteries were demolished, and eleven caissons blown up. When the smoke from these explosions was seen by the Confederates, their shouts and

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\* It may surprise the reader to learn that the sound of this cannonading was heard *one hundred and forty miles* from Gettysburg. This fact will be established in Chapter XI., where undoubted testimony will be given, together with philosophical explanations by Professors Spencer F. Baird, of the Smithsonian Institute, and A. B. Johnson, of the United States Light-House Board.

yells of exultation could at times be heard above the roar of the guns. Horses were blown to pieces, trees were riddled and cut down, rocks were splintered sending their fragments in all directions, tombstones and iron railing in the Cemetery were shivered, the ground was scored and furrowed, and men were killed, but the batteries were not silenced. The infantry sought shelter behind ledges and stone fences, but the artillerists at the guns suffered most. The destruction on both sides was terrible, but the Federals were damaged most, because of the concentration of the enemy's fire and their superior number of guns.

Mr. Wilkinson, of the New York *Tribune*, who was at General Meade's head-quarters, thus describes the awful scene:

"In the shadow cast by the tiny farm house, sixteen by twenty, which General Meade had made his head-quarters, lay wearied staff officers and tired correspondents. There was not wanting to the peacefulness of the scene the singing of a bird, which had a nest in a peach tree within the tiny yard of the whitewashed cottage. In the midst of its warbling a shell screamed over the house, instantly followed by another, and another, and in a moment the air was full of the most complete artillery prelude to an infantry battle that was ever exhibited. Every size and form of shell known to British and American gunnery shrieked, whirled, moaned, whistled, and wrathfully fluttered over our ground. As many as six in a second, constantly two in a second, bursting and screaming over and around the head-quarters, made a very hell of fire that amazed the oldest officers. They burst in the yard—burst next to the fence on both sides, garnished as usual with

the hitched horses of aides and orderlies. The fastened animals reared and plunged with terror. Then one fell, then another—sixteen lay dead and mangled before the fire ceased, still fastened by their halters, which gave the expression of being wickedly tied up to die painfully. These brute victims of a cruel war touched all hearts. Through the midst of the storm of screaming and exploding shells an ambulance, driven by its frenzied conductor at full speed, presented to all of us the marvelous spectacle of a horse going rapidly on three legs. A hinder one had been shot off at the hock. A shell tore up the little step at the head-quarters cottage, and ripped bags of oats as with a knife. Another soon carried off one of its two pillars. Soon a spherical case burst opposite the open door—another ripped through the low garret. The remaining pillar went almost immediately to the howl of a fixed shot that Whitworth must have made. During this fire the horses at twenty and thirty feet distant were receiving their death, and soldiers in Federal blue were torn to pieces in the road, and died with the peculiar yells that blend the extorted cry of pain with horror and despair. Not an orderly, not an ambulance, not a straggler was to be seen upon the field swept by this tempest of orchestral death, thirty minutes after it commenced. Were not one hundred and twenty pieces of artillery trying to cut from the field every battery we had in position to resist their proposed infantry attack, and to sweep away the slight defenses behind which our infantry were waiting? Forty minutes—fifty minutes—counted watches that ran, O so languidly! Shells through the two lower rooms. A shell into the chimney that did not explode. Shells in the yard.

The air thicker and fuller, and more deafening with the howling and whirring of these infernal missiles. The chief of staff struck — Seth Williams — loved and respected through the army, separated from instant death by two inches of space vertically measured. An aid bored with a fragment of iron through the bone of the arm. And the time measured on the sluggish watches was one hour and forty minutes.”

It will be of interest to know what was transpiring during this time within the Confederate lines. The following accounts by Confederate officers will be read with interest. Colonel W. H. Swallow, in the *Southern Bivouac*, February, 1886, says:

“It was on the western slope of Seminary Ridge and between it and Willoughby Run that the assaulting column was formed. \* \* \* Immediately after the column was formed Generals Lee, Longstreet, and Pickett rode along the lines several times inspecting the different alignments. They then rode aside and had an earnest and animated conversation together. After this conversation all three again rode along the column and then retired together. Their whole conduct showed in a manner not to be mistaken, how extremely dangerous and full of doubt these officers regarded the proposed assault. As General Lee rode away he looked mournfully at the column and muttered more to himself than to others, ‘The attack must succeed.’”

The following graphic account by Captain H. T. Owen, of the Eighteenth Virginia regiment, written for the *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, of March 26th, 1881, reveals the effect of the Federal cannonade upon the Confederate



lines. Captain Owen says: "On Friday morning, July 3d, Pickett's division left its bivouac at dawn of day and moving around to the right reached the position assigned it in the ravine behind Seminary Ridge soon after six o'clock. Long dark lines of infantry were massed along the bottoms, concealed from the enemy's view, and orders were given 'to lie down and keep still to avoid attracting the attention of the enemy.' About eight o'clock Generals Lee, Longstreet and Pickett, in company, rode slowly along up and down in front of the long lines of prostrate infantry, viewing them closely and critically as they rode along. They were not greeted with the usual cheers, as orders had preceded them forbidding this, but the men voluntarily rose up and stood in line with uncovered heads and hats held aloft while their chieftains rode by. This review over, strong detachments were thrown forward to support the artillery stationed along the crest of Oak Ridge and Seminary Ridge, composed of about one hundred and twenty cannon, and stretching along the brow of these ridges for a mile. The supporting detachments were placed about a hundred yards in the rear of this line of batteries and lay down in the tall grass under a cloudless sky and with a bright July sun pouring its scorching rays almost vertically upon them for five long, weary hours, while they listened and watched in painful suspense for some sound or some movement to break that profound stillness which rested over the vast battle-field and depressed the spirits like a dreadful nightmare. At one o'clock this awful stillness was suddenly broken and the men startled by the discharge of a couple of signal guns fired in quick succession, followed by a silence of half a minute, and then, while their echo

was yet rolling along the distant defiles and mountain gorges, an uproar began as wonderful as had been the previous silence. General Lee's one hundred and twenty guns opened at once with a crash and thunder sound that shook the hills for miles around from crest to base, and were instantly replied to by about eighty guns ranged by General Meade along the front of Cemetery Ridge, about one mile in front.

"No sound of roaring waters, nor wind, nor thunder, nor of these combined, ever equaled the tremendous uproar, and no command, no order, no sound of voice, could be heard at all above the ceaseless din of thousands of shrieking shot and shell falling thick and fast on every side and bursting with terrific explosions, while others by thousands came bounding, skipping, racing and chasing each other over the hill and down the slope, hissing, scoffing, spitting and moaning like relentless demons as they dashed through the detachments and went onward to crash among the reserves far back in the rear. The bursting shell in mid-heaven or upon the earth scattered death wherever its fragments flew, and the shrill shot over head or bounding madly across the field would both alike dip through a line of prostrate men and tear away with a wail to the rear, leaving a wide track of blood behind. The air was filled with clouds of dust and volumes of sulphurous, suffocating smoke rolled up white and bluish-gray like frightful storm clouds, and hung like a pall over the field, through the rifts and rents of which the sun with dim light looked down upon the ghastly scene.

"After two hours the firing suddenly ceased, and silence again rested for half an hour over the battle-field, during

which time the Confederates were rapidly forming an attacking column just below the brow of Seminary Ridge. Long double lines of infantry came pouring out of the woods and bottoms, across ravines and little valleys, hurrying on to the positions assigned them in the column. Two separate lines of double ranks were formed a hundred yards apart, and in the center of the column was placed the division of Pickett, said to be 'the flower of Lee's army,'—4,481 privates, 244 company officers, 32 field officers, and four general officers, making 4,761 all told. In the front line were placed Kemper's and Garnett's brigades side by side, covered by Armistead's brigade in the second line."

Before describing the great assault which followed this terrible artillery prelude, the reader's attention is specially called to the illustration given on the next page, which shows the ground over which the assaulting columns moved, as well as the point where the Federal line was pierced. The Federal line from the center to its extreme left was from the north-east to the south-west; but owing to a curve toward the west at the point where this view was taken, the prospect is *south-west*. The *inside* of the line, and the breast-works of stone which yet remain, are here seen. The house and barn to the right are Codori's. They stand beside the Emmittsburg road, which is seen running south-westwardly. This house marked about the center of the assaulting column. The Confederate position from which the columns of assault proceeded, was about a half mile further to the right of this house, which will be *to the west*. The *umbrella-shaped tree* by the side of the tablet on the left, which yet remains, was the ob-



**THE HIGH WATER-MARK OF THE REBELLION, OR THE POINT AT WHICH THE REBELLION RECEIVED ITS DEATH-WOUND.**  
[170]  
From a Photograph by Tipton.

jective point at which General Pickett directed his men to aim, and it was at this place that the Confederates pierced the Federal line. There the Confederate General Armistead received his mortal wound, and a little to the right Hancock was wounded. This place, by general consent, has been designated the *High water-mark of the Rebellion*. There it reached its highest—its supreme effort, and there it received its death-wound.

The Federal commanders well understood what the object of this tremendous fire was, and calmly prepared to meet it. After it had continued about an hour and a half, the artillerists were ordered to slacken their fire so as to give their guns time to cool for the final effort, as well as to induce the enemy to suppose that he had silenced them, and thus bring on the expected attack sooner.\* The ruse succeeded, and soon the enemy in three massive lines were seen to emerge from the wooded crest of Seminary Ridge, and to move steadily over the intervening space towards the Federal left center. This assaulting force consisted of Pickett's division of Longstreet's Corps, Heth's division of Hill's Corps,—under the temporary command of General Pettigrew, Heth having been wounded,—and the brigades of Wilcox, Lane and Scales, also of Hill's Corps, the whole amounting to from twelve

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\* Another cause for the cessation of the Federal fire has been given, which is, that General Warren, Meade's chief engineer, who was holding a position on Round Top with some of the signal corps, constructed a temporary telegraph from the heights of the mountain to Meade's head-quarters. A little after two o'clock he notified General Meade that he was doing the enemy but little injury, and that he was filling the valley between the two ridges with smoke, under cover of which the Confederates would make their expected assault. He also advised him to discontinue the firing and get ready for the assault. By Meade's permission General Hunt, the chief of artillery, arrested the firing all along the line.

to fifteen thousand men.\* Two brigades of Pickett's division formed the front, and one in the second line as a support, with the brigade of Wilcox in the rear of the right, to protect that flank. Heth's division moved on Pickett's left, and Lane and Scales were placed in the rear of its right. Its left was without reserve or support. While these lines were being formed General Meade moved his head-quarters from its exposed position, to Power's Hill, where General Slocum was already established. General Hunt also took advantage of the opportunity to withdraw such of the guns as had been injured by the

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\* Colonel W. H. Swallow, who participated in the battle of Gettysburg, on the Confederate side, in response to a letter of inquiry from the writer, as to the frontage of this great assaulting column, replies as follows :

"If I were to speak from the impression made while the column was moving before my eyes, I should say that from Brockenborough's brigade on the left of Pettigrew's division to Kemper's right brigade of Pickett's division, which measured the distance of the assaulting column, the frontage was about *three fourths of a mile*. But if you also include the brigades of Thomas and McGowan, which covered the left flank of Pettigrew's division, to the brigades of Wilcox and Perry that covered the right flank of Pickett's division, the distance was fully *one mile*.

"I make the *depth* 1,372 yards. My measurements, which were afterwards made, were from line of battle to line of battle.

"Now it should be remembered that Trimble's division lay *in line of battle*, on the western slope of Seminary Ridge, in the rear of the artillery. Now from Trimble's left to the right of Hays' division, the distance was 1,733 yards ; and from the right of Trimble's division to the central point of attack on the Union line, the distance was 1,400 yards. From the left of Pickett's division to the central point of attack on the Union line, the distance was only 1,066 yards. From Pickett's right to the left of General Stannard's left regiment was 1,350 yards. You will see that these figures will give an average of about 1,375 yards.

"The troops in the column that received the heaviest artillery fire were Pettigrew's own brigade, commanded by Jones. The right of Trimble's command also reached the point of attack as far as Pickett's, but then Trimble's men got there about fifteen minutes later than Pickett. General Kemper was up to the works when repulsed. General Kemper writes to me: 'I was nearly up to the Federal line, so near that I could easily see the faces and the expression on the countenances of the Union men, and I thought I could identify the individual soldier that shot me.'"

cannonading and replace them with others. The ammunition boxes were also replenished, and it was arranged that as the foe came forward he should be met first with solid shot, next with shell, and when he came to close quarters with double charges of canister. When this attacking force, preceded by a line of skirmishers, came into view, cries of admiration were extorted from all who witnessed it. It was probably the most imposing battle-column seen during the war. "Here they come!" was uttered by the men as the Confederates were seen to emerge from their place of shelter. When this grand moving mass had crossed about one third of the space between the two armies,—about three quarters of a mile,—the Federal batteries, which by a clever Yankee ruse the Confederates were led to suppose they had silenced, opened upon them in terrible and destructive discharges. Howard's guns on Cemetery Hill, and the powerful batteries upon Round Top, opened with terrible fury, ploughing through their ranks from right to left and from left to right, tearing fearful lanes through them, which were quickly closed again. Still on they came, yelling like demons; and when the Emmitsburg road was reached the Federal skirmishers behind a stone wall were driven in. The Confederates leaped over this wall and dashed forward, running at full speed until they came within range of the infantry, when from twenty thousand muskets a blinding, zig-zag flame burst upon them. General Gibbon, now in command,—Hancock having been wounded,—directed his men to make room for the fatal grape, and volley after volley, in quick succession of double-shotted guns, poured their deadly contents of iron hail upon the advancing foe. Sheets of flame



and smoke and swiftly flying death beat in their faces, until Pettigrew's men began to waver on the left and fall behind. Pickett's division, however, yet pressed on, and when within about five hundred yards of the Federal line, Pickett halted and changed his direction somewhat obliquely. Wilcox and Lane, who guarded his right flank, did



GROUND OVER WHICH PICKETT'S MEN CHARGED.

(From a Photograph by Tipton.)

The house and barn which stand by the side of the Emmittsburg road are Coker's. The elevated ground to the right, as seen above the fence, was the Confederate position, and from it Pickett's assaulting column came.

not make a corresponding change, but kept straight on, and, as a consequence, a wide interval between the two forces was soon made, and Pickett's flank was exposed. General Stannard, seeing his opportunity for a flank movement, immediately changed the front of his brigade so as



to place it perpendicular with the Confederate line of march, and poured into them a terribly destructive fire at short range. This caused many to surrender and others to retreat, but the division still pressed forward. Here now I will permit an eye - witness and participant to detail the terrible struggle which followed. General Doubleday says:

“Armistead’s brigade, united to Garnett’s, pressed on, overpowered Hays’ brigade of the Second Corps, and drove it from its advanced position at the fence, back through the batteries on the crest, and in spite of death-dealing bolts on all sides, Pickett determined to break Gibbon’s line and capture his guns. Although Webb’s front was the focus of the concentrated artillery fire, and he had already lost fifty men and some valuable officers, his line remained firm and unshaken. It devolved upon him now to meet the great charge which was to decide the fate of the day. It would have been difficult to find a man better fitted for such an emergency. He was nerved to great deeds by the memory of his ancestors, who in former days had rendered distinguished services to the Republic, and felt that the results of the war might depend upon his holding his position. His men were equally resolute. Cushing’s battery, ‘B,’ Fourth United States Artillery, which had been posted on his left, and Brown’s Rhode Island Battery on his right, were both practically destroyed by the cannonade. The horses were prostrated, every officer but one struck, and Cushing had but one serviceable gun left.

“As Pickett’s advance came very close to the first line, young Cushing, mortally wounded, holding on to his intestines with one hand, ran his only gun down to the fence

with the other, and said: '*Webb, I will give them one more shot!*' At the moment of the last discharge he called out, '*Good by!*' and fell dead at the post of duty. Webb sent for fresh batteries to replace the two that were disabled, and Wheeler's First New York Independent Battery came up just before the attack, and took the place of Cushing's battery on the left. Armistead pressed forward, leaped the fence, waving his sword with his hat on it, followed by about a hundred of his men, several of whom carried battle flags. He shouted, 'Give them cold steel, boys!' and laid his hands upon one of the guns. The battery for a few minutes was in his possession, and the Confederate flag flew triumphantly over our line. But Webb was at the front very near Armistead, animating and encouraging his men. He led the Seventy-second Pennsylvania Regiment against the enemy, and posted a line of wounded men in the rear to drive back or shoot every man that deserted his duty. A portion of the Seventy-first Pennsylvania, behind a stone wall on the right, threw in a deadly fire, while a great part of the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania and the remainder of the Seventy-first made stern resistance from a copse of trees on the left, near where the enemy had broken the line, and where our men were shot with the Confederate muskets touching their breasts. Then came a splendid charge of two regiments led by Colonel Hall, which passed completely through Webb's line, and engaged the enemy in a hand to hand conflict. Armistead was shot down by the side of the gun he had taken. \* \* \* Both Gibbon and Webb were wounded, and the loss in officers and men was very heavy; two Confederate brigadier-generals were killed, and more

prisoners were taken than twice Webb's brigade; six battle flags and fourteen hundred and sixty-three muskets were gathered in. \* \* \* When Pickett—the great leader—looked around the top of the ridge he had temporarily gained, he saw it was impossible to hold the position. Troops were rushing in on him from all sides. The Second Corps was engaged in a furious assault on his front. His men were fighting with clubbed muskets, and even banner staves were intertwined in a fierce and hopeless struggle. My division of the First Corps was on his right flank, and the Third Corps was closing up to attack. Pettigrew's forces on his left had given way, and a heavy skirmish line began to accumulate on that flank. He saw his men surrendering in masses, and, with a heart full of anguish, ordered a retreat. Death had been busy on all sides, and few, indeed, now remained of that magnificent column which had advanced so proudly, led by the Ney of the Confederate army, and these few fell back in disorder, and without organization, behind Wright's brigade, which had been sent forward to cover the retreat. At first, however, when struck by Stannard on the flank, and when Pickett's charge was spent, they rallied in a little slashing, where a grove had been cut down by our troops to leave an opening for our artillery. There two regiments of Rowley's brigade of my division, the One Hundred and Fifty-first Pennsylvania and the Twentieth New York State Militia, under Colonel Theodore B. Gates, of the latter regiment, made a gallant charge, and drove them out. Pettigrew's division, it is said, lost two thousand prisoners and fifteen battle flags on the left.\*

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\*In this charge Pickett's division alone lost in killed, wounded, and captured, two thousand eight hundred and eighty-eight men. Taking the Con-

“While this severe contest was going on in front of Webb, Wilcox deployed his command and opened a feeble fire against Caldwell’s division on my left. Stannard repeated the maneuver which had been so successful against Kemper’s brigade by detaching the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Vermont to take Wilcox in flank. Wilcox, thus attacked on his right, while a long row of batteries tore the front of his line to pieces with canister, could gain no foot-hold. He found himself exposed to a tremendous cross-fire, and was obliged to retreat, but a great portion of his command were brought in as prisoners by Stannard, and battle flags were gathered in sheaves.” †

As this great charge was the culmination in the series of great and mighty efforts made by the Confederates to overthrow the National forces, and as everything concerning it will, in all the years to come, prove of the highest interest, and as some of the best descriptions of it were written by participants and eye-witnesses for the newspapers, which will, if not preserved in some substantial form, soon be lost to the world, I will introduce here several graphic descriptions from both Confederate and Federal sources. The following was written by a correspondent under the title of “Agate:”

“The great, desperate, final charge came at four o’clock. The Confederates seemed to have gathered up all their strength and desperation for one fierce, convulsive effort, that should sweep over and wash out our obstinate resistance. They swept up as before, the flower of their army

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federate estimate as to its strength when it went into the fight, as about four thousand six hundred, it will be seen that Pickett lost over one half of his command.

† General Doubleday’s “Chancellorsville and Gettysburg,” pages 193-197.

to the front, victory staked upon the issue. In some places they literally lifted up and pushed back our lines; but, that terrible 'position' of ours!—whenever they entered it, enfilading fires from half a score of crests swept away their columns like merest chaff. Broken and hurled back, they easily fell into our hands; and, on the center and left, the last half hour brought more prisoners than all the rest.

“So it was all along the whole line; but it was on the Second Corps that the flower of the Confederate army was concentrated; it was there that the heaviest shock beat, and shook, and even sometimes crumbled, our line. We had some shallow rifle-pits, with barricades of rails from the fences. The Confederate line, stretching away miles to the left, in magnificent array, but strongest here,—Pickett's splendid division of Longstreet's Corps in front, the best of A. P. Hill's veterans in support,—came steadily, and as it seemed resistlessly, sweeping up. Our skirmishers retired slowly from the Emmittsburg road, holding their ground tenaciously to the last. The Confederates reserved their fire till they reached the same Emmittsburg road, then opened with a terrific crash. From a hundred iron throats, meantime, their artillery had been thundering on our barricades.

“Hancock was wounded; Gibbon succeeded to the command,—approved soldier, and ready for the crisis. As the tempest of fire approached its height, he walked along the line, and renewed his orders to the men to reserve their fire. The Confederates,—three lines deep,—came steadily up. They were in point blank range. At last the order came! From thrice six thousand guns, there came a sheet of smoky flame, a crash, a rush of leaden death. The

line literally melted away; but there came the second, resistless still. It had been our supreme effort,—on the instant we were not equal to another. Up to the rifle-pits, across them, over the barricades,—the momentum of their charge, the mere machine strength of their combined action,—swept them on. Our thin line could fight, but it had not weight enough to oppose this momentum. It was pushed behind the guns. Right on came the enemy. They were upon the guns,—were bayoneting the gunners,—were waving their flags above our pieces. But they had penetrated to the fatal point. A storm of grape and canister tore its way from man to man, and marked its track with corpses straight down their line. They had exposed themselves to the enfilading fire of the guns on the western slope of Cemetery Hill; that exposure sealed their fate. The line reeled back,—disjointed already,—in an instant in fragments. Our men were just behind the guns. They leaped forward upon the disordered mass; but there was little need of fighting now. A regiment threw down its arms, and, with colors at its head, rushed over and surrendered. All along the field, smaller detachments did the same. Webb's brigade brought in eight hundred; taken in as little time as it requires to write the simple sentence that tells it. Gibbon's old division took fifteen stand of colors. Over the fields the escaped fragments of the changing line fell back,—the battle there was over. A single brigade, Harrow's, (of which the Seventh Michigan is part,) came out with fifty-four less officers and seven hundred and ninety-three less men, than it took in! So the whole corps fought,—so too they fought further down the line. It was a fruitless sacrifice. They gathered up



**PICKETT'S CHARGE. (From a Photograph by Tipton.)**  
**The Union line is seen in the foreground, and beyond it the advancing columns of the enemy.**



their broken fragments, formed their lines, and slowly marched away. It was not a rout, it was a bitter, crushing defeat."

The following graphic account is by Mr. Charles C. Coffin, in his "Boys of '61:"

"As soon as the approach of the enemy was perceived every man was on the alert. The cannoners sprung to their feet. The long lines emerged from the woods and moved rapidly but steadily over the fields toward the Emmittsburg road. Howard's batteries burst into flame, throwing shells with the utmost rapidity. There are gaps in the Confederate ranks, but onward still they come. They reach the Emmittsburg road. Pickett's division appears by Klingel's house. All of Howard's guns are at work now. Pickett turns to the right, moving north, driven in part by the fire rolling in upon his flank from Weed's Hill (Little Round Top) and from the Third, Fifth and Sixth Corps batteries. Suddenly he faces east, descends the gentle slope from the road behind Codori's, crosses the meadow, comes in reach of the muskets of the Vermonters. The three regiments rise from their shallow trench. The men beneath the oak trees leap from their low breast-works of rails. There is a ripple, a roll, a deafening roar. Yet the momentum of the Confederate column carries it on. It is becoming thinner and weaker, but they still advance. The Second Corps is like a thin blue ribbon. Will it withstand the shock? 'Give them canister! Pour it into them!' shouts Major Charles Howard, running from battery to battery. The Confederate line is almost up to the grove in front of Robinson's. It has reached the clump of scrub oaks. It has drifted past



the Vermont boys. Onward still, 'Break their third line! Smash their supports!' cries General Howard, and Osborne and Wainwright send the fire of fifty guns into the column, each piece fired three times a minute! The Cemetery is lost to view,—covered with sulphurous clouds, flaming and smoking and thundering like Sinai on the great day of the Lord! The front line of Confederates is melting away,—the second is advancing to take its place; but beyond the first and second is the third, which reels, and breaks, and flies to the woods from whence it came, unable to withstand the storm. Hancock is wounded, and Gibbon is in command of the Second Corps. 'Hold your fire, boys; they are not near enough yet,' says Gibbon, as Pickett comes on. The first volley staggers, but does not stop them. They move upon the run,—up to the breastworks of rails,—bearing Hancock's line to the top of the ridge,—so powerful their momentum. Men fire into each other's faces, not five feet apart. There are bayonet thrusts, sabre strokes, pistol shots; cool, deliberate movements on the part of some,—hot, passionate, desperate efforts with others; hand to hand contests; recklessness of life; tenacity of purpose; fiery determination; oaths, yells, curses, hurrahs, shoutings; men go down on their hands and knees, spinning round like tops, throwing out their arms, gulping up blood, falling, legless, armless, headless. There are ghastly heaps of dead men. Seconds are centuries; minutes, ages; but the thin line does not break. The Confederates have swept past the Vermont regiments. 'Take them in flank,' says General Stannard. The Thirteenth and Sixteenth swing out from the trench, turn a right angle to the main line, and face to the north. They move

forward a few steps, pour a deadly volley into the backs of Kemper's troops. With a hurrah they rush on to drive home the bayonet. The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth Massachusetts and Seventh Michigan, Twentieth New York, Nineteenth Maine, One Hundred and Fifty-first Pennsylvania, and other regiments catch the enthusiasm of the moment, and close upon the foe. The Confederate column has lost its power. The lines waver. The soldiers of the front rank look around for their supports. They are gone,—fleeing over the field, broken, shattered, thrown into confusion by the remorseless fire from the cemetery and from cannon on the ridge. The lines have disappeared like a straw in a candle's flame. The ground is thick with dead, and the wounded are like the withered leaves of autumn. Thousands of Confederates throw down their arms and give themselves up as prisoners."

Having given these three accounts of this great assault by Federals, it is but fair to follow them by the following two by Confederates. The first is by a participant, Captain H. T. Owen, from whose article in the *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, I have before quoted. Captain Owen says:

"The column of attack, composed of Wilcox's brigade, Pickett's and Heth's divisions, and several other commands, detached for this duty, has been variously estimated, but probably numbered about thirteen thousand troops, the command of the whole line given to General Pickett, a brave and fearless officer and a fit leader of this forlorn hope, thrown forward to retrieve disaster or turn by fierce conflict the waning fortunes of a dying cause. Riding out in front, Pickett made a brief, animated address to the troops, and closed by saying to his own

division: 'Charge the enemy, and remember old Virginia.' Then came the command in a strong, clear voice: 'Forward! Guide center! March!' and the column, with a front of more than half a mile, moved grandly up the slope. Meade's guns opened upon the column as it appeared above the crest of the ridge, but it neither paused nor faltered. Round shot, bounding along the plain, tore through their ranks and ricocheted around them; shells exploded incessantly in blinding, dazzling flashes before them, behind them, overhead and among them. Frightful gaps were made from center to flank, yet on swept the column, and as it advanced the men steadily closed up the wide rents made along the line in a hundred places at every discharge of the murderous batteries in front. A long line of skirmishers, prostrate in the tall grass, firing at the column since it came within view, rose up within fifty yards, fired a volley into its front, then trotted on before it, turning and firing back as fast as they could reload. The column moved on at a quick step with shouldered arms, and the fire of the skirmish line was not returned. Half way over the field an order ran down the line, 'Left oblique,' which was promptly obeyed, and the direction is changed forty-five degrees from the front to the left. Men looking away, far off toward the left flank, saw that the supporting columns there were crumbling and melting rapidly away. General Pickett sent his brother, Major Charles Pickett, galloping swiftly to rally, if possible, the wavering lines, saying to him: 'Unless they support us on the left, my division will be cut to pieces.' Major Pickett and other officers rode among the breaking battalions and vainly attempted to restore order, but hundreds

and thousands of fugitives from the front could be seen fleeing from the field and went rushing pell-mell toward the rear like dry leaves before a gale. Order was not restored upon the left and Pickett's support there was gone excepting some brave Tennesseans and North Carolinians, who never wavered in the storm, but closing up by the side of Pickett's Virginians went as far, fought as long, bled as freely, and fell as thick as Pickett's men.

"The command now came along the line, 'Front, forward!' and the column resumed its direction straight down upon the center of the enemy's position. Some men now looking to the right saw that the troops there had entirely disappeared, but how or when they left was not known. The enemy in front, occupying an elevated position and watching closely every movement of the advancing columns, say 'the right gave way first, then the left broke up and fled the field, but the massive center, composed of Pickett's veterans of iron nerve, wounded in scores of battles, were coming sternly on.' Guns hitherto employed in firing at the troops on the right and left sent a shower of shells after the fleeing fugitives, and then trained upon the center, where the storm burst in ten-fold fury, as converging batteries sent a concentrated fire of shot and shell in, through, and around the heroic column. The destruction of life in the ranks of that advancing host was fearful beyond precedent, officers going down by dozens and the men by scores and fifties. Kemper has gone down terribly mangled, but Garnett still towered unhurt, and rode up and down the front line, saying in a strong, calm voice: 'Faster, men! faster! Close up and step out faster, but don't double quick!' The column

was approaching the Emmittsburg road, where a line of infantry, stationed behind a stone fence, was pouring in a heavy fire of musketry. A scattering fire was opened along the front of the division upon this line, when Garnett galloped along the line and called out: 'Cease firing,' and his command was promptly obeyed, showing the wonderful discipline of the men, who reloaded their guns, shouldered arms and kept on without slackening their pace, which was still a 'quickstep.'

"The stone fence was carried without a struggle, the infantry and the skirmish line swept away before the division like trash before the broom. Two thirds of the distance was behind, and the one hundred cannon in the rear were dumb and did not reply to the hotly worked guns in our front. We were now four hundred yards from the foot of Cemetery Hill, when away off to the right, nearly half a mile, there appeared in the open field a line of men at right angles with our own, a long, dark mass, dressed in blue, and coming down at a 'double quick' upon the unprotected right flank of Pickett's men, with their muskets upon 'the right shoulder shift,' their battle flags dancing and fluttering in the breeze created by their own rapid motion, and their burnished bayonets glistening above their heads like forest twigs covered with sheets of sparkling ice when shaken by a blast. Garnett galloped along the line saying: 'Faster, men! faster!' and the front line broke forward into a double quick, when Garnett called out: 'Steady, men! steady! Don't double quick. Save your wind and your ammunition for the final charge!' and then went down among the dead, and his clarion voice was no more heard above the roar of

battle. The enemy were now seen strengthening their lines, where the blow was expected to strike, by hurrying up reserves from the right and left, the columns from opposite directions passing each other double along our front like the fingers of a man's two hands locking together. The distance had again shortened and officers in the lines could be distinguished by their uniforms from the privates. Then was heard behind that heavy thud of a muffled tread of armed men that roar and rush of trampling feet as Armistead's column from the rear closed up behind the front line and he (the last brigadier) took command, stepped out in front with his hat uplifted on the point of his sword and led the division, now four ranks deep, rapidly and grandly across that valley of death, covered with clover as soft as a Turkish carpet.

"There it was again! and again! A sound filling the air above, below, around us, like the blast through the top of a dry cedar, or the whirring sound made by the sudden flight of a flock of quail. It was grape and canister, and the column broke forward into a double-quick and rushed toward the stone wall where forty cannon were belching forth grape and canister twice and thrice a minute. A hundred yards from the stone wall the flanking party on the right, coming down on a heavy run, halted suddenly within fifty yards and poured a deadly storm of musket balls into Pickett's men, double-quickening across their front, and under this terrible cross-fire the men reeled and staggered between falling comrades, and the right came pressing down upon the center, crowding the companies into confusion. We all knew the purpose to carry the heights in front, and the mingled mass, from fifteen to

thirty deep, rushed toward the stone wall, while a few hundred men, without orders, faced to the right and fought the flanking party there, although fifty to one, and for a time held them at bay. Muskets were seen crossed as some men fired to the right and others to the front, and the fighting was terrific,—far beyond all other experience even of Pickett's men, who for once raised no cheer, while the welkin rang around them with the 'Union triple huzza.' The old veterans saw the fearful odds against them, and other hosts gathering darker and deeper still.

"The time was too precious, too serious for a cheer; they buckled down to the heavy task in silence, and fought with a feeling like despair. The enemy were falling back in front, while officers were seen among their breaking lines striving to maintain their ground. Pickett's men were within a few feet of the stone wall when the artillery delivered their last fire from guns shotted to the muzzle. A blaze fifty feet long went through the charging, surging host with a gaping rent to the rear; but the survivors mounted the wall, then over and onward, rushed up the hill close after the gunners, who waved their rammers in the face of Pickett's men and sent up cheer after cheer as they felt admiration for the gallant charge. On swept the column over ground covered with dead and dying men, where the earth seemed to be on fire, the smoke dense and suffocating, the sun shut out, flames blazing on every side, friend could hardly be distinguished from foe, but the division, in the shape of an inverted V, with the point flattened, pushed forward, fighting, falling and melting away, till half way up the hill they were met by a powerful body of fresh troops charging down upon them, and

this remnant of about a thousand men was hurled back out into the clover-field. Brave Armistead was down among the enemy's guns, mortally wounded, but was last seen leaning upon one elbow, slashing at the gunners to prevent them from firing at his retreating men. Out in front of the breast-works the men showed a disposition to return for another charge, and an officer looking at the frowning heights, with blood trickling down the side of his face, inquired of another, 'What shall we do?' The answer was, 'If we get reinforcements soon we can take that hill yet.' But no reinforcements came, none were in sight, and about a thousand men fled to the rear over dead and wounded, mangled, groaning, dying men, scattered thick, far and wide, while shot and shell tore up the earth and minnie balls flew around them for more than a thousand yards."

One other Confederate account is also given. It was written by Colonel W. H. Swallow for the *Southern Bivouac* of February, 1886. It is somewhat lengthy, but it is the most circumstantial and interesting account of that great climax of the rebellion yet laid before the public. By permission of Colonel Swallow and the publishers of the *Bivouac*, I give part of this interesting and valuable article. Colonel Swallow says:

"The distance from Seminary Ridge, where Heth's division crossed the plain, to the Federal works on Cemetery Hill, where a part of Archer's Tennessee brigade burst into them, is exactly one thousand two hundred and seventy-three yards. In the months of July and August, 1880, the writer measured the relative distances passed over by the column of attack a number of times with due regard



to the speed of Heth's division, from which he reached the conclusion that the division must have passed from the top of Seminary Ridge to the Emmittsburg road in about eight minutes. It was on the western slope of Seminary Ridge and between it and Willoughby's Run that the assaulting column was formed. Pickett's division, composed of the three brigades of Garnett, Kemper, and Armistead, held the right of the column in the following order: On the right of the division was Kemper's brigade, next Garnett's, and to the rear, and in support of the other two, was placed the brigade of Armistead. Heth's division, commanded by General Pettigrew, formed the left of the assaulting column and was placed in the following order: Archer's Tennessee brigade, commanded by the brave Colonel Frey, held the right of Heth's division and hooked on to Garnett's brigade, who formed the left of Pickett's. Next to Archer's brigade came Pettigrew's North Carolina brigade, then Davis' Mississippi brigade, and then Brockenborough's Virginia brigade, that held the left of Heth's division, which in the attack that followed was commanded by General Pettigrew. Scales' and Lane's North Carolina brigades of Pender's division, commanded by General Trimble, of Maryland, were placed in the rear of Heth's division, and, with Armistead, formed the second line of the assaulting column. The two remaining brigades of Pender's division, under McGowan and Thomas, were placed on the left flank of the assaulting column, covering the advance of Pettigrew's division.

"Wilcox's Alabama and Perry's Florida brigades of Anderson's division were placed on the right flank of Pickett's line, while Wright's Georgia brigade of the same

division was suitably posted in reserve. It will be seen from the above statement that all of A. P. Hill's Corps was more or less concerned in the movement, partly in the direct column of attack, and partly on its flanks. It would seem, from this disposition of the force, that the movement ought more properly to be called the 'Assault of A. P. Hill's Corps' than by any other name. But as General Lee thought fit to place the entire movement under the direction and management of General Longstreet, it is properly called 'Longstreet's Assault.' It would be a misnomer to call this assault, as many writers have done, 'The charge of Pickett's division,' for that would be to strip the entire movement of much of its greatest significance.

"Equally erroneous is the generally accepted statement that the charge was made by Pickett, supported by Heth's division, commanded by Pettigrew, and that the disaster which followed was solely attributable to the failure of the supporting division. The truth is that neither of those divisions was specially assigned to support the other. That peculiar curve in the ridge which rendered it necessary to place Armistead in the rear of Kemper and Garnett, also compelled Longstreet to place Scales and Lane under Trimble, in the rear of Heth's division.

"Hence the entire column of attack moved in different directions with one end in view, over different portions of the earth's surface to a common center.

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"These men who composed the *assaulting column proper*, by which the writer means the divisions of Heth and Pickett with the brigades of Scales and Lane, were brought

together under different circumstances, and the column was composed of troops from five States,— Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi. Their strength was as follows: Pickett's division, three brigades, aggregating four thousand, five hundred; Heth's division, four brigades, five thousand; while the two brigades of Scales and Lane, of Pender's division, commanded by General Trimble, mustered about two thousand, five hundred. The assaulting column, therefore, contained about twelve thousand men.\*

“There were nine brigades engaged in the direct *column of attack*.

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“At precisely seven minutes past one o'clock the awful silence was broken, when two signal guns from Eshelman's Washington Artillery announced the opening of the cannonade. In a few moments all the Confederate batteries, extending from our extreme right at the Peach Orchard on the Emmittsburg road, in a circle around the ridge to the Harrisburg road, belched forth one inextinguishable flame of fire, to which the enemy responded from Cemetery Hill,

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\* Both Federals and Confederates have a peculiar kind of arithmetic by which they overestimate the number of the opposing force and minify their own. The time has come for fairness in these statements. It is with pleasure then that I recall the fact that Colonel Swallow estimates this assaulting force at twelve thousand men, and Captain Owen, in the preceding account, at thirteen thousand. If, as Colonel Swallow says, “All of A. P. Hill's Corps was more or less concerned in the movement, partly in the direct column of attack, and partly on its flanks,” it is evident that the Federal estimate of about fifteen thousand is nearly correct. Colonel Swallow also protests against calling this great episode “Pickett's Charge,” or “The Charge of Pickett's Division,” saying that it might more properly be called “The Assault of A. P. Hill's Corps,” or “Longstreet's Assault.” While entirely concurring in this remark, I have yet followed the general custom and term it “Pickett's Charge,” thereby avoiding the misunderstanding a new term would produce with many readers.

and all around Cemetery Hill to Round Top. As soon as the cannonade opened, Pickett's division, under cover of the artillery, with its right flank protected by the brigades of Wilcox and Perry, was shifted forward a little to the right and placed in position in the rear of the artillery, at a distance of nine hundred yards from Cemetery Hill, where it lay during the cannonade, while the divisions of Pettigrew and Trimble remained very nearly on the ground where they formed. The writer and many staff officers and officers of the corps of engineers were, during the whole cannonade, in an elevated position from which an unobstructed view could be had of Seminary Ridge, from the town to Longstreet's right.

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"When the order for the assault was given, Pickett's division, which held a somewhat advanced line, moved forward; the right of the division under General Kemper, after passing through the Washington Artillery, crossed the Emmittsburg road, and, had Kemper moved onward in a straight line, he would have struck Stannard's brigade, who was posted in a grove a little in front and on the left of Hancock's Corps. But no sooner had General Kemper crossed the road than he moved on the left flank, having changed front, his brigade, after passing south of Codori's house and out-buildings, marched eastward towards Gettysburg. In this movement of Kemper's brigade his command passed between the Emmittsburg road and Cemetery Ridge in the march to the center of attack. As Kemper's right was passing Stannard's brigade on Hancock's left, and at a distance of several hundred yards, the latter officer ordered his command to move also by the

left flank, and closing to the left until Kemper's right assumed the direct assault in his front, when by order of Hancock (who was on this part of the ground watching the movement), Stannard's command changed front, forward in the first battalion, and delivered several volleys of musketry into the flank and rear of Kemper's brigade, but the latter officer, under orders from Pickett, moved onward to the center of attack, not stopping to return the fire.

"General Garnett, with his brigade, held the left of the division, and started with Kemper to the enemy's works at the same time. Garnett moved on Cemetery Hill by marching eastward towards Gettysburg, north of Codori's house and out-buildings. The fences of the Emmittsburg road, near Codori's house, had been nearly destroyed the day before in the battle on our right.

"No sooner had Garnett and Kemper started with the right and left of Pickett's division than General Armistead, whose brigade was in the rear of both, followed closely after them. Armistead, however, started from a different position and passed over a different portion of the earth's surface to the same point of attack. Almost simultaneously with the advance of Garnett and Kemper, and while the writer was intently watching their onward march, his attention was directed to a dense column whose front seemed to cover twice the front of Pickett's division. This part of the column of attack had just burst through a fringe of timber along Seminary Ridge, where our artillery had been firing. /

"When the writer first saw it this force was moving in a direct line for Cemetery Hill, and both the assaulting

column at this point and the enemy were now in full view of each other. It proved to be Heth's division under General Pettigrew, with the brigades of Scales and Lane, of Pender's division, commanded by General Trimble. All our little group thought, from its appearance, that it was A. P. Hill's whole corps, and shouted out, 'Here they come! Here they are!! Hurrah!!!' This part of the attacking column was moving in a straight line over a different portion of the earth's surface from that of Pickett's division, but to the same center of attack. The writer would here remark that the lay of the ground around the ridge, which obliged Longstreet to place Armistead to the rear of Garnett and Kemper, also compelled him to form Heth a little behind the ridge and place Trimble's command in the second line of the assaulting column. The column of attack, now under way, moved steadily and firmly to the enemy's works, distant one thousand two hundred and seventy-three yards. The works of the enemy, in front of the assaulting column, lay at an average distance of about one hundred and fifty yards south of the Emmittsburg road, and formed the defense of Hancock's Corps on Meade's left center. These works consisted of an irregularly formed old stone fence, but not of the same height. At intervals there were breaks in the fence, and these were filled up by temporary breast-works, composed of rails and old logs, behind which earth was thrown to the depth of several feet.

"That part of the enemy's works that stretched to the right of the attacking column, was longer and stood forward, advanced about one hundred and twenty feet, while that part of the works on the left of the column of attack

bent inwardly, forming an angle, giving to the enemy's line of defense an echelon formation, or horse-shoe appearance.

"Nothing occurred to the divisions of Pettigrew and Trimble in their march from the crest of Seminary Ridge to Cemetery Hill, until the column of attack was half-way over the plain, when all of a sudden the enemy's artillery opened upon our advancing lines a most terrific fire from Cemetery Hill.

"On the right of our column Round Top and Little Round Top were in a perfect blaze, and sent forth one continuous and inextinguishable flame of fire, hurling their missiles of destruction into our advancing lines.\*

"Seminary Ridge to the rear of the column, with the Confederate batteries to the right and left of it, sent forth their commingling smoke of fire and thunder, laden with their messengers of death, into the enemy's left center.

"The first fire of the Federal artillery on the advancing lines of Pettigrew and Trimble seemed to smite the column of attack as if it had been struck by some unseen power, some great physical body, causing the column to waver, reel, and for a moment halt.

"It was only for a moment; in a few seconds the smoke lifted, when deep gaps which extended through our lines to the rear of the column could be seen. The brave Confederates closing up those gaps, over the dead and bleeding bodies of their companions, moved forward unflinchingly to the Emmitsburg road. Solid shot now plowed through their ranks, grape and canister were doing

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\*Colonel Swallow is in error here. Big Round Top had no artillery: it was inaccessible to cannon.

their fatal work in the game of death, and sweeping away hundreds from our advancing lines. Undismayed by the blood and terror of the conflict, the assaulting column pushed on.

“Some mighty, unseen power, over which they had no control and whose influence they could not resist, impelled them forward. As the column neared the road it was within reach of the enemy’s musketry, which poured volley after volley into the column of attack, greatly thinning its ranks.

“General Garnett, with the left of Pickett’s division, reached the road about the same time with Pettigrew, while Armistead and Trimble were following closely after. On the extreme right General Kemper’s brigade was south of the end of the road and near the works. Archer’s Tennessee brigade, holding the right of Pettigrew’s division, hooked on to the left of Garnett, and thus united the whole column made a break to get over the first fence on the Emmitsburg road.

“Scores of the survivors often related their anxious suspense and the length of time it seemed to climb to the top of the fence. As soon as the top of the fence was lined with troops the whole line tumbled over, falling flat into the bed of the road, while the enemy’s bullets buried themselves in the bodies of the falling victims. Just here at this point the brave General Garnett, of Virginia, rode along his line covered with blood, with his head bowed almost to his horse’s neck. In a moment the General and his horse fell to the ground riddled with bullets in all parts of their bodies. The assaulting column only remained in the road a few seconds. It could scarcely be



called a halt, when it rose and pushed over the second fence, leaving many of their comrades dead and wounded behind them. Just as the column crossed the second fence it received a most withering fire of musketry, a perfect shower of lead; it staggered for a few seconds, halted, returned the fire, and with one wild shout rushed forward to the works. From the road to the works the column of attack was for a few moments lost to view, being completely enveloped by the enemy's fire. The right of Pettigrew's division — Archer's Tennessee brigade and Garnett's brigade of Pickett's division — charged right on amid fire and flame to the enemy's works, while Armistead and the brigades of Scales and Lane, commanded by General Trimble, followed closely after. Archer's Tennessee brigade and Garnett's Virginia brigade struck the enemy's fortifications at the same moment, when Lieutenant Finley, of the Thirty-eighth Virginia, sprang to the left and grasping one of Archer's captains by the hand exclaimed, 'Virginia and Tennessee will stand together on these works to-day!'

"The left of the column, under Davis and Brockenborough, passed the advanced line of the wall where it formed an angle, and moving forward in that direction threatened to assault the right flank of Gibbon's division, which held the advanced line of the enemy's defense, supported by the Federal division of General Hays, one of the strongest and best divisions in the Federal army. The First Tennessee and the greater part of the Seventh, with the Thirty-eighth Virginia, and other portions of Garnett's brigade rushed over the enemy's breast-works, driving the enemy before them on his reserves. While he was beaten

back the enemy contested the ground most stubbornly, and the scenes that followed during those few moments baffle description. A hand to hand encounter now took place. They fired into each other's faces at the distance of five and ten feet, and struck each other over the head with the butt of the musket.       \*       \*       \*       \*

The struggle was soon ended, and a deadly fire from the right of Hays' division compelled the shattered remnants of Garnett's and Archer's brigades to fall back to the point where they had entered the enemy's fortifications. As they did so they saw hundreds of their companions dead and wounded upon the ground—boys in blue with boys in gray, crawling over each other, all smeared with blood.

“As part of Archer's brigade and Garnett's entered the works the rest of Archer's men on the left of his line also crowded to the right, but received a heavy fire from the two brigades of the enemy posted on the left of the column and commanded by General Smyth, of Delaware, whose name afterward obtained a melancholy celebrity.. Pettigrew's brigade, commanded by Colonel Jones, now united with Archer's regiment, which had not entered the fortifications, and attacked the enemy with the most desperate determination.

“While the writer lay wounded with General Smyth at Gettysburg, that officer told him that Pettigrew's brigade, all along his front, were within thirty or forty feet of his line and fought with a fiery determination that he had never seen equalled. Some of Scales' brave fellows took part in this assault. Three weeks after the battle General Smyth showed the writer the exact spot where the First

Delaware volunteers rushed to the front and broke the left of Pettigrew's line.

"If any find fault with the falling off—or, rather, break—that took place on the left of Pettigrew's brigade, the answer is, that there were scarcely any left to stand. One company of North Carolina troops in Pettigrew's brigade lost every man (eighty-four strong) in killed and wounded.

"As another act of simultaneous occurrence, while Archer and Garnett were in the works and Pettigrew and others attacking them from the outside, General Hays noticed Davis and Brockenborough trying to get their work in on Gibbon's right flank. He instantly detached three regiments from his division with a number of batteries and attacked our left, already weakening and beginning to break before the assault of Sherrill and Smyth.

"The assaulting column on the left and center was now completely broken, and in the confusion and terror that followed, thousands fell upon the ground between the works and the road and threw up their arms in token of surrender, while the iron and leaden hail rushing from the mouths of a hundred cannon was blazing over them like the lightning's fiery scourge.

"On the right of the assaulting column General Kemper's brigade was cut to pieces and its commander seriously wounded; nearly all his command were killed, wounded, and captured.

"General Armistead, who was before the works with his brigade toward the closing scenes of the assault, rushed up to a part of the wall which had been abandoned by Webb's right, which was at the time falling back before Archer and Garnett, and seeing that his men were using the works

as a line of defense, as some of the first line to the right and left were doing, cried out, 'Come forward, Virginians!' He then drew his sword and, placing his hat on the top of it, raised it high up into the air and, jumping over the wall, again cried out, 'Come on, boys, we must give them the cold steel; who will follow me?'

"Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, with over a hundred men, responded to the call and followed their brave General. Many brave men, however, weakened, and looked into each other's faces with awe and astonishment. At this moment the Federal brigades of Hall and Harrow rushed to the right (Kemper having been repulsed in their front) and attacked Armistead in flank, and at the same time Webb's second line advanced and fired.

"General Armistead fell dead, and Colonel Martin and all that followed were instantly shot down. Of those that entered the fortification, fifty lay dead on the ground and the remainder were terribly wounded. Not a soul escaped to tell the tale to their companions.

"The Emmittsburg road was literally choked up with the dead and wounded, while the space between the Federal fortifications and the road was covered with the dead and dying victims of the struggle, to which might be added thousands who lay upon the ground extending their arms in token of surrender.

"The cries of the wounded for water, mingled with their shrieks of agony from pain, greatly intensified the horror of the scene. Three fourths of the assaulting column were killed, wounded, or captured in less than half an hour.

"The left of Pettigrew's old brigade, commanded by

Colonel Jones, began to fall off almost simultaneously with the right of the column under Kemper. The center of the column, composed of part of Archer's Tennessee brigade, commanded by the brave Colonel Frey, and part of Garnett's Virginia brigade, were the only men in the column of attack that carried their standards into the enemy's fortification on Cemetery Hill. It is idle to ask such foolish questions as who gave way first? which imply a want of devotion and duty. Any intelligent soldier, accustomed to the hardships of battle, who shall even at this day visit Gettysburg and make himself acquainted with the ground and insurmountable obstacles that lay in the front of the assaulting column, will not be very much surprised that the attack failed; but his surprise will be greater still that any, even the bravest soldiers, could have reached the point they did and live. In the Federal lines Generals Hancock, Webb, Stannard, Sherrill, and Smyth lay wounded on the ground. Of the Confederates, Generals Armistead and Garnett were killed, while Generals Kemper, Trimble, and Pettigrew were wounded, with thousands of others. General Alexander, after the repulse, ordered up Wright's Georgia brigade to attack as a relief to Pickett, but Longstreet stopped him, observing 'that the attack had failed.' Longstreet then ordered Wright to rally and collect the scattered troops behind Anderson's division. About twenty minutes after the repulse of the assaulting column, General Wilcox with his brigade and Perry's Florida brigade, who were on Pickett's right, had, by some mistake that has never been explained, received orders to advance, but as he reached the middle ridge in front of Cemetery Ridge, he could see nothing of Pickett's

division, whose right Wilcox and Perry were covering, and concluding that Pickett had actually passed over Cemetery Ridge, he also commenced to follow after, but he was met with a deadly fire of artillery in his front, while General Stannard's brigade wheeled about and attacked Wilcox and Perry in flank, by which the Confederate line was broken and great numbers of our men killed and wounded. Wilcox and Perry then fell back and forming with Wright's Georgia brigade, completed Anderson's division.

"This division of Anderson, of A. P. Hill's Corps, now presented a line of defense on Seminary Ridge, behind which the squads and detachments who survived in the columns of attack, and reached the ridge, found shelter and rest. Orders were instantly issued to Longstreet's divisions on the right—Hood's and McLaws'—to be ready to move to the ridge at a given signal. The same was done to the division of Rodes, to fall back on Anderson immediately if the enemy attempted to follow up the disaster."

While the terrible conflict, which we have just narrated, was going on along the front, important operations were in progress at other parts of the line, which had an important effect upon the final result. To these we will now direct the attention of the reader. It was intended by General Lee that the assault upon the Federal front should take place simultaneously with an attack General Ewell was to make upon the right. Johnson's division was already in possession of the Federals' lines upon Culp's Hill, and it was expected that a determined advance of his troops, supported by others of Ewell's Corps, would enable him to come in upon the Federal rear while Pickett cut through the line in front. But this purpose was not car-

ried out, for the reason that Longstreet again failed to execute the part assigned him. He was not ready to attack at the early hour when the engagement on the right began. Indeed, for this he cannot be blamed, for the attack was commenced by the Federals. Johnson was within the Federal line, and he was compelled to defend himself from the efforts made to dislodge him. In this way Lee's plans were frustrated, and when he learned that Johnson had been driven out of the position he had gained the night before, and could not co-operate with Pickett upon the front, new plans had to be made. Stuart's cavalry, which had reached the field the evening previous, reinforced by Jenkins' brigade, were sent around the Federal right to accomplish the same purpose. The object was to take possession of the Baltimore pike and other roads in the Federal rear; and, besides creating a diversion in favor of Pickett, to be in a position to take advantage to capture or destroy the army in case the assault in front was successful. The movement of these troops was fortunately discovered by General Howard from his elevated position upon Cemetery Hill, and General Meade was promptly notified. The Federal cavalry, which, during the preceding days of the battle, had done excellent service in protecting the flanks and in repelling and driving the enemy's cavalry, were again called upon to meet this movement of Stuart; and General D. McM. Gregg, with two brigades of his cavalry division, commanded respectively by Colonels McIntosh and Irvin Gregg, and Custer's brigade of the Third Division, was sent to repel this threatened danger. When these two forces came into collision, one of the most desperate cavalry engagements

took place that occurred during the war. The design of Stuart was well understood, and the Federal cavalry-men appreciated the responsibility that was upon them, and determined to repel the enemy or die in the effort.

Colonel William Brooke-Rawle, who was present at that engagement and participated in it, in a contribution to the *Annals of the War*, pages 467-484, gives a detailed and highly interesting description of this terrific affair. His account is too lengthy to give in full, but as full justice has not been done in previous histories to the Federal cavalry for their excellent services at Gettysburg, I will insert here the colonel's description of the great charge and hand to hand conflict which occurred when Hampton's brigade, which had been held in reserve, came upon the field and threatened to turn the tide in favor of the enemy. The colonel's account is as follows:

"Just then there appeared in the distance, turning the point of woods on the cross-road by the Stallsmith farm, a brigade of cavalry. It was manifest to every one that unless this, the grandest attack of all, was checked, the day would go hard with the Army of the Potomac. It was Stuart's last reserve and his last resource, for, if the Baltimore pike was to be reached, and havoc created in our rear, the critical moment had arrived, as Pickett was even then moving up to the assault of Cemetery Ridge.

"In close columns of squadrons, advancing as if in review, with sabres drawn and glistening like silver in the bright sunlight, the spectacle called forth a murmur of admiration. It was indeed a memorable one. Chester being nearest opened at once with his section, at the distance of three quarters of a mile. Pennington and Kinney



soon did the same. Canister and percussion shell were put into the steadily approaching columns as fast as the guns could fire. The dismounted men fell back to the right and left, and such as could got to their horses. The mounted skirmishers rallied and fell into line. Then Gregg rode over to the First Michigan, which, as it had come upon the field some time before, had formed close column of squadrons between and supporting the batteries, and ordered it to charge. As Town ordered sabres to be drawn and the column to advance, Custer dashed up with similar orders, and placed himself at its head. The two columns drew nearer and nearer, the Confederates outnumbering their opponents as three or four to one. The gait increased,—first the trot, then the gallop. Hampton's battle-flag floated in the van of the brigade. The orders of the Confederate officers could be heard by those in the woods on their left: 'Keep to your sabres, men, keep to your sabres!' for the lessons they had learned at Brandy Station and at Aldie had been severe. There the cry had been: 'Put up your sabres! Draw your pistols and fight like gentlemen!' But the sabre was never a favorite weapon with Confederate cavalry, and now, in spite of the lessons of the past, the warnings of the present were not heeded by all.

"As the charge was ordered the speed increased, every horse on the jump, every man yelling like a demon. The column of the Confederates blended, but the perfect alignment was maintained. Chester put charge after charge of canister into their midst, his men bringing it up to the guns by the armful. The execution was fearful, but the long rent closed up at once. As the opposing columns

drew nearer and nearer, each with perfect alignment, every man gathered his horse well under him, and gripped his weapon the tighter. Though ordered to retire his guns, towards which the head of the assaulting column was directed, Chester kept on until the enemy were within fifty yards, and the head of the First Michigan had come into the line of his fire. Staggered by the fearful execution from the two batteries, the men in the front line of the Confederate column drew in their horses and wavered. Some turned, and the column fanned out to the right and left, but those behind came pressing on. Custer, seeing the front men hesitate, waved his sabre and shouted, 'Come on, you Wolverines!' and with a fearful yell, the First Michigan rushed on, Custer four lengths ahead.

"McIntosh, as he saw the Confederate column advancing, sent his adjutant-general, Captain Walter S. Newhall, to the left with orders to Treichel and Rodgers to rally their men for a charge on the flank as it passed. But sixteen men could get their horses, and with five officers they made for the battle-flag. Newhall, back once more with the men of his own regiment, who, as he knew well, would go anywhere, and sharing the excitement of the moment, rushed in by the side of Treichel and Rodgers at the head of the little band. Miller, whose squadron of the Third Pennsylvania was already mounted, and had rallied, fired a volley from the woods on the right, as the Confederate column passed parallel with his line, but one hundred yards off, and then, with sabres drawn, charged down into the overwhelming masses of the enemy.

"The small detachment of the Third Pennsylvania, under Treichel and Rodgers, struck the enemy first, all

making for the color-guard. Newhall was about seizing the flag when a sabre blow, directed at his head, compelled him to parry it. At the same moment the color-bearer lowered his spear and struck Newhall full in the face, tearing open his mouth and knocking him senseless to the ground. Every officer and nearly every man in the little band was killed or wounded, although some succeeded in cutting their way clear through. Almost at the same moment Miller, with his squadron of the Third Pennsylvania, struck the left flank about two thirds of the way down the column. Going through and through, he cut off the rear portion and drove it back past Rummel's, almost up to the Confederate battery, and nothing but the heavy losses which he had suffered and the scattering of his men prevented his going further, wounded though he was.

“In the meantime, the two columns had come together with a crash—the one led by Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee (for he, too, was there,) and the other by Custer—and were fighting hand to hand, McIntosh, with his staff and orderlies, and such scattered men from Michigan and other regiments as he could get together, charged in with their sabres. For minutes, which seemed like hours, amid the clashing of the sabres, the rattle of the small arms, the frenzied imprecations, the demands for surrender, the undaunted replies, and the appeals for mercy, the Confederate column stood its ground. Captain Thomas, of the staff, seeing that a little more was needed to turn the tide, cut his way over to the woods on the right, where he knew he could find Hart, with his fresh squadron of the First New Jersey. In the *melee*, near the colors, was an officer



**CAVALRY SHAFT.**

This column marks the place where the great cavalry engagement behind the right of the Federal line occurred in the afternoon of the 3d, simultaneous with Pickett's charge in front.

(From a Photograph by Tipton.)

of high rank, and the two headed the squadron for that part of the fight. They came within reach of him with their sabres, and then it was that Wade Hampton was wounded.

“By this time the edge of the Confederate column had begun to fray away, and the outside men to draw back. As Hart’s squadron, and the other small parties who had rallied and mounted, charged down from all sides, the enemy turned. Then followed a pell-mell rush, our men in close pursuit. Many prisoners were captured, and many of our men, through their impetuosity, were carried away by the overpowering current of the retreat.

“The pursuit was kept up past Rummel’s, and the enemy were driven back into the woods beyond. The line of fences and the farm buildings which constituted the key-point of the field, and which, in the beginning of the fight, had been in the possession of the enemy, remained in ours until the end. All serious fighting for the day was over, for Pickett’s simultaneous assault had also been repulsed, and the victory along the line was complete. Skirmishing and some desultory artillery firing was kept up at intervals by both forces until after nightfall, these disturbances being caused by the enemy’s endeavor to recover their killed and wounded, who were lying thickly strewn over the field in our possession. At dark Stuart withdrew to the York pike, preparatory to covering the retreat of Lee’s army toward the Potomac. In the evening, Custer’s brigade was ordered to join its division. Gregg remained all night in possession of the field, and in the morning started in pursuit of the retreating enemy.”

The force under General Gregg in this engagement

numbered about five thousand men; while Stuart's force has been estimated by reliable Confederate authority as between six and seven thousand. The Count of Paris, however, who is generally conceded to be entirely reliable, estimates Stuart's force as considerably greater than the Confederate estimate. It is needless to say that had not Stuart been defeated in his purpose and driven back, the results of the battle of Gettysburg would have been entirely different from what they were.

But this brilliant affair behind the Federal right was not the only occasion in which their cavalry did excellent service during the series of engagements upon this historic field. The left was the scene of the following dash upon the foe. General Longstreet had given orders to that part of his corps which was opposite Round Top, to make a demonstration upon that position for the purpose of preventing reinforcements being sent from there to meet Pickett's charge. In accordance with this order, the brigades of Benning, Robertson, and Law advanced to the attack, when they were unexpectedly called to meet a dash of the Federal cavalry. The brigades of Farnsworth and Merritt, accompanied by Graham's and Elder's batteries, under the gallant Kilpatrick, came sweeping around Big Round Top, screaming and yelling like demons, and dashed upon the astonished foe. A terrific fight ensued in which General Farnsworth was killed. He had been promoted to the command of a brigade on the Sunday previous, at General Meade's request, and now thus early fell at the head of his brave troopers. Kilpatrick not only came near capturing Longstreet's ammunition train, but compelled the troops, who were advancing towards

Round Top, to fall back to protect their own flank. It is altogether likely, too, that this dash upon the Confederate flank, prevented any part of the forces there from participating in the great attack upon the Federal left center. Of course two brigades of cavalry could not be expected to accomplish much against a greatly superior number of veteran infantry, such as these troopers met on that occasion, but having accomplished what has been stated, Kilpatrick withdrew.

Shortly after the repulse of Pickett, General Meade rode down to Round Top, and seeing the enemy in front, and learning that they had been annoying his men by their fire, he ordered the Pennsylvania Reserves to charge upon them. Colonel McCandless, who still occupied the position he had seized and fortified the evening before, dashed across the Wheat Field and into the woods beyond. The Confederates fled before him. Bartlett's brigade of the Sixth Corps advanced to the position reached by McCandless, and other troops were moved up on the right. The panic created by the repulse of Pickett seemed to have seized upon the enemy upon this part of the line, for they fled before the Reserves, leaving three hundred prisoners, one stand of colors, and five thousand stands of arms in their possession. The Confederates, although greatly outnumbering the Reserves, fell back nearly a mile, and the ground lost by Sickles the day before was recovered, with the wounded of the battle of the day previous, that had lain there uncared for.

With this brilliant and successful charge by the Pennsylvania Reserves the battle of Gettysburg was ended; and it is but right that while heroic and patriotic men



from many of the states of the Union participated in this decisive engagement, its closing and final charge should be made by the gallant sons of the state upon whose soil it was fought.

The plan decided upon by General Lee for the battle of this day, was evidently not carried out. This will appear in the following statements. General Lee, in his report of the campaign, speaking of this day, says:

“The result of this day’s operations (Thursday, July 2d,) induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the position gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed; and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett’s three brigades, which arrived near the battle field the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning; and General Ewell was directed to assault the enemy’s right at the same time.”

The following facts are clear from the statement of General Lee:

1. The attack upon the Federal left center was to have been made *simultaneously with Ewell’s assault upon the right*.
2. It was to take place *in the morning*, and not in the afternoon.
3. It was to have been made with the two divisions of Longstreet’s Corps previously upon the field—Hood’s and McLaws’—*reinforced by Pickett*.

Why, now, was not this arrangement of the commanding general carried into execution? As in the delay of the previous day, so in the departure from General Lee’s or-



ders in this, the blame is laid upon General Longstreet. Colonel W. H. Taylor, of General Lee's staff, in *Annals of the War*, page 312-316, says:

"General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected. It appears that he was delayed by apprehensions that his troops would be taken in reverse as they advanced. General Ewell, who had orders to co-operate with General Longstreet, and who was, of course, not aware of any impediment to the main attack arranged to be made on the enemy's left, having reinforced General Johnson, whose division was upon our extreme left, during the night of the 2d, ordered him forward early the next morning. In obedience to these instructions, General Johnson became hotly engaged before General Ewell could be informed of the halt which had been called on our right. After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his intrenchments, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of General Johnson, and finally, to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position. General Lee then had a conference with General Longstreet, and the mode of attack, and the troops to make it, were thoroughly debated. I was present, and understood the arrangement to be that General Longstreet should endeavor to force the enemy's line in his front. That front was held by the divisions of Hood and McLaws. To strengthen him for the undertaking, it was decided to reinforce him by such troops as could be drawn from the

center. Pickett's division of Longstreet's Corps was then up, fresh and available. Heth's division of Hill's Corps was also mentioned as available, having been, in a great measure, recuperated since its active engagement of the first day; so, also, were the brigades of Lane and Scales, of Pender's division, Hill's Corps; and as our extreme right was comparatively safe, being well posted, and not at all threatened, one of the divisions of Hood and McLaws, and the greater portion of the other, could be removed out of the lines and be made to take part in the attack. Indeed, it was designed, originally, that the two divisions last named, reinforced by Pickett, should make the attack; and it was only because of the apprehensions of General Longstreet that his corps was not strong enough for the movement, that General Hill was called on to reinforce him. Orders were sent to General Hill to place Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's at General Longstreet's disposal, and to be prepared to give him further assistance if requested. The assault was to have been made with a column of not less than two divisions, and the remaining divisions were to have been moved forward in support of those in advance. This was the result of the conference alluded to, as understood by me. Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill appears to have had the same impression, for he says in his report of the operations of his corps at this time: 'I was directed to hold my line with Anderson's division and the half of Pender's, now commanded by General Lane, and to order Heth's division, commanded by Pettigrew, and Lane's and Scales' brigades, of Pender's division, to report to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, *as a support to his corps*, in the assault

on the enemy's lines.' \* \* \* No more could be expected, or expected, of those men of brave hearts and nerves of steel; but where are their supports to reap the benefit of their heroic efforts, and gather the fruits of a victory so nobly won? Was that but a forlorn hope, on whose success, not only in penetrating the enemy's lines, but in maintaining its hold against their combined and united efforts to dislodge it, an entire army was to wait in quiet observation? Was it designed to throw these few brigades—originally, at the most, but two divisions,—upon the fortified stronghold of the enemy, while, full half a mile away, seven ninths of the army, in breathless suspense, in ardent admiration and fearful anxiety, watched, but moved not? I maintain that such was not the design of the commanding general. Had the veteran divisions of Hood and McLaws been moved forward, as was planned, in support of those of Pickett and Pettigrew, not only would the latter division, in all probability, have gained the enemy's works, as did that of Pickett, but these two would have been enabled, with the aid of Hood and McLaws, to resist all efforts of the enemy to dislodge them. \* \* \* It appears that General Longstreet deemed it necessary to defend his right flank and rear with the divisions of McLaws and Hood. These divisions, as before stated, constituted all of the Confederate line held by Longstreet's troops, and it is not apparent how they were necessary to defend his flank and rear. The nearest infantry force of the enemy, to our right, occupied the hills—Round Top and Little Round Top—and the only force that could be said to threaten our flank and rear consisted of a few brigades of cavalry, so posted as to protect the enemy's left.

It is not my purpose here to undertake to establish the wisdom of an attack on the enemy's position on the third day, which General Longstreet contends was opposed to his judgment, and of which he says he would have stayed the execution, had he felt that he had the privilege so to do; nor do I propose to discuss the necessities of the position, which he represents to have been such as to forbid the employment of McLaws' and Hood's divisions in the attack; neither do I seek any other than a just explanation of the causes of our failure at that time; but well recalling my surprise and disappointment when it was ascertained that only Pickett's division, and the troops from Hill's Corps had taken part in the movement, and with positively distinct impressions as to the occurrences just related, I deem it proper to record them for confirmation or refutation as the undisputed facts of the case, and the testimony of others, may determine."

In justice to General Longstreet I place on record here what he has said in reply to the serious charges of Colonel Taylor. This reply will be found in *Annals of the War*, pages 431, 432. General Longstreet says:

"I may mention here that it has been absurdly said that General Lee ordered me to put Hood's and McLaws' divisions in support of Pickett's assault. General Lee never ordered any such thing. After our troops were all arranged for assault, General Lee rode with me twice over the lines to see that everything was arranged according to his wishes. He was told that we had been more particular in giving the orders than ever before; that the commanders had been sent for, and the point of attack had been carefully designated, and that the commanders had been

directed to communicate to their subordinates, and through them to every soldier in the command, the work that was before them, so that they would nerve themselves for the attack, and fully understand it. After leaving me, he again rode over the field once, if not twice, so that there was really no room for misconstruction or misunderstanding of his wishes. He could not have thought of giving any such an order. Hood and McLaws were confronted by a largely superior force of the enemy on the right of Pickett's attack. To have moved them to Pickett's support, would have disengaged treble their own number of Federals, who would have swooped down from their rocky fortresses against the flank of our attacking column, and swept our army from the field."

In a foot-note to the same article from which the foregoing has been taken, General Longstreet further says:

"Colonel Taylor says that General Lee, in his presence, gave me orders to put Hood's and McLaws' divisions in this column of attack. This I deny, and do not suppose he will claim that any one else heard the order. If the reader will examine any of the maps of Gettysburg, he will see that the withdrawal of these two divisions from their line of battle would have left half of General Lee's line of battle open, and by the shortest route to his line of supplies and retreat. Fully one half of his army would have been in the column of assault, and half of Meade's army would have been free to sally out on the flank of our column, and we should have been destroyed on that field of battle, beyond a doubt. \* \* The only way for these divisions to have been moved, was to have attacked the heights in front. But this attack had been tried, and

failed the day before. If Pickett had shown signs of getting a lodgment, I should, of course, have pushed the other divisions forward to support the attack. But I saw that he was going to pieces at once. \* \* To have rushed forward my two divisions, then carrying bloody noses from their terrible conflict the day before, would have been madness."

In this conflict of statements in regard to this subject, the only authority that could settle the question would be General Lee himself. He, however, has gone, but he has left a brief but significant remark, made to General Imboden during the night after the battle of this day, which seems to decide against General Longstreet. General Imboden, in an article contributed by him to the *Galaxy* of April, 1871, says that the night after this battle (Friday, July 3d, 1863,) he met General Lee in the rear of his line. After describing the General's fatigued and depressed condition, and detailing some conversation which passed between them, General Imboden says that Lee addressed him thus: "General, I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett's division of Virginians did to-day in their grand charge upon the enemy. *And if they had been supported, as they were to have been,—but, for some reason not yet fully explained to me, they were not,—*we would have held the position they so gloriously won at such a fearful loss of noble lives, and the day would have been ours."

Whether charged rightly or wrongly with delaying the attack of this day as he clearly did delay the assault of the day before, and with failing to make it with the whole of the force that Lee intended and ordered, one thing is certain,—General Longstreet disapproved of making the

attack at all, and when forced by the command of his superior to make it, he did so with the utmost reluctance and fully assured of its hopelessness. This he does not attempt to conceal. The subject is so important that I transcribe here the General's own statement in *Annals of the War*, pages 429-431. General Longstreet says:

“Our artillery was in charge of General E. P. Alexander, a brave and gifted officer. Colonel Walton was my chief of artillery; but Alexander being at the head of the column, and being first in position, and being, beside, an officer of unusual promptness, sagacity, and intelligence, was given charge of the artillery. The arrangements were completed about one o'clock. General Alexander had arranged that a battery of seven eleven-pound howitzers, with fresh horses and full caissons, were to charge with Pickett, at the head of his line, but General Pendleton, from whom the guns had been borrowed, recalled them just before the charge was made, and thus deranged this wise plan. Never was I so depressed as upon that day. I felt that my men were to be sacrificed, and that I should have to order them to make a hopeless charge. I had instructed General Alexander, being unwilling to trust myself with the entire responsibility, to carefully observe the effect of the fire upon the enemy, and when it began to tell to notify Pickett to begin the assault. I was so much impressed with the hopelessness of the charge, that I wrote the following note to General Alexander: ‘If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our efforts pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise General Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on

your judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let Pickett know when the moment offers.' To my note the General replied as follows: 'I will only be able to judge the effect of our fire upon the enemy by his return fire, for his infantry is but little exposed to view, and the smoke will obscure the whole field. If, as I infer from your note, there is an alternative to this attack, it should be carefully considered before opening our fire, for it will take all of the artillery ammunition we have left to test this one thoroughly; and, if the result is unfavorable, we will have none left for another effort; and, even if this is entirely successful, it can only be at a very bloody cost.' I still desired to save my men, and felt that if the artillery did not produce the desired effect, I would be justified in holding Pickett off. I wrote this note to Colonel Walton at exactly half past one P. M.: 'Let the batteries open. Order great precision in firing. If the batteries at the Peach Orchard can not be used against the point we intend attacking, let them open on the enemy at Rocky Hill (Round Top).' The cannonading which opened along both lines was grand. In a few moments a courier brought a note to General Pickett (who was standing near me) from Alexander, which, after reading he handed to me. It was as follows: 'If you are coming at all, you must come at once, or I can not give you proper support; but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all; at least eighteen guns are still firing from the Cemetery itself.' After I had read this note, Pickett said to me, 'General, shall I advance?' My feelings had so overcome me that I would not speak, for fear of betraying my want of confidence to him. I bowed affirmation, and turned to mount my horse.



Pickett immediately said, 'I shall lead my division forward, sir.' I spurred my horse to the wood where Alexander was stationed with artillery. When I reached him, he told me of the disappearance of the seven guns which were to have led the charge with Pickett, and that his ammunition was so low that he could not properly support the charge. I at once ordered him to stop Pickett until the ammunition had been replenished. He informed me that he had no ammunition with which to replenish. I then saw that there was no help for it, and that Pickett must advance under his orders. He swept past our artillery in splendid style, and the men marched steadily and compactly down the slope. As they started up the ridge, over one hundred cannon from the breast-works of the Federals hurled a rain of canister, grape, and shell down upon them; still they pressed on until half way up the slope, when the crest of the hill was lit with a solid sheet of flame as the masses of infantry rose and fired. When the smoke cleared away, Pickett's division was gone. Nearly two thirds of his men lay dead on the field, and the survivors were sullenly retreating down the hill. Mortal man could not have stood that fire. In half an hour the contested field was cleared, and the battle of Gettysburg was over."

When Pickett's great charge was repulsed, all of the men that had engaged in it, and were not killed, wounded, or captured, went streaming back to their own line. There they were met and rallied by their officers, with the view to be in readiness for a counter charge, which all supposed would certainly follow. The condition of the Confederates at that part of their line is thus given by Colonel

Freemantle,—the English officer previously referred to,—in *Blackwood's Magazine* of September, 1863:

“I soon began to meet many wounded men returning from the front; many of them asked in piteous tones the way to a doctor, or an ambulance. The further I got the greater became the number of the wounded. At last I came to a perfect stream of them flocking through the woods in numbers as great as the crowd in Oxford Street in the middle of the day. \* \* They were still under a heavy fire; the shells were continually bringing down great limbs of trees, and carrying further destruction amongst their melancholy procession. I saw all this in less time than it takes to write it, and although astonished to meet such a vast number of wounded, I had not seen enough to give an idea of the real extent of the mischief.

“When I got close up to General Longstreet, I saw one of his regiments advancing through the woods in good order; so, thinking I was just in time to see the attack, I remarked to the General that ‘I wouldn’t have missed this for anything.’ Longstreet was seated on the top of a snake-fence, in the edge of the wood, and looking perfectly calm and unperturbed. He replied, ‘The d——l you wouldn’t! I would like to have missed it very much; we’ve attacked and been repulsed. Look there!’ For the first time I then had a view of the open space between the two positions, and saw it covered with Confederates slowly and sulkily returning towards us in small broken parties. \* \* I remember seeing a general (Pettigrew I think it was) come up to him and report that he was unable to bring his men up again. Longstreet turned upon him and replied with some sarcasm: ‘Very well, never mind, then,

General; just let them remain where they are. The enemy is going to advance, and will spare you the trouble.' \* \* \* Soon afterward I joined General Lee, who had in the meanwhile come to the front, on becoming aware of the disaster. He was engaged in rallying and in encouraging the troops, and was riding about a little in front of the woods quite alone, the whole of his staff being engaged in a similar manner further to the rear. His face, which is always placid and cheerful, did not show signs of the slightest disappointment, care, or annoyance; and he was addressing to every soldier he met a few words of encouragement, such as, 'All this will come right in the end; we will talk it over afterwards,—but in the meantime all good men must rally. We want all good men and true men just now,' etc. \* \* He said to me, 'This has been a sad day for us, Colonel,—a sad day; but we can't expect always to gain victories.' \* \* I saw General Wilcox (an officer who wears a short round jacket and a battered straw hat) come up to him, and explain, almost crying, the state of his brigade. General Lee immediately shook hands with him, and said, cheerfully, 'Never mind, General. All this has been my fault,—it is I that have lost the fight, and you must help me out of it in the best way you can.' "

Captain Owen, from whom I have previously quoted, gives the following account of what transpired within the Confederate lines after Pickett's repulse, and the demoralization among the men which prevailed. Owen's account is as follows: "Colonel Freemantle says, 'General Lee rode among Pickett's men after the repulse, and with a few kindly words rallied the broken troops; that he saw many men with an empty sleeve seize a musket and turn readily

into line; that there was less noise and confusion than on an ordinary review.' Here are the facts of this rally of Pickett's division. An attempt was made on the brow of Seminary Ridge, in front of the Confederate batteries, by a couple of officers, to rally the fugitives, but the effort (under a heavy cross-fire from both sides) failed, and then commenced a rout that soon increased to a stampede and almost demoralization of all the survivors of this noted charge without distinction of regiments or commands.

"A few hundred yards behind the Confederate batteries there is a ravine along which runs a country road that makes at one place an abrupt angle by turning or bending to the left. At this point there is a bluff on one side and a slight swamp on the other, creating a narrow pass through which the fugitives, without distinction of rank, officers and privates side by side, pushed, poured and rushed in a continuous stream, throwing away guns, blankets, and haversacks as they hurried on in confusion toward the rear. Here another effort was made to rally the broken troops, and all sorts of appeals and threats made to officers and men who turned a deaf ear and hurried on, some of the officers even jerking loose with an oath from the hand laid on their shoulders to attract attention. At last a few privates hearkening to the appeals halted and formed a nucleus around which about thirty others soon rallied, and with these a picket was formed across the road as a barrier to further retreat and the stream of stragglers dammed up several hundred strong.

"General Pickett came down from the direction of the battle-field weeping bitterly, and said to the officer commanding the picket: 'Don't stop any of my men. Tell

them to come to the camp we occupied last night;' and passed on himself alone toward the rear. Other officers passed by, but the picket was retained at this point until Major Charles Marshall came galloping up from the rear, and inquired what this guard was for and who placed it here; and finding the officer without orders, he moved the picket back a few hundred yards and extended the line along the stream or little creek found there. Here the guard did duty until sundown, arresting all stragglers from the battle-field, and Colonel Marshall took them forward himself, with no other help, to where General Lee was on the field, and it was to these men that Colonel Freemantle heard General Lee address his kindly words, but none of them had empty sleeves, as all the wounded were allowed to pass to the rear. When Colonel Marshall first came up to the picket across the road he had come from a point still farther in rear, where he had been sent by General Lee to rally the stragglers, if possible, and failing to do so was returning to report to General Lee. Colonel Marshall came down several times before sundown after the stragglers collected by the picket, and carried up to the field probably a total of four or five hundred men during the evening."

There is a difference of opinion among those who participated in the battle of Gettysburg, as well as among historians who have written of that engagement since, as to whether or not Pickett's repulse should have been followed by a counter-charge by the Federal forces. As it is simply a question of opinion, it may be well to give here the views expressed by the following eminent persons:

General Longstreet says: "When this charge failed, I

expected that, of course, the enemy would throw himself against our shattered ranks and try to crush us. I sent my staff officers to the rear to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried to our line of batteries, as the only support that I could give them, knowing that my presence would impress upon every one of them the necessity of holding the ground to the last extremity. I knew if the army was to be saved, those batteries must check the enemy. \* \* \* The enemy's skirmishers were then advancing and threatening assault. For unaccountable reasons, the enemy did not pursue his advantage."\*

In his second contribution to the same work from which the foregoing is taken (page 627), General Longstreet further says:

"The charge (Pickett's) was disastrous, and had the Federal army been thrown right upon the heels of Pickett's retreating column, the results might have been much more serious."

Mr. Swinton, in his "History of the Army of the Potomac," quotes General Longstreet somewhat differently. Mr. Swinton says:

"I have become convinced from the testimony of General Longstreet himself, that that attack would have resulted disastrously. 'I had,' said that officer to the writer, 'Hood and McLaws, who had not been engaged; I had a heavy force of artillery; I should have liked nothing better than to have been attacked, and have no doubt I should have given those who tried as bad a reception as Pickett received.'"

General Alexander, the same officer to whom General

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\* Annals of the War, page 431.

Longstreet referred to in a previous quotation, as having charge of his artillery, says in a communication to the "Southern Historical Papers":

"I have always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest opportunity they ever had of routing Lee's army by a prompt offensive. They occupied a line shaped somewhat like a horse-shoe. I suppose the greatest diameter of this horse-shoe was not more than one mile, and the ground within was entirely sheltered from our observation and fire, with communications by signals all over it, and they could concentrate their whole force at any point and in a very short time without our knowledge. Our line was an enveloping semi-circle, over four miles in development, and communication from flank to flank, even by courier, was difficult, the country being well cleared and exposed to the enemy's view and fire, the roads all running at right angles to our lines, and some of them at least broad turnpikes, where the enemy's guns could rake for two miles. Is it necessary now to add any statement as to the superiority of the Federal force, or the exhausted and shattered condition of the Confederates for a space of at least a mile in their very center, to show that a great opportunity was thrown away? I think General Lee himself was quite apprehensive that the enemy would *riposte*, and that it was that apprehension which brought him alone out to my guns, where he could observe all the indications."

General Trimble, who commanded a division of Hill's Corps, which supported Pickett in his charge, says:

"By all the rules of warfare the Federal troops should (as I expected they would) have marched against our shat-

tered columns and sought to cover our army with overwhelming defeat."

The views of Federal officers are as follows. General Doubleday says:

"When Pickett's charge was repulsed, and the whole plain covered with fugitives, we all expected that Wellington's command at Waterloo of, 'Up, guards, and at them!' would be repeated, and that a grand counter-charge would be made. But General Meade had made no arrangements to give a return thrust. It seems to me that he should have posted the Sixth and part of the Twelfth corps in rear of Gibbon's division the moment Pickett's infantry were seen emerging from the woods, a mile and a half off. If they broke through our center these corps would have been there to receive them, and if they failed to pierce our line and retreated, the two corps could have followed them up promptly before they had time to rally and reorganize. An advance by Sykes would have kept Longstreet in position. In all probability we would have cut the enemy's army in two, and captured the long line of batteries opposite us, which were but slightly guarded."\*

General Hancock, whose brilliant services during this great engagement and elsewhere, justly entitle him to the honorable distinction of "the superb soldier," subsequently bestowed upon him, favored a counter-charge. Lying wounded in an ambulance, he penned a few lines to General Meade, recommending that it be done.†

General Howard, too, favored an immediate advance upon the enemy. In an article in the *Atlantic Monthly*,

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\* General Doubleday's "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 202.

† General Doubleday's "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 202.



this excellent officer says that the fearful exposure to which General Meade was subjected during the nearly two hours of terrific cannonading preparatory to the charge, seemed to have confused him so that he did not at first realize the victory he had won, and therefore he failed to follow up the advantage gained.

General Pleasanton says:

"From the suddenness of the repulse of the last charge on July 3d, it became necessary for General Meade to decide at once what to do. I rode up to him, and, after congratulating him on the splendid conduct of the army, I said: 'General, I will give you half an hour to show yourself a great general. Order the army to advance, while I will take the cavalry and get in Lee's rear, and we will finish the campaign in a week.' He replied: 'How do you know Lee will not attack me again; we have done well enough.' I replied that Lee had exhausted all his available men; that the cannonade of the last two days had exhausted his ammunition; he was far from his base of supplies; and by compelling him to keep his army together, they must soon surrender, for he was living on the country. To this the general did not reply, but asked me to ride up to Round Top with him; and, as we rode along the ridge for nearly a mile, the troops cheered him in a manner that plainly showed they expected the advance."

Horace Greeley, in his "American Conflict," volume II., page 388, presents the other side of this question in the following language:

"Nor is General Meade justly blamable for not pushing forward at once on the heels of his beaten foes. Around him lay nearly or quite one fourth of his army killed or

wounded; he knew that his own ammunition was running low; he *did not* know that Lee's was even more completely exhausted. If he had ordered a general advance, and been repelled from Seminary Ridge by such a fire as had met and crushed the Confederate assailants of Cemetery Hill, he would have been reproached as rash and foolhardy by many who have deemed him deficient in courage and heartiness because he did not make the Union a Fourth of July present of the remnant of Lee's army."

Colonel James C. Biddle, in *Annals of the War*, pages 215, 216, says:

"It had been General Meade's intention to order a general advance from our left, after the close of the action; but, owing to the lateness of the hour, and the wearied condition of the army, with a 'wisdom that did guide his valor to act in safety,' he abandoned the movement he contemplated. For this he has been severely censured. \* \* General Meade was not in the least 'demoralized' by the enemy's fire, but realized fully the exact condition of affairs. Lee had been repulsed, not routed, and, if Meade had yielded to his own inclination to attack, he would have been repulsed himself, and would thus have thrown away the fruits of his great victory."

General McLaws, in an article contributed by him to the *Philadelphia Weekly Press*, of April 21st, 1886, says:

"Some have asserted the belief that if General Meade had assaulted immediately after 'Pickett's charge' he would have gained an easy victory. I can see no reason for such an opinion. It was a saying of General Jackson, based on his observation of results in many encounters, 'that our men sometimes fail to drive the enemy from

their positions, but they always fail to drive us from our positions.'

"For General Meade to have made an assault with sufficient force to have gained a victory over Lee's army, just after Pickett's repulse, following Pickett's men, it would have been necessary for him to have known beforehand where the assault was to be made, to know that General Lee had no preparations to assault elsewhere, and to have given orders to his commanders that in the event of Pickett's repulse an immediate advance was to be made by his army. But could General Meade know that only his center was to be assaulted? Could he believe that after a grand artillery display of hours, calling his attention to the preparations for an assault *somewhere*, that in the middle of the day his left center was to be the point of attack, and that it was to be made by two divisions only, one coming after, but not following the other, and with their flanks unprotected? Had General Meade any reason to think that there was nothing else to follow?

"Was it not more reasonable for him to suppose that the force in the woods opposite his left, which, on the day before, had made such a 'terrific attack,' would take part in the engagement?

\* \* \* \* \*

"He could see Pickett coming for at least a half mile over an open country, and had every reason to think that it was a demonstration to cover some other and more formidable and better arranged assault, for it was not reasonable to suppose that General Lee expected to defeat his army with two divisions, coming one on the left of the other, each in line, but one in the rear, without support

and being pelted with over two hundred guns from the flanks and in front from the moment it formed while on the march until it reached his works,—all this, besides the work of destruction in its flanks from the infantry fire. I repeat that General Meade had every reason to think that something more serious than this was to follow, and to come at once or very soon, and it was but an act of good judgment for him to keep his troops couchant, waiting the *denouement*.

“That nothing else came, that no other assault was made, is no reason why an attempt should be made to blame General Meade for not attacking in turn. For if he had followed Pickett’s flying troops with a large portion of his force he would have given his flanks to that force in the woods, the amount of which he could not know; but it was his good reason to think, when seeing the composition of that attacking his left center that a very large force was there concentrated, and besides he would have attempted to do that which the Confederates had failed to do; that is, assault his enemy in position without due preparation, and his advance would have been over the same open country and exposed to the fire of over two hundred guns.

“I have stated that unless orders had been given beforehand for a general advance, should Pickett’s assault prove a failure, no movement could have been made in time and with sufficient force to meet the occasion. Such has not been the practice in war. It is not among the possibilities. I do not recollect of an instance in our war, when an assault on any position of the enemy’s line having been made, the enemy being in position entrenched to receive

an attack, had risen *en masse* on failure of that assault and attacked the whole opposing army, nor was it ever done by our own troops. There are doubtless numerous instances when the troops immediately opposed to the assaulting forces have rushed out and made a short pursuit, but that is done on an impulse and with small bodies without previous orders from commanding general and never amounts to a general movement.

“In the charge of Federals against Jackson’s line at Fredericksburg, when that charge failed, and it failed for the same reason our assaults failed at Gettysburg,—that is, because there was not a supporting force ample to take advantage of the first success and push it,—it was expected that Jackson’s force, the whole force, would have jumped forward in pursuit, and in the language of the time, ‘Drive the enemy into the river.’ But it was not done. I was on Lee’s Hill, looking at the retiring Federals, and saw but Hoke’s North Carolina Brigade dash out in pursuit; but it, being unsupported, returned after going a short distance. I have read that some of General Early’s command did the same as Hoke’s, but I could not see that part of the line. The truth is, it is an impossibility for different commands to co-operate in such a contingency depending on so many chances. General Lee, with his point of attack selected hours beforehand, with his intentions well known to his staff, to the corps commanders, to those who were to take part in the assault, and to others, failed to get the co-operation needed, even with the two divisions engaged in the charge on the 3d of July.

“On the 2d of July General Lee reports that General

Longstreet was ordered to place the divisions of McLaws and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was to drive in, etc. No time was stated, but he evidently intended that it should be done much earlier than it was done, and General Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should an opportunity offer. But it seems that there was a want of co-operation between the corps, and we read that Early fell back from his assault for want of expected support.

"It would thus appear that if General Lee, with his points of attack agreed upon beforehand and known to all concerned, failed to get co-operation between his different commands, General Meade, who could not say where the attack was to be made or what would be the result, could not give orders in advance, of that private nature which could possibly secure co-operation among his commanders.

"And even if orders had been given before the assault to be prepared to advance, should the intended assaults be unsuccessful, the commanding general alone would be the judge of the situation. He alone could give orders, when and how to move the different commands, and to send staff officers to conduct the troops to the positions they would be called on suddenly to take. This would cause so much delay, and probably so much confusion, as the accidents of war would have changed many commanders, some incompetent, that it would be nearly impossible to make a successful attack, for enough time would be consumed for the Confederates to have regained their defensive lines, reorganized and recuperated, and be prepared

for an attack, and to be assaulted was just what General Lee wanted.

“The failure of ‘Pickett’s charge’ was not the defeat of General Lee’s army. The assaulting column was not greater than that under Longstreet on the 2d.

“The Confederate army was not in retreat, but was now in their turn ‘at bay,’ waiting in position and eager for an assault to be made, and waited all of the 4th wishing for it, and the army had about enough ammunition on hand for another battle, but none to waste on experiments, and thus could not make another assault.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Therefore, it looks as if General Lee, while ordering an assault, had great hopes that he might be assaulted in turn, as he was ready for it, and believed that if one was made it would have been disastrous to the Federals.

“I think that the record of that battle will warrant the assertion that General Lee was not at any time during it unprepared for an attack on his lines, and that on the 3d, during and after Pickett’s charge, he was stronger on the defensive than at any other time.”

Mr. Thomas Robins, jr., in the same paper, of April 18th, says: “Between four and five o’clock on the evening of July 3d the last shot was fired by General Webb’s Philadelphia brigade, and the men composing the Confederate assaulting column against the Federal center were either retreating across the Ennibtsburg road or rushing into the Federal lines with hands thrown above their heads as a sign of surrender. At that moment General Meade rode up to the spot. His staff was scattered in all directions in quest of reinforcements to strengthen the threatened point,

and the General was accompanied only by his son, who was serving as his aid. The whole field was covered with smoke, through which the combatants could be seen indistinctly moving backwards and forwards. General Meade was unable to see whether or not the enemy had been repulsed, and, turning to an officer who commanded a section of Woodruff's battery, he inquired of him whether the assaulting column had turned. The officer answered that the Confederates were just about turning, and, in proof of this, pointed to General Alexander Hays, commanding the third division of the Second Corps, who was waving a captured flag. The commanding general, however, soon had a more convincing demonstration of the fact, for within a minute he was surrounded by a howling mob of Confederate prisoners who recognized him as an officer of authority who could tell them where to go to escape from the fire of their own guns.

"General Meade, having satisfied himself that the assault was repulsed, turned, and rode to the summit of Cemetery Hill to ascertain whether the Confederates had renewed upon the right wing the desperate assaults of the evening before. At the Cemetery he was soon surrounded by a large cavalcade of officers, who came to offer their congratulations and to ascertain his intentions. He found that the enemy had undertaken no active operations against either the Cemetery or Culp's Hill. The decision of General Meade was quickly made. He determined to make an assault against the Confederate right wing, which the repulse of Pickett had left exposed, and to endeavor to break it before the gap in the lines, caused by the destruction of the Virginia division, could be closed up. Having



formed this resolution, the General proceeded in person to give the necessary orders to General Sykes, who was in command of the Fifth Corps. This corps was posted in the vicinity of the Round Tops; and General Meade, followed by a large number of officers, rode out in front of the lines, and proceeded at a hard gallop along the entire Federal front. The effect upon the men was electrical. The enthusiastic cheers of the entire army greeted this appeal to their enthusiasm; and the effect upon the dispirited Confederates is mentioned by Colonel Freemantle, of the British Guards, who accompanied General Longstreet during the campaign.

“Arriving on Little Round Top, General Meade personally directed General Sykes to advance his corps across the same country which had been fought over the day before, and to attack the divisions of Hood and McLaws, which formed the extreme right wing of the Confederate army. General Meade’s action in ordering this attack from the left instead of advancing from the center of his line has been sharply criticised; but its wisdom is beyond question. To advance over the same ground as that covered in Pickett’s charge would have been only a repetition of the Confederate General’s mistake. Any one who has seen the ground can not but recognize the danger of such an operation. Commanded as it is by Seminary Ridge in front, and by the high ground in the neighborhood of the Peach Orchard on the flank, the plain between the lines of the two armies is a veritable death trap for an assaulting column from either. As the writer knows from personal experience, the distance between the two ridges can not be covered by brisk walking in less than twenty

minutes, and, allowing for halts to reform broken lines and to clear away obstructions, not less than half an hour would have been occupied in advancing an assaulting column from Ziegler's Grove to the Confederate position. In that time an advancing column would have been simply annihilated. Besides, as Swinton points out in his 'Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,' the necessity of strengthening the point at which Pickett's charge was directed led to the mixing up of brigades, divisions, and corps to such a degree that an organized advance from the center immediately after the repulse of Pickett was quite impossible.

"On the left, however, the advance of an assaulting column is more or less covered by woods and inequalities in the ground, and it is probable that, had the assault been made promptly, General Lee would have suffered severely, and might have lost much of his artillery. What General Meade said to General Sykes is not known. No record of it exists. This much, however, is certain: That the assault was not made in force sufficient to accomplish decisive results. General Warren, Meade's chief engineer, who was in his confidence, and who was probably present at the time when the order was given to General Sykes, states positively in his testimony before the Congressional Committee on the conduct of the war that it was General Meade's intention to move forward all the forces he could get in line and assault the enemy in turn. What prevented this assault? We have the answer at hand in General Warren's testimony. 'Many officers were killed and wounded,' he says. 'We were much shattered in this respect, and there was a tone among most of the prominent

officers that we had quite saved the country for the time, and that we had done enough; that we might jeopardize all that we had won by trying to do too much.'

"All that was done in pursuance of General Meade's orders was a gallant advance by the division of Pennsylvania Reserves against General Hood's position. This attack resulted in the recapture of the battle-field of the second, together with a number of prisoners. Darkness then put an end to the movement."

Mr. J. R. Sypher, in his "History of the Pennsylvania Reserves," page 471, says:

"As soon as General Meade saw that success attended his troops in the center, he rode to the left to order an advance in support of the Reserves, who had marched so promptly in obedience to his instructions. It was nearly sunset, and before the forces could be sufficiently concentrated to make a charge on the right flank of the enemy, darkness ensued, and it was too late to follow up the victory."

It was not too late to accomplish decisive results by a vigorous charge upon the Confederate right, as Mr. Sypher seems to suppose, for nearly three hours of daylight yet remained; nor were the troops, who would have led in the charge, too much wearied, for the Sixth Corps had scarcely been engaged during all the day, and the Fifth had been but little engaged. Had an advance been made from the Federal left center directly upon the heels of the retreating foe, success might have resulted, but only at a fearful cost of life. But had it been made from the left, as it seems General Meade contemplated, by the Pennsylvania Reserves, backed by the remainder of the Fifth Corps and

the whole of the Sixth, all of whom were within convenient distance, the discomfiture and rout, if not the entire destruction of the Confederate army would most likely have been effected. That such might have been the result, had the advance been made from the left, seems to be assured in the fact that the enemy fled before the Reserves, in the charge made upon them, with scarcely any resistance. This probability is further strengthened in the following statement made to General Crawford by Colonel Semmes, who commanded a Georgia brigade in the engagement with the Reserves already referred to.

Colonel Semmes, says: "There was much confusion in our army so far as my observation extended, and I think we would have made but feeble resistance if you had pressed on, on the evening of the third."

General Meade, it should be remembered, had been in chief command of the army but six days. The responsibility which was thrust upon him was great indeed. A false step at the juncture under consideration would have resulted most disastrously. He had to decide, not simply for the time, nor for the army under his command, but for the whole country, for the Government, and for all time to come. If he did not possess, as some have alleged, the grasp of mind, the quickness of comprehension, which are essential in great commanders when called upon to meet sudden emergencies, and decide upon important movements, he at least should be judged for what he had done, not for what some think he should have done. In the case under consideration he doubtless saw and felt the importance of some counter action, but his caution, his inclination to be on the safe side, led him to defer the order

for an aggressive movement until he had further tested the matter, and in the seemingly justifiable delay the opportunity for its successful accomplishment passed away. Perhaps he acted wisely in not putting in jeopardy all he had already gained, but great results are seldom gained except by great risks. Had Grant, or Sherman, or Sheridan, or some other commander been in General Meade's position, the risk might have been taken, and the results might have justified it. If failure had followed, their names would not shine as brightly in history as does that of General George G. Meade.

The battle of Gettysburg, as is universally conceded, was the turning point in the great war of the rebellion, for from it the ultimate failure of the cause for which the South fought was assured. And as that battle was the culmination, the crisis of the war, so the last great effort of the Confederate chieftain, when he hurled fifteen thousand of his choicest troops against the Federal line, was the culmination, the supreme crisis of that battle. The rebellion at that point reached its high-water mark, and from that period it gradually receded. That charge, then, was the supreme crisis in our country's history, and the turning point in its destiny. It failed, and with its failure the fact was demonstrated that a government founded upon oppression and wrong, could not succeed in the light of the civilization and Christianity of this age. The Republic was saved, redeemed, baptized, and consecrated anew to the coming ages.

It is a singular coincidence that the rebellion should receive its most decisive defeat in the east and west at the same time; for the same shadow on the dial which marked

the time of the crushing overthrow at Gettysburg, also indicated a similar event in the great drama twelve hundred miles away at Vicksburg.

The casualties of the two armies during the three days of battle, are officially stated by a publication from the adjutant-general's office, Washington, bearing date, 1886, as follows:

CASUALTIES OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

COMMAND.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
General Head-quarters.....	.....	.....	2	2	.....	.....	4
First Army Corps.....	42	551	257	2,952	82	2,140	6,024
Second Army Corps.....	67	729	269	2,917	13	355	4,350
Third Army Corps .....	50	528	251	2,775	14	592	4,210
Fifth Army Corps.....	28	337	129	1,482	1	210	2,187
Sixth Army Corps. ....	2	25	14	171	.....	30	242
Eleventh Army Corps.....	33	335	120	1,802	62	1,449	3,801
Twelfth Army Corps.....	18	186	43	767	2	65	1,081
Cavalry Corps. ....	5	85	37	315	8	399	849
Artillery Reserve.....	2	40	15	172	.....	13	242
Total .....	247	2,816	1,137	13,355	182	5,253	22,990

CASUALTIES OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.


COMMAND.	Killed.	Wounded.	Captured or missing.	Aggregate.
First Army Corps.....	910	4,336	2,290	7,536
Second Army Corps.....	809	3,823	1,305	5,937
Third Army Corps.....	837	4,407	1,491	6,735
Stuart's Cavalry Division.....	36	140	64	240
Grand total.....	2,592	12,706	5,150	20,448

It will be seen in the foregoing, that the losses of the Confederates at this battle, contrary to the general opinion,

were less than those of the Federals. The records of prisoners of war on file in the office of the Adjutant-General of the United States Army bear the names of twelve thousand two hundred and twenty-seven wounded and unwounded Confederates captured by the Federal forces at and about Gettysburg from July 1st to the 5th inclusive. This large number of prisoners, in connection with the fact that the number of casualties reported by the Confederate officers does not entirely harmonize with those of the medical director, whose estimate is thus given, leads to the inference that the report is not entirely correct. It may be safely assumed, I think, that the losses of the two armies were about equal.

## CHAPTER IX.

### RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

HE Confederate army had remaining fit for duty, at the close of the battle of Gettysburg, about fifty thousand men. This force, with its ammunition nearly exhausted, with its immense trains, amidst a terrific rain storm, which swelled the streams and made the roads almost impassable, with a hostile people all about it, and a swollen and impassable river in its rear, was about to be withdrawn from the presence of its victorious enemy and make its way back to Virginia, from which it had come. The distance it had to traverse by the route it chose—by Monterey Pass and Hagerstown to Williamsport—was about forty miles. The task, it will readily be seen, was an exceedingly difficult one, and could not have been made except at a great loss, had the pursuit been vigorous and determined as it should have been.

The Federal army had remaining fit for duty, at the close of the battle, about seventy-two thousand men. This force, with its ammunition somewhat exhausted, but an inexhaustible supply near at hand, elated with victory, in the midst of its friends, and with reinforcements nearly equal in number to its own that could have been called upon for assistance, was about to be employed according



to the best judgment of its commander, in preventing the escape of its enemy. That it should have succeeded in effecting this all-important object, with all these advantages, will scarcely be denied.

In addition to the seventy-two thousand who remained of the Army of the Potomac at the close of the great struggle at Gettysburg, there were available and within reach, the following troops: In the defenses of Washington and Baltimore probably from fifty thousand to sixty thousand;\* General Couch's emergency men about Carlisle and Pine Grove, two divisions under Generals Dana and Smith, about twenty thousand; French's division at Frederick and Tennallytown, ten thousand; Milroy's refugees in Bedford and Fulton counties, about three thousand; and several thousand under General Kelly in West Virginia. By a proper use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad a force equal and probably superior in numbers to Lee's, could and should have been drawn from Baltimore, Washington, and West Virginia, and placed upon the south bank of the Potomac. This would have effectually prevented the enemy from recrossing that river. Couch's two divisions could and should have been ordered at an earlier period to advance to the vicinity of Hagerstown, where Milroy's men from the west of the mountain, could have joined them. Thus hemmed in on every side, with a vigorous pursuit made by the army under General Meade, either upon the line the enemy took, or the longer one which Meade chose, the destruction or capture of Lee's army must have ensued. But these combinations were

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\*General Pleasanton, in *Annals of the War*, page 458, says that there were at that time seventy thousand troops in the defenses of Washington alone.

not made, and the army of the Potomac was not sent forward at once, and when it was sent in pursuit, it went by a long and round-about way, and moved so slowly, that the enemy was enabled to effect his escape. This failure to follow up the advantages gained in the battle of Gettysburg, both immediately after the repulse of Pickett's great assault and subsequently upon the withdrawal of Lee, has caused some even to question whether or not after all the Federals gained the victory. Colonel W. H. Taylor, in *Annals of the War*, pages 316, 317, says:

“Notwithstanding the brilliant achievements of Ewell and Hill on the first day, and the decided advantage gained by Longstreet on the second, the failure of the operations of the third day, involving as they did, but two divisions of the army, deprived us of the prestige of our previous successes, and gave a shadow of right to our adversary's claim of having gained a victory. Their exultation, however, should be tempered with moderation, when we consider that, after one day of absolute quiet, the Confederates withdrew from their front without serious molestation, and with bridges swept away, and an impassable river in the rear, stood in an attitude of defiance until their line of retreat could be rendered practicable, after which they safely recrossed into Virginia.”

As soon as night closed in after the battle of the 3d day of July, arrangements were made by the Confederates to return to Virginia. Generals Lee and Hill, seated on camp-stools in the latter's tent, under the dim and flickering light of a single candle, examined a map which they had spread out upon their knees, and decided upon the routes to be taken.\* As many of the wounded as

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\* See General Imboden's account in the succeeding chapter.

were unable to walk, and for whom transportation could be provided, were to be sent under a cavalry escort across the mountain by Cashtown and Greenwood, and thence by a side - road directly across the country to the Potomac at Williamsport. Those of the wounded who were able to walk were to accompany this train on foot. The army was to proceed by Fairfield and Monterey Pass to Hagerstown and Williamsport. At about four o'clock on the following afternoon this wagon - train was in readiness to move. It was about twenty - five or thirty miles in length, and contained about ten or twelve thousand wounded and suffering men. A description of this immense aggregate of human agony and distress, as well as some of the thrilling incidents which befell it by the way, will be given in the ensuing chapter.

Sometime during this night (Friday, 3d,) Ewell's Corps was withdrawn from its exposed position in the town and east of it, and placed behind Seminary Ridge. On the next day field - works were thrown up to conceal their intention of retreating, and to protect their rear in case of an attack. Shortly after noon a heavy rain set in, and in a short time the fields were covered with water, the streams swollen, and the roads rendered almost impassable. At night, under cover of the darkness and rain, the army began to retire by the road leading to Fairfield and Monterey Pass, and shortly after daylight in the morning of Sunday, July 5th, the last of them left. Suspecting that the enemy were about to retreat, General Mead directed General Pleasanton to send out reconnoitering parties of cavalry. These, upon returning, reported that the enemy were moving toward the Potomac in some

confusion. General D. B. Birney, who had succeeded General Sickles in the command of the Third Corps, (General Sickles having been wounded,) says:

“I was ordered (on the 4th) to send out a reconnoissance at daylight to ascertain the position of the enemy. I did so early on Sunday morning, and reported that the enemy were in full retreat. I also sent back for permission to open upon the enemy with my rifled batteries as they were crossing a point very near me, upon the turnpike going toward Hagerstown; and the staff officer brought me permission to do so. I had commenced the movement to attack, when another staff officer arrived from General Meade with a written order from him to make no attack; which was done. My skirmishers advanced and took possession of their hospitals, with a large number of their wounded. I had sent some twenty orderlies with a staff officer, who led the reconnoissance; and I reported these facts constantly to General Meade; but his peremptory order not to open fire at all prevented any pursuit of the enemy.”

About eleven o'clock, when there could no longer be any doubt that the enemy were in full retreat, an order was issued for pursuit. McIntosh's brigade of Gregg's cavalry division was sent to Emmittsburg, and J. I. Gregg's brigade was directed to proceed by Cashtown and across the mountain to Greenwood. General Sedgwick was ordered to follow directly on the track of the fugitives, and after marching about eight miles he came upon the rear guard under Early in the neighborhood of Fairfield. After a considerable cannonade at long range, Sedgwick reported to Meade that the enemy's position was too

strong to be carried. General Sedgwick was acting under instructions from the commander in chief, and he doubtless understood that a general engagement was not intended. The spirit in which Sedgwick was constrained to construe General Meade's orders, is thus given by General A. P. Howe, commanding a division of the Sixth Corps, in his testimony before the committee of Congress on the conduct of the war. General Howe, says:

“On the 4th of July, it seemed evident enough that the enemy were retreating. How far they were gone, we could not see from the front. We could see but a comparatively small force from the position where I was. On Sunday, the 5th, the Sixth Corps moved in pursuit. As we moved, a small rear guard of the enemy retreated. We followed them, with this small rear guard of the enemy before us, up to Fairfield, in a gorge of the mountains. There we again waited for them to go on. There seemed to be no disposition to push this rear guard when we got up to Fairfield. A lieutenant from the enemy came into our lines and gave himself up. He was a Northern Union man, in service, in one of the Georgia regiments; and, without being asked, he unhesitatingly told me, when I met him as he was being brought in, that he belonged to the artillery of the rear guard of the enemy, and that they had but two rounds of ammunition with the rear guard. But we waited there without receiving any orders to attack. It was a place where, as I informed General Sedgwick, we could easily attack the enemy with advantage. But no movement was made by us until the enemy went away. Then one brigade of my division, with some cavalry, was sent to follow on after

them, while the remainder of the Sixth Corps moved to the left."

Two separate expeditions, under command of bold and daring commanders, away from the main army, and acting according to their own judgment, were undertaken about this time, which are worthy of mention here. They illustrate what should have been the spirit in which to conduct the pursuit, and what important results can be accomplished if prosecuted with the proper force. General French, on Saturday, July 4th, marched from Frederick City, Maryland, where he had remained during the series of engagements at Gettysburg, to Turner's Pass in the South Mountain, and held that important point for the National army. He also sent a detachment to Falling Waters, on the Potomac river, a few miles east of Williamsport, Maryland, and destroyed the pontoon bridge erected there by the Confederates. On this same day (Saturday, 4th,) Kilpatrick's cavalry division, reinforced by Huey's brigade, of Gregg's division, moved from Emmittsburg up to Monterey Pass, with the purpose of striking the enemy's line. The following thrilling and graphic account of the terrific night attack by that bold and intrepid leader, has been furnished me by Dr. H. G. Chritzman, who was connected with Huey's brigade. So far as I am aware no account of that affair has ever before been published. Dr. Chritzman, says:

"July 4th, we moved to Emmittsburg and reported to Kilpatrick; moved same evening to intercept Ewell's wagon-train which was reported to be near Monterey Springs. The brigade moved rapidly up the mountain-road, striking Ewell's wagon-train about three o'clock in

the morning of July 5th, in the midst of a furious thunder storm, whilst on its retreat from Gettysburg.

'At once there rose so wild a yell  
Within that dark and narrow dell,  
As if all the fiends from heaven that fell,  
Had pealed the banner cry of hell.'

This, combined with the Plutonic darkness made it one of the nights long to be remembered. When we came up with the wagon - train, Federal and Confederate cavalry, wagons, ambulances, drivers and mules became a confused mass of pursued and pursuing demons whose shouts and carbine shots, mingled with the lightning's red glare and the thunder's crash, made it appear as if we were in the infernal regions. Especially so as the cries of the wounded often rose high above the din of the conflicting forces.

"Frequently a driver would be shot or leave his mule team, when the unrestrained animals would rush wildly down the narrow road, and in many instances the wagons with the mules attached would be found at daylight at the bottom of some deep ravine crushed to pieces, with the mules dead or dying. It was a fearful ride suiting well the fearless intrepidity of our daring commander. A Confederate brigade, then a long train of wagons and ambulances, then our brigade in the center, with Ewell's corps in our rear, going down that narrow mountain road upon the principle of the devil take the hindmost,—you have Kilpatrick's dash across Monterey Pass.

"The result of this brilliant movement was the capture of a large number of wagons, ambulances, and mules with fifteen hundred prisoners. The brigade reached the foot of the mountain about daylight; leaving the Baltimore pike where it turns toward Waynesborough, the column

moved on to Smithsburg, Maryland, where the wagons and ambulances were burned. The command rested at this place during the day. As the shades of evening drew nigh we were treated to a compliment of shot and shell by Stuart, who appeared at Raven Rock Gap, above the little village. Soon our battery got into position, when Stuart was compelled to retire; our brigade taking up the line of march for Boonsborough, where it arrived about midnight without further interruption."

The pursuit of Lee upon the same line he went having been abandoned, and a movement by the round-about way of the eastern base of the mountain through Emmittsburg, Frederick, Middletown, and Turner's Pass, having been decided upon, it will be of interest to the reader to see the movements of the several corps of the pursuing army, to note the places of their encampments, as well as the leisurely manner of the march, and to observe the time and place when they again confronted their old antagonist. These are given from reliable surces:

*Sunday, 5.* The Second Corps marched from Gettysburg to Two Taverns; the Fifth Corps to Marsh Run; the Sixth Corps, as previously stated, to Fairfield; the Eleventh Corps to Rock Creek; and the Twelfth to Littlestown. As already said, Gregg's cavalry brigade moved out on the Chambersburg road to Greenwood; Buford's division reached Frederick City, and Kilpatrick, reinforced by Huey's brigade, of Gregg's division, moved from Emmittsburg upon the enemy by Monterey Pass.

Skirmishes took place this day between the Federal cavalry and the retreating enemy at or near Smithsburg, Maryland, and at Fairfield, Caledonia Iron Works, Green-



castle, and Cearfoos' Cross Roads, Pennsylvania. That at Caledonia Iron Works was between Gregg's cavalry and the rear guard of Imboden's force in charge of the great wagon train of wounded, and the one at Cearfoos' Cross Roads was between Captain Jones' command and this same force, as detailed in the succeeding chapter. The skirmish at or near Smithsburg was between Kilpatrick and a part of Stuart's command.

*Monday, 6.* The First Corps marched from Gettysburg to Emmittsburg; the Fifth Corps from Marsh Run to Moritz Cross Roads; the Sixth Corps went from Fairfield, whither it had gone the day previous in pursuit of Lee, to Emmittsburg, except Neill's brigade of Howe's division, which, in conjunction with McIntosh's brigade of cavalry, was left at Fairfield to pursue the enemy; the Eleventh Corps went from Rock Creek to Emmittsburg. Buford's cavalry division went from Frederick to Williamsport and thence back to Jones' Cross Roads; Kilpatrick's cavalry and Huey's brigade went from Boonsborough *via* Hagerstown to Williamsport. At Hagerstown a spirited engagement took place between these forces and Stuart's cavalry, after which they went on to Williamsport, where they engaged both Stuart and Imboden, in charge of the wagon train, as detailed in the succeeding chapter. After this engagement they returned and went into camp at Jones' Cross Roads.

McIntosh's brigade, of Gregg's division, marched from Emmittsburg to Fairfield; and J. I. Gregg's brigade, of Gregg's division, moved from Greenwood to Marion. Smith's division, of General Couch's command of emergency men, moved from Pine Grove in the South Moun-

tain, which it had reached on the evening of Saturday, 4th, direct from Carlisle by Mount Holly, to Newman's Pass, where the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg crosses the mountain. Kenly's brigade, of French's division, marched from Frederick *en route* to Maryland Heights; and Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of the same division, left Tennallytown *via* Washington and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad *en route* to Frederick.

*Tuesday, 7.* The Head-quarters of the Army were moved this day from Gettysburg to Frederick City, and the Reserve Artillery from Littlestown to Woodsborough. The First Corps marched from Emmittsburg to Ham-  
burgh; the Second Corps from Two Taverns, at which place it remained since the 5th, to Taneytown; the Third Corps, which up to this time had remained at Gettysburg, marched by way of Emmittsburg to Mechanicstown; the Fifth Corps from Moritz Cross Roads *via* Emmittsburg to Utica; the Sixth Corps from Emmittsburg to Mountain Pass, near Hamburgh; the Eleventh Corps from Emmittsburg to Middletown; and the Twelfth Corps from Littlestown, where it had remained since the 5th, to Walkersville. Buford's and Kilpatricks cavalry divisions and Huey's brigade, of Gregg's division, moved from Jones' Cross Roads to Boonsborough; J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade was moving *en route* from Marion to Middletown; McIntosh's brigade of cavalry and Neill's brigade, of the Sixth Corps, which followed in the rear of the retreating Confederates, moved across the Mountain by Monterey Pass to Waynesborough; Smith's division, of Couch's emergency men, marched from Newman's Pass to Altodale; Kenly's brigade, of French's division, with other troops forwarded by

General Schenck from Baltimore, reoccupied Maryland Heights; and Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of French's division, reached Frederick City from Washington.

Skirmishes took place at Downsville and Funkstown, Maryland, and at Harper's Ferry, West Virginia.

*Wednesday, 8.* Head-quarters moved from Frederick City to Middletown, and the Reserve Artillery from Woodsborough to Frederick City. The First Corps marched from Hamburg to Turner's Gap, in South Mountain; the Second Corps from Taneytown to Frederick; the Third Corps from Mechanicstown to a point three miles southwest of Frederick; the Fifth Corps from Utica to Middletown; the Sixth Corps from near Hamburg to Middletown; the Eleventh Corps from Middletown to Turner's Gap,—Schurz's division being advanced to Boonsborough; and the Twelfth Corps from Walkersville to Jefferson. Smith's division of Couch's command, moved from Alto-dale to Waynesborough. Campbell's and Mulligan's brigades, of Kelly's command, department of West Virginia, were concentrated at Hancock, whence they moved to Fairview, on North Mountain.

Actions occurred this day at Boonsborough and Williamsport.

*Thursday, 9.* Head-quarters moved from Middletown to Turner's Gap of the South Mountain, and the Reserve Artillery from Frederick City to Boonsborough. The Second Corps marched from Frederick City to Rohrer'sville; the Third Corps from near Frederick City to Fox's Gap in the South Mountain; the Fifth Corps from Middletown, by way of Fox's Gap, to near Boonsborough; the Sixth Corps from Middletown to Boonsborough; and

the Twelfth Corps from Jefferson to Rohrersville. Elliott's and Smith's brigades of French's division, marched from Frederick to Middletown.

Skirmishes this day at Benevola (Beaver Creek), afterward General Meade's head-quarters.

*Friday, 10.* Head-quarters moved from Turner's Gap to Beaver Creek, beyond Boonsborough, where it remained until the enemy recrossed the Potomac river; the First Corps marched from Turner's Gap to Beaver Creek, where it was joined by Kenly's brigade, of French's division, from Maryland Heights; the Second Corps from Rohrersville to near Tilghmanton; the Third Corps from Fox's Gap through Boonsborough to Antietam Creek, in the vicinity of Jones' Cross-Roads, where it was joined by Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of French's division, which marched from Turner's Gap; the Fifth Corps from near Boonsborough to Delaware Mills, on Antietam Creek; the Sixth Corps from Boonsborough to Beaver Creek; the Eleventh Corps from Turner's Gap to Beaver Creek; and the Twelfth Corps from Rohrersville to Bakersville. Buford's and Kilpatrick's cavalry divisions moved from Boonsborough to Funkstown, and Huey's brigade, of Gregg's division, moved from Boonsborough to Jones' Cross-Roads.

*Saturday, 11.* The Reserve Artillery was this day brought forward from Boonsborough to Benevola. The Second Corps moved from near Tilghmantown to the neighborhood of Jones' Cross-Roads; the Twelfth Corps from Bakersville to Fairplay and Jones' Cross-Roads; Gamble's and Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry, from Funkstown to Bakersville; J. I. Gregg's brigade from Middletown to Boonsborough; and Kilpatrick's division from

Funkstown to near Hagerstown. Neill's brigade of the Sixth Corps, and McIntosh's cavalry brigade, that had crossed the mountain in the rear of the Confederates by Monterey Pass, reached Waynesborough on the 7th, where they were joined by Smith's division of Couch's emergency men, which had advanced from Harrisburg by way of Mt. Holly, Pine Grove, Newman's Pass, Greenwood, Funkstown, and Quincy, and the whole command, except one brigade, marched to Leitersburg.

Skirmishes occurred at or near Old Antietam Forge (near Leitersburg), Clear Spring, Hagerstown, Jones' Cross-Roads (near Williamsport), and Funkstown.

*Sunday, 12.* The First, Sixth, and Eleventh Corps moved from Beaver Creek to Funkstown; McIntosh's cavalry brigade from Leitersburg to Boonsborough; Kilpatrick's cavalry division and Ames' division of the Twelfth Corps, occupied Hagerstown; Neill's brigade of the Sixth Corps, moved from Leitersburg to Funkstown, where it rejoined its corps; Smith's division (except one brigade left at Waynesborough) marched from Leitersburg to Cavetown; Dana's division, of Couch's emergency men, which had advanced from Harrisburg by Carlisle, Shippenburg, and Chambersburg, simultaneously with Smith's advance by the mountain route, this day reached Greencastle. General Couch himself reached Chambersburg on Friday, 10th, where he established his head-quarters. Averell's cavalry brigade, from West Virginia, were *en route* from Cumberland to Fairview.

Skirmishes occurred this day at or near Hagerstown, Jones' Cross-Roads, and Funkstown.

*Monday, 13.* The two great armies were again together,

face to face. Being in such close proximity, the movements were necessarily but few, and these with great caution. The Sixth Corps moved from Funkstown to the vicinity of Hagerstown; Smith's division of Couch's command, moved from Waynesborough and Cavetown to Hagerstown and Beaver Creek; and Averill's cavalry brigade joined Kelly's infantry at Fairview.

Skirmishes occurred at Hagerstown, Jones' Cross Roads, and Funkstown.

During these days the Confederates had been busy and had reached advanced positions. As previously stated, the Southern army withdrew from their lines behind Seminary Ridge during the night of Saturday, July 4th, and the morning of Sunday, 5th, and by marching day and night reached Hagerstown on the afternoon of Monday, 6th, and the morning of Tuesday, 7th. Finding that the almost continuous rains had swollen the river so that he could not recross it, Lee took up a strong position on Marsh Run, below the town, completely covering the fords at Williamsport and Falling Waters. The four or five days which intervened before the Federal army came up, were spent in the vigorous use of the spade and axe, and by the time that army reached the field, the position was almost impregnable. In addition to this the stock of ammunition, which was nearly exhausted, was replenished by supplies ferried across the river.\* This

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\*Persons residing in Williamsport, who lived there at the time, say that the Confederate army received some ammunition while it lay in battle line about Williamsport and Falling Waters, but *not much*. It was ferried across the river. Professor J. Fraise Richard, the historian, in order to ascertain from reliable sources to what extent that army was supplied with ammunition after the battle of Gettysburg, addressed a letter to General Longstreet upon this subject, to which the following is the reply. A copy of this letter has been kindly placed at my disposal:

fact has been explicitly stated by General Imboden, whose account will be found in the ensuing chapter.

The distance which the Confederate army traversed from Gettysburg to Hagerstown was about *thirty-four miles*. The distance by the route the Federal army went was about *seventy miles*. The former occupied but *two days* in marching this distance, while the latter spent *eight days* in its march. This evident want of haste in the pursuit can only be accounted for by one of two reasons: either General Meade did not recognize the necessity of haste, supposing that Lee could not recross the river because of its swollen condition, or he did not desire again to engage him in battle north of the river. That the latter seems to

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GAINESVILLE, GEORGIA., 27th April, 1886.

J. FRAISE RICHARD:

*Dear Sir* — \* \* Replying to your question of supplies, I think I should say that General Lee went into Pennsylvania with the avowed purpose of war in its full import. There can be little doubt that he was fully supplied with the necessary supplies.

Besides the eighty to one hundred rounds in the cartridge boxes. I guess there were as many more in the ordnance train.

I am truly yours,

JAMES LONGSTREET.

General Early, in response to a letter of inquiry upon this same subject from the same person, says:

With regard to our supply of ammunition, I have to say that the cartridge boxes used by our troops were capable of carrying only about sixty rounds. If the one you mention [one that was found upon the field] contained eighty rounds, then the cartridges must have been packed in very closely. [This box had no tin case for the cartridges; the latter having been crowded closely into the leather openings.—J. F. Richard.] Besides the cartridges carried in the boxes, we had ammunition wagons, in which an extra supply was carried; but in a battle lasting three days much more than eighty rounds of cartridges would be easily exhausted.

On the first day's fight at Gettysburg one of my brigades—the first engaged—exhausted all of its ammunition before the others got into the fight, and had to send back to the wagons for a fresh supply, as well as appropriate that taken from the cartridge boxes of the dead, wounded, and prisoners of the enemy.

After the three days fighting at Gettysburg, our ammunition, especially for the artillery, certainly did get short; and if we had had no more than eighty

have been the case will appear in the following additional statement of General Howe, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. General Howe says:

“We moved on through Boonsborough, and passed up on the pike road leading to Hagerstown. After passing Boonsborough it came to my turn to lead the Sixth Corps. That day, just before we started, General Sedgwick ordered me to move on and take up the best position I could over a little stream on the Frederick side of Funkstown. As I moved on, it was suggested to me by him to move carefully. ‘Don’t come into contact with the enemy; we don’t want to bring on a general engagement.’ It seemed to be the current impression that it was not desired to bring on

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rounds of cartridges for the infantry, it would have been exhausted. But, nevertheless, General Lee halted his army near Hagerstown, on the retreat, and offered battle to Meade, which the latter failed to accept. As we were entirely dependent on the country in which we were operating for provisions for the men and provender for the horses, and the Potomac was rapidly rising in our rear, we had to move across it. It was impossible for us to carry provisions into Pennsylvania sufficient to last for any length of time, and therefore we had to gather them in the country through which we passed. When the armies confronted each other at Gettysburg it was impossible for us to send out foraging parties, even if we had an abundant supply of ammunition. We had no railroads or navigable water courses to bring up supplies for us, and the retreat across the Potomac was therefore an absolute necessity.

Respectfully,

J. A. EARLY.

Colonel W. H. Taylor, of General Lee’s staff, writes as follows:

NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, May 17th, 1886.

PROF. J. FRAISE RICHARD:

*Dear Sir—* \* \* It is true that our supply of ammunition was seriously reduced after the several days engagements at Gettysburg; but it was not exhausted. We had a sufficient supply for another general engagement, and we were anxious to be assailed in the lines taken near Funkstown [the same referred to by General Early]. Had such engagement occurred, it would have been absolutely necessary then to have replenished our supply; and this admonished General Lee not to risk a fight, except on terms of his own, so far removed from his base of supplies.

Yours respectfully,

W. H. TAYLOR.



a general engagement. I moved on until we came near Funkstown. General Buford was along that way with his cavalry. I had passed over the stream referred to, and found a strong position, which I concluded to take and wait for the Sixth Corps to come up. In the meantime, General Buford, who was in front, came back to me and said, 'I am pretty hardly engaged here; I have used a great deal of my ammunition; it is a strong place in front; it is an excellent position.' It was a little further out than I was—nearer Funkstown. He said, 'I have used a great deal of my ammunition, and I ought to go to the right; suppose you move up there, or send up a brigade, or even a part of one, and hold that position.' Said I, 'I will do so at once, if I can just communicate with General Sedgwick; I am ordered to take up a position over here and hold it, and the intimation conveyed to me was that they did not want to get into a general engagement; I will send to General Sedgwick, and ask for permission to hold that position and relieve you.' I accordingly sent a staff officer to General Sedgwick, with a request that I might go up at once and assist General Buford; stating that he had a strong position, but his ammunition was giving out. General Buford remained with me until I should get an answer. The answer was, 'No, we do not want to bring on a general engagement.' 'Well,' said I, 'Buford, what can I do?' He said, 'They expect me to go farther to the right; my ammunition is almost out. That position is a strong one, and we ought not to let it go.' I sent down again to General Sedgwick, stating the condition of General Buford, and that he would have to leave unless he could get some assistance; that his position was not far in front, and that

it seemed to me that we should hold it, and I should like to send some force up to picket it at least. After a time I got a reply that, if General Buford left, I might occupy the position. General Buford was still with me, and I said to him, 'If you go away from there, I will have to hold it.' 'That's all right,' said he, 'I will go away.' He did so, and I moved right up. It was a pretty good position, where you could cover your troops. Soon after relieving Buford, we saw some Confederate infantry advancing. I do not know whether they brought them from Hagerstown, or from some other place. They made three dashes, not in heavy force, upon our line to drive it back. The troops that happened to be there on our line were what we considered in the Army of the Potomac unusually good ones. They quietly repulsed the Confederates twice; and the third time they came up, they sent them flying into Funkstown. Yet there was no permission to move on and follow up the enemy. We remained there sometime, until we had orders to move on and take a position a mile or more nearer Hagerstown. As we moved up, we saw that the Confederates had some light field-works,—hurriedly thrown up, apparently,—to cover themselves while they recrossed the river. I think we remained there three days, and the third night, I think, after we got up into that position, it was said the Confederates recrossed the river."

On Sunday, July 12th,—the army having nearly all come up,—reconnoissances were made, and the different corps placed in position. The Eleventh, First, and Sixth corps were placed on the right, the Fifth and Third in the center, and the Second and Twelfth on the left. The situation was

about this: The Confederate army was in a strong position. Their numbers, however, had not been increased, for no reinforcements had reached them. That they were in a precarious condition, and that General Lee was impressed with the danger which threatened him, and was looking to the contingency of attempting the recrossing of the river higher up, even as far as Cumberland, Maryland, will fully appear in General Imboden's account of his interview with him, as found in the ensuing chapter. General Imboden, in his statement, says that their situation then "was very precarious."

Upon the part of the Federal army, the situation may be stated as follows: The army had been reinforced by French's division, and Smith's division of Couch's emergency men. That is to say, General Meade confronted Lee's *fifty thousand men* with about *eighty-six or eighty-seven thousand*, with the conditions of Gettysburg, so far as positions are concerned, reversed. The great question which Meade was now called upon to decide was, "Shall I order an attack, and run the risk of defeat, and thus not only lose all we gained at Gettysburg, but endanger the National capital, and probably the very life of the Government?" It was a tremendous question, and the commander in chief was unwilling to bear the responsibility of deciding it alone, and he called into council the honored chiefs upon whom he would have to rely in case of ordering an attack. The council convened on the evening of Sunday, July 12th, and was composed of General Wadsworth, commanding the First Corps, General Hays, of the Second, General French, of the Third, General Sykes, of the Fifth, General Sedgwick, of the Sixth,

General Howard, of the Eleventh, General Slocum, of the Twelfth, and General Pleasanton, of the Cavalry. After a long and careful consideration of the situation, the vote was taken on the expediency of attacking the enemy next morning, which resulted as follows: Generals Howard, Wadsworth, and Pleasanton voted to attack, but Generals Sedgwick, Slocum, Sykes, French, and Hays opposed it. General Meade, having heard the decision, stated that whilst he could have but a limited knowledge of the enemy's strength or position, he was yet in favor of attacking him, but that he would not do so against the opinion and advice of a majority of his corps commanders. The situation of General Meade was an exceedingly trying one. He had been in the chief command of the army but a short time, and he was urged by repeated orders from President Lincoln to attack the enemy, but now he was called upon either to disregard these orders, or execute them against the judgment of a majority of his counsellors. The responsibility was indeed a grave one, and he decided not to order the attack.

This decision of General Meade not to advance upon the enemy, has been severely censured. Certainly the judgment of the eminent soldiers who were upon the ground, and were better able to form an intelligent opinion than persons at a distance, should have due weight in the solution of this question. These men, and others as eminent, but then absent because of their wounds, favored an advance upon the heels of the enemy after the repulse of Pickett's assault. It was not indifference nor cowardice, then, which influenced their judgment on this occasion. Plainly they saw that the opportunity had been lost, and now the conditions were not favorable.

It is said that after the retreat of the Confederates, the engineers examined the line of their works, and found them very strong, and gave it as their opinion that an assault would have resulted disastrously to the Federal army. This view seems to be supported by the fact that in the great battles between the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia, an assault by either upon a strongly fortified position held by its opponent, was almost without exception a failure. This fact is adduced by General Longstreet as the principal argument he used in his discussion with General Lee, when deciding upon the policy to be pursued in the Pennsylvania campaign, and when it was decided, as he claims, that the campaign was to be "offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics."

The day following the consultation between General Meade and his corps commanders (Monday, 13th) was rainy and misty, so that but little could be learned of the enemy's position. That night, however, General Meade decided to attack him the next morning, and orders to that effect were issued accordingly. The river in the meantime had fallen, and upon examination by the Confederate engineers it was found that it could be forded. This fact was reported to General Lee, as well as that of the replacing of the pontoon at Falling Waters, and the army withdrew from its lines during that night and re-crossed into Virginia. Ewell's Corps waded the river up to their arm-pits at Williamsport, and Longstreet and Hill crossed upon the pontoon at Falling Waters.\* Gen-

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\*The artillery and wagon-trains were driven across the river on the pontoon at Falling Waters which had been replaced. Old citizens residing at Williamsport, who saw the Confederates fording the river at that place, say that two lines, composed of the tallest men, were placed in the river from

eral Kilpatrick, commanding the Federal cavalry on the left, learning at three o'clock in the morning that the Confederate pickets in his front were retiring, started after them, and at half past seven A. M. came up with their rear guard under General Pettigrew, about two miles from their bridge at Falling Waters. After a short, but hotly contested action, the enemy was driven to the river with a loss of one hundred and twenty-five killed, and fifteen hundred prisoners. General Pettigrew was mortally wounded in this engagement. The Federal loss was one hundred and five. It is a singular circumstance that the same Confederate officer who led the reconnoissance toward Gettysburg on the day preceding the battle, participated in the opening of the first day's engagement, and led part of the great assaulting column in the attack of the third, should lose his life in the last struggle north of the Potomac.

When the intelligence was flashed over the country that the Confederates had succeeded in escaping across the Potomac river without another battle, disappointment and dissatisfaction were felt and expressed on every hand. The Government too was dissatisfied, as the following dispatch from General Halleck to General Meade shows:

"I need hardly say to you that the escape of Lee's army without another battle has created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the President, and it will require an active, energetic pursuit on your part to remove the impression that it has not been sufficiently active heretofore."

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shore to shore, with their guns interlocked so as to give strength and stability to the lines. Between these the remainder of the infantry made their way through the water up to their necks.

Whether or not the dissatisfaction with General Meade, as expressed in this dispatch, was deserved, has been, and ever will be, a subject of dispute. That he was not wholly at fault, and that the causes of the delay in the pursuit of the enemy were not wholly his own, will appear in the following article, contributed to the *Philadelphia Weekly Press* by Mr. Thomas Robins, jr. Mr. Robins says:

“On the morning of the 5th, signal officers and reconnoitering parties reported to General Meade Lee’s movement by way of the Cashtown and Fairfield roads, and the southerly direction of the latter seemed to indicate that the Potomac and not the Susquehanna was the enemy’s objective. How should he be pursued? There were two ways open, one a direct pursuit by way of the Cashtown and Fairfield roads, the other a pursuit by the flank through Taneytown and Emmittsburg to Frederick, and then over the southerly passes in the South Mountain chain. General Meade was not content simply to start blindly after the enemy by the flank without some effort to open a way through the mountains by the Fairfield Pass. He did not entirely abandon the chance of striking in the rear of the retreating Confederates by means of a direct pursuit. He accordingly directed General Sedgwick with the Sixth Corps—which had been comparatively unengaged during the battle, and was therefore in full force and strength—to advance on the Fairfield road, pursue the enemy vigorously, ascertain his intentions, and transmit whatever information he might acquire to headquarters. At the same time a detachment of cavalry was sent along the Cashtown road in order that intelligence might be given of any move toward the north on the part

of General Lee. In the meantime orders for the movements of the various corps were prepared, in order that the advance by the flank toward Middletown might be begun just as soon as General Sedgwick should report; and a message was sent to General French at Frederick to push on and occupy Boonsborough and the passes in the mountains.

“General Sedgwick’s column started at half past twelve p. m. on the fifth. It was intended that the Third and Fifth corps should support his movement, and that the rest of the army should remain at Gettysburg or in that vicinity. General Butterfield, the chief of staff, however, without any authority from the commanding general, issued the provisional orders for the movement of the other corps in the direction of Middletown; and they made more or less progress in that direction throughout the day. General Sedgwick occupied the remainder of the fifth in getting as far as Fairfield. There was no more gallant officer or persistent fighter in the whole army; but the afternoon of the fifth wears away and night comes. At two a. m. on the sixth General Meade implores him to send some intelligence of the enemy; at nine a. m. he tells him that he must push his reconnoissance, for the whole army is waiting to know whether the Fairfield road can be opened or not. Finally a reply is received. General Sedgwick says that he has reason to believe that Lee’s whole army is in the neighborhood of the Fairfield Pass, and that it is possible that another engagement may be had with the enemy in the mountains.

“By this time some of the corps were on the march to Middletown under the orders issued by General Butter-



field. Was a chance to fight another battle to be thrown away? Was it possible that General Lee was not going to recross the Potomac after all? Although beaten, nevertheless the Confederate army was still an invading force, and while it remained on Northern soil the general in command of the Army of the Potomac must not indulge in any gambling military operations, but must act strictly within his instructions to cover Washington and Baltimore. He, therefore, sent in hot haste and arrested the progress of the Third and First corps, which had not moved very far, and detained them to support General Sedgwick in case of necessity. And then, after all this time had been lost, General Sedgwick finally came to the conclusion that the Fairfield Pass was too strong to be attacked, and so reported to his commander. The latter immediately concluded that it would involve delay and waste of time to pursue the enemy any further on that road, and he consequently directed the whole army to move down toward Middletown.

“At this time an occurrence placed the Confederate general in a position of the greatest peril. On the 3d of July General French’s cavalry surprised the Confederate guard of the pontoon bridge over the Potomac at Falling Waters, and succeeded in burning the platform and cutting loose the boats, so that they were swept away by the current. The following day it began raining; the waters of the Potomac rose rapidly, and when Lee’s army arrived on the 7th at Hagerstown it found itself blockaded, the pontoon bridge gone, and all the fords submerged. Intelligence of this was soon transmitted to the Union commander. Here was another opportunity which he was quick to appreciate.

With rapid concentration Lee might be struck a heavy blow before he could cross the Potomac. But again obstacles arose in the way of the Army of the Potomac. The same storm which aided the Federals by submerging the Potomac fords now became a hindrance in that it so broke up the roads that a rapid concentration of the army was impossible.

“Nevertheless, the general was unceasing in his endeavors to get his army forward. He keeps urging the corps commanders to hurry. To Howard he writes that he must leave those who have no shoes behind in Frederick and push on with the rest. Then he takes a turn at Newton, then at Slocum, and then again at Howard. Finally he dispatches a circular to all the corps commanders enclosing a letter from Halleck urging forced marches, and calls on them to use their best efforts to meet the wishes of the President and the Commander in chief.

“Such was the second period of the pursuit. There were no eventful incidents, but it was a time of great anxiety and incessant toil for the Federal commander. His dispatches show that he was at work at all hours of the day and night. The elements, the destitution of his worn-out army, and the easy-going character of some of his corps commanders combined to prevent a more rapid pursuit. Well might he regret the loss of Reynolds and Hancock.

“On the evening of the 9th, the army passed the South Mountain, and was halted for the night with its right at Boonsborough and its left at Rohrersville. The Confederate army was then in a good position, the right resting on the river near Downsville, and the left in the vicinity of

Hagerstown, covering the road from that place to Williamsport. This position covered both the ford at Williamsport and the remains of the pontoon-bridge at Falling Waters. It ran along a range of high ground, and was very difficult to attack in front, owing to the broken character of the country. The right wing was protected by the river. On the left the country was level, but the proximity of Conococheague creek, which empties into the Potomac river at Williamsport, and the numerous stone walls made it a difficult position to turn. General Lee had added to its natural strength by entrenching it completely; and behind these earth-works his army lay, while his engineers were making herculean exertions to establish communication with the south shore. On the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th of July the cavalry of the two armies was constantly engaged, the Confederates endeavoring to block the advance of the Union forces, and the Federals to clear the way.

“By the night of the 10th of July the Twelfth, Second, Fifth, and Third corps were across Antietam creek and in front of Williamsport, on which rested the right flank of the enemy. The Sixth, Eleventh, and First Corps were near Funkstown and Hagerstown in front of the Confederate left. On the 11th and 12th of July the army advanced in line to feel the enemy, and ascertain how he was posted. Before this the commanding general had tried by personal reconnoissances to find out something of the Confederate position, so that an attack could be directed against the weak points. He was assisted by the two ablest men in the army,—General Warren, his chief engineer, and General Humphreys, his chief of staff. The

former was the man whose foresight had saved the Round Tops and the position of Gettysburg to the Federal army on the memorable 2d of July. The latter was distinguished as one of the two generals who had gained laurels at the battle of Fredericksburg. Both were clear-headed men, and no one could accuse either of any want of stomach for a fight. Yet they could find no point for an attack. 'Wherever seen, the Confederate position was naturally strong,' says General Humphreys in his book, "Gettysburg to the Rapidan." 'It presented no vulnerable points, but much of it was concealed from view. Its flanks were secure and could not be turned. In this condition of affairs,' continues General Humphreys, 'General Meade determined on the evening of the 12th of July to move forward the next morning and make a reconnoissance in force, supported by the whole army, feel the enemy and attack him where weakest, if it should give any promise of success.'

"What followed is best told by General Meade himself in his testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war. I give his own words:

'Having been in command of the army not more than twelve or fourteen days, and in view of the tremendous and important issues involved in the result, knowing that if I were defeated the whole question would be reversed, the road to Washington and to the North open, and all the fruits of my victory at Gettysburg dissipated, I did not feel that I should be right in assuming the responsibility of blindly attacking the enemy without any knowledge of his position. I, therefore, called a council of my corps commanders, who were the officers to execute this duty, and laid before them the precise condition of affairs.'

“The council of war, with but two dissenting voices, disapproved of the general's aggressive policy, and opposed an attack. In this decision the Federal commander acquiesced, and agreed to defer the attack for one day, in order that an endeavor might be made by means of further reconnoissance to find some weak spot in the enemy's lines. The 13th of July was devoted to this work, and orders were issued on that evening for the whole army to move forward in accordance with the plans of the day before. But it was too late. The bird had flown. By superhuman efforts General Lee had re-established the pontoon-bridge. Across this bridge on the night of the thirteenth, he moved his baggage and artillery, the infantry taking the fords. Before morning the whole Confederate army was once more on the soil of Virginia.”

General McLaws, in his article in the *Philadelphia Weekly Press*, referred to in the previous chapter, says:

“General Lee's forces fell back leisurely without any engagement between the infantry forces worthy of notice, and on the 12th, when the main body of the enemy arrived, took position *previously selected*, covering the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, where it remained for two days with the enemy immediately in front, manifesting no disposition to attack, but throwing up entrenchments along his whole line.

“The Confederate army was now concentrated and on the defensive. General Lee himself had recovered in a great measure from his fatigue consequent on his exhausting labors, and as he rode along the line he had adopted I joined him and rode with him for some distance. He

was in good spirits and seemed confident of success if his lines were attacked, and he was evidently wishing for it. If General Meade had attacked, his chances of success would have been much less than they were at Gettysburg, as the troops were eager to engage, and if they could have been allowed to try to provoke an attack would have done so.


“On the 13th, the river having become fordable and the bridge at Falling Waters having been reconstructed, General Lee, finding it difficult to obtain flour for his troops, concluded not to wait on General Meade any longer and retired across the river, with no great loss of men or material—in fact, with much less than usually attends such a movement made under such circumstances.

“And thus the invasion of Pennsylvania by the Confederate forces, under General Lee, was brought to a close, and to General Meade is due the honor of the result.”

Upon ascertaining in the morning that the enemy had succeeded in effecting his escape, General Meade put his army in motion, and marching by Pleasant Valley, crossed the Potomac at Berlin. Halting a day on the Leesburg and Winchester pike to ascertain the movements of the enemy, and to be assured that an attempt to capture the National Capital by a rapid march by his rear, would not be made in case he advanced and left the way open, he again put his columns in motion and at length, near the close of July, reached his old position on the Rappahannock. Lee moved rapidly down the valley, and passing through the mountain below Strasburg, concentrated his army at Culpeper, and the memorable Pennsylvania campaign of less than two months in duration was ended.

## CHAPTER X.

### THE GREAT WAGON TRAIN OF WOUNDED.

S stated in a previous chapter, as soon as the darkness of night closed over the terrible scene of the third and concluding day of the series of battles at Gettysburg, General Lee began his preparations for returning with his defeated and shattered forces to Virginia. His first and greatest care, next to the safety of his army, was for his large number of wounded, and he determined to take as many of these with him as possible. Consequently all his available transportation was used for this purpose, and an immense train, not less than twenty-five or thirty miles long, was loaded with wounded and suffering men. All that could walk were required to accompany this train on foot, and the remainder of the wounded were left to the care of the Federals. This train was placed in charge of General J. D. Imboden, and the head of it left the scene of conflict amidst a terrific rain storm about four o'clock in the afternoon of Saturday, July 4th. It recrossed the South Mountain by Cashtown—the same way the army had come,—and at Greenwood left the turnpike and took a country road which cuts directly across toward the Potomac, leaving Chambersburg to the right. This side road is known as the Pine Stump Road

and the Walnut Bottom Road. It passes through the small places known as New Guilford and New Franklin, and intersects the road leading south from Chambersburg at Marion, six miles south of the former place. From Marion the train proceeded to Greencastle and thence diverged to the right and reached Williamsport on the Potomac by the Williamsport Pike. Such was the route taken by this train, but, as will appear in statements by eye-witnesses, it did not confine itself to the road. Fences were torn away, and men and wagons took to the fields, either to shorten the distances to be traversed or to accelerate their progress.

This train was *thirty-four hours* in passing a given point. General Imboden, who had charge of it, and whose statement will be given, says it was *seventeen miles* long. Allowing a mile of its length to each hour of passing any point, and it will be seen that it was not less than *thirty miles* in extent. Competent eye-witnesses have estimated the number of wounded in these wagons and walking along by them, as not less than ten or twelve thousand. Add to these the seven thousand five hundred and forty who were left upon the field because too badly wounded to be borne away, or for whom transportation could not be given, and some idea may be formed of the extent of the losses of those three eventful days.

All along the route by which this train made its way, broken wagons and dead and dying soldiers were strewn. The bottom of the wagons was smeared with blood. Barns and houses were improvised into hospitals. Groans and shrieks of agony filled the air as the wagons jolted on the rough and stony way, while cries and prayers and



curses were heard all along that moving line of human woe. During all this time the rain was pouring down in torrents, and the roads, as a consequence, were soon rendered almost impassable. Wagons were ditched and teams stalled, and as the roads became blocked the train took to the fields where the wheels sank to the axles in the soft earth. Drivers lashed their horses; curses and profanity abounded; axles were broken; wagons and caissons, and an occasional cannon, were abandoned; and dead soldiers were taken from the wagons to give more room for the remaining inmates, and thrown by the way-side. To add to the terror of the scene the Federal cavalry were upon them, and dashes were made here and there along the line and hundreds of wagons with their miserable and suffering inmates were captured.

The vastness of this train, and the aggregate of human agony it contained, has never been understood by the country. And now to bring these before the reader in some adequate form, I append here several statements, written especially for this history, by competent and reliable persons who resided along the line. I will, however, first introduce the following graphic description given by General Imboden, who had charge of this train. This statement was written for the *Galaxy* of April, 1871, from which I copy it. After detailing his operations along the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in Western Virginia, from Cumberland to Hancock, Maryland, and his entering Pennsylvania and march to the rear of the Confederate line near Gettysburg, where he arrived about noon of Friday, July 3d, just previous to General Pickett's great charge, General Imboden says:

"I belonged to no division or corps in the Confederate army, and therefore on arriving near Gettysburg about noon, when the conflict was raging in all its fury, I reported directly to General Lee for orders, and was assigned a position to aid in repelling any cavalry demonstration that might occur on his flanks or rear. None being made, my little force took no part in the battle. I then had only about two thousand one hundred effective mounted men, and a six-gun battery.

"When night closed upon the grand scene the Confederate army was repulsed. Silence and gloom pervaded our camps. We knew that the day had gone against us, but the extent of the disaster was not known except in high quarters. The carnage of the day was reported to have been frightful, but the Confederate army was not in retreat, and we all surmised that with the dawn of the next day would come a renewal of the struggle. We also knew that if such was the case, those who had not been in the fight would have their full share in the honors and dangers of the next day. All felt and appreciated the momentous consequences of final defeat or victory on that great field. These considerations made that, to us, one of those solemn and awful nights that every one who fought through our long war sometimes experienced before a great battle.

"Few camp-fires enlivened the scene. It was a warm summer's night, and the weary soldiers were lying in groups on the luxuriant grass of the meadows we occupied, discussing the events of the day or watching that their horses did not straggle off in browsing around. About eleven o'clock a horseman approached and deliv-

ered a message from General Lee that he wished to see me immediately. I mounted at once, and, accompanied by Lieutenant McPhail of my staff, and guided by the courier, rode about two miles toward Gettysburg, where half a dozen small tents on the road-side were pointed out as General Lee's head-quarters for the night. He was not there, but I was informed that I would find him with General A. P. Hill half a mile further on. On reaching the place indicated, a flickering, solitary candle, visible through the open front of a common tent, showed where Generals Lee and Hill were seated on camp-stools, with a county map spread upon their knees, and engaged in a low and earnest conversation. They ceased speaking as I approached, and after the ordinary salutations General Lee directed me to go to his head-quarters and wait for him. He did not return until about one o'clock, when he came riding along at a slow walk and evidently wrapped in profound thought.

"There was not even a sentinel on duty, and no one of his staff was about. The moon was high in the heavens, shedding a flood of soft silvery light, almost as bright as day, upon the scene. When he approached and saw us, he spoke, reined up his horse, and essayed to dismount. The effort to do so betrayed so much physical exhaustion that I stepped forward to assist him, but before I reached him he had alighted. He threw his arm across his saddle to rest himself, and fixing his eyes upon the ground leaned in silence upon his equally weary horse,—the two forming a striking group, as motionless as a statue. The moon shone full upon his massive features, and revealed an expression of sadness I had never seen upon that fine

countenance before, in any of the vicissitudes of the war through which he had passed. I waited for him to speak until the silence became painful and embarrassing, when to break it, and change the current of his thoughts, I remarked in a sympathetic tone, and in allusion to his great fatigue:

“‘General, this has been a hard day on you.’

“This attracted his attention. He looked up and replied mournfully:

“‘Yes, it has been a sad, sad day to us,’ and immediately relapsed into his thoughtful mood and attitude. Being unwilling again to intrude upon his reflections, I said no more. After a minute or two he suddenly straightened up to his full height, and turning to me with more animation, energy, and excitement of manner than I had ever seen in him before, he addressed me in a voice tremulous with emotion, and said:

“‘General, I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett’s division of Virginians did to-day in their grand charge upon the enemy. And if they had been supported, as they were to have been,—but, for some reason not yet fully explained to me, they were not,—we would have held the position they so gloriously won at such a fearful loss of noble lives, and the day would have been ours.’

“After a moment he added in a tone almost of agony:

“‘Too bad! *Too bad!!* OH! TOO BAD!!’

“I never shall forget, as long as I live, his language, and his manner, and his appearance and expression of mental suffering. Altogether it was a scene that a historical painter might well immortalize had one been fortunately present to witness it.

“In a little while he called up a servant from his sleep to take his horse; spoke mournfully, by name, of several of his friends who had fallen during the day; and when a candle had been lighted he invited me alone into his tent, where, as soon as we were seated, he remarked:

“‘We must return to Virginia. As many of our poor wounded as possible must be taken home. I have sent for you because your men are fresh, to guard the wagon-trains back to Virginia. The duty will be arduous, responsible, and dangerous, for I am afraid you will be harassed by the enemy’s cavalry. I can spare you as much artillery as you require, but no other troops, as I shall need all I have to return to the Potomac by a different route from yours. All the transportation and all the care of the wounded will be intrusted to you. You will recross the mountain by the Chambersburg road, and then proceed to Williamsport, Maryland, by any route you deem best, without halting. There rest and feed your animals, then ford the river, and make no halt till you reach Winchester, where I will again communicate with you.’

“After a good deal of conversation he sent for his chiefs of staff and ordered them to have everything in readiness for me to take command the next morning, remarking to me that the general instructions he had given would be sent to me next day in writing. As I was about leaving to return to my camp, he came out of his tent and said to me in a low tone: ‘I will place in your hands to-morrow a sealed package for President Davis, which you will retain in your own possession till you are across the Potomac river, when you will detail a trusty commis-

sioned officer to take it to Richmond with all possible dispatch, and deliver it immediately to the President. I impress it upon you that whatever happens this package must not fall into the hands of the enemy. If you should unfortunately be captured, destroy it.'

"On the morning of the 4th of July my written instructions and the package for Mr. Davis were delivered to me. It was soon apparent that the wagons and ambulances and the wounded could not be ready to move till late in the afternoon. The General sent me four four-gun field batteries, which with my own gave me twenty-two guns to defend the trains.

"Shortly after noon the very windows of heaven seemed to have been opened. Rain fell in dashing torrents, and in a little while the whole face of the earth was covered with water. The meadows became small lakes; raging streams ran across the road in every depression of the ground; wagons, ambulances, and artillery-carriages filled the roads and fields in all directions. The storm increased in fury every moment. Canvas was no protection against it, and the poor wounded, lying upon the hard, naked boards of the wagon bodies, were drenched by the cold rain. Horses and mules were blinded and maddened by the storm, and became almost unmanageable. The roar of the winds and waters made it almost impossible to communicate orders. Night was rapidly approaching, and there was danger that in the darkness the 'confusion' would become 'worse confounded.' About four o'clock in the afternoon the head of the column was put in motion and began the ascent of the mountain. After dark I set out to gain the advance. The train was

seventeen miles long when drawn out on the road. It was moving rapidly, and from every wagon issued wails of agony. For four hours I galloped along, passing to the front, and heard more—it was too dark to see—of the horrors of war than I had witnessed from the battle of Bull Run up to that day. In the wagons were men wounded and mutilated in every conceivable way. Some had their legs shattered by a shell or minnie ball; some were shot through their bodies; others had arms torn to shreds; some had received a ball in the face, or a jagged piece of shell had lacerated their heads. Scarcely one in a hundred had received adequate surgical aid. Many of them had been without food for thirty-six hours. Their ragged, bloody, and dirty clothes, all clotted and hardened with blood, were rasping the tender, inflamed lips of their gaping wounds. Very few of the wagons had even straw in them, and all were without springs. The road was rough and rocky. The jolting was enough to have killed sound, strong men. From nearly every wagon, as the horses trotted on, such cries and shrieks as these greeted the ear:

“‘Oh God! why can’t I die?’

“‘My God! will no one have mercy and kill me and end my misery?’

“‘Oh! stop one minute and take me out, and leave me to die on the road-side.’

“‘I am dying! I am dying! My poor wife, my dear children! what will become of you?’

“Some were praying; others were uttering the most fearful oaths and execrations that despair could wring from their agony. Occasionally a wagon would be passed

from which only low, deep moans and sobs could be heard. No help could be rendered to any of the sufferers. On, on; we *must* move on. The storm continued and the darkness was fearful. There was no time even to fill a canteen with water for a dying man; for, except the drivers and the guards disposed in compact bodies every half mile, all were wounded and helpless in that vast train of misery. The night was awful, and yet it was our safety, for no enemy would dare attack us when he could not distinguish friend from foe. We knew that when day broke upon us we would be harrassed by bands of cavalry hanging on our flanks. Therefore our aim was to go as far as possible under cover of the night, and so we kept on. It was my sad lot to pass the whole distance from the rear to the head of the column, and no language can convey an idea of the horrors of that most horrible of all nights of our long and bloody war.

“Daybreak on the morning of July 5th found the head of our column at Greencastle, twelve or fifteen miles from the Potomac river at Williamsport, our point of crossing. Here our apprehended troubles from the Federal cavalry began. From the fields and cross-roads they attacked us in small bodies, striking the column where there were few or no guards, and creating great confusion.

“To add still further to our perplexities, a report was brought that the Federals in large force held Williamsport. This fortunately proved untrue. After a great deal of harassing and desultory fighting along the road, nearly the whole immense train reached Williamsport a little after the middle of the day. The town was taken possession of; all the churches, school houses, etc., were



converted into hospitals, and proving insufficient, many of the private houses were occupied. Straw was obtained on the neighboring farms; the wounded were removed from the wagons and housed; the citizens were all put to cooking, and the army surgeons to dressing wounds. The dead were selected from the train,—for many had perished on the way,—and were decently buried. All this had to be done because the tremendous rains had raised the river more than ten feet above the fording stage, and we could not possibly cross.

“Our situation was frightful. We had over ten thousand animals and all the wagons of General Lee’s army under our charge, and all the wounded that could be brought from Gettysburg. Our supply of provisions consisted of a few wagon-loads of flour, and a small lot of cattle. My effective force was only about two thousand, one hundred men and twenty-odd field pieces. We did not know where the Confederate army was; the river could not be crossed; and small parties of cavalry were still hovering around. The means of ferriage consisted of two small boats and a small wire rope stretched across the river, which owing to the force of the swollen current broke several times during the day. To reduce the space to be defended as much as possible, all the wagons and animals were parked close together on the river bank.

“Believing that an attack would soon be made upon us, I ordered the wagoners to be mustered, and, taking three out of every four, organized them into companies, and armed them with the weapons of the wounded men found in the train. By this means I added to my effective force about five hundred men. Slightly wounded officers

promptly volunteered their services to command these improvised soldiers; and many of our quartermasters and commissaries did the same thing. We were not seriously molested on the fifth, but the next morning about nine o'clock information reached me that a large body of cavalry from Frederick, Maryland, was rapidly advancing to attack us. As we could not retreat further, it was at once frankly made known to the troops that unless we could repel the threatened attack we should all become prisoners, and that the loss of his whole transportation would probably ruin General Lee; for it could not be replaced for many months, if at all, in the then exhausted condition of the Confederate states. So far from repressing the ardor of the troops, this frank announcement of our peril inspired all with the utmost enthusiasm. Men and officers alike, forgetting the sufferings of the past few days, proclaimed their determination to drive back the attacking force or perish in the attempt. All told, we were less than three thousand men. The advancing force we knew to be more than double ours, consisting, as we had ascertained, of five regular and eight volunteer regiments of cavalry, with eighteen guns, all under the command of Generals Buford and Kilpatrick. We had no works of any kind; the country was open and almost level, and there was no advantage of position we could occupy. It must necessarily be a square stand up fight, face to face. We had twenty-two field guns of various calibre, and one Whitworth. These were disposed in batteries, in semi-circle, about one mile out of the village, on the summit of a very slight rising ground that lies back of the town. Except the artillery, our troops were

held out of view of the assailants, and ready to be moved promptly to any menaced point along the whole line of nearly two miles in extent. Knowing that nothing could save us but a bold 'bluff' game, orders had been given to the artillery as soon as the advancing forces came within range to open fire along the whole line, and keep it up with the utmost rapidity. A little after one o'clock they appeared on two roads in our front, and our batteries opened. They soon had their guns in position, and a very lively artillery fight began. We fired with great rapidity, and in less than an hour two of our batteries reported that their ammunition was exhausted. This would have been fatal to us but for the opportune arrival at the critical moment of an ammunition train from Winchester. The wagons were ferried across to our side as soon as possible, and driven on the field in a gallop to supply the silent guns. Not having men to occupy half our line, they were moved up in order of battle, first to one battery, then withdrawn and double-quickened to another, but out of view of our assailants till they could be shown at some other point on our line. By this maneuvering we made the impression that we had a strong supporting force in rear of all our guns along the entire front. To test this, Generals Buford and Kilpatrick dismounted five regiments and advanced them on foot on our right. We concentrated there all the men we had, wagoners and all, and thus, with the aid of the united fire of all our guns directed at the advancing line, we drove it back, and rushed forward two of our batteries four or five hundred yards further to the front. This boldness prevented another charge, and the fight was continued till near sun-

set with the artillery. About that time General Fitzhugh Lee sent a message from toward Greencastle, that if we could hold out an hour longer he would reinforce us with three thousand men. This intelligence elicited a loud and long-continued cheer along our whole line, which was heard and understood by our adversaries, as we learned from prisoners taken. A few minutes later General J. E. B. Stuart, advancing from Hagerstown, fell unexpectedly upon the rear of their right wing, and in ten minutes they were in rapid retreat by their left flank in the direction of Boonsborough. Night coming on enabled them to escape.

“By extraordinary good fortune we had thus saved all of General Lee’s trains. A bold charge at any time before sunset would have broken our feeble lines, and we should all have fallen an easy prey to the Federals. This came to be known as ‘the wagoners’ fight’ in our army, from the fact that so many of them were armed and did such gallant service in repelling the attack made on our right by the dismounted regiments.

“Our defeat that day would have been an irreparable blow to General Lee, in the loss of all his transportation. Every man engaged knew this, and probably in no fight in the war was there a more determined spirit shown than by this handful of cooped-up troops. The next day our army from Gettysburg arrived, and the country is familiar with the manner in which it escaped across the Potomac on the night of the 13th.

“It may be interesting to repeat one or two facts to show the peril in which we were until the river could be bridged. About four thousand prisoners taken at Gettys-

burg were ferried across the river by the morning of the 9th, and I was ordered to guard them to Staunton. Before we had proceeded two miles I received a note from General Lee to report to him in person immediately. I rode to the river, was ferried over, and galloped out toward Hagerstown. As I proceeded I became satisfied that a serious demonstration was making along our front, from the heavy artillery firing extending for a long distance along the line. I overtook General Lee riding to the front near Hagerstown. He immediately reined up, and remarked that he believed I was familiar with all the fords of the Potomac above Williamsport, and the roads approaching them. I replied that I knew them perfectly. He then called up some one of his staff to write down my answers to his questions, and required me to name all fords as high up as Cumberland, and describe minutely their character, and the roads and surrounding country on both sides of the river, and directed me to send my brother, Colonel Imboden, to him to act as a guide with his regiment, if he should be compelled to retreat higher up the river to cross it. His situation was then very precarious. When about parting from him to recross the river and move on with the prisoners, he told me they would probably be rescued before I reached Winchester, my guard was so small, and he expected a force of cavalry would cross at Harper's Ferry to cut us off; and he could not spare to me any additional troops, as he might be hard pressed before he got over the river, which was still very much swollen by the rains. Referring to the high water, he laughingly inquired, 'Does it ever quit raining about here? If so, I should like to see a clear day.'

“These incidents go to show how near Gettysburg came to ending the war in 1863. If we had been successful in that battle, the probabilities are that Baltimore and Washington would at once have fallen into our hands; and at that time there was so large a ‘peace party’ in the North, that the Federal Government would have found it difficult, if not impossible, to carry on the war. General Lee’s opinion was that we lost the battle because Pickett was not supported ‘as he was to have been.’ On the other hand, if Generals Buford and Kilpatrick had captured the ten thousand animals and all the transportation of Lee’s army at Williamsport, it would have been an irreparable loss, and would probably have led to the fall of Richmond in the autumn of 1863. On such small circumstances do the affairs of nations sometimes turn.”

Leaving out of the foregoing account that which is evidently but a pardonable vanity in detailing his own achievements, and the extraordinary valor and prowess of his troops, General Imboden’s statement presents the condition of the Confederates, after their defeat at Gettysburg, in a faithful light. The acknowledgment of General Lee of his overwhelming defeat, and his deep and undisguised distress thereat, stand in strange contrast with the claims that have been made by some Confederate writers that the Federals did not gain much of a victory after all. The statement also shows that in this immense train there was as much distress as was probably ever brought together on this continent. There were, it is true, places and occasions where a greater number of wounded were congregated, as in the Wilderness, and at Gettysburg itself before the removal of these men, but as

a moving mass of human agony, augmented and intensified by the roughness of the road, the rolling and jolting of the wagons, the darkness of the night, the rain and the mud, and the pursuing Federals, this event stands without a parallel upon this continent, if not in all history.

I introduce next a statement prepared by Mr. Jacob C. Snyder, who resided at the time of the passage of this train upon his farm near New Franklin. Mr. Snyder says:

“About ten or eleven o'clock on the night of Saturday, July 4th, 1863, we heard a great noise of horses' feet clattering and tramping along the road. It was at first supposed that another detachment was passing to Gettysburg. After a little the rumbling of wagons was heard. I at once arose, struck a light, opened the door and went out, and in less than fifteen minutes the large hall of my house and the yard in front were filled with wounded Confederate soldiers. They at once set up the clamor to my wife and other members of my family, ‘*Water! Water!! Give us water!!*’ They also begged to have their wounds dressed. O, what a sight! I at once came to the conclusion that something unusual had taken place, and as the rain was falling in torrents, I put on my overcoat and walked out to the barn-yard at the roadside with a staff in my hand. I there found that some cavalry-men were driving part of my young cattle out of my barn-yard. I walked up to the gate and closed it to prevent any more from being driven out. The officer in charge, sitting on his horse and seeing the staff I carried, supposed it to be a gun and at once rode away. At about one o'clock A. M. a man with a short leg rode up to the yard gate in company with five or six others. He very politely

asked Mrs. Snyder for a drink of water. He seemed to be strapped to his horse. When riding away one of the men said he was General Ewell. I afterward learned that his amputated limb had gotten sore.\* The long-wished for daylight at length dawned, and revealed to the farmers along the road that their fences were torn down and that ambulances and wagons, together with hundreds of cavalry, were making a way through their fields, and that their wheat, corn, and grass were being ruined. The narrow road in many places was so badly cut up that the wagons could scarcely get on, and many had to take the fields. Broken down wagons and caissons, yet containing large amounts of ammunition, were strewn all along the route. O, what a sight! The groans of the wounded and shrieks of the dying beggar description. I said to several of the men—Major Throckmorton and others who had been at my house on their way to Gettysburg,—‘What does this mean? I think you have received a terrible whipping.’ They replied that they were only going back to get more ammunition and would return and clean out the

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\*It will be remembered that General Ewell had lost a leg in a previous battle, and afterward wore a wooden substitute. When he passed through Chambersburg on his way to Gettysburg, he rode in a carriage, but when going into battle, it is said, he was strapped to his horse. The stump of his amputated limb, it is also said, sometimes became inflamed, so that he would have to lay aside for awhile his artificial limb. A citizen of Gettysburg, who witnessed the incident, informed the writer that during an interval of the battle, General Ewell, accompanied by his staff, rode out Baltimore Street toward the Federal line and was fired upon, at which the whole party beat a hasty retreat, keeping upon the pavements rather than the street where they would have been more exposed. Reaching a sheltered place near the court house, some of his attendants either pulled off the general's boot or examined a probable wound, which he had just received. The general may have received a slight wound in his leg, or his amputated limb may have become sore, and he was compelled to seek safety in the way indicated by Mr. Snyder. And yet it seems strange that if such was the case it was kept secret.



Yankees. I then said, 'It looks to me as if the Yankees had completely cleaned you out, and I think, and I presume you think so yourselves, that you had better have stayed at home and remained under the old flag.' At two o'clock P. M. a company with a battery of six brass pieces drew up in front of my barn and fed their horses. This battery was supported and accompanied by about one hundred cavalry and some infantry. The cavalry dismounted in a ten acre field of prime wheat, all out in head. At the same time during the halt the men were slaughtering cattle at Mr. Jeremiah W. George's. At this place some of the men died and were buried, and others unable to go any further were left with Mr. George. The graves of some that died there can yet be seen along the road; others are farmed over. Among those that were buried was Major McDine, of South Carolina. He was buried close by the well in a beautiful grove, and the grave was marked by a head-board bearing his initials. On the 20th day of April, 1866, three persons came to Mr. George's in search of this grave. One of them was the major's brother-in-law, who was accompanied by a friend of the deceased, and the two were under the guidance of a colored man who had been the major's servant, and was with him when he died and was buried. In a conversation with these persons I learned that Mrs. McDine, the major's wife, had partially lost her mind upon hearing of the death of her husband, and at her urgent solicitation and with the hope of relieving her, they had come in search of his body. They came from South Carolina to Hagerstown, thence to Gettysburg, and then under the guidance of the colored man, followed up the

way of the disastrous retreat until they came to Mr. George's, where the guide at once recognized the place and took them to the grave. The remains were taken up, carried to a place near my spring, and there prepared and enclosed in a box and taken along.

"Among the wounded left at Mr. George's was Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin F. Carter, of General Hood's division, Longstreet's Corps. I visited Colonel Carter frequently during his stay there. He was a man of more than ordinary ability. He had enjoyed the advantages of a fine education, and had great conversational powers. He was a Texan and had served two years in the legislature of that state. In the discussion of 'the principles of the secession heresy' as he termed it, which he often did with his companions, in my presence, I learned that he was of the Alexander H. Stephens stamp. He was taken to Chambersburg in an ambulance, where he subsequently died.

"From Colonel Carter I obtained much information in relation to the battle of Gettysburg. He had received his wound in the first charge made by Law upon Little Round Top, from the 'Devil's Den.' They had met a heavy repulse from that place, and when General Longstreet ordered General Law to charge the second time, the latter replied in these words: 'General Longstreet, I regard a second charge a needless sacrifice of human life,—to lead men against one of nature's impregnable barriers so well manned and so bravely defended,—I disobey the order.' 'These,' said Colonel Carter, 'were the precise words used by General Law.'\*

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\*This alleged act of disobedience seems incredible, but General Law,

"On Monday morning, July 6th, about three o'clock, four men drove into my yard with a two-horse carriage. They asked to have their jaded horses fed and breakfast for four persons, for all of which they proposed to pay. I said that if they paid in greenbacks and not in Confederate scrip, they could be accommodated. They were evidently civilians and not soldiers, and belonged to the higher grade of Southern aristocracy. They were cursing and swearing about the Yankees getting one of their blooded horses, for which they said they were offered fifteen hundred dollars. Their great trouble seemed to be, 'If the Yankees only knew what kind of a horse they had.' They paid my son a five dollar Government note. I told them that they had better get away or the Yankees would get them and their old jades of horses. It was about daylight when they left. It was evident that they expected the 'blue-coats' to be after them. Just as they were about to leave some colored persons, who came along, began to sing,

'I'se gwine back to Dixie,  
No more I'se gwine to wander,  
My heart's turned back to Dixie,  
I can't stay here no longer;  
I miss de old plantation,  
My home and my relation,  
My heart's turned back to Dixie,  
And I must go.

CHORUS:—'I'se gwine back to Dixie,  
For I hear the children calling,  
I see the sad tears falling,  
My heart's turned back to Dixie,  
And I must go.'

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in his article in *The Century* of December, 1886, relates it himself, but somewhat different.

“Never shall I forget that scene, and never did I see a more forlorn and disgusted party than those five men, when, in their old rickety two-horse carriage, drawn by two old jaded horses, they drove away amidst the singing of those negroes.

“In a few hours the ‘Boys in Blue,’ under General Gregg, were on hand and took hundreds of prisoners.”

Rev. J. Milton Snyder, a son of the writer of the foregoing, relates as follows:

“I can well remember when the Confederate train of wounded came from Gettysburg, by way of my father’s residence and New Franklin. I was quite young at the time, and hence noticed many things that failed to attract the attention of older persons. On Saturday evening, July 4th, 1863, whilst we were quietly seated in the house, my father heard a peculiar noise, — like the approach of a heavy storm. This was, if I remember correctly, about ten o’clock on Saturday night. Father went out into the darkness to listen. A short time after a body of Confederate cavalry came down the road from Greenwood. They halted in front of father’s house and called him out. The night was very dark, and they asked to be directed to Greencastle. They seemed to be lost or bewildered. My father not knowing in the darkness whether they were Federals or Confederates, directed them properly. About midnight the first of the train of wounded reached our place. The wagons kept the main road as much as possible, and on either side of the train a continual stream of wounded soldiers kept moving. Thus they continued coming and going the remainder of Saturday night, all day Sunday, and the last wagon passed by New Franklin

Monday morning at nine o'clock. The train of wounded left the pike at Greenwood, came on the old 'Walnut Bottom Road' (called also the Pine Stump road), through New Guilford by way of my father's house, through New Franklin, thence to Marion and Greencastle. On Monday morning Gregg's cavalry came after the train, following the same route. General Gregg halted at father's place, and camped in one of our fields east of New Franklin and in our orchard. Some of our Franklin County boys were with Gregg. The Confederates claimed that they were going South for ammunition. Wounded Confederate soldiers were left all along the route of retreat. Many died and were buried by the road-side. I shall never forget those ghastly wounds, those thousands of faces dusky with powder, and that battery of black and horrid field-pieces, which had sent, as could be seen, many charges of grape and canister into the bosoms of our brave men."

Rev. J. C. Smith, at that time a resident of Greencastle, gives the following account:

"Saturday, July 4th, 1863, closed in perfect quiet at Greencastle. Captain Dahlgreen and his troops disappeared as mysteriously as they had come. The stragglers, who had been bringing up the rear of Lee's army, had either all passed through or had received a hint that it would be a saving of muscle to advance no further North just then. The citizens of Greencastle went to their beds in entire ignorance of the results of the battle of Gettysburg, hopeful to be sure, but not assured that all was well. Four o'clock Sunday morning we awoke to hear the rumbling of wagons, the tramping of horses, the

noise and racket attending an army in motion. The first question naturally would be, 'What does all this commotion mean?' And the answer came readily and easily, 'There goes another Confederate army to help decide the battle of Gettysburg.' Hastily dressing and going out into the street, we were supremely happy at seeing the army heading the other direction. It was the army of wounded from the battle-field hastening on toward the Potomac to cross over to Virginia. No one, with any feelings of pity, will ever want to see such a sight even once in a life-time. Here came the men who but eight or ten days before had passed through our town in the prime of health, boasting of the exploits they would do when they would have the happy chance of seeing the Union army. A more crest-fallen, woe-begone mob may never have been seen. Hurry was the order of the day. They seemed almost to be pushing each other forward. Yet when asked about the results of the battle, the officers invariably declared that they gave the boys in blue a sound thrashing. In conversation with an intelligent officer, I asked, 'If you have thrashed our army so soundly, why are you leaving us so hurriedly? Why not stay and occupy your conquered territory?' In reply he said: 'O, we are just taking these home to have them cured up, and with these wagons bring on more ammunition and soldiers and finish up the job.' Then said he, 'Did you hear from Vicksburg?' 'No,' said I. 'Well, Pemberton has captured Grant and his army.' I did not feel as though I could go into ecstasies over this, but still I hoped that for veracity he might be classed among those creatures whom Paul accurately describes in I. Tim. 1: 12. The common soldiers

seemed to be either too stupid to speak, or else forbidden to give a true account of the battle, but all the way through the colored portion declared that they were badly whipped. Such a scene of suffering, who may undertake to describe? No one counted the wounded. They could not be counted because hundreds of wagons loaded with them were a part of this train. All who were wounded in the lower extremities were placed into these huge and rough-rolling army wagons. When passing over any part of the street where the wagon would jolt, they would yell and groan with pain. Many had received their hurt on Wednesday or Thursday before, with no attention paid to them by surgeons, the doctors having been kept busy with the graver cases. All who were wounded in the head, the arms, the shoulders, the non-vital parts of the body, were compelled to walk through the mud ankle-deep, with no food save a little flour mixed with water and baked on a few coals. Those wounded in the arms or shoulders would tear away the garment and expose the wounded part. Such arms—swollen to twice or thrice their natural size—red and angry. When they came to a pump, one would place his wounded member under the spout while another would pump cold water on the sore. Then he would do a like service to his comrade. Thus the pumps were going all that day. I will particularize one case; this will be a sample for probably five or six thousand similar ones. He was from North Carolina; was shot through the arm, between the shoulder and the elbow. The arm was swollen to the size of a man's thigh, very red and very much inflamed. Nothing had been done for him by the doctor save to press a wad of cotton into the

wound in each side of the arm. He had received the injury on Wednesday. 'Now,' said he, 'I am going home, and I will never enter the army again.' Said I, 'My dear friend, I fear you can't reach home soon. I learn that our government has thrown an army on the south bank of the Potomac.' Said he, 'I never wanted to go into the war. They came to my home and drove me into the army at the point of the bayonet. The next time they come they may shoot me down at my door; I will rather die than fight again.' We estimated the number of wounded that passed through our town at twelve to fifteen thousand. It was an easy matter to trace their route of flight. Dead horses, broken down and abandoned wagons, cannons, carriages and caissons, new made graves were everywhere to be seen. It was simply a road covered with wrecks.

"On Monday evening, July 6th, about sundown some cavalry, being the rear guard, passed through, and there ended our connection with the Southern Confederacy."

Mr. David Z. Shook, a resident of Greencastle, and an eye-witness, relates the following:

"We were awakened by a rumbling sound in the direction of Chambersburg. It was the wagon-train from Gettysburg. The teamsters and guards were somewhat excited, and were hurrying through. Many of the wagons were loaded with wounded, whose cries and groans were pitiful indeed. We asked the Confederates what was up. They told us that a battle had been fought at Gettysburg, but it was not at all decisive. They said, too, that they were only taking their wounded off, and that they expected reinforcements from Virginia. They tried to hide their defeat, but we saw that there were more than



wounded hurrying toward Virginia. One poor fellow begged to be lifted out of a wagon and laid on the ground, as his pain in the jolting wagon was unbearable, but the teamsters hurried on and took no account of his entreaties. The night following being very dark, many persons in town engaged in capturing horses and cattle from the train. As cattle passed by I saw many turned into alleys. Horses tied behind wagons had their halters cut, and were led away unobserved. Many horses, too, gave out here and were left. They suffered greatly from not being shod, their hoofs being worn off to the quick. Many such were offered for sale,—fine ones being offered for as little as five dollars in Yankee money. I captured a fine bay horse, hid him in the barn, fed him well and felt proud of my possession. A few days after a citizen of Greencastle came to the barn, recognized his horse, proved him, and took him away. The Confederates had taken this horse on their way to Gettysburg, and I had the luck to get him as my first capture, though I was in utter ignorance of his belonging to a fellow townsman until he informed me. Many persons threw taunts at the retreating foe, such as, ‘How are you Gettysburg?’ ‘Have you been to Philadelphia already?’ and ‘Did you meet the Pennsylvania militia down there?’ An officer rode up to a pump and asked for water. A citizen standing by said, ‘Did you get enough of *Meade* over there?’ The officer grew furious and called him an impudent puppy.”

On Saturday evening some of the citizens of Chambersburg, who resided on the eastern outskirts of the town, heard the low rumbling sound of this wagon-train, as it proceeded across the country some six miles to the south-

east; and the same night information was brought that the train was of immense extent, and was hurriedly making its way south. This information led us to suppose that in the battle, fought east of the mountain, of which we had some intimations, the Confederates had been worsted. Of this we had no certain information until the morning of Monday, July 6th.

At day-break on Sunday morning, July 5th, I was called from my bed and requested to proceed immediately to the King Street hospital to assist in removing from wagons a number of wounded Confederates. The teamsters in charge of these wagons had lost their way during the night, and had come into Chambersburg. Arriving at the hospital I found in the street four or five wagons, drawn by four mules each, and all loaded with wounded men. Standing upon the pavement in front of the hospital was a soldier with his arm off close to the shoulder. To an inquiry made by one of our citizens as to what this meant, the wounded Confederate replied, "It means that Uncle Robert has got a —— of a whipping." This, however, was denied by others. O what a terrible sight these men presented! Filthy, bloody, with wounds undressed and swarming with vermin, and almost famished for food and water, they presented such a sight as I hope I may never again be called upon to witness. After they were all taken into the hospital, arrangements were at once made to have their wounds dressed and food supplied. These arrangements a few of the citizens kept up until the ensuing Friday, when General D. N. Couch, who commanded this department, reached here, and relieved us of our charge. Appreciating the importance of send-

ing information to the authorities at Harrisburg of this train, so that, if possible, it might be intercepted, I engaged a man, who had just come in from the country in search of information, to carry a dispatch. Telling him the situation, and showing him the importance of forwarding the information as soon as possible, he agreed to bear my dispatch, addressed to Governor Curtin, to the nearest telegraph station. Mounting his horse he rode rapidly out the western pike, as we had heard that a repair party was coming from that direction, and was not far off, and that it repaired the telegraph line as it came. Whether or not my dispatch was received by the authorities at Harrisburg, I can not say. If it was received, and the cavalry who were at that time in McConnellsburg, had been ordered to proceed across the mountain against that train, it all might have been captured. The few cavalry-men who did make a dash upon it made large captures. How they did it, and how they came to be there, I will next proceed to narrate.

On the evening of Saturday, while this wagon train was making its way across the South Mountain, a citizen of Mercersburg—Hon. James O. Carson—sent a messenger across the North Mountain with a few lines to Mr. W. S. Fletcher, of McConnellsburg, informing him that there were prowling about the former place a number of marauding stragglers from the Confederate army, and asking, if there were any Federal soldiers at the latter place, that Mr. Fletcher would have some sent across for their protection. There were in and about McConnellsburg at that time nearly all of the men of General Milroy's command, who had escaped from Winchester into southern

Pennsylvania, and had congregated at Everett, or Bloody Run. There were the Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, several companies of the First New York Cavalry, and some infantry from several different regiments, the whole under command of Colonel Pierce. Mr. Fletcher received this letter late in the evening, and he at once proceeded to Colonel Pierce's head-quarters and showed it to him, asking him to send on the following morning Captain Jones with about two hundred men to Mercersburg. Mr. Fletcher asked that Captain Jones might be in command of this force because of his daring exploit in defeating a force of Confederates double the number of his own command in McConnellsburg a few weeks previous, as related in a previous chapter. To this request Colonel Pierce agreed, and about two hundred men were detailed for this duty, Captain Jones' own heroic Irishmen being of the number. These men left McConnellsburg early on Sunday morning, and when at Mercersburg,—ten miles distant,—or probably before reaching that place, they learned of the great wagon-train, and at once proceeded to intercept it. Captain Jones ran into this train at Cearfoss' Cross-Roads, nearly midway between Greencastle and Williamsport. After a sharp skirmish with the guards, who were scattered somewhat thinly along the line, the wagons were turned into the road leading to Mercersburg. The train was cut out from Mr. Hayde's down to the farm formerly owned by Mr. David Zellers. The wagons cut off south of the cross-roads were turned about in the barn-yard of Mr. Zellers, and hastily driven back to follow the other part of the captured train to Mercersburg. Great gallantry was displayed by Captain Jones and his brave troopers in this affair, and had all the cavalry

at McConnellsburg been with this brave and dashing officer, the whole of that train might have been captured.

In this gallant affair about one hundred wagons—as many as this small body of cavalry could handle—with about one thousand wounded Confederates, who were in the wagons, were captured. The head of this captured train reached Mercersburg near evening, and the whole of it passed on through the town and out toward the Gap, from fear of being recaptured. At or near the Gap the head of the train met a large detachment from the Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, under Colonel Pierce. Believing then that they were strong enough to protect themselves from recapture, the whole turned again and went back to Mercersburg, where the wounded were taken from the wagons and placed in the Theological Seminary buildings and other improvised hospitals. No sooner was this train and its inmates disposed of, than the brave Jones wanted to make another dash upon the enemy, but he was overruled by Colonel Pierce. This was not the only instance in the history of war, in which brave and earnest subordinates were held in check, and great and important results prevented by timid, hesitating commanders.

It will be remembered that General J. I. Gregg with his brigade of cavalry had been sent in pursuit of this train. These cavalry-men had skirmishes with its guard at Caledonia Iron Works, in the South Mountain, and at or near Greencastle, capturing a large number of prisoners. The writer passed along the pike from Chambersburg to Gettysburg in the afternoon of Monday, 6th, and from Fayetteville to the top of the mountain passed hundreds of Confederate prisoners under charge of detachments of General Gregg's command.

## CHAPTER XI.

### PHENOMENA OF BATTLE SOUND.

**A**LTHOUGH but twenty-five miles from Gettysburg, the inhabitants of Chambersburg were scarcely aware that a great battle was being fought at the first named place. A few of our citizens, who resided upon the outskirts of the town, heard the sound of the guns. These sounds, however, were very indistinct. The large majority of our people did not hear them at all. And yet, notwithstanding the reports of the cannon were scarcely heard here, the following indubitable testimony establishes the almost incredible fact that the reports of the guns were heard as far as *one hundred and twenty* and *one hundred and forty miles* away. This testimony is from men of undoubted intelligence and veracity, whose standing and character are widely known. The first is from Rev. C. Cort, a minister of the Reformed Church. Mr. Cort's statement is as follows:

MR. J. HOKE:

*Dear Sir*—As everything relating to the battle of Gettysburg will be of increasing interest as the years pass by, I hereby submit to you for insertion in your book the following singular phenomenon relating to the sound of the guns at that great conflict: On Friday afternoon, July 3d, 1863, I was returning to Somerset, Pennsylvania, from a trip to Mount Pleasant, in Westmore-

land County, same state. Rev. George H. Johnston, then pastor of the Reformed Church in Somerset, but now pastor of a congregation in West Philadelphia, was my traveling companion. We stopped for a late dinner at the hotel of a Mr. Hay, at the eastern base of Chestnut Ridge in Ligonier Valley, Westmoreland County, and while we were at dinner the landlord entered the room and remarked that a terrible battle must be going on somewhere. We replied that the latest telegraphic dispatches received at Mount Pleasant before our departure indicated that the invading army under General Lee had met the Federal forces at Gettysburg, and a great battle would, no doubt, be fought there. Mr. Hay replied, "It must be going on now; we hear the cannonading." Expressing our astonishment at his statement, he led us out to the end of his porch, where we distinctly heard what we regarded as heavy and continuous discharges of artillery in an easterly direction. This was about two o'clock, and the precise time when the great artillery duel took place preparatory to Pickett's great charge upon the Federal line. Upon going out to the turnpike the sound was still more distinct. We listened to the portentous sounds for some time with great interest and anxiety, for we knew that to a great extent the destiny of our Government depended upon the battle then in progress. The following entry in my diary indicates the thought which was uppermost in our minds at the time: "May the Lord of hosts give victory to the army of the Union, and may the hordes of rebeldom be discomfited in the valleys of our noble old Keystone Commonwealth."

Mr. Hay told us that the cannonading had been going on more or less for several days. We afterwards learned that hundreds of people had heard the same sound all along the south-eastern border of Westmoreland County, and that during the battle of Manassas the sound of the cannonading was also distinctly heard throughout the same localities. The distance from the place where we heard this cannonading to Gettysburg, in a straight line, was not less than *one hundred and forty miles*. The configuration of the intervening country,—the numerous transverse ridges of the Allegheny mountains,—would seem to be unfavorable for the transmission of sound so great a distance. And yet, while the fact is established beyond dispute that the sound of the great conflict at Gettysburg was distinctly heard in one of the western counties of the state, it was not heard in many intervening localities not one third that distance from the scene of the conflict. Even in Chambersburg and Greencastle, but about twenty-five miles distant, but few heard the cannonading, and the few who did hear it say it was very indistinct. Here is a question for scientists to solve. Some military men to whom I stated the fact a few days later at Gettysburg, hooted at the idea of

what I said, and supposed, I have no doubt, that I was telling an untruth, or was mistaken. *And yet the fact is true beyond question*, and upon the strength of what I heard, I at once prepared to start for the scene of strife.

Yours respectfully,

C. CORT.

*Greencastle, Pennsylvania.*

The following letter is from Rev. C. R. Lane, D. D., an eminent and well-known divine of the Presbyterian Church. Mr. Lane, at the time of the battle of Gettysburg, resided in Wyoming County, Pennsylvania. His statement is as follows:

CHAMBERSBURG, August 19th, 1884.

JACOB HOKE, ESQ.:

*Dear Sir*—The facts referred to in our late conversation, as I understood the matter at the time, are the following: The sound of the artillery at the battle of Gettysburg, was heard on a mountain in the south-western part of Wyoming County, a distance measured in a straight line of at least one hundred and twenty (120) miles. Supposing the alleged fact to be true, this was a very remarkable propagation of sound and requires,

1st. A very favorable state of atmosphere for the propagation of sound.

2d. A favorable current of air; and

3d. Perhaps there was a cloud so situated as to reflect the sound to the particular locality where it was heard.

Thanking you for your efforts to collect and preserve information in regard to the war, I remain,

Yours truly,

C. R. LANE.\*

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\* That the phenomena stated by Rev. C. Cort and Rev. Dr. Lane were not confined to the battle of Gettysburg alone, but occurred at other great battles, will appear in the following statements by Rev. Bishop J. J. Glossbrenner, D. D., of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ, a resident of Churchville, Augusta County, Virginia, and by Hon. F. M. Kimmell, at the time referred to a resident of Somerset, Somerset County, Pennsylvania, and at present residing in Chambersburg. Judge Kimmell was formerly presiding judge of this district, and is a man well known all over the State. Bishop Glossbrenner, by reason of his age, extensive travels, and undoubted integrity, is known from Pennsylvania to the Pacific Coast. The statements of these gentlemen therefore, are beyond dispute.

The statement of Bishop Glossbrenner is as follows:

CHURCHVILLE, VIRGINIA, June 19th, 1884.

MR. J. HOKE:

*Dear Sir*—In your note you desire me to state in writing what I communicated to you verbally some time ago. That fact is as follows: During



Deeming the fact of the phenomenon authenticated beyond a doubt, and desiring to know the reasons why this sound was heard at such great distances, and so indistinctly at Chambersburg and at other intervening places, I communicated the facts to the officers of the Smithsonian Institute, at Washington, D. C., and asked for an explanation, to be used in my history. The following are the replies.

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the great battles about Richmond, which is upwards of one hundred miles from here, we distinctly heard the report of the cannonading.

Respectfully yours,

J. J. GLOSSBRENNER.

The following is Judge Kimmell's statement:

CHAMBERSBURG, September 12th, 1884.

MR. J. HOKE:

*Dear Sir*—On the 21st of July, 1861, I lived at Somerset, Somerset County, Pennsylvania, distant from Cumberland, Maryland, thirty-seven miles by turnpike road. This latter place is one hundred and ninety miles by rail from Baltimore, and as I now understand the geography of the country one hundred and ninety miles would carry you from Cumberland to either Washington or Bull Run in Virginia. This would make a distance of some two hundred and thirty miles by the roads from Somerset to the battle-field, or as the bird flies, or as sound carries, two hundred miles. Standing on a hill which overlooks the town, in company with others, we distinctly heard the "thuds" of the cannon of the battle, not once only nor for a short time, but often and at intervals extending over hours. We, having previously learned of the army having moved South, conjectured that a battle was being fought between the Federal and Confederate forces, and we were on the tip-toe of expectation. When the news came we found our conjectures fully verified, as to time and direction. Somerset lies on the west of the main ridge of the Allegheny Mountain, fourteen miles from the summit. The waters of the eastern slope of the mountain at that point are carried by Wills Creek to the Potomac at Cumberland, and thence flow to Washington City, D. C. The clouds during the day were impending so far as we could see. We learned that this was the case along the river, and my theory was, whether right or wrong, that the clouds confined the sound to the valley of the Potomac, and sent them to the mountains upwards, as through a funnel. Along the Alleghenies above Cumberland, the sounds were heard by multitudes. Our congregation near the summit adjourned the sermon to listen.

On the days of the Gettysburg fights I lived at Chambersburg, twenty-five miles from the contest, in which there was immense cannonading, and never heard it at all. I don't remember the condition of the clouds, and only remember the facts of the first fight, because the matter was the subject of discussion.

I have heard or read somewhere that the sounds of Waterloo were heard two hundred miles away.

F. M. KIMMELL.

The first is from that eminent scientist, Prof. Spencer F. Baird:

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 6, 1884.

MR. J. HOKE:

*Dear Sir*—The irregularities of sound transmission referred to in your letter of August 30th, have been repeatedly observed, and may be thus explained: With a gentle wind, the current of air is of course considerably retarded near the surface of the earth by friction with its irregular outlines; and as we rise higher the speed is ordinarily found to gradually increase for some hundreds of feet. The effect of this partial retardation of the aerial current on the spherical wave-fronts of sound, is to press forward their higher portions more than the lower portions,—*in the direction in which the wind is moving*,—and reversely to press back the upper portions of the wave-fronts more than their lower portions,—*in the opposite direction*. It thus results that sound-rays moving *with* the wind, tend to curve downward toward the earth; and sound-rays moving *against* the wind, tend to rise upward, and at the distance of a mile or so, to leave the observer in an acoustic "shadow"—the sounds passing at some distance above his head. This has been verified by climbing to eminences, where a lost sound is completely recovered. Sound probably travels *as far* against the wind as with it, but it is refracted upward beyond the ears of the listener. (See the Smithsonian Report for 1875, page 210.)

This subject was well discussed by the late Professor Henry,—a copy of whose "Researches in Sound" is herewith mailed to your address. You will find special reference to the abnormal effects observed during cannonading in battles, at pages 492, 493. See also pages 512, 513.

Under certain circumstances, an intervening obstacle—as a hill—tends to deflect sound-rays upward to some distance over the adjacent valley; so as to render them quite audible at a considerable distance, while wholly inaudible through the middle distance. Yours very respectfully,

SPENCER F. BAIRD, *Secretary*.\*

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\*The following certificate from Rev. L. W. Stahl, received subsequent to the submission of this matter to the learned gentlemen of the Smithsonian Institute, presents this matter of the phenomena of sound in a new light. It will be seen from this statement that the *ground* was the conductor and not the atmosphere:

ANNVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA, August 2d, 1886.

J. HOKE, ESQ.:

*Dear Sir*—At the time of the war I resided in Madison, Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, on the Cumberland pike, twenty-eight miles from Pittsburg. During the 2d of July, 1863,—the second day of the battle of Gettysburg,—I was in a field near the village helping to harvest, and while

The references made in the foregoing to Professor Henry's "Researches in Sound" are as follows:

"The science of acoustics in regard to the phenomena of sound as exhibited in limited spaces, has been developed with signal success. The laws of its production, propagation, reflection and refraction have been determined with much precision, so that we are enabled in most cases to explain, predict, and control the phenomena exhibited under given conditions. But in cases of loud sounds, and those which are propagated to a great distance, such as are to be employed as fog-signals, considerable obscurity still exists. As an illustration of this I may mention the frequent occurrence of apparently abnormal phenomena. General Warren informs me that at the battle of Seven Pines, in June, 1862, near Richmond, General Johnson, of the Confederate army, was within three miles of the scene of action with a force intended to attack the flank of the Federal forces, and although listening attentively for the sound of the commencement of the engagement, the battle, which was a severe one, lasting about three hours, ended without his having heard a single gun. (See Johnson's report.) Another case of a similar kind occurred to General McClellan, at the battle of Gaines' Mills, June 27, 1862, also near Richmond. Although a sharp engagement was progressing within three or four

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thus engaged one of our number, after raking together enough of wheat to make a sheaf, laid the handle of his rake against his head while he bound the grain thus raked together, when to his astonishment he heard distinctly the roar of the cannon. I then too tried it and the sounds were very distinct. We heard at intervals throughout the three days of battle, a strange roaring, but it was only by the use of the rake handle that we could distinguish what it was. This was in an air line not less than one hundred and fifty miles from Gettysburg.

Yours truly,

L. W. STAHL.

miles for four or five hours, the General and his staff were unaware of its occurrence, and when their attention was called to some feeble sound they had no idea that it was anything more than a skirmish of little importance. (See Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War.) A third and perhaps still more remarkable instance is given in a skirmish between a part of the Second Corps under General Warren and a force of the enemy. In this case the sound of the firing was heard more distinctly at General Meade's head-quarters than it was at the head-quarters of the Second Corps itself, although the latter was about midway between the former and the point of conflict. Indeed, the sound appeared so near General Meade's camp that the impression was made that the enemy had gotten between it and General Warren's command. In fact so many instances occurred of wrong impressions as to direction and distance derived from the sound of guns that little reliance came to be placed on these indications."

By direction of Professor Baird the subject was also referred to Professor A. B. Johnson, chief clerk of the Light House Board, who kindly favored me with the following:

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 10, 1884.

MR. J. HOKE:

*Dear Sir*—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 6th, 1884, which came to hand by due course of mail.

You state that during the battle of Gettysburg, Rev. C. Cort and others distinctly heard the sound of the cannonading in Westmoreland County, western Pennsylvania, in an air line one hundred and forty miles almost west from the field of conflict, while during that battle, at Chambersburg, but twenty-five miles west from Gettysburg, the sound of the guns was not heard, except indistinctly on the outskirts of the town.

You also state that Rev. Dr. Lane says that the sound of the cannonading at Gettysburg was heard in the southern part of Wyoming County, Pennsyl-

vania, a distance of over one hundred and twenty miles north-east, in an air line.

And you also say that at the instance of Professor Baird, of the Smithsonian Institution, you ask my opinion as to the cause of this phenomenon.

In reply, I beg leave to say that this phenomenon has received the attention of scientists for many years.

Dr. Derham, of England, writing in Latin to the British Philosophical Society in 1708, seemed to consider it as caused by variations in temperature, moisture, and the direction of the wind. Baron von Humboldt, and after him Dr. Dove, Sir John Herschel and Dr. Robinson, held that aerial flocculence caused this phenomenon, a theory which was adopted and amplified by Professor Tyndall. Professor Joseph Henry, long the Director of the Smithsonian Institute, has, however, presented a more satisfactory theory and has worked it out with great care by many experiments. He accepted as a good working hypothesis, the suggestions made by Professor Stokes, of Cambridge, England, founded upon those remarkable observations of the French Academician, De la Roche, which, roughly stated, is this: The several strata into which a current of air may be divided, do not move with the same velocity. The lowest stratum is retarded by friction against the earth; the one immediately above, by friction against the lower; hence the velocity increases from the ground upward, and when the direction of the sound is perpendicular to the sound-wave, as when projected against the wind, it will be thrown upward ahead of the observer, and when it is projected with the wind it will be thrown downward toward the earth.

Professor Henry tested this theory by careful and often repeated experiments, and announced the results of five different phenomena, with his idea of their cause. One of these formula describes the case you cite in these words:

*"The audibility of sound at a distance and its inaudibility nearer the source of sound."* The cause of this aberration in audibility, he formulates thus: *"Sound moving with the wind is refracted down toward the earth; while moving against the wind it is refracted upward and passes over the head of the observer."*

You will see from my several pamphlets on this general subject, which I send you, that I have given this matter some attention, that I agree with Henry rather than Tyndall, and that I have cited a number of instances which have occurred under my own observation similar to those which you relate, though on a smaller scale,—but that in each of these cases, the wind is blowing against, rather than with the sound.

You ask me for a short statement of the reason of the phenomena you have

related. In reply I beg to say that I am of the opinion that the aberration in the audibility of the sound of the guns at Gettysburg was caused by the wind; that is, the wind blowing against the sound-waves tilted them up so that they first touched the earth near Chambersburg and then passed over it describing one or more curves from there to the hearers in Westmoreland County.

It is not improbable that the length of the cord of the arc described by the sound-wave was about the distance from Gettysburg to Chambersburg, and that the sound was heard at intervals of twenty-five or thirty miles from thence to the hearers in Westmoreland County and maybe beyond. It would be interesting to know if this was the case.

An instance of this kind, though on a much smaller scale, is given on page 731 of my pamphlet, "Anomalies in the Sound of Fog Signals," and the curve of the sound-wave showing the area of inaudibility in the observations made near the White Head-Light Station, Maine, is indicated in a rude wood cut on the next page.

The battle of Gettysburg lasted about three days, if I remember it correctly; it is possible that the wind during that time changed, so that the same reasons which would have caused the sound of the guns to be heard in Westmoreland County in one day, might cause them to be heard in Wyoming County on another.

Guns were frequently heard at a great distance from battle-fields during the War of the Rebellion, while they were not heard by persons comparatively near, but in the same direction. In one instance those near by did not hear the noise of the guns when they could see their flash. This is the first time I have had to consider this phenomenon when extending over twenty-five miles. Within that distance, it seems to me, to be accounted for. When, as in this instance, the distance is five or six times greater, I speak with less confidence. But I do not see that the question of the distance changes the principle.

Yours very truly,

ARNOLD B. JOHNSON, *Chief Clerk.*

In the publications accompanying the foregoing letter, Mr. Johnson has specially called attention to several places which he has marked as bearing directly upon the phenomena under consideration. These I annex. The first quotation states Professor Henry's five phenomena of sound, as referred to by Mr. Johnson:

"Professor Henry, in considering the results of General

Duane's experiments, and his own, some of which were made in company with Sir Frederick Arron and Captain Webb, Her Britannic Majesty's Navy, both of the British Light House Establishment, who were sent here to study and report on our fog signal system, formulated these abnormal phenomena. He said they consisted of—

“1. The audibility of a sound at a distance and its inaudibility nearer the source of sound.

“2. The inaudibility of a sound at a given distance in one direction, while a lesser sound is heard at the same distance in another direction.

“3. The audibility at one time at a distance of several miles, while at another the sound can not be heard at more than a fifth of the same distance.

“4. While the sound is generally heard further with the wind than against it, in some instances the reverse is the case.

“5. The sudden loss of a sound in passing from one locality to another in the same vicinity, the distance from the source of the sound being the same.”

In illustration of the foregoing the following is cited:

“There are six steam fog whistles on the coast of Maine; these have been frequently heard at a distance of twenty miles, and as frequently can not be heard at the distance of two miles, and this with no perceptible difference in the state of the atmosphere.

“The signal is often heard at a great distance in one direction, while in another it will be scarcely audible at the distance of a mile. This is not the effect of wind, as the signal is frequently heard much farther against the wind than with it; for example, the whistle on Cape Eliza-

beth can always be distinctly heard in Portland, a distance of nine miles, during a heavy north-east snow storm, the wind blowing a gale directly from Portland toward the whistle." \*

In illustration of his sound-wave theory, Professor Henry states the following, as given in the same paper:

"It frequently happens on a vessel leaving a station that the sound (of the fog whistle) is suddenly lost at a point in its course, and, after remaining inaudible some time, is heard again at a greater distance, and then is gradually lost as the distance is further increased. This is attributed to the upward refraction of the sound-wave, which passes over the head of the observer, and continues an upward course until it nearly reaches the upper surface of the current of wind, when the refraction will be reversed, and the sound sent downward to the earth. Or the effect may be considered as due to a sound-shadow produced by refraction, which is gradually closed in at a distance by the lateral spread of the sound-wave near the earth on either side, in a direction which is not affected by the upper refraction. Another explanation may be found in the probable circumstance of the lower sheet of sound-beams being actually refracted into a serpentine or undulating course."

Upon this sound-wave theory, Mr. Johnson, also said:

"This ricochetting of sound, these intervals of audibility, ought to be recognized by the mariner, who should now understand that in sailing toward or from a fog-signal

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\*"Aberrations of Audibility of Fog Signals." A paper read before the Philosophical Society of Washington, October 22, 1881, by Arnold B. Johnson, Chief Clerk of the Light House Board.




in full blast, he might lose and pick up its sound several times though no apparent object might intervene. And the mariner now needed that science should deduce the law of this variation in audibility and bring out some instrument which should be to the ears what the mariner's compass is to the eyes, and also that variations of this instrument yet to be invented, be provided for and corrected as now are the variations of the mariner's compass. The speaker referred to the benefit the mariner had derived from the promulgation of Professor Henry's theory of the tilting of the sound-wave up or down by adverse or favorable winds, and said that by this the sailor had been led to go aloft in the one case and to get as near as possible to the surface of the water in the other, when trying to pick up the sound of a fog-signal."

Such are the explanations given of these phenomena by these eminent scientists. The facts are exceedingly interesting and are worthy of investigation.

## CHAPTER XII.

### GETTYSBURG, THE NATION'S SHRINE.

"On Fame's eternal camping ground  
Their silent tents are spread,  
And Glory guards, with solemn round,  
The bivouac of the dead."

S soon as the result of the series of engagements between the Federal and Confederate armies at Gettysburg was known throughout the country, people from all sections flocked to that place. In traversing the field of conflict the evidences of the tremendous struggle were visible in all directions. Disabled cannon, abandoned and captured arms, broken down fences, trampled and ruined fields of grass and grain, pools of blood, dead and wounded men, and the bloated and offensive carcasses of horses, were some of the visible results. The hearts of patriots were saddened and their feelings shocked to see the remains of the brave men who had yielded up their lives that the Nation might live, because of the necessary haste with which they were interred, in many instances but partially covered with earth. These partly covered bodies were scattered for miles over ground that would soon be cultivated. The graves which were marked were only temporarily so, and the marks would soon decay or be obliterated, and all traces of the sacred

dust be entirely lost. Humanity shuddered at the sight, and patriotism revolted at such desecration. The idea then was suggested of purchasing a suitable piece of ground upon some elevated place, and gathering these men from all parts of the field and decently interring them side by side. Mr. David Wills, a citizen of Gettysburg, submitted a proposition to effect the purpose to his Excellency, Governor Andrew G. Curtin, in a letter dated July 24th, 1863; and the governor, with the promptness and zeal for the cause of the Union, and the welfare and comfort of the soldiers, which he had always shown, approved of the design, and appointed Mr. Wills as agent to carry out the project. Mr. Wills at once opened correspondence with the governors of other states, which had soldiers dead upon the field, and they all with great promptness responded and seconded the plan. About seventeen acres of ground on Cemetery Hill, at the apex of the triangular line of battle of the Union army, was purchased and the title made to the State of Pennsylvania. No more beautiful or appropriate place for the gallant heroes who died upon that field, could be found than the one selected. It is high and prominent. It was the center of the Federal position. Upon it were planted the batteries which thundered forth death and destruction to the foe; and it was there that the awful fire of Lee's one hundred and twenty guns was concentrated during that fearful two hours' artillery duel, which preceded Pickett's great, but wild and disastrous charge. Lots in this cemetery were gratuitously given to each State having dead on the field. It was arranged that the expenses for the removal and re-interment of the dead, the laying out, orna-



THE SOLDIERS' NATIONAL CEMETERY AT GETTYSBURG. (From a photograph by Beldel.)

menting, and enclosing of the grounds, erecting a lodge for the keeper, and constructing a suitable monument, should be borne by the several States, and assessed in proportion to their population, as indicated by their representation in Congress.

The Soldiers' National Cemetery is enclosed by a well built stone wall, surmounted with heavy dressed capping stones. This wall extends along the south, west, and north sides of the grounds. The division fence between it and the local cemetery of the town is of iron. The lodge for the residence of the keeper is a beautiful structure, and the front fence and gate-way are of ornamental iron work. The grounds have been graded, and are adorned with many beautiful trees, shrubbery, and flowers. The burial-place proper is semi-circular in form. In the center of this semi-circle stands the National Monument. The grounds from this center slope off gradually in every direction. They are laid out in lots, each State proportioned in size to the number of its dead. Each of these lots is divided into sections, with a space of four feet for a walk between the sections. There are also spaces set apart for the Regulars, as also for those whose identity could not be distinguished. Many of those who fell in the first day's engagement are among the latter; they lay either unburied and exposed to the sun and rain, until the Monday following the battle, or were but slightly covered. The outer division of the section is lettered "A," and so on in alphabetical order. As the observer stands in the center of the semi-circle, facing the circumference, the burials are commenced at the right hand of the section in each lot, and the graves are num-

bered regularly. A register is kept of the number, name, regiment, and company of the occupant of each grave. Two feet of space is allowed to each, and they are laid with their heads toward the center of the semi-circle. At the head of the graves there is a stone wall, built up from the bottom as a foundation for the head-stones, which are placed along the whole length of each section, and on



GENERAL REYNOLDS' MONUMENT IN THE SOLDIERS' NATIONAL CEMETERY AT GETTYSBURG. (From a photograph by Tipton.)

which, opposite each grave, is engraved the name, regiment, and the company of the deceased. These headstones are all alike in size, the design being wholly adapted to a symmetrical order, and one which combines simplicity and durability. The remains of the soldiers were taken up and re-interred with great care. Every precaution was

taken to identify the unmarked graves, and also to prevent the marked graves from losing their identity by the defacement of the original temporary boards, on which the names were written or cut by their comrades in arms. The graves being all numbered, the numbers are registered in a record-book, with the name, company, and regiment. This register will ever designate the graves and preserve the identity of the occupants. The coffins and head-stones were furnished by the Government, and the cemetery is kept in order by persons appointed and paid by the same. A careful account was also taken and kept of each article found in the pockets, or about the person of the deceased.

Not all, however, who fell at this place in the sacred cause of Freedom were interred here. Many were taken away by their friends and buried among their own kindred; and many others who were wounded and taken to their homes, or to distant hospitals, and died there, were laid away to rest where they died. Among the killed who were removed was the brave, the lamented Reynolds. His body was borne to his native city, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, where, amidst his own kindred, he sleeps. A beautiful monument, however, has been erected by his comrades, in the National Cemetery, near the entrance, a view of which is shown in our illustration.

But of all the gallant heroes who fell at Gettysburg, wherever they rest, it may truthfully be said:

"They fell devoted, but undying;  
Their very names the gale seems sighing;  
The rivers murmur of their name;  
The woods are peopled with their fame;  
The silent tombstone, cold and gray,

Claims kindred with their hallowed clay;  
Their spirits wrap the dusky mountains;  
Their memory sparkles over the fountains;  
The meanest rill, the mightiest river,  
Rolls mingling with their fame forever."

The Soldiers' National Monument, standing in this semi-circle, is one of the most beautiful works of art upon the continent. The whole rendering of the design is intended to be purely historical, telling its own story, with such simplicity that any discerning mind will readily comprehend its meaning and purpose.

The superstructure is sixty feet high, and consists of a massive granite pedestal, twenty-five feet square at the base, crowned by a colossal statue, representing the GENIUS OF LIBERTY. Standing upon a three quarter globe, she raises with her right hand the victor's wreath of laurel, while with her left she gathers up the folds of our national flag under which the victory has been won.

Projecting from the angles of the pedestal are four buttresses, supporting an equal number of allegorical statues representing, respectively, WAR, HISTORY, PEACE, and PLENTY.

WAR is personified by a statue of the American soldier, who, resting from the conflict, relates to HISTORY the story of the battle which this monument is intended to commemorate.

HISTORY, in listening attitude, records with stylus and tablet the achievements of the field, and the names of the honored dead.

PEACE is symbolized by a statue of the American mechanic, characterized by appropriate accessories.

PLENTY is represented by a female figure, with a sheaf





SOLDIERS' NATIONAL MONUMENT.

of wheat and fruits of the earth, typifying peace and abundance as the soldier's crowning triumph.

Upon the panels of the main die between the statues are appropriate inscriptions, one of which is the concluding part of President LINCOLN's address upon the occasion of the dedication of this cemetery, as follows:

"It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to the cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that the dead shall not have died in vain; that the nation shall, under God, have a new birth of freedom, and that the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

The main die of the pedestal is octagonal in form, panelled upon each face. The cornice and plinth above are also octagonal, and are heavily molded. Upon this plinth rests an octagonal molded base, bearing upon its face, in high relief, the National arms.

The upper die and cap are circular in form, the die being encircled by stars equal in number with the States whose sons contributed their lives as the price of the victory won at Gettysburg.

The ground thus purchased and set apart for the burial of those who fell at Gettysburg in defense of the Government, was, on November 19th, 1863, solemnly dedicated to this sacred purpose. There were present, beside a vast concourse of people from all parts of the country, the President of the United States, several members of his cabinet, the ministers of France and Italy, the governors of several States, representatives of the army and navy,

members of Congress, and many other distinguished persons. A stand or platform was erected for the speakers and invited guests. This stand stood just where the National Monument now stands. The exercises were opened by music by Birgfield's band, after which followed an eloquent and impressive prayer by Rev. Thomas H. Stockton, D. D., from which I make the following extracts:

“By this Altar of Sacrifice; on this Field of Deliverance; on this Mount of Salvation; within the fiery and bloody line of the ‘Munitions of Rocks,’ looking back to the dark days of fear and trembling, and to the rapture of relief that came after, we multiply our thanksgivings, and confess our obligations to renew and perfect our personal and social consecration to Thy service and glory.

“Oh, had it not been for God! For lo! our enemies, they came unresisted, multitudinous, mighty, flushed with victory, and sure of success. They exulted on our mountains; they revelled in our valleys; they feasted, they rested; they slept, they awakened; they grew stronger, prouder, bolder, every day; they spread abroad, they concentrated here; they looked beyond this horizon to the stores of wealth, to the haunts of pleasure, and to the seats of power in our capital and chief cities. They proposed to cast a chain of slavery around the form of Freedom, binding life and death together forever. Their premature triumph was the mockery of God and man. One more victory, and all was theirs! But behind these hills was heard the feeble march of a smaller, but pursuing host. Onward they hurried, day and night, for God and their country. Foot-sore, way-worn, hungry, thirsty, faint,—but not in heart,—they came to dare all, to bear all, and to do all

that is possible to heroes. And Thou didst sustain them! At first they met the blast on the plain, and bent before it like the trees in a storm. But then, led by Thy hand to these hills, they took their stand upon the rocks and remained as firm and immovable as they. In vain were they assaulted. All art, all violence, all desperation, failed to dislodge them. Baffled, bruised, broken, their enemies recoiled, retired, and disappeared. Glory to God for this rescue! But oh, the slain! In the freshness and fulness of their young and manly life, with such sweet memories of father and mother, brother and sister, wife and children, maiden and friends, they died for us. From the coasts beneath the eastern sky, from the shores of northern lakes and rivers, from the flowers of the western prairies, and from the homes of the midway and border, they came here to die for us and for mankind. Alas, how little we can do for them! We come with the humility of prayer, with the pathetic eloquence of venerable wisdom, with the tender beauty of poetry, with the plaintive harmony of music, with the honest tribute of our Chief Magistrate, and with all this honorable attendance; but our best hope is in thy blessing, O Lord, our God! O Father, bless us! Bless the bereaved, whether present or absent; bless our sick and wounded soldiers and sailors; bless all our rulers and people; bless our army and navy; bless the efforts for the suppression of the rebellion; and bless all the associations of this day and place and scene forever. As the trees are not dead, though their foliage is gone, so our heroes are not dead, though their forms are fallen. In their proper personality they are all with Thee. And the spirit of their example is here. It fills the air; it fills our hearts.

And, long as time shall last, it will hover in the skies and rest on the landscape; and the pilgrims of our own land, and from all lands, will thrill with its inspiration, and increase and confirm their devotion to liberty, religion, and God."

At the conclusion of this prayer, the Marine Band of Washington rendered excellent and appropriate music, after which Hon. Edward Everett delivered an able and elaborate address. Following this address a choir sang the hymn composed specially for the occasion by B. B. French, Esq., some verses of which are given at the close of this chapter. The President of the United States, the honored and revered LINCOLN, then, amidst the tremendous applause of the assembled multitude, arose and slowly advanced to the front of the platform and delivered his celebrated dedicatory address, which was as follows:

"Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

"Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle field of that war. We are met to dedicate a portion of it as a final resting place of those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

"But in a larger sense we can not dedicate, we can not consecrate, we can not hallow this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here have consecrated

it far above our power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work that they have thus so nobly carried on. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to the cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we highly resolve that the dead shall not have died in vain; that the nation shall, under God, have a new birth of freedom, and that the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

The words of the president were uttered in slow and measured tones, and although not heard by the large majority of the people present, the most profound silence was observed during their delivery. When he uttered the closing sentences, which have become immortal, emphasizing each with a significant nod and jerk of his head,—*“that the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth,”*—it occurred to the writer, who stood within a few feet of him, that those words were destined to an imperishable immortality.

After the president’s dedicatory address, a solemn dirge was sung, after which the benediction was pronounced by Rev. H. L. Baugher, D.D.

The admiration of the people for President LINCOLN exceeded that ever bestowed upon any other person within my knowledge. It was evidently not so much for him personally, as *representatively*. He was recognized as the personification of the cause which was enshrined in every

patriot's heart, and for which the armies of the Union were contending. To love the Union was to love ABRAHAM LINCOLN. To hate and defame him was the acknowledged evidence of disloyalty. The honored head of the Nation, the humble and unpretending man from Illinois, standing upon the ground where one of the greatest battles of modern times occurred, and in which the existence and destiny of the Government were in part decided, modestly received the willing homage of the assembled thousands. The Man—the President—the Government—the yet undecided peril to which it was exposed—the ground we were on—the sleeping thousands all about us, whose blood had been poured out upon that soil that the Nation might live, all conspired to make the occasion one never to be forgotten.

During the twenty-three years that have elapsed since this ground was dedicated to the sacred purpose of the interment of these honored dead, many improvements have been made. Additional grounds have been purchased; avenues along the lines held by the Federals have been laid out; tablets have been erected to mark the places where corps, divisions, brigades, and regiments stood, and monuments where distinguished men fell. States whose troops fought in this battle are appropriating money for additional improvements, and in the years to come the field of Gettysburg will increase in beauty and interest, and will be visited by untold thousands.

Such was the origin of this final resting place for the remains of the heroic men who fell upon the field of Gettysburg. Who can estimate the importance to the race of their valor and heroism? They have fallen, but victory

is ours — theirs enrollment upon the scroll of undying fame. They did not fight in vain. Not for themselves, but for their children, for the race, for humanity, for righteousness, for God, they gave themselves a willing sacrifice. Their remains deserve the highest honor that a grateful people can bestow. Their deeds will live in history long after their bodies have mouldered into dust; and the place where they lie will be honored, protected, and preserved as a sad, but sacred, memento of their heroic conduct. And, as was intimated in Dr. Stockton's impressive prayer, the place where this great battle was fought, the ground where the dust of the slain reposes, has become the Nation's shrine, and pilgrims from our own land, and from all lands, will ever continue to visit it to catch a new inspiration of freedom, and increase and confirm their devotion to Liberty, to Religion, and to God.

In the Soldiers' National Cemetery at Gettysburg there are interred the bodies of three thousand five hundred and fifty-five Union soldiers. They were from the following states: Maine, one hundred and four; New Hampshire, forty-eight; Vermont, sixty-one; Massachusetts, one hundred and fifty-nine; Rhode Island, twelve; Connecticut, twenty-two; New York, eight hundred and sixty-six; New Jersey, seventy-eight; Pennsylvania, five hundred and twenty-six; Delaware, fifteen; Maryland, twenty-two; West Virginia, eleven; Ohio, one hundred and thirty-one; Indiana, eighty; Illinois, six; Michigan, one hundred and seventy-one; Wisconsin, seventy-three; Minnesota, fifty-two; United States Regulars, one hundred and thirty-eight; Unknown, nine hundred and seventy-nine. These fallen patriots having come together from the East, North, and



West, and stood side by side under one flag, inspired by one spirit, and fought for one cause, it is but right and proper that they should not be divided in death, but rest in the ground hallowed by their valor and made sacred by their blood. For them there is no more separation from home and loved ones at their country's call, no more weary marches, no more digging of trenches, no more charging into yawning chasms of death, no more painful wounds and sleepless nights, and long and weary days in hospitals. All these are forever ended. On this Altar of Sacrifice, this Mount of Salvation, this Field of Deliverance, and surrounded by these Munitions of Rocks, let them rest until the Archangel's clarion shall sound with a louder blast than that which summoned them to this field of heroic deeds.

“'Tis holy ground —  
This spot, where, in their graves,  
Are placed our country's braves,  
Who fell in freedom's holy cause,  
Fighting for liberties and laws:  
Let tears abound.

“Here where they fell,  
Oft shall the widow's tears be shed;  
Oft shall fond parents mourn their dead;  
The orphan here shall kneel and weep,  
And maidens where their lovers sleep,  
Their woes to tell.

“Here let them rest:  
And summer's heat and winter's cold  
Shall glow and freeze above their mould—  
A thousand years shall pass away—  
A nation still shall mourn their clay,  
Which now is blest.”

## CHAPTER XIII.

### A GUIDE TO THE FIELD OF BATTLE.

**V**ISITORS to Gettysburg should bear in mind that the field of battle extends over about twenty-five square miles; and while events of thrilling interest occurred at every portion, a few points only, which possess special interest, and from which a general view of the whole may be had, can be visited by those whose time is limited. Those, however, whose time will justify it should employ one of the many excellent guides at all times to be found, whose services, with the necessary means of conveyance, can be had for a reasonable compensation. To such as have but a day, or part of a day, to spend in inspecting the field, the following directions will be of value.

In approaching Gettysburg from the north, you pass along and through part of the battle field of the first day. The wooded elevation to your right, just before entering the town, is *Oak Hill*, and is almost the center of the Union line. The line of battle extended from this ridge in a north-easterly direction for about a mile. The ridge, which you see to your right, and which extends for several miles in a southerly direction, is *Seminary Ridge*. Along

this ridge, from the Chambersburg pike to a short distance below Big Round Top,—about three miles,—the Confederate line extended during the battles of the second and third days. That large brick building upon this hill, surmounted by a cupola, is the *Lutheran Theological Seminary*, from which the hill was named. The left of the Federal line, on the first day's engagement, extended down some distance below this building; and near it General Reynolds was killed. That large white building to your left is *Pennsylvania College*. It was used as a hospital during the battle, and from its cupola General Lee took observations. The first road, or street, which leaves the town, and leads up and over the hill in a westerly direction, is the *Chambersburg Pike*. By this road the principal part of the Confederate army came, and by it their great wagon train of wounded retreated after the close of the three days of conflict. Along this road, a short distance out, stands a stone house in which General Lee had his headquarters. The next road immediately after this, which runs in a south-westerly direction, crossing Seminary Ridge below the seminary, is the *Fairfield Road*. It crosses the South Mountain by Monterey Pass. Upon this road the Confederate army retreated after the battle.

Turning to your left, you see in the distance the Adams County Alms-house, around which desperate fighting took place. The hills to your left are CULP'S and WOLFF HILL—names which have become historic. CEMETERY HILL, crowned with the stars and stripes, rises to your view just beyond the town.

Arrived at Gettysburg, you will proceed first to EAST CEMETERY HILL. This stands at the southern edge

of the town, and you reach it by going out Baltimore Street, or the Baltimore Pike. Upon this hill, to your left, and directly opposite the entrance to the *Soldiers' National Cemetery*, is the center of the Federal position. A view of the breast-works and cannon, which yet remain, is given on page 278 of this book. Here the broken,



OBSERVATORY ON EAST CEMETERY HILL.

(From a photograph by Tipton.)

but heroic survivors of the First and Eleventh corps rallied behind those guns which you see around you. And here, in the evening of the second day's engagement, the most desperate hand to hand fighting took place. The Louisiana Tigers charged up and upon this hill and captured the guns, but after a desperate and terrific hand to hand fight, in which the butts of guns, cannon rammers,

and stones were used, they were driven away, and in their retreat a battery stationed to your right across that depression, swept through and through them with grape and canister. But let us mount the Observatory upon this hill and take a survey. Here you have an excellent view of the scene of the first day's engagement. From *Seminary Ridge*, about a mile to the west, and a half mile south of the *Theological Seminary*, to about two miles to the north and north-east, at *Barlow's Knoll*, where a monument may be seen, the line of battle extended. Over the fields intervening the conflict raged; and when the Federals were compelled to fall back, they retreated over these and through the town to the hill upon which you stand. Turning your eyes to the west and south-west you have a fine view of *Seminary Ridge* upon which the Confederate line rested during the battles of the second and third days. The illustrations upon pages 260 and 298 show this ridge from where the Chambersburg pike crosses it, to that point where Pickett's division of Longstreet's Corps joined the right of Hill's; and the illustration in this chapter—*View from Little Round Top looking west*—shows the extension of that hill to the extreme right of the Confederate line.

Turning toward the east—but about a half mile—is *Culp's Hill*, a view of which is given on page 280, and beyond it is *Wolff Hill*, where the Federal right terminated. Upon *Culp's Hill* you will see the Federal breast-works, which yet remain as is shown on page 302. A short distance further east is *Spangler's Spring*, where, on the evening of the second day of the battle, Johnson's division, in the absence of nearly the whole of the Twelfth Corps,

which defended that part of the line, and had been sent to assist in repelling Longstreet's assault upon the left, succeeded in obtaining an entrance, which, had it been followed up, might have proved fatal to the Federals. This position the Confederates held during the night, but were driven out in the morning after a fearful and desperate engagement of six hours duration. The slain here were many, the Confederates losing most heavily.

Returning from Culp's Hill, we enter the SOLDIERS' NATIONAL CEMETERY, and view the beautiful resting-place of the heroic slain. A beautiful view of this sacred place will be found in the preceding chapter. That bronzed statue near the entrance is to the brave, noble, and gallant REYNOLDS. Although the place of his death is a mile to the west, and his body was interred at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, his statue was placed here. It is but right that in the absence of himself, that which represents him should be placed among his gallant fallen comrades. From the Cemetery, as well as from the Observatory, you have an excellent view of the Confederate position of the second and third days. Upon that ridge their line was formed, and all along it down to Round Top, and through the town, and around to the north-east of it—a distance from one extreme to the other of about four and a half miles—a line of bristling bayonets stood. And all along that ridge, as well as upon elevated positions to the north and north-east, across the fields and beyond the town, their batteries were planted. These all in terrible concert opened upon the place where you now stand during the fearful two hours' prelude to Pickett's great assault upon the afternoon of the 3d of July. The ground all about you was torn and ploughed

with shot and shell, and almost every foot of it was hallowed with patriot blood. That modest looking building you see to your left, standing by the side of the Taneytown road, was GENERAL MEADE'S HEAD-QUARTERS. Just before Pickett's great assault, General Meade removed to *Powers' Hill*, which stands about half a mile to the south-east by the Baltimore pike, where General Slocum had previously established his head-quarters.

Having satisfied your curiosity, or spent as much time as you have at your disposal in looking about this part of the field, you will next proceed to LITTLE ROUND TOP.

Round Top is about three miles south of Gettysburg, and the train, if you go by rail, will land you at *Round Top Park*, on the eastern slope of that historic hill. Passing down by rail from the town, you go between the lines of the two armies—Seminary Ridge on your right, and Cemetery Hill and Ridge on your left. That dilapidated *yellow farm house, with a barn* opening toward you, about two hundred yards to your right, and just on this crossing of that lane, marks the extreme left of Pickett's great assaulting column. On your *left* you will see, on the slope of the hill, a *clump of trees*, one of which is *umbrella shaped*. This was the center and focus of the great charge, and General Pickett, it is said, directed his men to aim at that place. At that point the Federal line was pierced; there General Armistead received his mortal wound; near it Hancock was wounded; and there the rebellion received its death-blow. Excellent views of this historic place, with the ground over which the charge was made, are given on pages 370, 374. To your *right*, as the train crosses the Emmittsburg road, you will see a *brick house and red barn*.

These are *Codori's*, so frequently spoken of in the history of the battle. These buildings mark about *the center of Pickett's assaulting column*. In and behind the *grove*, about a half mile west, upon Seminary Ridge, this column was formed.

Over the ground all about you the Confederate hosts passed under a terrific artillery and musketry fire. The guns from Round Top and East Cemetery Hill ploughed through and through them diagonally from right to left, and from left to right, covering the ground with their slain.

Arriving at *Round Top Park*, you ascend by a gradual slope to its summit. The ground over which you pass is historic. Over it the Union forces moved to charge the enemy. Round Top was the key to the field, and to seize and hold it the Confederates made the most determined and desperate efforts, but were met and driven back by the brave defenders of the Union. This hill was baptized with blood. That monument which stands out so conspicuously marks the spot where the brave *General Strong Vincent* fell. But a few feet to its rear *General Weed* fell, and *Lieutenant Hazlett*, in the act of catching him in his arms, also fell pierced by the bullet of a sharp-shooter from the Devil's Den. Near by, too, fell the lamented *Colonel O'Rourke* while bravely leading his regiment against the foe. Then to your left, where the ground begins to slope toward the depression between Little and Big Round Top, the heroic *Chamberlain* threw his hardy sons of Maine into the form of the letter U to meet the foe, who pressed upon him from every side. And down through the depression between these two hills the *Pennsylvania Reserves*





VIEW FROM LITTLE ROUND TOP—LOOKING NORTH AND NORTH-EAST. (From a Photograph by Tiplon.)

made their desperate charge, driving the enemy before them, and this *Hill of Salvation* was saved to the Union cause. And when the Federals by main force succeeded in planting their cannon upon its rock-crowned brow, it became a second Gibraltar, and victory was assured to the cause of Freedom. Does it not seem that God planted that rock-covered and rock-crowned hill just at that place, with its bold, precipitous, and almost inaccessible side to the enemy, and its comparatively gentle elevation to the Federals, for the express purpose of saving the American Union?

But let us sit down now, and by the aid of this beautiful illustration, take a more extended view of the field. This view, as its title indicates, gives us a north-eastern outlook. But in order that you may have a correct understanding of the situation you will bear in mind that the Federal line was in the shape of a fish-hook. The heel of that hook rested upon the place where you now are, its curve upon *Cemetery Hill*,—the high ground which is seen three miles off to the right,—and its point upon *Culp's and Wolff Hills*, which lie further to the right, or about a half to three quarters of a mile south-east of *Cemetery Hill*. These hills are not seen in this picture. *Gettysburg* lies behind Cemetery Hill. The Federal line, then, on the second and third days of the battle, extended from *Round Top*, and in front of it, up across the ground between you and that elevation in the extreme right, and then curving in an easterly and then in a south-easterly direction, ended upon *Wolff Hill*,—the whole about three and a half miles in length. *Seminary Ridge*, upon which the *Confederate line* lay, up as far as where the Chambersburg road crosses



VIEW FROM LITTLE ROUND TOP--LOOKING WEST AND NORTH-WEST. (From a photograph by Tipton.) [545]

it, is faintly seen in the distance. This view embraces the whole field, from the Federal left to the center, and all the ground within view was fought over.

But we introduce another view from this same hill, looking west and north-west.

This view presents the theatre of the greatest events in human history. Within an area scarcely more than a mile square, and directly in front of you (the corps badge on the monument marks its eastern side, or the side next to you), amidst those fields and woods and rocks and stones, fifty thousand armed men, like two mighty wrestlers, struggled and fought for four hours for the mastery, strewing the ground with their slain. But let me particularize. The ridge, or high ground you see in the distance, and which extends from one end of the picture to the other, is *Seminary Ridge*, along which the Confederate line lay during the battles of the second and third days. On pages 260 and 298 you have a view of this ridge from where the Chambersburg pike crosses it down beyond the Theological Seminary. On that part of the ridge the Federal left rested during the battle of the first day (facing west), and Hill's Corps was stationed there during the second and third days. This view shows that ridge from where it ends in those pictures down to the Confederate right a little below *Big Round Top*. The *house and barn* which are seen just beyond the right of that grove are *Codori's*. The *Emmitsburg road* which leaves the town close by the western base of *East Cemetery Hill*,—or near the curve of the fish hook,—passes by that house. The group of buildings this side of the grove are *Trostle's*; and the lane, or narrow road, which is seen running westward

close by those buildings, intersects the Emmittsburg road a short distance beyond that grove a little to the left. In the left hand angle where these roads meet is the *Peach Orchard*. General Sickles' line, in the battle of the afternoon of the second day, extended along the Emmittsburg road, some distance to the left of Codori's to the Peach Orchard, where it formed an angle and passed down in a south-easterly direction through and across the woods and fields in your front to the *Devil's Den*, which is about six hundred yards in a south-westerly direction from where you sit. Against this line General Longstreet threw his disciplined and brave fighters, and upon the angle at the Peach Orchard the fire of sixty cannon was concentrated, until after some of the most desperate fighting that ever occurred upon this continent, the brave boys in blue were compelled to fall back step by step, covering the ground with the slain of the two armies. At the same time Hood's Texans outflanked Sickles' left by the Devil's Den, and made desperate efforts to capture this hill. Division after division from the Second and Fifth Corps were sent to assist in driving back the enemy, and at length the hill was held. In that enclosed field a little to your right, immediately south of Trostle's and across the lane from that house is the *Wheat Field*. There occurred what is called the *Whirlpool of the Battle*. Regiments from three corps, and from eight or ten brigades, here fought promiscuously. The Confederate lines also seemed to be in confusion. The scene as the men advanced and then fell back, and fought in a circle and through and about each other, resembled a huge whirlpool and suggested the title given the battle at this place. Hundreds on each side



here fell, and the ground was drenched with human gore. Upon no other two places of equal extent upon the American continent,—the *Wheat Field* and the *Peach Orchard*,—excepting probably the Bloody Angle at Spottsylvania, were so many human lives lost, and so much human blood shed. On page 327 a view of the *Wheat Field* is given. That view is from the west, and from the lane beyond Trostle's. Ayer's division of Regulars charged down into the abyss before you and across the rocky space into those woods, but were driven back with the loss of nearly half their number. An officer who participated in the charge says that it seemed like "going down into hell." The illustration on page 325 shows this fearful vale. It is called "*The Valley of Death*." In the terrific struggle for the possession of this hill, the Confederates at length came up by the ravine between Big and Little Round Top, a short distance to the left, and attacked the Federals in flank and rear. At this juncture, when the result of the struggle seemed to be so nearly decided in favor of the Confederates, the Pennsylvania Reserves, under the gallant Crawford, charged, and with tremendous cheers dashed upon the foe and drove them at the point of the bayonet down the slope, over the Valley of Death, and across the stone fence by the Wheat Field. This point the gallant Pennsylvanians held to the close of the battle of the following day, when, after the repulse of Pickett's assault, they made another charge and regained the ground lost by Sickles the day before. *Big Round Top*, just south of you, had been occupied by Confederate sharp-shooters, and in the evening after Longstreet's final repulse, a detachment of Pennsylvania Reserves drove them away and

took possession of the hill, and held it until the final retreat of the enemy. Its abrupt, precipitous, and rocky sides prevented artillery from being taken to its summit, hence it was of comparatively little value, and little effort was made for its possession. All along that lane, which runs westward by Trostle's and the Wheat Field, and among those rocks and boulders, south of it, are monuments and tablets which mark the places where noble and heroic men fell. Among them is that monument in the Wheat Field to *General Zook*; the magnificent monument to *Colonel Ellis* of the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth New York, surmounted by his statue in marble, a little to the left and just beyond the Devil's Den; and that humble stone tablet, which is seen across the Valley of Death, marks the spot where *Colonel Frederick Taylor*, of the Buck-tails, met his fate. All about Trostle's to the right of the Wheat Field, the battle raged with terrible fury, and the ground was strewn with the slain. The *Devil's Den*, that wonderful freak of nature, the home of Confederate sharpshooters, by whose deadly aim so many prominent officers fell, is seen about six hundred yards in front and a little to the left. (Fine views of this are given on pages 320 and 322.) Visitors should, if possible, visit the places named, all of which except the Peach Orchard, which is about one mile distant, are within easy and convenient reach.

Before dismissing this picture, there is one more view which is of special importance. Turn your eyes now to the grove which stands upon Seminary Ridge, directly west of Codori's, (toward the top of the picture,) and you have the place where *Pickett's great assaulting columns*

*formed, and from which they came.* The ground about Codori's, and up to the Federal line, was the scene of their great charge, and the artillery planted upon this hill decimated their ranks as it ploughed through and through them.

BIG ROUND TOP, as already stated, was not of so much importance, and comparatively little fighting was done for its possession. If able to do a little climbing, by all means go to the top of this hill. Stone steps wind up to its summit, upon which stands an Observatory, from the top of which you will have a view of sublimity and grandeur, as well as of historic interest, which has few equals anywhere. Upon a clear day, and without the aid of a glass, Hanover and Littlestown to the east, Taneytown to the south, and Emmittsburg to the south-west, can be seen. Even the hills below Frederick, bordering on the Potomac, are visible. With the aid of a glass the view is of course more extensive and satisfactory. In the fields to the east, sheltered by these hills, part of the immense wagon train of the army was parked. The greater part was left in the neighborhood of Westminster. Upon that elevated ground west of you the Confederate right rested, and in the ravine which intervenes Kilpatrick made his famous dash upon the Confederates while Pickett's charge was in progress. In this charge the gallant Farnsworth, promoted to the command of a brigade but the Sunday before, fell.

Visitors should, if possible, return to Gettysburg by the *Avenue*, which runs along the Federal line. Tablets and monuments of exquisite design, and some of them executed at great expense, are found all along this avenue.



These mark the places where distinguished men fell, as also where the various corps, divisions, brigades, and regiments fought. The different states whose sons fought upon this field are vying with one another in erecting these mementos. They are to be seen standing everywhere—all over the field of strife. These, with the hundreds which will yet be erected, in connection with the sacred associations of the place, will make the *Battle Field of Gettysburg* a place of the greatest interest upon the American continent during all the ages to come.



# APPENDIX.

## A.

EXTRACT FROM HON. A. H. STEPHENS' ADDRESS AT SAVANNAH, GEORGIA.

Reference is made on page 108 to the address of Hon. A. H. Stephens in Savannah, Georgia, March 21st, 1861, upon the occasion of his election to the office of Vice-President of the Confederacy, in which he unequivocally declared that Slavery was the basis and corner-stone of the new government sought to be established. That part of this address which relates to this subject is as follows:

‘But, not to be tedious in enumerating the numerous changes for the better, allow me to allude to one other—though last, not least: the new constitution has put at rest *forever* all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institution—African slavery as it exists among us—the *proper status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and the present revolution.* Jefferson, in his forecast, had anticipated this, as the ‘rock upon which the old Union would split.’ He was right. What was conjecture with him is now a realized fact. But whether he comprehended the great truth upon which that rock *stood and stands*, may be doubted. *The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old constitution were, that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically.* It was an evil they knew not well how to deal with; but the general opinion of the men of that day was, that some how or other, in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away. This idea, though not incorporated in the constitution, was the prevailing idea at the time. The constitution, it is true, secured every essential guarantee to the

institution while it should last, and hence no argument can be justly used against the constitutional guarantees thus secured, because of the common sentiment of the day. *These ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of the races. This was an error.* It was a sandy foundation; and the idea of a government built upon it—when the storm came and the wind blew, *it fell.*

*"Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas; its foundations are laid, its corner stone rests upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition. [Applause.] This, our new government, is the first in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth.* This truth has been slow in the process of its development, like all other truths in the various departments of science. It is so, even amongst us. Many who hear me, perhaps, can recollect well that this truth was not generally admitted, even within their day. The errors of the past generation still cling to many. Those at the North who still cling to these errors with a zeal above knowledge we justly denominate fanatics. All fanaticism springs from an aberration of the mind; from a defect in reasoning. It is a species of insanity. One of the most striking characteristics of insanity, in many instances, is, forming correct conclusions from fancied or erroneous premises; so with the anti-slavery fanatics; their conclusions are right if their premises are. They assume that the negro is equal, and hence conclude that he is entitled to equal privileges and rights with the white man. If their premises were correct, their conclusions would be logical and just; but their premises being wrong, their whole argument falls. I recollect once of having heard a gentleman from one of the Northern states, of great power and ability, announce in the House of Representatives, with imposing effect, that we of the South would be compelled, ultimately, to yield up this subject of slavery; that it was impossible to war successfully against a principle in politics, as it was in physics or mechanics—that the principle would ultimately prevail—that we, in maintaining slavery, as it now exists with us, were warring against a principle—a principle founded in nature—the principle of the equality of man. The reply I made to him was, that, upon his own grounds, we should succeed; that he and his associates in their crusade against our institutions would ultimately fail. The truth announced, that it was impossible to war successfully against a principle in politics as in physics and mechanics, I admitted; but told him it was he, and those acting with him, who were warring against a principle. They were attempting to make things equal which the Creator had made unequal.

"In the conflict thus far, success has been on our side complete, throughout the length and breadth of the Confederate states. It is upon this, as I have stated, our social fabric is firmly planted; and I can not permit myself to doubt the ultimate success of a full recognition of this principle throughout the civilized and enlightened world.

"As I have stated, the truth of this principle may be slow in development, as all truths are, and ever have been, in the various branches of science. It was so with the principles announced by Galileo—it was so with Adam Smith, and his principles of political economy. It was so with Harvey, and his theory of the circulation of the blood. It is stated that not a single one of the medical profession, living at the time of the announcement of the truths made by him, admitted them. Now they are universally acknowledged. May we not, therefore, look with confidence to the ultimate universal acknowledgment of the truths upon which our system rests? It is the first government ever instituted upon principles in strict conformity with nature, and the ordination of Providence, in furnishing the materials of human society. Many governments have been founded upon the principle of enslaving certain classes; but the classes thus enslaved were of the same race, and their enslavement in violation of the laws of nature. Our system commits no such violation of nature's laws. The negro, by nature, or by the curse against Canaan, is fitted for that condition which he occupies in our system. The architect, in the construction of buildings, lays the foundation with proper material—the granite—then comes the brick or the marble. The substratum of our society is made of the material fitted by nature for it; and by experience we know that it is the best, not only for the superior, but for the inferior race, that it should be so. It is, indeed, in conformity with the Creator. It is not for us to inquire into the wisdom of his ordinances, or to question them. For his own purposes he has made one race to differ from another, as he has made 'one star to differ from another in glory.'

*"The great objects of humanity are best obtained when conformed to his laws and decrees in the formation of governments as well as in all things else. Our Confederacy is founded upon principles in strict conformity with these laws. THIS STONE, WHICH WAS REJECTED BY THE FIRST BUILDERS, 'IS BECOME THE CHIEF STONE OF THE CORNER' IN OUR NEW EDIFICE."* [Applause.]

## B.

The following beautiful poem, from which I have quoted a single verse on page 109, is given here in full. It was written by a Southern man to the people of the South. In the rapid recuperation of the people of that section of our restored Union from the effects of the war, and the increase of their manufacturing and educational interests, the beautifully expressed desire of the author has been already largely realized. That this prosperity may ever continue is the wish and desire of every lover of his country, North as well as South.

## TO THE SOUTH.

O, subtle, musky, slumbrous clime !  
 O, swart, hot land of pine and palm,  
 Of fig, peach, guava, orange, lime,  
 And terebinth and tropic balm !  
 Land where our Washington was born,  
 When truth in hearts of gold was worn !  
 Mother of Marion, Moultrie, Lee,  
 Widow of fallen chivalry !  
 No longer sadly look behind,  
 But turn and face the morning wind,  
 And feel sweet comfort in the thought :  
*"With each fierce battle's sacrifice  
 I sold the wrong at awful price,  
 And bought the good ; but knew it not."*

Cheer up ! Reach out ! Breathe in new life !  
 Brood not on unsuccessful strife  
 Against the current of the age ;  
 The Highest is thy heritage !  
 Leave off this death's-head scowl at Fate,  
 Throttle this hate insatiate,  
 And into thy true heart sink this :  
*"God loves to walk where Freedom is !"*

There is no sweet in dregs and lees ;  
 There is no fruit on girdled trees.  
 Plant new vineyards, sow new fields,  
 For bread and wine the Future yields ;  
 Out of free soil fresh spathes shall start :  
 Now is the budding-time of Art !

But hark! Oh! hear! My senses reel!  
Some grand presentiment I feel!  
A voice of love, bouquet of Truth,  
The quick sound of the feet of Youth!

Lo! from the war-cloud, dull and dense,  
Loyal and chaste, and brave and strong,  
Comes forth the South with frankincense,  
And vital freshness in her song.  
The weight is fallen from her wings;  
To find a purer air she springs  
Out of the Night into the Morn,  
Fair as cotton, sound as corn.

Hold! Shall a Northman, fierce and grim,  
With hoary beard and boreal vim,  
Thus fling, from some bleak waste of ice,  
Frost-crystals of unsought advice  
To those who dwell by Coosa's stream,  
Or on dark hummocks plant the cane  
Beside the lovely Pontchartrain,  
Or in gay sail-boats drift and dream  
Where Caribbean breezes stray  
On Pensacola's drowsy bay?

Not so! I am a Southerner;  
I love the South; I dared for her  
To fight from Lookout to the sea,  
With her proud banner over me;  
But from my lips thanksgiving broke,  
As God in battle-thunder spoke,  
And that Black Idol, breeding drouth  
And dearth of human sympathy  
Throughout the sweet and sensuous South,  
Was, with its chains and human yoke,  
Blown hellward from the cannon's mouth,  
While Freedom cheered behind the smoke!

MAURICE THOMPSON.

*Crawfordsville, Indiana.*

## C.

CONSIDERATION OF GENERAL SICKLES' ALLEGED DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS,  
JULY 1ST, 1863.

Since the preparation of the chapters relating to the battles of the 1st and 2d of July, 1863, a controversy has arisen between certain gentlemen, formerly connected with the First Corps of the Army of the Potomac, and General Sickles, in which the latter is charged with having disregarded an order sent him by General Reynolds, in the early morning of July 1st, and also one from General Meade, on the following day. Unfortunately the only persons who could decide the truthfulness of these allegations have passed away, and we are left to decide upon the facts and circumstances as related by others. These facts, or statements, we condense and place upon record here.

That part of the controversy which relates to the conduct of General Sickles on July 1st, is as follows: Colonel A. Wilson Norris, in an address delivered at Gettysburg, July 1st, 1886, upon the occasion of the dedication of a monument to General Reynolds upon the spot where he fell twenty-three years ago, made two important statements: He attempted to vindicate the battle of the first day from a charge previously made by General Sickles, in a speech delivered in Boston, Massachusetts, that it was but an accidental collision of the advanced wings of the two armies, and without much influence upon the final result; he also charged that he—Sickles—failed to perform the part assigned to him by Reynolds. Colonel Norris asserted that Reynolds was perfectly aware of the presence near Gettysburg of the enemy in force upon the evening of Tuesday, June 30th, and that he had determined to proceed there the following morning and engage him; that he sent an order to Sickles to advance at daylight to that place, which order reached him at one o'clock A. M. of Wednesday, July 1st, and that disregarding this order he delayed to march till sometime in the afternoon, and only reached the front late in the evening, and that because of such delay the Union army was defeated.

To this allegation General Sickles enters a positive denial. In an address delivered at Gettysburg, July 2d, 1886, upon the twenty-third anniversary of this battle, Sickles said that General Meade, as well as Reynolds, was ignorant of the fact that the enemy were in force at Gettysburg, that a place for battle had been decided upon on the line of Pipe Creek, between Middletown and Manchester, some twenty-three miles to the rear, and that the left wing of the army, consisting of the First, Third, and Eleventh corps, was pushed forward toward Emmitsburg and Gettysburg as a mask to enable the army to con-



concentrate on the line chosen. The Third Corps, he said, was ordered to Emmittsburg to hold the road running through that place, and while there, as directed, in the afternoon of Wednesday, July 1st, he received information that a battle was in progress at Gettysburg; that Reynolds had fallen; that the Federals were being sorely pressed, and that he was needed there. He further says that although under imperative orders from the commander in chief to remain at Emmittsburg and hold that place, he at once upon the receipt of information of the perilous condition at the front, left two brigades and a battery of artillery at that place, and with the remainder of his command moved as quickly as possible to Gettysburg. This, too, "without orders; even against orders."

The case will be better understood by the following: Gettysburg, Taneytown, and Emmittsburg form a triangle, with the first named as its apex, and a line running nearly due west from the second named, its south-eastern angle, to the last named, its south-western angle, as its base. The distance from Gettysburg to Taneytown is thirteen miles, to Emmittsburg, ten miles, and from Taneytown to Emmittsburg, ten miles. Midway between these two last named places, at the crossing of the Monocacy, is Bridgeport. This place is distant from Gettysburg, *direct*, twelve miles, and by way of Emmittsburg, fifteen miles. Marsh Creek is four miles south of Gettysburg on the road leading to Emmittsburg. There is another place called Marsh Creek, four miles out from Gettysburg, on the road leading to Chambersburg. Both these places are at crossings of the same stream of water. During the night of Tuesday, June 30th, —the night preceding the first day's engagement,—General Meade was at Taneytown; Sickles, with the Third Corps, at Bridgeport; Howard, with the Eleventh Corps, at Emmittsburg; and Reynolds, with the First Corps, at Marsh Creek. In the forenoon of the preceding day, a brigade of Confederates, under General Pettigrew, came in by the Chambersburg pike to a point within a mile of Gettysburg, and then fell back to Marsh Creek on the same road. At this place, during the night following, the divisions of Heth and Pender, of Hill's Corps, were encamped, and Anderson's division of the same corps, was four miles further west at Cashtown. Rodes' and Early's divisions of Ewell's Corps, were at Heidlersburg, ten miles north of Gettysburg. General Buford in command of a division of Federal cavalry passed through Gettysburg in the afternoon of the day (Tuesday), and apprised of the presence of the enemy, encamped over night midway between Gettysburg and the enemy at Marsh Creek.

Such was the situation on the night preceding the opening of the battle. Let us now consider whether General Meade was fully apprised of the con-

dition, and what were his plans; and whether General Reynolds, as has been alleged, had another plan different from the plan of the commander in chief, and whether General Sickles disregarded an order from him. Upon these points the following testimonies are adduced. General Doubleday says:

"By evening Meade was fully apprised by telegrams and Buford's scouts, that the enemy were concentrating on Gettysburg. He knew that Reynolds at Marsh Creek was only about six miles from Hill at Cashtown, but he sent no orders that night, and gave no indication of having any plan. He simply stated that the enemy were marching on Gettysburg, and he would issue orders when they developed their intentions. Thus the opposing forces were moving in directions that would necessarily bring them in contact, and a fight or a retreat was inevitable, for one or both. Reynolds had the true spirit of a soldier. He was a Pennsylvanian, and, inflamed at seeing the devastation of his native State, was most desirous of getting at the enemy as soon as possible. I speak from my own knowledge, for I was his second in command, and he told me at Poolesville soon after crossing the river, that it was necessary to attack the enemy at once, to prevent his plundering the whole State. As he had great confidence in his men, it was not difficult to divine what his decision would be. He determined to advance and hold Gettysburg. He directed the Eleventh Corps to come up as a support to the First, and *he recommended, but did not order the Third Corps to do the same.*" \*

Speaking of the conduct of General Reynolds in the morning of Wednesday, July 1st, after being apprised of the proximity of the enemy, General Doubleday says:

"General Reynolds, in consequence of the duties devolving upon him as commander of the left wing of the army,—that is, of the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps,—had turned over the command of the First Corps to me. He now made immediate dispositions to go forward to *assist Buford.* \* \* He sent for me about six o'clock in the morning, read to me the various dispatches he had received from Meade and Buford, and told me he should go forward at once with the nearest division—that of Wadsworth—to *aid the cavalry.* He then instructed me to draw in my pickets, assemble the artillery and the remainder of the corps, and join him as soon as possible. Having given these orders he rode off at the head of the column, and I never saw him again." †

General Doubleday's statement would seem to imply that Reynolds had formed a purpose to fight the enemy at Gettysburg upon his own responsibility, but in other statements it is evident that when he left Marsh Creek for

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\* "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," page 122.

† "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," pages 124, 125.

Gettysburg he did not go to carry out any prearranged plan of his own, but "*to assist Buford*" and "*aid the cavalry*," and that to afford this assistance the Eleventh Corps was needed and was ordered up from Emmittsburg, and that in his judgment the Third Corps might also be needed, and could render as much service at the front as back at Emmittsburg, to which place it had been ordered. General Doubleday, it will be seen, clearly exonerates Sickles from the charge of having been peremptorily ordered to proceed to Gettysburg, as has been charged.

General Sickles, in a letter to Mr. James Beale, of Philadelphia, dated July 17th, 1886, explains some seeming inconsistencies in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War and in his later statements in relation to what he terms "his preliminary orders in going to Gettysburg" which throw additional light upon this subject. An extract from that letter is as follows:

\* \* \* \* \* "You intimate a desire to learn from me whether or not I received any orders to march to Gettysburg, as you seem puzzled to explain a passage in my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (February 26, 1864), in which, by a misprint, I am made to speak of my 'preliminary orders in going to Gettysburg,' etc.

"I have no hesitation in addressing you on the subject, as I recognize the love of truth and justice which governs your conduct in this matter.

"So acute a critic and so well-informed a military student as yourself can not fail to see from the context that the word '*Gettysburg*' in that sentence of my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in which I refer to 'my preliminary orders,' etc., was a misprint for Emmittsburg. I say my orders were 'to go there and *hold that position with my corps*, as it was regarded as a very important flanking position, to *cover our rear and line of communication*.' Surely this description could not possibly mean Gettysburg, our most advanced position, to which Reynolds had been ordered, and which he, not Sickles, was ordered to hold, temporarily at least. The obvious misprint is preceded by another of the same tenor, in the same paragraph, equally obvious, in which I am made to say: That I received a dispatch from General Howard, '*at Gettysburg*,' between two and three o'clock in the afternoon of July 1st. Of course that dispatch was received by me at Emmittsburg.

"The whole paragraph in my testimony, to which reference is made, is a statement of the considerations and reasons which led me to move without orders from Emmittsburg to the relief of General Howard. After summing up the conflicting orders on the one hand and the earnest appeal of Howard on the other, my conclusion is stated as follows: '*I therefore moved to Gettysburg on my own responsibility*.'

"Again, I proceeded to state in my testimony, February 26, 1864, that as soon as I determined to march to Gettysburg, 'I addressed a communication to General Meade from Emmittsburg informing him of what I had done, and explaining my anxiety to have his sanction of it. I received a communication from him, informing me that he approved my course, and that the two brigades and battery I had left at Emmittsburg would be relieved and ordered to join me.'

"Why ask General Meade's approval of my march to Gettysburg if I moved there pursuant to orders from competent authority?

"The suggestion that I received orders from General Reynolds during the night before his battle, directing me to march to Gettysburg, is absurd; that is to say, it is a statement contradicted by all the facts and by all probabilities. First. General Reynolds received his orders to move to Gettysburg late in the night before his battle. Second. He did not know that the enemy were approaching Gettysburg until Buford reported the enemy in his front, on the Cashtown Road, on the morning of July 1st. Third. General Reynolds, on the morning of July 1st, was ordered by General Meade to 'withdraw the force at present at Gettysburg, two corps (First and Eleventh) by the road to Taneytown and Westminster, and, after crossing Pipe Creek, deploy toward Middleburg. The corps at Emmittsburg (Sickles' Corps) will be withdrawn via Mechanicsville to Middleburg.' Fourth. My senior aide-camp, Major H. E. Tremaine, sent by me on the morning of July 1st to communicate with General Reynolds, reached Reynolds at Gettysburg shortly before he fell and received no intimation from Reynolds of any order sent to me to march to Gettysburg. General Tremaine, writing to me under date of June 28th, 1880, says: 'I recall my interview with General Reynolds shortly before he was killed, and his message by me to you suggesting more than otherwise that you had better come up, and that without orders you moved your troops from Emmittsburg to Gettysburg.' Fifth. General Hancock in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War states: 'On the morning of the 1st of July I received an order to march to Taneytown. I arrived there about eleven o'clock and massed my troops. I then went to the head-quarters of General Meade and reported to him. While I was there General Meade told me all his plans. He said he had made up his mind to fight a battle on what was known as Pipe Creek.

"'Shortly after that conversation General Meade received a message from General Reynolds, who, at Gettysburg, was really a mask, in order to allow this movement (occupying the line of Pipe Creek) to go on in his rear.'

"Of course, General Reynolds, in command of the left wing of the army, was as well informed as General Hancock or myself of the plans of General

Meade. I had received from General Meade, on the morning of July 1st, a similar communication. Is it conceivable—is it consistent with the soldierly qualities of Reynolds—that he should order the Third Corps to Gettysburg in defiance of the plans of his commanding officer and in direct disobedience of the orders requiring the whole of the left wing to fall back to Pipe Creek?

“The assertion by anybody that Reynolds gave such an order on the night before his battle betrays the grossest ignorance of the character of General Reynolds and of all the facts of history touching this question.”

Mr. Beale, to whom the foregoing letter was addressed by General Sickles, has published a digest of the orders, circulars, and other communications, drawn from official sources, which passed between General Meade and his subordinate commanders on the day before the first day's engagement, and also upon the first day of the battle, which, besides showing the true situation at that eventful time, prove conclusively that the charge of disobedience to an order from General Reynolds to Sickles is entirely without foundation. The following is Mr. Beale's paper:

MEMORANDA REFERRING TO MOVEMENTS, JUNE 30 AND JULY 1, 1863.

*June 30, 1863.*

1. Reynolds to Butterfield:

“The enemy will undoubtedly endeavor to turn our left by way of Fairfield and mountain roads leading down into the Frederick and Emmittsburg pike, near Mt. St. Mary's College.”

He asks for an engineer officer to reconnoiter this position.

2. Meade answers at 11:30 A. M.

“In case of an advance in force either against you or Howard at Emmittsburg, YOU MUST FALL BACK TO THAT PLACE, and I will reinforce you from the corps nearest to you, which is Sickles', at Taneytown.”

3. At 12:45 P. M. Meade orders Third Corps to Emmittsburg, with sixty rounds of ammunition, three days' rations, and ambulances. “Enemy reported to be in force at Gettysburg. \* \* You will report to General Reynolds, and throw out strong pickets on the roads from Emmittsburg to Greencastle and Chambersburg.”

4. Meade to Sickles:

“It is of the utmost importance that you should move with your infantry and artillery to Emmittsburg with all possible dispatch.”

5. When about half way out toward Emmittsburg, Sickles receives a verbal message—“Halt!” He writes Meade, enclosing Reynolds' order relative to “Cat-tail Branch,” and says, “It agrees with written orders re-

ceived at 1 P. M. [see 3 and 4 above], but is in conflict with verbal order given by the commanding general while on the march. Shall I move forward?"

[See also Humphrey's testimony, Report of the Committee on Conduct of the War, page 389.]

6. Meade issues a circular saying he "has received information that the enemy are advancing, probably in strong force, on Gettysburg. \* \* Three corps (First, Third, Eleventh,) are in vicinity of Emmittsburg, the Third Corps being ordered up to that point."

7. At 7:45 P. M. Sickles notifies Reynolds: "By direction of the general commanding I have gone into camp here, countermanding a previous order to go to Emmittsburg, AND I AM TO WAIT HERE FOR FURTHER ORDERS FROM HEAD-QUARTERS A. OF P. When these orders were received I sent Captain Crocker, of my staff, to communicate them to General Reynolds, AND TO INFORM HIM OF MY POSITION."

#### INFERENCES.

- (a.) The left wing was considered in some danger of being flanked.
- (b.) Reynolds, if attacked, was to fall back.
- (c.) Both Meade and Reynolds knew where the Third Corps was, it being under Meade's special orders, and practically, temporarily detached from Reynolds, though co-operating with him.

*July 1, 1863.*

8. Meade issues the "Pipe Creek order." (Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, page 353.)

9. He sends a circular to Reynolds in which he refers to "General Humphreys, who is AT EMMITTSBURG WITH THE THIRD CORPS,"

10. "Pretty late in the morning" (*vide* Meade's testimony, page 347,) Meade receives Buford's dispatch to Reynolds, dated at Gettysburg, June 30, 10:30 P. M. (Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, page 352.)

11. Meade to Sedgwick:

"It is not improbable he [the enemy] will reach that place [Gettysburg] before the command under Major-General Reynolds (First and Eleventh Corps), now on the way, can arrive there. Should such be the case, and General Reynolds find himself in the presence of a superior force, he is instructed to hold the enemy in check, AND FALL SLOWLY BACK. If he is able to do this, the line indicated in the circular of to-day will be occupied to-night."

12. Meade to French:

"In the event of our being compelled to withdraw or retire before the

enemy, you will be in readiness to throw your command by rail or march, as may be most speedy, into the defenses of Washington."

13. Meade corrects the Pipe Creek order so far as it relates to route of withdrawal of THE CORPS AT EMMITTSBURG.

14. At 12:30 P. M. Meade writes Hancock:

"In view of the possible failure of Reynolds to receive the order to withdraw his command by the route through Taneytown, \* \* \* proceed with your troops out on the direct road to Gettysburg from Taneytown. When you find that Reynolds is covering that road (instead of withdrawing by Emmittsburg, WHICH IT IS FEARED HE MAY DO,) you will withdraw to Frizellburgh, as directed in the circular issued this morning." (See No. 13, *ante*.)

#### INFERENCES.

(d.) Meade was well aware of the locality of the Third Corps.

(e.) He expected Reynolds, if attacked, to fall back, but was in doubt whether Reynolds had received the Pipe Creek circular. (See No. 14, *ante*.)

(f.) Meade was taking all proper precaution in case of any reverse to his army. (See No. 12, *ante*.)

Now, at 10:30 P. M. of June 30, Buford, at Gettysburg, was able to correctly locate the Confederate army. I have found the scout who brought the news late that evening on which this 10:30 dispatch is based.

Until 11 P. M. that night Howard and Reynolds were at Marsh Run, studying maps, etc. (See *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1876, page 52.)

Soon after this, Buford appears at Marsh Run, and holds conference with Reynolds.

Buford returns to Gettysburg with one of Reynolds' staff.

This staff officer reports to Reynolds "very early in morning of July 1st," with the latest news.

Quite early on July 1st, before any of the First Corps marched, Buford again appears at Marsh Run, and says to Reynolds, "I've run on a couple of regiments in woods near Gettysburg, lend me some troops to feel them."

Reynolds forwards this news to Meade, and the First Corps march for Gettysburg.

How the rest of the First Corps may have traveled I know not, but I do know our division (Robinson's) moved quite leisurely. In fact, when we received the news of "trouble ahead," Robinson, his staff, and many of his division, were eating cherries.

Now here are Buford and Reynolds in close and frequent conference—Buford in full and correct knowledge of the locality of the enemy. How in

the face of his 10:30 dispatch could Buford a few hours later speak of "a couple of regiments," etc.

Meade was using Reynolds as a mask to cover the Pipe Creek movement (see Hancock's testimony, page 404). Until Meade heard of Reynolds' death (noon of July 1st), Meade was expecting Reynolds to fall back, if attacked. (see 11 and 14, *ante*).

Did the death of Reynolds upset these plans? Who is responsible for the stand made on Seminary Ridge? Had Buford and Reynolds concluded to force the fight there at all hazards?

See Wadsworth's testimony, page 413.

"It was a matter of momentary consultation between General Reynolds and myself whether we would go into the town or take a position in front. He decided we had better take a position in front."

Meade had doubts whether Reynolds had received the Pipe Creek circular (see No. 14, *ante*). Did Reynolds ever get that circular? The general belief is he did not receive it.

At 11:20 A. M., July 1st, Meade receives Reynolds' message from Gettysburg (the aide quotes from his diary); at 12:30 Meade orders the Second Corps out (see No. 14, *ante*), and at 1:10, Meade, having heard of Reynolds' death, orders Hancock to the front, and (see Meade's testimony, page 330, 331,) about 6 or 7 o'clock P. M., having heard from Hancock, the Pipe Creek movement is abandoned, and the Army of Potomac march on Gettysburg.

15. Sickles to Howard, 3:15 P. M.:

"I have at this moment received a communication from an officer of your staff, and also two written communications dated at 1 and 1:30 P. M. I SHALL MOVE TO GETTYSBURG IMMEDIATELY."

16. Sickles to Meade, 3:15 P. M.:

"A staff officer from Howard and a communication dated Gettysburg 1:30 has just reached me. Howard requests me to support him, and I SHALL MOVE IMMEDIATELY."

17. Sickles to Meade, 3:25 P. M.:

"I shall leave a brigade and a battery on the heights beyond Emmittsburg toward Fairfield, and another to the left and rear of Emmittsburg. These have orders, if unable to hold Emmittsburg, to fall back to Taneytown."

18. Sickles to Birney, 3:50 P. M.:

"Move your division to Gettysburg immediately and report to General Howard."

19. Meade to Sickles, 4:40 P. M.:

"Have just learned that Howard has ordered you from Emmittsburg up to Gettysburg; \* \* do not wish the approaches through Emmittsburg un-



guarded as they cover our left and rear. \* \* Hold on until you shall hear from General Hancock, leaving a division at Emmittsburg, AS IT IS A POINT NOT TO BE ABANDONED EXCEPT IN AN EXTREMITY."

20. Meade to Hancock and Doubleday, 6 P. M.:

"Say to him (Slocum), I thought it prudent to leave a division of the Third Corps at Emmittsburg. It can be ordered up to-night if necessary."

21. Meade to Sedgwick, 7 P. M.:

"The present prospect is, that our general engagement must be there" (Gettysburg).

22. Meade to commanding officer at Emmittsburg, 7:30 P. M.:

Directs that "the division of General Sickles' Corps ordered to remain at Emmittsburg move up and join their corps on the field of Gettysburg."

23. Sickles to Meade, 9:30 P. M.:

"Our left and rear is not sufficiently guarded. \* \* This is a good battle-field."

This 9:30 message of Sickles' is of same tenor as one sent by Hancock at 5:25: "It is a position, however, easily turned."

[Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, page 357.]

#### INFERENCES.

(g.) Sickles moved from Emmittsburg on his own responsibility and without delay.

(h.) Meade was loth to let Sickles go, but on finding some troops had been left at Emmittsburg, Meade fully endorsed Sickles. (Sickles really had anticipated Meade's order.) See 17, 18, and compare 19 *ante*.

(k.) On the evening of July 1st, Meade was twice notified that the left of his line was weak. (See No. 23, *ante*, and Hancock's testimony, page 405; also Hancock's message, page 357.)

Thus it is shown beyond peradventure that the movements of July 1st, until noon, as far as they were controlled by General Meade, did not contemplate any serious engagement of First and Eleventh corps; that the Third Corps was operating under direct and positive instructions from General Meade; that the Third Corps commander was guilty of no delay or postponement on July 1st in coming to the front; that he actually went in advance of his orders; and that even before General Meade's arrival at Gettysburg, he had been twice notified that the left of his line would need special attention.

JAMES BEALE,

*Late 12th Mass. Inf'y, 2d Brig., 2d Div., 1st Corps, A. of P.*

In summing up this matter the following conclusions seem to be fully sustained from the facts given:

1. If, as has been alleged, General Sickles received an order from Reynolds at one o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, July 1st, to move to Gettysburg, that order was received by him at *Bridgeport* and not at Emmittsburg; and being already under orders from the commander-in-chief to proceed in another direction to occupy what was supposed to be a very important point, is it not reasonable to suppose that the reception of an order, which indicated a departure from the plan determined upon, and the execution of which would derange that plan, would be at least reported to headquarters, but five miles distant? This inference is equally applicable were the dispatch the "*recommendation*" spoken of by General Doubleday and not a peremptory order.

2. General Sickles, as Doubleday says on page 125 of the book already referred to, "was under orders to march to Emmittsburg, to relieve the Eleventh Corps, which was directed to join the First at Gettysburg." If Reynolds issued an order to Sickles to march to Gettysburg, that order was issued subsequent to the order to Howard, for the former was *en route* to Emmittsburg to enable the latter to comply with the order to him. Howard's order evidently did not reach him until after six o'clock in the morning.\*

3. General Tremaine, of Sickles' staff, who was present at Gettysburg when General Sickles delivered his address there, said that he was the only officer in communication between Sickles and Reynolds, and that he was sent by the former to the latter's head-quarters on the night of June 30th, and that the first intimation he had of a desire upon the part of Reynolds for Sickles to advance was about nine o'clock in the morning of July 1st, and that his wish did not come in the form of an order, but a suggestion, and that he at once set out for Sickles' head-quarters to deliver this suggestion. That suggestion for Sickles to advance is entirely inconsistent with an order previously given to do so; and it could not have reached him before ten o'clock A. M.

4. General Carr says that he was in command that day (July 1st,) while Sickles, as directed by Meade, was reconnoitering the country about Emmittsburg for a battle-field in case one were needed there, and the first order to move to Gettysburg came from *Hancock* about two o'clock P. M., and that with that order came the news of Reynolds' death.

5. The foregoing should settle the question, and show that General Sickles received no order from Reynolds, as alleged. The following, however, from General Meade establishes this fact beyond dispute:

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\*General Doubleday's "*Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*," page 124.

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 1, 1:10 P. M., 1863.

*Commanding Officer of the Second Corps (Hancock):*

The Major-General commanding has just informed me that General Reynolds has been killed or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the command of your corps to General Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, and by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of General Reynolds' death, you assume command of the corps there assembled, viz: The Eleventh, First, and Third, at Emmittsburg. If you consider the ground and position there a better one to fight a battle under existing circumstances, you will so advise the General and he will order all the troops up. You know the General's views, and General Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see General Reynolds.

D. BUTTERFIELD,

*Major-General and Chief of Staff.*

The fact that General Meade located Sickles' Corps at Emmittsburg as late as 1:10 P. M. on the first day of the battle, and ordered its advance, through General Hancock, to Gettysburg, dissipates entirely the theory of an earlier order from General Reynolds. Assuming then that the first order which Sickles received to move to the front came from Hancock, and that Hancock issued that order immediately upon receiving Meade's order, it could not have reached him before the time stated by General Carr, namely, two o'clock, and probably later, for the distance it had to be carried from Taneytown to Emmittsburg is ten miles.

6. If General Reynolds, burning with the fire of patriotism, and a desire to attack the invaders and despoilers of his State, did, in the exercise of a discretion which his temporary position as commander of the left wing of the army, enabled him to assume, form a plan and purpose of his own, which conflicted with the plan of his commander in chief, and took measures to carry his plan into execution without informing him of it when he had abundant time to do so, he was guilty of disrespect and discourtesy, if not of downright disobedience and insubordination. Who would entertain such a reflection upon General Reynolds?

7. General Sickles, as already stated, was under orders from the commander in chief to proceed to Emmittsburg and hold that place, and in accordance with this order he did, in the morning of July 1st, proceed from Bridgeport to the place named, and while there engaged in reconnoitering the country for a battle-field in case one were needed there, he received about two or three o'clock in the afternoon a dispatch from General Howard, telling of the critical condition at Gettysburg, and directing him to come as quickly as possible to his assistance. Upon the receipt of this order or request (General Sickles claims that under the circumstances he was not subject to the orders of Howard) he "without orders and against orders" left

two brigades and a battery to hold the place and marched with all possible speed with the remainder of his command to the point of danger. How striking the contrast between his conduct and that of General Slocum, whose corps was at Two Taverns, but five miles from the field, and who was repeatedly importuned by Howard to come to his assistance, but, held by Meade's orders for an expected concentration elsewhere, refused to do so.

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## D.

### DID GENERAL SICKLES DISREGARD AN ORDER FROM GENERAL MEADE ON JULY 2D, 1863?

It has generally been supposed that General Sickles acted imprudently, if not in direct disobedience of orders, in advancing his line so far from the position he was expected to take on July 2d. General Meade, in his official report to the government, charges that, either through misapprehension or disobedience, General Sickles advanced his line a half to three quarters of a mile from the position he was directed to take, and that by so doing he brought on the engagement before he (Meade) was prepared for it, and that he thereby endangered the whole army. When this report was made General Sickles went in person to President Lincoln and asked for a court of inquiry for the purpose of correcting the charge, which, he claimed, was erroneous and did him injustice. Mr. Lincoln said: "Sickles, they say you pushed out your men too near the enemy, and began the fight just as that council was about to meet, at three o'clock in the afternoon of the battle. I am afraid what they say of you is true, and God bless you for it. Don't ask us to order an inquest to relieve you from bringing on the battle of Gettysburg. History will set you all right and give everybody his just place, and there is glory enough to go all around." To the remonstrance of the president General Sickles yielded, and no inquiry was had into the charge made by the commander in chief. Public opinion, however, from that day to the present has been divided as to the propriety of Sickles' course, many believing that he acted imprudently, and perhaps an equal number that the position he took was the best one. Colonel Batchelder, the Government Gettysburg Historian, said once in the hearing of the writer, that he had consulted fifty-six general officers who participated in the battle of Gettysburg, as to Sickles' position, and they were about equally divided in their opinion regarding it.

Recently General Sickles has been making some extravagant assertions touching the part his corps took in the battle of the 2d of July, claiming substantially that it fought the battle of Gettysburg, and that the battle of the first day was but an accidental and unimportant affair. This indiscretion upon his part, as might be expected, has led to a renewal of the charges made against him, and much bad feeling has been evoked. The case has assumed such shape that it demands our attention, and we shall consider it as follows:

Colonel James C. Biddle, of General Meade's staff, in the *Philadelphia Press* of July 18th, 1886, thus presents the case against Sickles:

"General Meade, after a careful inspection of the ground, in the early morning of July 2d, issued orders to his corps commanders directing the positions they were to take. Under these orders General Sickles was directed to form his corps in line of battle on the left of the Second Corps, commanded by General Hancock, his right resting on Hancock's left and his left on Round Top, if it was practicable to occupy it. Between eight and nine o'clock A. M. these orders were repeated to General Sickles, and furthermore he was told that he was to relieve Geary's division, and to occupy the position it was understood General Hancock had put Geary in the night before. It should be stated here that General Geary had had two regiments on Little Round Top during the night of July 1. Even as late as between eleven A. M. and twelve M. General Sickles came to General Meade's headquarters, when the latter distinctly told him that his *right* was to be Hancock's *left*, his *left* on *Round Top*, which General Meade *pointed out to him*.

"Between three and four P. M. I rode with General Meade to the left of our line occupied by General Sickles with the Third Corps. General Meade, after surveying the position, sent for General Sickles and on meeting him said in my presence:

"'General Sickles, why have you not obeyed my orders to connect with General Hancock's left, with your left on Little Round Top?'

"General Sickles answered that he had moved out to occupy the high ground on which he had formed his line. General Meade replied:

"'This is neutral ground. The guns of the enemy command it, our guns command it, and you can not occupy it for the very same reason that they can not.'

"General Sickles expressed regret that he should have occupied a position that did not meet with General Meade's approval, and asked if he should move to the line designated. General Meade replied:

"'Yes, you may as well, at once. The enemy will not let you withdraw

without taking advantage of your position, but you have to come back and may as well do it at once as at any other time.'

"General Sickles left to carry out this movement, and had not gone more than a few hundred feet when the enemy opened upon him, enfilading his entire corps. General Meade called Sickles back and told him that it was now too late for him to retire, and that he must hold his line as best he could and that he would support him.

"General Warren had accompanied General Meade when he rode out to General Sickles' advanced position. As soon as General Meade saw the condition of affairs he ordered General Warren to ride at once to Little Round Top, see what troops, if any, were there and to take every measure for its proper defense. Fortunately, by the timely arrival of the Fifth Corps, which General Meade had ordered over to his left before going to General Sickles, General Warren was enabled to secure Vincent's brigade, which was hurried on to Round Top, and, after a most desperate and bloody encounter, secured this most important position, which Sickles had neglected to occupy. General Meade remained on or about that part of the field where the enemy's attack was made throughout the whole of the contest, bringing forward reinforcements from all parts of the field, himself leading Lockwood's brigade into action. His horse was shot under him during the engagement. Finally, owing to the valor and admirable fighting of the troops, to the hearty co-operation of the superior officers and to the skillful handling of the army, was the enemy's attack repulsed, and a new line, where General Meade had intended originally that General Sickles should form, was occupied by the supports that had been brought up and held until the end of the battle."

General Sickles, in an address delivered at Gettysburg, on the twenty-third anniversary of the great engagement, thus gives his side of the case:

"It has been said that General Meade had formed a plan of battle on the left, and assigned a position to my corps on that flank, from which I advanced on the enemy too soon, and that advance so disarranged General Meade's plans as to hazard their successful execution. My statement is that no plan of battle whatever had been promulgated to any corps commander, or to any officer of the general staff on July 2d. The enemy had a plan of battle, but we had none."

The General further said that Meade's attention was altogether turned to his right, where, he thought the real attack would be made; and that to the repeated notices he sent him that the enemy was massing large bodies of troops opposite his left, and that Little Round Top should be at once strongly occupied, he paid no attention whatever. He further said that he sent

repeatedly for Meade to come and see for himself, or to send General Warren, his chief engineer, but neither of them paid any attention to his requests. At length, when he found that he could not get either the commander in chief, or his chief engineer, to come and see the point of danger and give his support and orders, he asked for General Hunt, the chief of artillery, who was sent, and who approved of the position he had taken. In support of these allegations, as well as those to follow, Sickles quotes numerous authorities, Federal and Confederate. Upon the point of having received no orders from Meade, Sickles said, pointing to General Tremaine, who sat near him and assented to what he said, "There 's the officer whom I kept in the saddle from sunrise till the battle opened, imploring him (Meade) to send troops to Little Round Top."

The following are further extracts from this speech:

"The battle of July 2d was fought on the lines I occupied, on my own responsibility. The battle was fought, so far as the Third Army Corps is concerned, without orders of any nature or kind whatever from the commanding general of the army of the Potomac. From sunrise on the morning of July 2d until after six o'clock in the afternoon, when I was wounded, I received no order from General Meade relating to the dispositions of my troops or to the conduct of the battle, except that I was to occupy the position General Geary had left, which I at once reported to General Meade was no position at all, and the further exception that at half-past three, when the battle was in progress, General Meade directed me to call on General Hancock for support for my right and upon General Sykes for the support of the Fifth Corps on my left and upon the artillery of the reserve for such batteries as I might need.

"From half-past three in the afternoon until after six o'clock, when I was wounded, I received no communication from him on the field. \* \* \* \*

"I am, therefore, alone responsible for the lines on which the battle of July 2d was fought. Good or bad, it was my line. I am not responsible for the delay in occupying Round Top, the key of our position on the left. I had repeatedly urged General Meade to send infantry and artillery to Little Round Top, but he did not do so, nor did he approve my suggestion that I should occupy it in force. General Meade did not concur in my belief that the enemy would make a serious attack on our left, hence he made no dispositions himself and authorized none on my part to meet such an attack. At length, when the assault of the enemy was so imminent that I could wait no longer for orders, I made my own dispositions to meet it. I advanced my corps so as to occupy higher and better fighting ground, cleared away the fences which obstructed my movements. I took positions which threatened

the flank of the enemy in moving to our left and forced him to attack me on my front.

"I knew that the enemy had massed in my front and on my left a much larger force than I had under my command. I had so reported to General Meade more than once or twice or thrice, but he did not accept my estimate of the strength of the assaulting columns of the enemy, nor my judgment as to the design of the enemy to turn our left. He believed the enemy was making a demonstration on my front to cover a serious attack on our right. The Fifth Corps had been kept all the morning on the right as a reserve. There was no reserve within supporting distance on the left. Buford's division of cavalry, the only support on my left, had been ordered away to the rear, toward Westminster."

Upon due consideration of the two conflicting statements thus given, I arrive at the following conclusions:

1. It is scarcely conceivable that in such an emergency as confronted General Meade in the morning of July 2d, he would give no directions whatever concerning the posting of troops on every part of the field, especially upon his left, which was the most exposed, and to which his attention had been specially directed. We assume then that he undoubtedly did give General Sickles some order.

2. Colonel Biddle asserts most positively that General Meade did order General Sickles to place his line with his right joining Hancock's left, and his left upon Little Round Top; and General Sickles declares as positively that General Meade gave no order whatever. And yet both these men concur in the statement that an order such as Colonel Biddle asserts Meade gave, was actually given, with the qualification that Sickles was to place his troops in the position General Geary had occupied during the night, which was upon Little Round Top, "*provided it was practicable to occupy it.*" How can this qualification, which is equally admitted by both Colonel Biddle and General Sickles, be reconciled with the declaration of the former of a positive and unqualified order, and the assertion of the latter of no order whatever?

3. In this *qualification*, which is admitted by both parties, the solution of the difficulty seems to lie. General Sickles was given a *discretion* so far as occupying Little Round Top was concerned, and he used that discretion concerning his whole line, and, for reasons which seemed satisfactory to himself and his engineers, he chose the advanced position for which he is blamed.

4. General Sickles is again inconsistent in the fact that in the discretion given him concerning Round Top, he reported that "that there was no position there at all," and yet says that he sent aid after aid to the commander in chief, urging him to send troops to occupy that place.



5. It seems clear that General Meade, in his earnest efforts to prepare for an expected assault upon his right, did not pay sufficient attention to his left. Upon no other ground can the strange oversight until too late to rectify it of the advanced position taken by Sickles, and the neglect to occupy Little Round Top, be accounted for.

6. The question at issue is not whether the advanced position Sickles took was better than the one Meade expected him to take, but whether or not he disobeyed the order of his commanding general. He certainly did receive a qualified order, and interpreted the discretion it gave him liberally.

7. Among the advantages claimed by General Sickles for the line he chose over the one Meade expected and qualifiedly ordered him to take, are these: That both Little and Big Round Top were thereby secured to the Federal army. If, he says, his line had been placed where Meade expected it to be placed, the enemy would certainly have succeeded in siezing these two commanding eminences, and thereby the whole Federal line would have been rendered untenable. Judging from the fact that the line he did take could not be held with the force at his disposal, as he was driven back, he assumes that the same result would have happened had he occupied Round Top, and that important position would have fallen into the possession of the enemy and the battle of Gettysburg would have been lost. It may be true that in the position he took these eminences were secured to the Federal army, and a final victory there assured; but what would have been the probable result had he occupied and fortified that place? Upon this question the following remarks by General McLaws, taken from an article written by him for the *Philadelphia Weekly Press* of August 4th, 1886, are important. General McLaws says:      \*      \*      \*      \*      \*      \*      \*

“But in the general results General Sickles might say that his corps, considered apart from the remainder of the army, was so posted that it not only occupied a strong position of itself, but one which, while inviting an attack, could be reinforced without the movement being known, as there was a dense wood in his rear; that in carrying that position against General Sickles and the strong reinforcements which were brought forward, that strong outwork as it were, Longstreet's forces exhausted themselves, and by the time the Confederate advance reached the main Federal line it was too scattered and had lost so many commanders and rank and file as to be unfit and unable to make any further combined effort and was, in consequence, recalled from the most advanced position, as there was no support on hand from any other corps.

“In the sense I have last considered it, I suppose, General Sickles has argued that his position was the cause of victory, as events turned out.

"But before the crown of 'victory' can be accorded to him we must discuss the chances and the strong probabilities of disaster which might have happened, not only to his corps, but to the Federal army, because of this advanced salient position, taken on his own responsibility, and then see if it would not have been more advantageous to his corps and the army if he had taken his position on the left extension of the main line, occupying and fortifying the Round Tops.

"If General Sickles had taken position on the extension of General Meade's main line occupying and fortifying Round Top and vicinity, certainly it would have been more difficult to carry Round Top by assault than it was when occupied for the first time in great haste by General Warren's orders, after the battle had commenced. And as it was not then seized by the Confederates, there could have been no apprehension felt by General Meade as to its capture had it been occupied as I have supposed—and as the Round Tops were natural fortresses and could have been made practically impregnable—the Confederates arriving there, and seeing the formidable preparations to receive them, would not, it is very probable, have made the attempt to take them. There would have been no need of a reserve force to aid in holding them.

"Whereas General Sickles, instead of taking his place on the extension of the main line, which it would be natural for General Meade to suppose he had done, did, without special orders, take an advanced position forming a salient to the main line, and being there without orders and, as General Meade says, contrary to orders, of course no support was provided to maintain him in that salient position, unless General Meade had determined to make that his battle-ground. But he had no such intention, and as he was the commander-in-chief it reads strange to a Confederate that a subordinate should attempt to thwart the wishes of his chief.

"Thus being in that salient position and 'inviting' an attack, General Sickles was assaulted by two divisions of Longstreet's Corps and forced back to the main line, and if General Longstreet's advance had been supported, followed by even another division, I do not think there can be any doubt but that Round Top would have been occupied and held by the Confederates. Therefore, it would seem that by occupying the salient position in the manner it was done without orders, a very great risk was run of losing the key to the battle-field.

"That it was not lost was owing to the rapid concentration by General Meade of forces from other portions of the field, and one can imagine how astonished General Meade was when he found out how near he had been to losing Round Top, which he supposed, until then, had been occupied and

fortified, but which had not been when his line was formed. The question may well be propounded here: By whose fault was this great catastrophe so near of accomplishment, and by whose exertions was it avoided?

"If General Stuart, with his cavalry, had been with General Lee at Chambersburg—and he could have been if he had not gone within four miles of Washington in his travels—the whole of Longstreet's Corps, including Pickett's division, would have been up on the morning of the 2d of July, and the 'supporting' division would have been present in the charge; but not only this, the advance would have been made early on the morning of the 2d of July, before Round Top was occupied!

If, when Longstreet's divisions of McLaws and Hood made their charge, General Ewell, who had been directed to co-operate, had so timed his advance on the right of the Federal army as to have struck General Meade's right when all but one brigade of the force stationed there had been withdrawn to resist Longstreet's assault, General Ewell could have carried the heights, and, advancing his whole corps, the Federal reserve being away, what then? If the Round Tops had been occupied and fortified there would have been no necessity of sending the reserve which had been posted there to aid in averting the danger to Round Top.

"Thus the non-occupation and fortification of Round Top not only came near being the loss of this position, but it was a mere chance that it was not the cause of a very serious disaster on the right.

"It would, therefore, appear that the arrangements of the troops made by General Meade, which contemplated the occupation of Round Top, were the best possible to meet all emergencies.

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"Had General Sickles taken possession of Round Top and vicinity with his corps and fortified his position, as General Meade says he supposed had been done, it must have been a surprise when General Meade learned that the Confederates had attacked, in force, on his left. For, believing it impregnable, he could have had no reasonable fear of bad results, and, while wondering at the rashness of the move, he must have been more than ever convinced that it was made to cover some other and more real attack. But he must have been very much surprised when he learned the true state of the case—that his orders had not been carried out, and that in consequence the key to the battle-field was in imminent danger of being captured, and he showed that he was fully posted as to the positions occupied by the commands in his army by the skill and promptness with which he moved troops from other and the most distant parts of the field to meet, as he did, this emergency and pluck therefrom the flower of safety.

"General Meade was in command of the army, and upon him rested the responsibility as to the manner and mode of driving back the invaders—whether to do this he chose to stand on the defensive in his stronghold or assume the offensive was for him alone to say. It was not personal fame he was looking after, but safety to his people and the success of his cause. He was in the occupation of a line which on his left could have been made impregnable, and his right, was, so General Sickles says, also impregnable. That the commander on his left should leave the position which could be made impregnable and offer battle in front of that position, thereby imperiling that position, and this without the knowledge or consent of the commander in chief, thus taking upon himself to force the defensive plan into an offensive movement, will have to be characterized by those whose interests he was serving. The assault, as it was, was unsuccessful. But if it had been made on the same troops, occupying an impregnable position, the attacking party would have been defeated with far greater loss to themselves and much less to the defenders than the records show."

Since the renewal of this controversy, a letter written by General Meade to Colonel G. G. Benedict, of Burlington, Vermont, bearing date March 16th, 1870, has been published. That part of it which relates to the conduct of General Sickles on the second day at Gettysburg unmistakably fixes it (so far as the personal testimony can go) that Sickles did disregard the order of his commander-in-chief. The following is an extract from that letter:

"As to General Sickles having by his advance brought on an attack, and thus compelled the battle which decided the war, you have completely answered—and it is a very favorite theory with the partisans of this officer. But these gentlemen ignore the fact that of the eighteen thousand men killed and wounded on the field during the whole battle, more than two thirds were lost on the second day, and but for the timely advance of the Fifth Corps and the prompt sending a portion on Round Top, where they met the enemy almost on the crest, and had a desperate fight to secure the position—I say but for these circumstances, over which Sickles had neither knowledge nor control, the enemy would have secured Round Top, planted his artillery there commanding the whole battle-field, and what this result would have been, I leave you to judge.

"Now, when I wrote my report of the battle I honestly believed General Sickles did not know where I wished him to go, and that his error arose from a misapprehension of my orders, but I have recently learned from General Geary, who had the day before been sent by Hancock to hold the left, and who, in doing so, had seen the great importance of Round Top and *posted a brigade on it*, that on the morning of the 2d, when he received my order

that he would be relieved by the Third Corps, and on being relieved would rejoin his own corps (Twelfth) on the right, after waiting for some time to be relieved he sent to General Sickles a staff officer, with instructions to explain the position and its importance, and to ask if troops could not be sent to relieve him; that General Sickles would send one of his staff to see the ground, and to place troops there on their arrival. He received for reply that General Sickles would attend to it in due time. No officer or troops came, and, after waiting till his patience was exhausted, General Geary withdrew and rejoined his corps.

"Now, my first orders to General Sickles were to relieve the Twelfth Corps Division (Geary's) and occupy their position. Here is evidence that he knew the position occupied by Geary's division, or could have known, and yet failed to occupy it. Furthermore, when he came to my head-quarters at about noon and said he did not know where to go, I answered: 'Why, you were to relieve the Twelfth Corps.' He said they had no position; they were massed awaiting events. Then it was I told him his *right* was to be *Hancock's left, his left on Round Top, which I pointed out*. Now, his right was three-quarters of a mile in front of Hancock's left, and his left one-quarter of a mile in front of the base of Round Top, leaving that *key-point unoccupied*, which *ought to have* been occupied by Longstreet before we could get there with the Fifth Corps. Sickles' movement practically destroyed his own corps, the Third, caused a loss of *fifty per cent* in the Fifth Corps, and very heavily damaged the Second Corps, as I said before, producing sixty-six per cent of the loss of the whole battle, and with what result?—driving us back to the position he was ordered to hold originally. These losses of the first and second day affected greatly the efficiency and morale of the army, and prevented my having the audacity in the offense that I might otherwise have had.

"If this is an advantage, to be so crippled in battle without attaining any object, I must confess I can not see it. Pardon my writing with so much prolixity, but your generous defense and the clear view you have taken of the battle have led me to wander thus far.

"Very truly yours,

"GEORGE G. MEADE."

## E.

## THE BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA.

In the campaign of the spring of 1864, General Hunter succeeded General Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley, and by the orders of General Grant, advanced upon Lynchburg, Virginia, with the view of destroying the enemy's resources at that place. On the 5th of June he met the enemy at Piedmont and defeated him. Forming a junction on the 8th, with Crook and Averell at Staunton, he moved directly on Lynchburg by way of Lexington, reaching the latter place on June 10th. Up to this time Hunter had been very successful, and the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very great. To meet this movement General Lee sent General Early with his corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg in advance of Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition, declined to give battle, and found himself under the necessity of retiring from the place, and abandoning the chief object of his expedition. This want of ammunition, and consequent inability to meet the force sent against him, compelled him to choose as the route of his return the way of the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence up the Ohio River, and returning to Harper's Ferry by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This movement uncovered the valley, and Early, after some show of pursuit upon the route Hunter had taken, fell back to the valley and rapidly advanced toward the Potomac. Crossing this river on Thursday, July 7th, he turned hastily toward the National Capital, defeating the Federal force under General Lewis Wallace at the Monocacy River, on Saturday, July 9th. On Tuesday, the 12th, the advance of his army came up in front of the defenses of Washington, but finding them too strong to be carried, and fearing that the gathering forces might cut his communications, Early, in the morning of the 13th, fell back, recrossing the river at Edwards' Ferry, and passing through Snicker's Gap with an immense train of plunder, which he had gathered by the way, encamped about Martinsburg. The Federal force under General Hunter, having arrived from the west, crossed the river and engaged Early, and were finally compelled to recross and take position from Hancock, Maryland, to Harper's Ferry, the main body being at the latter place. Each army had cavalry stationed upon its flanks. The brigade of General John A. McCausland was placed upon Early's left; the command of General Averell was upon the Federal right and confronting McCausland. This was substantially

the situation up to Thursday, July 28th. It is needless to say that the proximity of the Confederates, and their bold and aggressive movements, caused intense excitement and alarm all along the Southern border of the tier of counties immediately threatened.

On Thursday, July 28th, General Early directed General McCausland to take his own brigade of mounted infantry and the cavalry brigade of General Bradley T. Johnson, the two numbering about two thousand nine hundred men, and proceed to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, and after capturing it, levy a tribute upon it of one hundred thousand dollars in gold, or five hundred thousand dollars in United States currency, and in default of the payment of either to burn the town. On this same day these two brigades were assembled at or near Hammond's Mill, in Berkeley County, West Virginia. During the ensuing night the Federal pickets on the north side of the Potomac were captured, and in the early morning of Friday, 29th, the command crossed at Cherry Run and McCoy's fords, and with but little opposition advanced by way of Clearspring and Mercersburg upon Chambersburg. The first knowledge the citizens of the latter place had of the approach of the enemy was at about half past twelve o'clock of this day, when a scene of indelible confusion at once took place. The contents of the bank, stores, shops, and many private houses were hurriedly removed and secreted,—an experience which the people of that place, and other towns along the southern border, had often undergone.

About ten o'clock at night the Confederate force came up to the high hills two miles west of town. At this place they remained during the night, kept back probably by the firing of a single gun, which, with a few men—all the soldiers then at this place—had been sent to retard the approach of the enemy.

Chambersburg at this time was the head-quarters of the military district of the Susquehanna, and although General Couch, its commander, had organized regiment after regiment specially to guard the southern border, they were, as soon as organized, ordered to Washington to meet the danger threatening that place. His inability, then, to meet this emergency may be seen in the fact that during the time Early was raiding Maryland and threatening the Capital, his whole available force in the department did not exceed three hundred men, and at this time he had but one hundred and thirty-five under his command, of whom but about forty, including himself and staff, were in the town. It will thus be seen that while the people of the southern border had a military department, well and ably officered, they were without troops, and that too at one of the most threatening periods of the war.

At an early hour in the morning—Saturday, July 30th—General McCausland placed about two thousand of his command in line upon a hill near the western suburb of the town, and about one mile from its center. Six pieces of artillery were also placed in position, and three shells were fired into the place without any notice to the citizens. The remaining nine hundred of his force were sent into the town, and the Court House bell was rung as a signal for the citizens to assemble to hear his requisition. No response being made, a guard under Major Harry Gilmore, of Baltimore, was sent around, who captured some six or eight of our leading men and conducted them to the front of the Court House. Captain Fitzhugh, McCausland's chief of staff, then read to them General Early's requisition, demanding the immediate payment of one hundred thousand dollars in gold, or five hundred thousand dollars in United States currency, and in default of payment ordering the destruction of the town. This order stated that this requisition and threatened burning were in retaliation for acts of destruction committed by General Hunter in the Valley of Virginia, and specially naming some half dozen dwellings which he had burned. The money demanded was not, and could not be paid, for the reason that there was nothing like the amount demanded remaining in the town. Besides the citizens did not feel like contributing to aid in the overthrow of their government. While these negotiations were going on the work of plunder had already been commenced. Stores, shops, and other places of business were broken into and robbed of whatever of their contents yet remained unremoved or unsecreted. In some cases saloons were opened and liquor obtained and some of the soldiers became intoxicated. Citizens, too, along the streets were relieved of hats, caps, boots, shoes, watches, etc.

As soon as General McCausland saw that the money demanded would not be furnished he gave the order to commence the work of destruction. Detachments were sent to different parts of the town. Houses were opened, furniture was broken and piled upon heaps in rooms and fired. In some cases fire was kindled in closets, bureaus, and other depositories of clothing. Many of the Confederate soldiers entered into this work with evident delight, and to the entreaties and tears of the aged, the infirm, of women and children, they turned a deaf ear. Others, to their credit be it said, entirely disapproved of the work, and only entered upon it because compelled to do so. In some instances, in response to the cries and entreaties of the afflicted inmates of houses entered, the unwilling soldiers would say: "I must obey my orders and fire your house; you can do what you please when I leave." In some cases, after fire had been kindled, others would come in and assist in extinguishing it. Some sections of the town were entirely saved because



the officers sent there refused to execute their barbarous orders, and in a few cases officers and soldiers worked with citizens at the fire engine to extinguish the flames. Cases were numerous in which valuable articles were taken from those who were dragging them from their burning homes, or through streets and alleys, up upon the horses by their riders and safely deposited upon the outskirts of the town. Others again were robbed of valuable articles which they were trying to carry away. The writer, while running with his family through flame and smoke, was pursued and stopped by a Confederate cavalryman and ordered to hand over a satchel. When assured that it contained neither money nor valuables, but a few pieces of clothing, the man desisted and rode away. No sooner did this one leave us than another rode up and entreated one of the ladies of our company to mount his horse and ride away, declaring that he would never use him again in the Confederate service.

The scenes enacted in the streets during the earlier part of the burning were distressing indeed. People were running wildly about in search of children and friends. The occupants of houses were dragging from their threatened or burning homes valuable articles, such as sewing machines, articles of furniture, etc. Others with their arms full of clothing, bedding, carpets, books, pictures, etc., were running hither and thither seeking places of safety. In some cases these persons were compelled to sit down and pull off their boots and hand them over to some cavalryman.

In a town the size of Chambersburg there were necessarily many aged, infirm, and sick persons, as well as some dead bodies of friends awaiting burial. The infirm had to be assisted to places of safety; the sick removed; and corpses temporarily buried in gardens. In several instances Confederate soldiers assisted in these humane acts. In a few cases houses isolated from others were spared and guards placed about them, because one or more of the inmates were too ill to be removed; and others still were spared by paying a ransom. Had the destruction occurred in winter, or at night, or during a storm, the destruction of life, with other imaginable horrors, would have been fearful. But it was in the morning and during a perfect calm. And yet at one time a fearful cyclone, or funnel-shaped column, which originated in the public square, where the converging flames seemed to have suddenly given birth and shape to this terrible apparition, moved with a hissing and roaring noise eastward along the line of Market Street, carrying far up into the heavens innumerable flakes of fire, ignited shingles and bits of boards. In its course it passed over the ground surrounding a residence which was not burned, and in which clothing, bedding, furniture, etc., had been deposited. As this whirling, hissing, and sucking cone touched these articles, it instantly drew

some of the lighter ones up into the air. Pillows, feather-beds, bed quilts, and other articles were carried up and fell at considerable distances. A little girl of probably four years of age was caught by the monster and lifted six or eight feet from the ground.

The conflagration at its height was a scene of surpassing grandeur and terror. As building after building was fired, or caught from others, column after column of smoke rose black, straight, and single; first one, then another, and another. Each of these then, like huge serpents, writhed and twisted into a thousand fantastic shapes, until all finally blended and commingled, and formed one vast and livid column of smoke and flame which rose perpendicularly to the sky, and then spread out into a huge crown of sackcloth. It was heaven's shield mercifully drawn over the scene to shelter from the blazing sun the homeless and unsheltered ones that had fled to the fields and cemeteries around the town, where they in silence and sadness sat and looked upon the destruction of their homes and the accumulations of a life-time. Add to all this the roaring and crackling of the flames, the sound of falling walls, the distressing cries of burning animals, as horses, cattle, and swine, and a picture of the terrible is seen which no one who witnessed it would ever desire to have repeated.

General McCausland crossed the Potomac at Cherry Run and McCoy's fords, thus turning the right flank of General Averell, who had been placed nearly opposite him to watch him. As a demonstration in his favor, and to prevent Averell from intercepting him, the divisions of Rodes and Ramsuer and the cavalry brigade of Vaughan also crossed the river at Williamsport—Vaughan pressing on as far as Hagerstown, Maryland. Averell, thus threatened upon both flanks, was under the necessity of looking after his own safety, and accordingly fell back into Pennsylvania, reaching Greencastle, eleven miles south of Chambersburg, about sundown, where he went into bivouac. Learning of his presence there, General Couch, who yet remained at Chambersburg, sent him three successive dispatches peremptorily ordering him on to the latter place. These dispatches were taken by couriers to the camp, but Averell could not be found. For some reason which has never been satisfactorily explained, he had changed the place of his own rest without the knowledge of his staff, and when Couch's orders were taken to the camp no one knew where the General was.\* At length about four o'clock in the morning he was found and the

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\*In so important a matter as this, in which a general officer of such well known vigilance and efficiency as General Averell, is charged with indiscretion, or negligence, resulting so disastrously as in this case, I have sought for the most positive information, and append here extracts from letters from two reliable persons whose means of information will not be questioned. The first is from Thomas R. Bard, Esq., an at-

dispatches placed in his hands, but it was then too late. General Couch, unable to communicate with him, and having no other force to rely upon, had left the town. Averell at once put his command in motion, but still fearing an attack by Vaughan's command, which had pressed him the day before,

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torney at the bar of Hueneme, Ventura County, California. Mr. Bard was formerly a citizen of Chambersburg, but at the time of the war was in the forwarding and commission business, at Hagerstown, Maryland, and also the agent at that place of the Cumberland Valley Railroad Company, charged with the duty of superintending the transportation of troops and supplies. Mr. Bard, after detailing his departure from Hagerstown upon the approach of the Confederates in the evening of Friday, July 29th, and his attendance upon the telegraph office at Greencastle, and the passage through that place of Averell's forces, says:

"General Averell left three 'orderlies' at the telegraph office to convey to him all messages that might be received for him, and encamped his troops in a grove distant about one and a half miles north-east of Greencastle, and only nine and a half miles from Chambersburg. Late in the evening General Couch, commanding the Department of the Susquehanna, with head-quarters at Chambersburg, sent a message to General Averell, which was promptly handed to one of the orderlies, who quickly mounted his horse and rode off in the direction of General Averell's camp. Mr. B. Gilmore, the telegraph operator at Chambersburg, kept us informed constantly of all that was transpiring at that place, and of the movements of the Confederate force. It is quite probable that I was informed by one of the operators as to the contents of the message from General Couch. At any rate, at the time, I understood that General Couch informed General Averell that the Confederate forces were at or had passed through Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, and were moving toward Chambersburg; and, that being without adequate forces to check the movement, he inquired whether Averell could be depended on for assistance. Later in the night two other messages were received from General Couch for General Averell, and were promptly delivered to the orderlies. The last of these messages was received probably about three o'clock in the morning of July 30th. These messages reported the rapid approach of the Confederates, and expressed great anxiety to learn if General Averell intended to render assistance for the defense of Chambersburg.

"There had been no reply from General Averell, and learning that General Couch had made preparations for leaving Chambersburg, and that in all probability the communications with that place would soon be interrupted, I mounted a horse and hurriedly rode out to find General Averell. On the road, about half way to the camp, I met the orderlies riding leisurely toward Greencastle. In reply to my inquiry if they had delivered their messages, they said that General Averell could not be found, and that they did not know what to do with the messages. Hastily informing them of the importance of the dispatches, I took them in my own hands, and telling them to follow me, I spurred my horse and was soon at the grove. There was no sentry or guard to halt me. All was quiet. There was not a sound save the champing of the feeding horses; there were no lights or fires except the embers where the men had prepared their evening meal. I dashed into the middle of the encampment, and there found a solitary man to answer my inquiry, 'Where is General Averell?' He could not tell me. An officer of a West Virginia regiment then appeared and said it would be difficult to find General Averell, but offered to aid me in the search. While he prepared to mount his horse, the booming of a cannon was heard in the direction of Chambersburg. The

and to avoid being caught between it and the force under McCausland, he proceeded in an easterly direction until he reached Greenwood, eight miles from Chambersburg, when he turned westward and proceeded to the latter place. The Confederates, apprised by their scouts of his approach, left the

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officer expressed surprise and asked, 'What can that be?' I told him it supplemented the messages which I brought, and indicated that McCausland had arrived at Chambersburg. We rode hastily through the grove and soon found General Averell asleep by the side of a fence. On being awakened, he raised upon his elbow and heard the information I had brought. I had handed him the telegrams, but as there was no light I told him what they contained, and informed him that they had been delivered to his orderlies hours before. He made no reply, and, as I thought, was about to turn over and go to sleep: Minutes seemed hours to me, and growing impatient I said to him, 'General Averell, if you wish me to convey any answer to General Couch, I beg you to let me have it quickly, for it is barely possible that I can get back before telegraphic communications will be cut off.' Without rising to put his troops in motion, or without the slightest manifestation of interest in the condition of General Couch, or of the peril to which the loyal people of Chambersburg were exposed, he merely said, 'Tell Couch I will be there in the morning.' It was then, I think, about four o'clock, A. M. Returning to Greencastle, I found that already the Chambersburg office was closed, having first reported that General Couch had all his military forces and supplies on the cars, and that the Confederate advance was about to enter the town."

The other account is from H. R. Fetterhoff, M. D., of Baltimore, Maryland, but at the time of the war telegraph operator at Greencastle, Pennsylvania. Dr. Fetterhoff says:

"At the time these events transpired I was telegraph operator at Greencastle, and had the means of knowing what was going on generally. In the evening of Friday, July 29th, 1864, about eight o'clock, General Averell's command passed through Greencastle on their way from Hagerstown toward Chambersburg, and bivouacked for the night a short distance north of the town along the road leading to Chambersburg. If my memory serves me right General Averell reported his arrival to General Couch at Chambersburg. At least I so reported it to Mr. Gilmore, telegraph operator at Chambersburg. The General sent three or four orderlies to my office and informed me of his whereabouts. Mr. D. C. Aughinbaugh, operator at Hagerstown, Mr. T. R. Bard, and I think several other persons from that place, were at the office in the evening and at intervals during the night. The scouts reported that the Confederates had built camp-fires in the neighborhood of State Line, four miles south of Greencastle, and it was supposed that they had encamped there for the night. About midnight, or perhaps a little later, Mr. Gilmore informed me that the telegraph lines west of Chambersburg on the Pittsburg turnpike had been cut, showing that the enemy after building the camp-fires at the State Line as a blind had moved in the direction of Upton and Bridgeport on General Averell's left flank. I immediately informed General Averell of this fact, when he sent me a message thanking me for the information, and requesting me to keep him posted in regard to any information I might obtain. About one o'clock A. M. July 30th, General Couch sent an order to General Averell directing him to 'Move on to Chambersburg at once.' I immediately sent this message with an orderly, but never heard from him again. In about a half hour General Couch repeated the message in the same words, and I sent another orderly with the message, but still no answer. The same order was repeated about every half

burning town about eleven o'clock and passed rapidly westward and crossed the North Mountain into Fulton County and thence down the valley and recrossed the Potomac at Hancock, pursued by Averell. Had General Averell informed his staff of his removal, Couch's dispatches would have reached him in time, and the terrible disaster of Chambersburg would have been averted. It certainly seems strange that a commander of Averell's sagacity should, under the threatening circumstances, have committed so grave an oversight.

The work of destruction was commenced about eight o'clock in the morning, and by eleven o'clock the enemy had all gone, but so thorough had been their work that the major part of Chambersburg—its chief wealth and business, its capital and elegance—were laid in ruins. Ten squares of buildings were burned and two thousand human beings were made homeless, and many of them penniless. From this disaster the majority never recovered, but lived the remainder of their days in poverty. Reduced from affluence to poverty, many were dependent upon the charity of the few whose homes escaped the invaders' torch, as well as upon the provision made by the military authorities to meet their immediate wants.

When the fire had subsided and the enemy had gone, the people who had taken refuge in the cemeteries and fields around the town, returned to view the remains of their ruined homes. Sad indeed were their feelings when they stood by the scene of desolation, recognizing here and there among the ruins some articles which reminded them of the past, as broken and warped stoves, cooking utensils, etc. But when night came on, and a place of shelter had to be sought, then only did they realize their sad condition. Such buildings as had escaped the common destruction were opened and were crowded to their utmost capacity. Some made their way on foot to the country, or to neighboring towns, and some removed to distant places, never again to reside in Chambersburg. Chambersburg was founded A. D. 1764, and was burned A. D. 1864.

The following is the aggregate of the buildings burned: Residences and places of business, 266; barns and stables, 98; out-buildings of various kinds,

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hour until my orderlies were all gone and I had no one to carry the last message, when Mr. Bard came to my office and volunteered to deliver it. After searching for General Averell and finding him he delivered the message. I then learned that when I had sent General Averell the information that the Confederates were in his rear, or on his flank, he moved his head-quarters from the rear of his line, where it had been, up into the line without informing the orderlies or any one else, consequently no one knew where to find him, and the messages had not been delivered and only reached him near four o'clock A. M. when Mr. Bard delivered them. The Confederates entered Chambersburg about this time, and Mr. Gilmore bade me 'good-bye' and left the office."

173; total buildings burned, 537. Two commissions, composed of competent and disinterested persons, appointed by the governor of the State, and authorized by acts of the legislature, came to the town and adjudicated the losses of the citizens by the fire. The claims adjudicated by these commissions were carefully scrutinized. Each claimant was examined separately and under oath, evidence besides his own being required. The claims thus adjudicated were as follows: Real estate, \$713,294.34; personal property, \$915,137.24; total, \$1,628,431.58. Immediately after the fire the legislature of



AFTER THE FIRE.

[This view, copied from a photograph taken shortly after the fire, shows the ruins of the north-east corner of the public square. The column on the left marks the ruins of the writer's dwelling and store, and the ruins to the right are those of the Court House. Between these two buildings stood Franklin Hall. These three buildings were not in line in front, but the hall was about thirty feet behind the writer's building, and the Court House about seventy-five feet behind the hall. The walls of the hall had entirely fallen except the column on the extreme right, which marks its south-west corner. Had these walls not fallen the ruins of the Court House could not have been seen in this picture.]

the State was convened in special session, and after visiting the town and ascertaining the destitution of the people, the sum of one hundred thousand dollars was appropriated to meet the immediate wants of the needy. This



sum was divided, not pro-rata to the amount of losses sustained, but according to the necessities of each. Subsequently an appropriation of five hundred thousand dollars, followed a year or two later by another of three hundred thousand, was made. These appropriations were divided pro-rata, and, as will be seen from the figures given, paid about one half the losses by the fire. Certificates were given for the remainder, certifying to the amount, but not binding the State to pay it until the United States indemnifies the State.

Three causes have been assigned for the destruction of Chambersburg. One of these is that it was in revenge for the innocent hospitality the town gave to John Brown and his misguided followers when planning their mad raid upon Harper's Ferry. A second is, that it was in retaliation for alleged acts of burning and destruction committed by Federal troops in the South, and specially in the Shenandoah Valley, by orders of General Hunter during the raid referred to in the opening of this article. A third opinion regards it as a barbarous, wanton, and unjustifiable act. The true cause will appear in the following statements. The first is a letter written by General Early, who gave the order, in response to one addressed to him by the writer:

YELLOW SULPHUR SPRINGS, September 4th, 1864.

J. HOKK, Esq:

*Sir*—Having been from home since the 5th of August, your letter of the 6th of that month did not reach me until a very few days ago, when it was forwarded to me from Lynchburg with a number of others.

As you desire my statement in regard to the burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, under my order in July, 1864, I send you a copy of my "Memoirs of the Last Year of the War," in which you will find, on pages 60 to 70, my account of that affair. All I have to add, is that on my march from Lynchburg in pursuit of General Hunter, and down the valley on the expedition against Washington, I had seen the evidences of the destruction wantonly committed by his troops under his orders, including the burning of a number of private houses without provocation, among them being the family residence, at Lexington, of ex-Governor Letcher; also the Virginia Military Institute at the same place, and a part of the town of Newtown, in Frederick County; and in addition there had been a wholesale destruction of private property, including even wearing apparel of ladies, and bed clothing; the beds in many cases being cut to pieces and the feathers scattered to the winds. In addition, there had been the destruction of several towns in the South by Federal troops, among them being the town of Darien, Georgia, in the year 1863. When, therefore, on my return from the expedition threatening Washington, I found that Hunter, who had reached the lower valley on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, after his flight to the Kanawha Valley, had been engaged in his accustomed work, and had burned the valuable residences of several citizens of Jefferson County, I

determined to demand compensation therefor from some town in Pennsylvania, and in the event of failure to comply with my demand to retaliate by burning said town. The town of Chambersburg was selected because it was the only one of any consequence accessible to my troops, and *for no other reason*. The houses mentioned with their contents, all of which were destroyed, were fully worth at least \$100,000 in gold, and I required \$500,000 in United States currency in the alternative, for the reason that said currency was rapidly depreciating, being then nearly three to one in gold, and I determined to secure the full equivalent of \$100,000 in gold. I will add that according to the laws of retaliation in war, I would have been justified in burning Chambersburg without giving the town a chance of redemption.

Compare the expedition of Hunter into Virginia in June, 1864, the campaign of Sherman in Georgia and South Carolina, of Banks in the trans-Mississippi, and Sheridan in the valley of Virginia, with General Lee in Pennsylvania, leaving out of consideration Beast Butler's performances in New Orleans, and then say whether the denunciations of those who applaud the destroyer of Atlanta, Georgia, and Columbia, South Carolina, and him who boasted that, besides burning the town of Dayton, he had so desolated the valley as that a crow flying over it would have to carry its rations, should have any terror for me.

Respectfully,

J. A. EARLY.

Accompanying the foregoing letter was a pamphlet of one hundred and thirty-six pages, entitled "A Memoir of the Last Year of the War for Independence in the Confederate States of America, containing an account of the operations of his commands in the years 1864 and 1865, by Lieutenant-General Jubal A. Early, of the Provisional Army of the Confederate States." In a foot-note on page 70, General Early, speaking of the destruction of Chambersburg, says: "For this act I, alone, am responsible, as the officers engaged in it were simply executing my orders, and had no discretion left them." As General Early, then, assumes the entire responsibility in this matter, and claims as his justification the wanton destruction of property by General Hunter in the Shenandoah Valley, it is but fair to give him a further hearing, as well as to introduce other testimony to the allegations he makes. I therefore quote from his pamphlet as follows:

"The scenes on Hunter's route from Lynchburg had been truly heart-rending. Houses had been burned, and helpless women and children left without shelter. The country had been stripped of provisions, and many families left without a morsel to eat. Furniture and bedding had been cut to pieces, and old men and women and children robbed of all the clothing they had except that on their backs. Ladies trunks had been rifled and their dresses torn to pieces in mere wantonness. \* \* We had renewed evidence of the outrages committed by Hunter's orders in burning and plundering private houses. We saw the ruins of a number of houses to which the torch had



been applied by his orders. At Lexington he had burned the Military Institute, with all its scientific apparatus; and Washington College had been plundered and the statue of Washington stolen. The residence of ex-Governor Letcher at that place had been burned by his orders, and but a few minutes given Mrs. Letcher and her family to leave the house." (Page 48.)

Again General Early, on page 50, says:

"On this day (July 2d) we passed through Newtown where several houses, including that of a Methodist minister, had been burned by Hunter's orders, because a part of Mosby's command had attacked a train of supplies for Sigel's force at this place. The original order was to burn the whole town, but the officer sent to execute it had revolted at the cruel mandate of his superior, and another had been sent who had but partially executed it, after having forced the people to take the oath of allegiance to the United States to save their houses. Mosby's battalion, though called 'guerillas' by the enemy, was a regular organization in the Confederate army, and was merely serving on detached duty under General Lee's orders. The attack on the train was an act of legitimate warfare, and the order to burn Newtown, and the burning of the houses mentioned, were most wanton, cruel, unjustifiable, and cowardly."

One more quotation from this pamphlet is as follows:

"On the 26th (July) we moved to Martinsburg, the cavalry going to the Potomac. The 27th and 28th were employed in destroying the railroad, it having been repaired since we passed over it at the beginning of the month. While at Martinsburg it was ascertained, beyond all doubt, that Hunter had been again indulging in his favorite mode of warfare, and that, after his return to the valley, while we were near Washington, among other outrages, the residences of Mr. Andrew Hunter, a member of the Virginia Senate, Mr. Alexander R. Boteler, an ex-member of the Confederate Congress, and Edmund I. Lee, with their contents, had been burned by his orders, only time enough being given for the ladies to get out of the houses. \* \* I now came to the conclusion that we had stood this mode of warfare long enough, and that it was time to open the eyes of the people of the North to its enormity by an example in the way of retaliation. I did not select the cases mentioned as having more merit or greater claims for retaliation than others, but because they had occurred within the limits of the country covered by my command, and were brought more immediately to my attention.

"The town of Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, was selected as the one on which retaliation should be made, and McCausland was ordered to proceed with his brigade and that of Johnson's and a battery of artillery to that place, and demand of the municipal authorities the sum of \$100,000 in gold

or \$500,000 in United States currency, as a compensation for the destruction of the houses named and their contents; and, in default of payment, to lay the town in ashes, in retaliation for the burning of these houses and others in Virginia, as well as for the towns which had been burned in other Southern States. A written demand to that effect was sent to the municipal authorities, and they were informed what would be the result of a failure to comply with it. I desired to give the people of Chambersburg an opportunity of saving their town by making compensation for part of the injury done, and hoped that the payment of such a sum would have the desired effect, and open the eyes of the people of the North to the necessity of urging upon their government the adoption of a different policy."

As General Early bases his retaliatory policy upon certain specific acts of alleged vandalism upon the part of General Hunter, it is important that the fullest information upon those facts that can be obtained should be considered here. I will therefore introduce some extracts from an article written by General J. D. Imboden, for the *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, and republished in *Annals of the War* (pages 169-183), entitled "Fire, Sword, and the Halter." This article by General Imboden is lengthy and enters into details, covering the precise cases referred to by Early, as well as many others, to which the latter but incidentally refers. General Imboden says:

"Up to his occupation of Staunton, where his army was so much strengthened by Crook and Averell, as to relieve his mind of all apprehension of disaster, the conduct of General Hunter had been soldierly, striking his blows only at armed men. But at Staunton he commenced burning private property, and, as will be seen further on, the passion for house burning grew upon him, and a new system of warfare was inaugurated that a few weeks afterward culminated in the retaliatory burning of Chambersburg. \* \*

"From Brownsburg General Hunter proceeded to Lexington, encountering only such delay as McCausland could effect with a single brigade of cavalry. At Lexington he enlarged upon the operations begun at Staunton. On his way, and in the surrounding country, he burnt mills, furnaces, store-houses, granaries, and all farming utensils he could find, beside a great amount of fencing, and a large quantity of grain. In the town he burnt the Virginia Military Institute, and all the professor's houses except the superintendent's (General Smith), where he had his head-quarters, and found a portion of the family too sick to be removed. He had the combustibles collected to burn Washington College, the recipient of the benefactions of the Father of his Country by his will; but yielding to the appeals of the trustees and citizens, spared the building, but destroyed the philosophical and chemical apparatus, libraries, and furniture. He burned the mills and some private

stores in the lower part of the town. Captain Towns, an officer in General Hunter's army, took supper with the family of Governor John Letcher. Mrs. Letcher having heard threats that her house would be burned, spoke of it to Captain Towns, who said it could not be possible, and remarked that he would go at once to head-quarters and let her know. He went, returned in a half hour, and told her that he was directed by General Hunter to assure her that the house would not be destroyed, and she might, therefore, rest easy. After this, she dismissed her fears, not believing it possible that a man occupying Hunter's position would be guilty of wilful and deliberate falsehood to a lady. It, however, turned out otherwise, for the next morning, at half past eight o'clock, his assistant provost-marshal, accompanied by a portion of his guard, rode up to the door, and Captain Berry dismounted, rang the door bell, called for Mrs. Letcher, and informed her that General Hunter had ordered him to burn her house. She replied: 'There must be some mistake,' and requested to see the order. He said it was verbal. She asked if its execution could not be delayed till she could see General Hunter? He replied: 'The order is peremptory, and you have five minutes to leave the house.' Mrs. Letcher then asked if she could be allowed to remove her mother's, her sister's, her own, and her children's clothing. This request being refused, she left the house. In a very short time they poured camphene on the parlor floor and ignited it with a match. In the meantime Miss Lizzie Letcher was trying to remove some articles of clothing from the other end of the house, and Berry, finding these in her arms, set fire to them. The wardrobe and bureaus were then fired, and soon the house was enveloped in flames. Governor Letcher's mother, then seventy-eight years old, lived on the adjoining lot. They fired her stable, within forty feet of the dwelling, evidently to burn it, too; but owing to the active exertions of Captain Towns, who made his men carry water, the house was saved. While Hunter was in Lexington, Captain Matthew White, residing near town, was arrested, taken about two miles, and, without trial, was shot, on the allegation that he was a bush-whacker. During the first year of the war he commanded the Rockbridge Cavalry, and was a young gentleman of generous impulses and good character. The total destruction of private property in Rockbridge County, by Hunter, was estimated and published in the local papers at the time as over \$2,000,000. The burning of the Institute was a public calamity, as it was an educational establishment of great value.

"From Lexington he proceeded to Buchanan, in Botetourt County, and camped on the magnificent estate of Colonel John T. Anderson, an elder brother of General Joseph R. Anderson, of the Tredegar Iron Works, at Richmond. Colonel Anderson's estate, on the banks of the Upper James, and his

mansion, were baronial in character. The house crowned a high, wooded hill, was very large, and furnished in a style to dispense that lavish hospitality which was the pride of so many of the old-time Virginians. It was a seat of luxury and refinement, and in all respects a place to make the owner contented with his lot in this world. Colonel Anderson was old—his head as white as snow—and his wife but a few years his junior. He was in no office, and too old to fight—hence he was living on his fine estate strictly the life of a private gentleman. He had often, in years gone by, filled prominent representative positions from his county. There was no military or public object on God's earth to be gained by ruining such a man. Yet Hunter, after destroying all that he could on the plantation when he left it, ordered the grand old mansion, with all its contents, to be laid in ashes." \* \* \* \*

General Imboden, then, details the burning of several fine mansions in the Lower Valley, referred to also by General Early. He says:

"I shall conclude this already long narrative by citing a few more instances of Hunter's incendiarism in the Lower Valley. It seems that, smarting under the miserable failure of his grand raid on Lynchburg, where, during a march of over two hundred miles, the largest force he encountered was under Jones, at Piedmont, and he routed that, thus leaving the way open to Lynchburg within three days, destroy the stores there and go out through West Virginia unmolested, he had failed to do any thing but inflict injury on private citizens, and he came back to the Potomac more implacable than when he left it a month before. His first victim was the Hon. Andrew Hunter, of Charlestown, Jefferson County, his own first cousin, and named after the General's father. Mr. Hunter was a lawyer of great eminence, and a man of deservedly large influence in his county and the state. His home, eight miles from Harper's Ferry, in the suburbs of Charlestown, was the most costly and elegant in the place, and his family as refined and cultivated as any in the state. His offense, in General Hunter's eyes, was that he had gone politically with his state, and was in full sympathy with the Confederate cause. The general sent a squadron of cavalry out from Harper's Ferry, took Mr. Hunter prisoner, and held him a month in the common guard house of his soldiers, without alleging any offense against him not common to nearly all the people of Virginia, and finally discharged him without trial or explanation, after heaping these indignities upon him. Mr. Hunter was an old man, and suffered severely from confinement and exposure. While he was thus a prisoner, General Hunter ordered his elegant mansion to be burned to the ground, with all its contents, not even permitting Mrs. Hunter and her daughter to save their clothes and family pictures from the flames; and, to add to the desolation, camped his cavalry within the inclosure of the beautiful

grounds, of several acres, surrounding the residence, till the horses had destroyed them.

"General Hunter's next exploit was at Shepherdstown, in the same county, where, on the 19th of July, 1864, he caused to be burned the residence of Hon. A. R. Boteler, 'Fountain Rock.' Mrs. Boteler was a cousin of General Hunter. This homestead was an old colonial house endeared to the family by a thousand tender memories, and contained a splendid library, many pictures, and an invaluable collection of rare and precious manuscripts, illustrating the early history of that part of Virginia, that Colonel Boteler had collected by years of toil. The only members of the family who were there at the time were Colonel Boteler's eldest and widowed daughter, Mrs. Shepherd, who was an invalid, her three children, the eldest five years old and the youngest eighteen months, and Miss Helen Boteler. Colonel Boteler and his son were in the army, and Mrs. Boteler in Baltimore. The ladies and children were at dinner when informed by the servants that a body of cavalry had turned in at the gate, from the turnpike, and were coming up to the house."

General Imboden then proceeds to detail the manner of the burning of this house by order of General Hunter, and follows this description with another detailing the burning of the residence of Mr. Edmund I. Lee, in the same locality. He then concludes as follows:

"If the people of Chambersburg will carefully read this record of wanton destruction of private property, this 'o'er true tale' of cruel wrong inflicted on the helpless, they will understand why, when goaded to madness, remuneration was demanded at their hands by General Early, and upon its refusal retaliation was inflicted on the nearest community that could be reached, and it was their misfortune to be that community. Contrast Lee in Pennsylvania, in 1863, and Hunter in Virginia, in 1864, and judge them both as history will."

I follow these accounts by Generals Early and Imboden with an extract from a letter from F. C. Slingluff, Esq., a leading member of the bar of the city of Baltimore, and a gentleman of unimpeachable veracity. Mr. Slingluff was a member of the First Maryland (Confederate) Cavalry, General Bradley T. Johnson's brigade. He participated in the valley campaign, and was an eye-witness of what he relates. He was also present, as a private, in the destruction of Chambersburg. Mr. Slingluff says:

"\* \* \* Now you would like to know if the men whom I have described (the men who assisted in burning Chambersburg, many of whom are now among the leading merchants, lawyers, doctors, and farmers of Baltimore and other parts of Maryland,) justified the burning of your town, in their individual capacity, irrespective of the orders from head-quarters, under

which they acted. I must say to you frankly that they did, and I never heard one dissenting voice. And why did we justify so hard a measure? Simply because we had long come to the conclusion that it was time for us to burn something in the enemy's country. For the campaign of the preceding year, when our whole army had passed through your richest section of country, where the peaceful homes and fruitful fields only made the contrast with what we had left the more significant, many a man, whose home was in ruins, chafed under the orders from General Lee, which forbade him to touch them, but the orders were obeyed and we left the homes and fields as we found them, the ordinary wear and tear of an army of occupation alone excepted. We had so often before our eyes the reverse of this wherever your army swept through Virginia, that we were thoroughly convinced of the justice of a stern retaliation.

"It is no pleasure to me to have to recall the scenes of those days, nor do I do so in any spirit of vindictiveness, but I simply tell the truth in justification of an act which you and others may suppose was without justification. We had followed Kilpatrick (I think it was) in his raid through Madison, Greene, and other counties, and had seen the cattle shot, or ham-strung in the barn-yards, the agricultural implements burned, the feather-beds and clothing of the women and children cut in shreds in mere wantonness, farmhouse after farmhouse stripped of every particle of provisions, private carriages cut and broken up, and women in tears lamenting all this. I do not write here anything that I did not see myself. We had seen a thousand ruined homes in Clark, Jefferson, and Frederick counties,—barns and houses burned and private property destroyed,—but we had no knowledge that this was done by 'official orders.' At last when the official order came openly from General Hunter, and the burning was done there under his orders, and when our orders of retaliation came, they met with the approbation, as I have said, of every man who crossed the Potomac to execute them. Of course we had nothing personal against your pretty little town. It just so happened that it was the nearest and most accessible place of importance for us to get to. It was the unfortunate victim of circumstances. Had it been further off and some other town nearer, that other town would have gone, and Chambersburg would have been saved."

These three persons whose statements have been given, while speaking of the general disregard of private property in the South, concur in the allegation of General Hunter's wholesale destructive propensities, and two of them specifically refer to the destruction of the properties of Andrew Hunter, A. R. Boteler, E. I. Lee, ex-Governor Letcher, J. T. Anderson, and the Virginia Military Institute. These six properties were specifically named by

General Early in his order to McCausland, and upon these he based his retributive demand upon Chambersburg. The responsibility, then, for the destruction of Chambersburg, it will be seen, rests upon General Hunter. Justice to him, and to the people of the South, as well as the truth of history, demands a fair, candid, and impartial consideration of the case.

The fact of the destruction of the six properties named, as well as many others by General Hunter, in his valley campaign, has not been denied. Federal soldiers, who saw these ruins, have freely admitted them. But while these facts are conceded, General Hunter claims that he had sufficient ground for his severity in the following considerations: In no part of the South, perhaps, was the hostility to the Union so bitter and malignant as in the valley of Virginia. With but few exceptions the entire male population, capable of bearing arms, were either in the Confederate army, or the secret emissaries of such as were thus engaged. The entire valley was infested with guerillas and bush-whackers who, during the day, assumed to be farmers and tradesmen, and at night carried on the nefarious work of way-laying straggling Federal soldiers and unprotected trains. Familiar with every foot of ground in the valley, as well as with the mountain fastnesses, they stole upon their victims, and then, under the cover of the night, fled to places of safety. And as one of the evidences of the facts stated, the following account of an act of barbarity, committed by this class of men, is cited. It was published in one of the papers of Martinsburg, West Virginia, July 23, 1864, under the caption of "A Fiendish Act." "Six Union soldiers were found strapped to a fence in the vicinity of Charlestown, having their throats cut from ear to ear. The fiendish act is supposed to have been the work of resident Confederates, who are farmers and tradesmen during the day and guerillas at night. Virginia swarms with men of this class, who have, ever since the commencement of the war, pursued a course of this kind, and who have committed deeds so fiendish in their character as to put to blush the darkest and bloodiest deeds of our Indian savages. It is said that General Hunter is as mad as — about this barbarous deed, and has arrested some sixty residents of the neighborhood in which these unfortunate men were found, and are now held in order, if possible, to ferret out the guilty parties and bring them to justice."

Compare the date of the foregoing barbarous act with the arrest and imprisonment of Mr. Andrew Hunter, and the destruction of the properties referred to in that neighborhood, and the cause which led General Hunter to adopt so severe a retributive policy will be seen. In justification of the destruction of the property of ex-Governor Letcher, it is said, whether truly or falsely I can not say, that the form of a hand-bill was found in a printing



establishment in Lexington, bearing Letcher's name, and urging the bushwhacking of Federal soldiers; and, further, that his house was occupied by concealed sharpshooters, who fired upon some of General Hunter's men. What the particular provocation was, which led to the destruction of the other properties named, has not been stated.

The three gentlemen from whom I have quoted—Early, Imboden, and Slingluff,—refer to the humane manner in which General Lee conducted his campaign in Pennsylvania in 1863, and claim that no wanton destruction of private property was made. This is freely admitted. With the exception of the railroad buildings in Chambersburg, and one or two buildings on the field of Gettysburg, no houses or barns were destroyed. Private property was taken for the use of the army, but, except in a few cases by stragglers, the regulations of seizure laid down by General Lee in general orders No. 72, and issued specially for the Pennsylvania campaign, were strictly observed. But while the comparative good conduct of the Confederates in Pennsylvania is admitted, it must also be remembered that there was no bushwhacking of them, nor depredations committed upon their trains. Suppose General Lee had found a number of his men massacred by citizens as were the six Federal soldiers near Charlestown, Virginia, and the houses of the people used for concealed sharpshooters, and his trains waylaid and robbed, would he not have adopted a different policy, and would not the laws of civilized warfare and the sentiment of the world have justified him in so doing? That a retributive policy would have been adopted, and severe retaliation visited upon the people, is clear from a paragraph in General Order, No. 49, issued by Lieutenant-General Ewell while in Chambersburg: "*Citizens of the country through which the army may pass, who are not in the military service, are admonished to abstain from all acts of hostility, upon a penalty of being dealt with in a summary manner.*" The contrast, then, is not between the conduct of General Lee in Pennsylvania, and his treatment of the people there, and that of General Hunter in the Valley of Virginia and his treatment of the people in that locality, but between the conduct of the people of Pennsylvania, and their treatment of the Confederate army, and that of the people of the valley and their treatment of the Federals.

The policy of the commanders of the Federal armies operating in the Shenandoah Valley had been humane and lenient, notwithstanding the evils complained of, but when General Hunter succeeded to the command in that place, he adopted a different policy. From the time he assumed command in that department he gave evidence that he had decided convictions as to how to deal with such inveterate haters of the Union. He was convinced that the mild and lenient course pursued by his predecessors had only em-



boldened them in their unwarranted methods, and he determined to adopt a retaliatory policy. Guerrillas and bushwhackers, whose depredations had heretofore gone unpunished, were now notified that their claim to be in the regular Confederate service, under which they claimed exemption from the summary punishment inflicted upon irregular and unorganized soldiers, would no longer avail them. He accordingly issued and circulated the following circular:

HEAD-QUARTERS OF WEST VIRGINIA,—IN THE FIELD.  
Valley of the Shenandoah, May 24th, 1864.

*Sir*—Your name has been reported to me with evidence that you are one of the leading secessionist sympathizers in the valley, and that you countenance and abet the bush-whackers and guerillas who infest the woods and mountains of this region, swooping out on the roads to plunder and outrage loyal residents, falling upon them and firing into defenseless wagon-trains and assassinating soldiers of this command, who may chance to be placed in exposed positions. These practices are not recognized by the laws of war of any civilized nation, nor are the persons engaged therein entitled to any other treatment than that done by the universal code of justice to pirates, murderers, and other outlaws.

But from the difficulties of the country, the secret aid and information given to these bush-whackers by persons of your class, and the more important occupation of the troops under my command, it is impossible to chase, arrest, and punish these marauders as they deserve. Without the countenance and help given to them by the Confederate residents of the valley, they could not support themselves for a week. You are spies upon our movements, abusing the clemency which has protected your persons and property, while loyal citizens of the United States, residing within the Confederate lines, are invariably plundered of all they may possess, imprisoned, and in some cases put to death. It is from you and your families and neighbors, that these bandits receive food, clothing, ammunition and information, and it is from their secret hiding-places in your houses, barns and woods, that they issue on their missions of pillage and murder.

You are therefore hereby notified, that for every train fired upon, or soldier of the Union wounded or assassinated by bush-whackers in any neighborhood within the reach of my command, the houses and other property of every secession sympathizer residing within a circuit of five miles from the place of the outrage, shall be destroyed by fire, and that for all public property jayhawked or destroyed by these marauders, an assessment of five times the value of such property will be made upon the secession sympathizers residing within the circuit of ten miles around the point at which the offense was committed. The payment of this assessment will be enforced by the troops of this department, who will seize and hold in close military custody the persons assessed, until such payment shall have been made. This provision will also be applied to make good from the secessionists in the neighborhood five times the amount of any loss suffered by loyal citizens of the United States, from the action of the bush-whackers whom you may encourage.

If you desire to avoid the consequences herein set forth, you will notify your

guerilla and bush-whacking friends to withdraw from that portion of the valley within my lines, and to join, if they desire to fight for the rebellion, the regular forces of the secession army in my front or elsewhere. You will have none but yourselves to blame for the consequences that will certainly ensue if these evils are permitted to continue. This circular is not sent to you for the reason that you have been singled out as peculiarly obnoxious, but because you are believed to furnish the readiest means of communication with the prominent secession sympathizers of your neighborhood. It will be for their benefit that you communicate to them the tenor of this circular.

D. HUNTER,

*Major-General Commanding.*

In his invasion of Pennsylvania, General Lee fully appropriated to the use of his army the resources of our people, conveying away with him all he had transportation for. All was, however, taken under special instructions and by specified officers, and either paid for in such money as he had, or vouchers given. In the valley campaigns, Hunter and Sheridan did what Lee did in Pennsylvania, except paying for what they took, and in addition destroyed what they could not consume or carry away. This was done as a war measure to deplete the resources of the enemy. The Valley of Virginia had been the great store house from which supplies had been drawn for the army about Richmond, and it was deemed necessary to destroy these resources. Consequently all the grain, provender, and cattle that could not be used were destroyed, and barns, granaries, mills, and factories burned. It was an extreme measure allowable under the circumstances. The policy, however, inaugurated by Hunter, as indicated in the foregoing circular, was still a sterner resort, and could never be justified unless the provocations were actually such as he states. If citizens—persons not regularly in the Confederate service, and wearing the Confederate uniform—committed depredations upon his trains and brutally waylaid and murdered his soldiers, he was justified in resorting to the extreme measure of retaliating upon the citizens and their property, and he was as clearly within the rules of civilized warfare in so doing as was Lee in his more humane policy in Pennsylvania. The fault lies with the people who first violated the rules of war by depredations upon the soldiers. The severe punishment which followed was but the sequel of their own actions. Chambersburg, then, was burned, not so much because of General Hunter's retaliatory policy in the Valley of Virginia, but because of the barbarous violations of the laws of war by the citizens of the last named place.

War is a game at which the two contending parties can play, and any retaliatory or cruel policy inaugurated by the one is invariably followed by a similar policy by the other. It need not seem strange, then, that the first opportunity the Confederates had of retaliating upon their enemies, they improved. They could scarcely have been expected to do otherwise.

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
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









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